Although Patocka did not develop a systematic theory of aesthetics, he wrote numerous texts that together make up for his “philosophy of literature” as he himself called it. He creates a highly personal corpus of writers, a corpus that reflects his own philosophical positions. He dedicates a highly committed, indeed political interpretation to the works of Ivan Vyskocil, where he focuses on the description of mechanisms of power and its abuse. The political, civic dimension of Patocka's literary criticism, where he (...) does not shy away from contemporary polemics, contradicts the largely shared idea of Patocka's late commitment to political debate. The persistent presence of the figure of Socrates in his texts, as a symbol of the philosopher's role in society, further refutes the notion of an apolitical nature of Patocka's work prior to Charter 77. The topic of “selling one's soul” that Patocka explores in his texts on Faust could be seen as the reverse side of caring for one's soul and a complement to his philosophical texts on the soul by Plato dating from the same period. Patocka's texts on literature and art, where we can see Patocka's philosophical concepts in action, coming alive in concrete literary interpretations, might be a refreshing, alternative port of entry into the complex but coherent and extremely rich Patocka's intellectual universe that still maintains its surprises and topical appeal today. (shrink)

In his Commentaries, Proclus describes the ways in which a teacher can awaken the desire for knowledge and philosophy in a given soul, and help this soul to make cognitive and moral progress. He considers such an intervention to be a case of providence, analogous to both the action of divine Pronoia and the care of one’s personal daemon. As the soul being thus educated is still unaware of the merits of rational thought, the teacher needs to use the emotions (...) of his student to stimulate him; he might even want to generate desirable emotions in his soul. I focus here on two emotions: wonder and shock. The first serves to stimulate interest while preserving autonomy. The second allows deeper commitment at the price of reduced autonomy of the pupil. Both are complementary aspects of philosophical perplexity. (shrink)

The paper is mainly focused on Russian philosopher Aleksei Losev: his dissident theoretical works of the 1920s, and the philosophy of language.

Mohandas Gandhi had an interesting conception called “work ethic”. It propounded that one ought to focus on the process of work rather than the result of the work. “Full effort is thus full victory” in Gandhi’s conception. This is because the result can be corrupted with self interest maximization of the productive sector of society. I translated this concept into the rigour of analytical philosophy with original thought experiments, Kantian contractarianism etc. I submitted that Gandhi reached a different conclusion despite (...) unintentionally sharing the same methodology of western/analytical philosophers such as John Rawls, Gerald Cohen, T M Scanlon and others. I reiterate that the methodology pertained to Kantian contractarianism and intuitive ethics. Precisely, the different conclusion was that Gandhi espoused much lesser desert, incentives, social appraisal. In contrast, Rawls, Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Scanlon et al allowed comparatively more desert, incentives and social appraisal. Lesser desert, incentives, social appraisal for the productive individuals creates higher taxes for these privileged individuals and this benefits the least advantaged. This is individual ethic but it can be the groundwork or an emerging ethos for future institutional implementations i.e. higher taxes levied on the privileged. As an example, the relevance is that Gandhi’s “work ethic” submitted that luxury consumption is regrettable and one ought to conscientiously and personally struggle to reduce this without external or governmental coercion. Contrarily, Dworkin, Rawls, Scanlon, Cohen and others respect luxury consumption as personal pursuits, especially with Cohen's latest statements and Rawls' “rational plan” concept. There are several illustrations in the thesis to demonstrate the main contribution of the thesis i.e. Gandhi’s conception espoused much lesser desert, incentives, social appraisal compared to the research of Dworkin, Rawls, Scanlon, Cohen and others. It, additionally, in the seventh chapter, submitted that humility is vital because it can provide a response in a world saturated by undeserved suffering. Humility is connected to “work ethic”. Gandhi's definition of humility is novel. It is different from the existing definitions in political theory, different from Kellenberger’s and Cooper’s account on humility, for example. The juxtaposition of Gandhi’s and Dostoevsky’s oeuvre engenders a nuanced understanding of humility. Crucially, it has significant benefits in the field of distributive justice/solidarity. It addresses many of the challenges traditionally associated with humility. Ralph Ellison, drawing from his perspective as a Black American in segregation times, propounded that humility is susceptible to be used to further oppress the already oppressed. This thesis asserts that Gandhi’s earlier writings indeed embody the dangers delineated by Ellison. However, Gandhi’s later writings not only respond to this cogent argument but also enhances it. Both Ellison and Gandhi reinvent humility as the ability of the marginalised to perform service without self promotion while not being obsequious to those in power. (shrink)

The Zhuangzi is known as a literary masterpiece as well as a philosophical monument. The philosophical power of this book is linked to its original way to play with language and phrases, which makes the Zhuangzi a constant challenge for readers and translators. Due to the fact that, in China, the Zhuangzi has been continuously read and commented, the exegetical literature is as large as it is diverse and contradictory. For modern readers, those commentaries could appear as a tremendous mass (...) of secondary literature, a subsequent production which sometime, however, seems to be unrelated to the Zhuangzi’s problems. In order to understand the Zhuangzi, a reader can then choose to refer only to the text itself, using modern editions or translations. For the translator, however, the problem is not that simple. Some among the classical commentaries, indeed, shape and influence our very access to the Zhuangzi. Because of their role in the textual transmission and considering the fact they are our primary resources for semantical analysis, it is highly difficult for a translator to leave aside those commentaries. This paper aims to stress the translator’s reliance to the exegetical literature. This paper presents two case studies, showing how Cheng Xuanying 成玄英 subcommentary, or Lu Deming 陸德明 philological glosses, both written during the Tang dynasty, are, for many expressions from the Zhuangzi, the cornerstone of the translators’ work. Through those case studies and through the comparison of several modern translations of the Zhuangzi, our purpose is to draw the outlines of a philosophical reflexion about the usefulness of the exegetical tradition in the study and the translation of the Zhuangzi. (shrink)

In the Chinese exegetical tradition, Guo Xiang 郭象 holds a very important position. Although he is mostly known in the field of Taoist Studies as the author of a very influent Commentary on Zhuangzi, some evidence allows us to think that Guo Xiang also wrote commentaries about the Confucian Analects. Regarding those so-called “Confucian works” of Guo Xiang, research is still in preliminary stage. Even though the History of the Sui and the Old History of the Tang still mention them, (...) most appear to be lost in subsequent Dynastic Histories. Furthermore, the biography of Guo Xiang in the History of the Jin does not mention those works. Among them, only the 論語體略, Explanations on the main points of the Analects, survive until today as a collection of nine fragments of commentaries, together with the commented text from the Analects. How were those fragments passed on to us? In which context where they transmitted? After briefly exploring those questions, I consider the content of the fragments. In so doing, I show that the literary style as well as some of the main concepts are extremely close of those used by Guo Xiang in his Commentary on Zhuangzi. However, one should keep in mind that whether Guo Xiang did actually write the Explanations remains an open question. In the event that Guo Xiang did write this commentary, the study of those fragments opens new perspectives on Guo Xiang’s thought as well as new material for the research on Wei-Jin exegesis. This paper aims to provide a textual and historical approach to these issues as well as the philosophical questions raised by Guo Xiang’s Explanations. (shrink)

This article aims to understand Guo Xiang’s concept of self-so in the perspective of the metaphysical agenda of the Xuanxue movement. After reviewing the core features of this metaphysical agenda, I show that Guo Xiang’s original use of self-so could be understood as an exegetical tool to deal with the challenges addressed to language in the Zhuangzi, as well as with its conception of reality as ever-transforming. I attempt to show that although Guo Xiang dismisses the metaphysical quest for a (...) first principle, his philosophy can nevertheless be read as an enquiry into the most fundamental feature of reality. (shrink)

Background: Strong relations between medicine and public health have long been advocated. Today, professional medical practice assumes joint clinical/public health objectives:GPs are expected to practice community medicine;Hospital specialists can be involved in disease control and health service organisation;Doctors can teach, coach, evaluate, and coordinate care;Clinicians should interpret protocols with reference to clinical epidemiology. Public health physicians should tailor preventive medicine to individual health risks. This paper is targeted at those practitioners and academics responsible for their teams’ professionalism and the accessibility (...) of care, where the authors argue in favour of the epistemological integration of clinical medicine and public health. Main text: Based on empirical evidence the authors revisit the epistemological border of clinical and public health knowledge to support joint practice. From action-research and cognitive psychology, we derive clinical/public health knowledge categories that require different transmission and discovery techniques. The knowledge needed to support the universal human right to access professional care bridges both clinical and public health concepts, and summons professional ethics to validate medical decisions. To provide a rational framework for teaching and research, we propose the following categories:‘Know-how/practice techniques’, corresponding a.o. to behavioural, communication, and manual skills;‘Procedural knowledge’ to choose and apply procedures that meet explicit quality criteria;‘Practical knowledge’ to design new procedures and inform the design of established procedures in new contexts; andTheoretical knowledge teaches the reasoning and theory of knowledge and the laws of existence and functioning of reality to validate clinical and public health procedures. Even though medical interventions benefit from science, they are, in essence, professional: science cannot standardise eco-biopsychosocial decisions; doctor-patient negotiations; emotional intelligence; manual and behavioural skills; and resolution of ethical conflicts. Conclusion: Because the quality of care utilises the professionals’ skill-base but is also affected by their intangible motivations, health systems should individually tailor continuing medical education and treat collective knowledge management as a priority. Teamwork and coaching by those with more experience provide such opportunities. In the future, physicians and health professionals could jointly develop clinical/public health integrated knowledge. To this end, governments should make provision to finance non-clinical activities. (shrink)

Every new discovery in science and technology leads to use terms and expressions that form the basis of humans’ representations. In the fields of robotics and artificial intelligence, the words are borrowed from the vocabulary of the living.The state-of-the-art shows that there is an intrinsic link between the cognitive process of the attribution of intentions to moving objects and machines and the agentive lexicon. Indeed, humans’ perception of movement impacts their representation of the world and the way that they talk (...) about the world. On the other hand, natural language plays an important role in the way that humans represent the movements and actions of robots. Following a review of the main principles that explain how movement is decoded as well as encoded through natural language, I observe that the agentive lexicon imposes itself, regardless of the state of our beliefs about a possible robot intelligence.Thereupon, many roboticists are concerned about the lexicon of robotics, as they fear that the words used to describe robots create or at least, encourage, the confusion between the machines and the living. As the words of robotics are often considered by the roboticists as ambiguous, the agentive lexicon is analyzed under the general rules of the lexical ambiguity resolution. The results suggest that ambiguity is not at the basis of the problem of interpretation of the discourses in robotics and that the problematic carries on beyond the meaning of the words used to describe robots.Consequently, I assume that the relation between moving machines and language is not a problem of the logos but include also the ethos and the pathos. This observation is verified through the study of a corpus gathering public discourses and a series of speeches produced by roboticists and scientific journalists during a rhetorical experiment conducted at the Cité des Sciences et de l’Industrie of Paris. Hence, I observe that the discourses in robotics fall under a matter of rhetoric in its whole and relate to one’s own conception of rationality.Finally, in order to engage a discussion on alternative rhetorical strategy in robotics, I consider the ancient and practical rhetorical exercice of ekphrasis as a tool to trigger the criteria of an adequate and accurate rhetorical style in the context of robotics. This means that I seek to discover the criteria of the discourse that prove to be useful for society as it allows roboticists and citizens to question and make decisions about concrete matters of robotics. (shrink)

This article explores the historical background of the Kantian demarcation between non-science, improper science and proper science. It is argued that Kant’s claim that « a doctrine of nature will contain only as much proper science as there is mathematics capable of application there » ensued after a long series of responses to the demarcation challenge preceding Kant’s, which responses attempted to distinguish between proper mathematics and proper natural science. The article suggests that the unusual expression « improper science » (...) is a direct response to the conception that proper natural science is independent of any mathematics. Finally, it defends the notion that this tripartition is already at work in Kant’s first articles on physics and that it is this division that lies in the background of the Kantian project to bring metaphysics onto the path of science. (shrink)

Does the robot actually look, does the robot actually feel? To experts in robotics, the conflict between “touch” and “feel” may first appear as a concern of communication, situated at a linguistic level only. However, the core of the question is rather a matter of epistemology of the discourse that invokes their own relation to natural language and rationality. To support this statement, we explore the rhetorical practices of roboticists. From a general point of view, their discourses embody two epistemological (...) tendencies that are representative of every disciplinary field. We address the problem of these two epistemological pitfalls which need to be overcome as experts in robotics intend to guide citizens in their judgements about robots. (shrink)

Originating in medical and veterinary spheres, the One Health concept stands as an open call for collaboration also between these disciplines or professions and those of environmental and social science. However, the communities of practice in question show uneasy or under-developed collaborations, due to a variety of factors. We argue that an important factor is the way issues are raised and questions are formulated, i.e. their framing. Based on complementary perspectives on health and knowledge, this overview provides an inter- and (...) trans-disciplinary analysis of the role of the framing of « nature » in One Health discourses as a barrier or a facilitator to collaboration, as revealed by the scientific literature. We find that the lack of reflection by scientists about the framing under which they operate appears as a major factor of misunderstanding between disciplines, and a barrier for inter- and trans-disciplinary solutions to improve management of health risks and benefits. Hence, to build such solutions, framing will have to be a conscious and repeated step in the process, acknowledging and explaining the diversity of viewpoints and values. The interdisciplinary dialogues inherent in this process promote translation between scientific domains, policy-makers and citizens, with a critical but pluralistic recourse to various framings of health risks and benefits associated with nature, and a deep awareness of their practical and ethical consequences. (shrink)

Why would a philosopher choose to convey his ideas in the form of Manga? This discussion between Masahiro Morioka, author of Manga Introduction to Philosophy, and the translator of its French edition, Pierre Bonneels, shows how philosopher and artist Morioka became acquainted, through images, with fundamental abstract notions. After a short historical analysis of the aesthetic advantages of Manga, consideration is given to this unique way of provoking thought. On this basis, theoretical aspects of “time” and the “I” proposed by (...) Ōmori Shōzō are compared with Morioka’s Manga presentation. Although the questions raised are universal, the authors note that the use of Japanese metaphors enables these two thinkers to draw on a concrete understanding of notions like temporality and identity. (shrink)

This article aims to show how Fernand Deligny's thought and practices with autistic children, as well as his impact on Deleuze and Guattari, offer a paradigm of subjectivity that in turn rests upon an aesthetic and political account of what we can shape and share in common with autistic people. Well known by French educators and followers of alternative psychiatry, Fernand Deligny remains quite unknown in English-speaking parts of academia despite his influence on the work of Deleuze and Guattari. Nevertheless, (...) Deligny's proposals are of great interest for renewing how we think about subjectivity. (shrink)

This study offers new insights on the open method of coordination of the European Union by focusing on the effects of this new method for producing EU regulation. The starting points here are that the OMC is not a radically new method of governance, and that it must be seen as an application of the theory of indirect legislation – as developed by Bentham. With the concept of indirect legislation, Bentham thinks a system of governing individuals that does not rest (...) only on the fear of legal punishment, but is backed by the prospect of rewards and the fear of public censure. For the purpose of the comparison between the OMC and indirect legislation, the latter is considered as a system of social control, which – whether it be categorised as legal or not – is first and foremost normative and has effects, i.e. is applied, followed and enforced in a given community without resorting to the binding force of the law. Thanks to the input of indirect legislation, this study aims to understand what have been the real effects of the OMC and more particularly of the OMC applied to the research and innovation policy in Belgium. (shrink)

This study offers new insights on the open method of coordination of the European Union by focusing on the effects of this new method for producing EU regulation. The starting points here are that the OMC is not a radically new method of governance, and that it must be seen as an application of the theory of indirect legislation – as developed by Bentham. With the concept of indirect legislation, Bentham thinks a system of governing individuals that does not rest (...) only on the fear of legal punishment, but is backed by the prospect of rewards and the fear of public censure. For the purpose of the comparison between the OMC and indirect legislation, the latter is considered as a system of social control, which – whether it be categorised as legal or not – is first and foremost normative and has effects, i.e. is applied, followed and enforced in a given community without resorting to the binding force of the law. Thanks to the input of indirect legislation, this study aims to understand what have been the real effects of the OMC and more particularly of the OMC applied to the research and innovation policy in Belgium. (shrink)

Three-dimensional representation is becoming an effective supportfor the documentation of the state of conservation of heritage artefacts, for thestudy of its transformations and for cultural diffusion. 3D digitizationtechnologies now offer effective means to observe and analyze historicbuildings with more accuracy, completeness and timeliness. Nevertheless, itproduces a real problem of information overload. The growing mass of uninterpreteddata make emerge a need for innovative methodologies assistingdata processing, sorting and analysis by researchers who want to use it foradvancing the knowledge of cultural heritage. (...) Exploring the informationalvalue of these new representation systems allows introducing new approachesto the analysis of artefacts so distant in space but so close in features. This chapter presents someresearch avenues for defining a geometric /semantic description model ofarchitectural elements in order to integrate the informative value of 3Ddigitization in intelligible representations. (shrink)

The goal of this thesis in finance is to combine the use of advanced mathematical methods with a return to foundational economic issues. In that perspective, I study generalized rational expectations and asset pricing in Chapter 2, and a converse comparison principle for backward stochastic differential equations with jumps in Chapter 3. Since the use of stochastic methods in finance is an interesting and complex issue in itself - if only to clarify the difference between the use of mathematical models (...) in finance and in physics or biology - I also present a philosophical reflection on the interpretation of mathematical models in finance. In Chapter 5, I conclude the thesis with an essay on the history and interpretation of mathematical probability - to be read while keeping in mind the fundamental role of mathematical probability in financial models. (shrink)

Economists have been blamed for their inability to forecast and address crises. This article attributes this inability to intertwined factors: the lack of a coherent definition of crises, the reference-class problem, the lack of imagination regarding the nature of future crises and sample-selection biases. Specifically, economists tend to adapt their views on crises to recent episodes, and omit averted and potential crises. Threshold-based definitions of crises run the risk of being ad hoc. Using historical examples, this article highlights some epistemological (...) shortcomings of the current approach. (shrink)

Green's target article is an attack on most current connectionist models of cognition. Our commentary will suggest that there is an essential component missing in his discussion of modeling, namely, the idea that the appropriate level of the model needs to be specified. We will further suggest that the precise form of connectionist networks will fall out as ever more detailed constraints are placed on their function.

Nostalgia has played a foundational role in the history of anthropology. Historically, our discipline lent its passion for exotic cultures vanishing against the modern world. I call this perspective 'disciplinary exonostalgia'. In this article, I suggest the persistence of an intimate entwinement of contemporary anthropology with exonostalgia. I argue that nostalgia never really went away. Moreover, it continues to inform major aspects of the production of anthropological knowledge.

Mainstream theories on household energy consumption are characterized by reductionist assumptions about consumers and the socio-material contexts of choice. Much of the social science attention on consumption has focused on mental states, meaning, cognition, and rational choice. In mainstream theory, body is collapsed into mind and the demand for goods is both disembodied and decontextualized from social and material worlds. These reductions hinder the development of a robust theory of consumption and new thinking in energy savings policy. In this paper (...) we bring the body back to consumption. We argue that people's exposure to practices, both in the form of personal and culturally mediated experience, embodies knowledge and this in turn affects the ways we perform energy-consuming acts. We draw on work on body, habitus and perception by anthropologists Marcel Mauss, Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Pierre Warnier, and philosopher Bergson, as well as more recent perspectives framed under the heading of social practice theory. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. (shrink)

The paper draws on the aesthetic theory and on the cognitive neuroscience approach of music, as well as on music history to try to convince Frederic Scherer that he should listen to music composed after Mahler. ©FrancoAngeli.

Economists have been blamed for their inability to forecast and address crises. This paper attributes this inability to intertwined factors: the lack of a coherent definition of crises, the reference class problem, the lack of imagination regarding the nature of future crises, and sample selection biases. Specifically, economists tend to adapt their views on crises to recent episodes, and omit averted and potential crises. Threshold-based definitions of crises run the risk of being ad hoc. Using historical examples, this paper highlights (...) some epistemological shortcomings of the current approach. (shrink)

The Norbert Wiener Memorial Gold Medal address delivered by the Nobel Laureate recipient. Considers Norbert Wiener and the idea of contingence. Refers to Wiener's book The Human Use of Human Beings and in particular to the preface entitled "The idea of a contingent universe" and to the epilogue of the book by Rosenblith. This raises the question faced by Wiener: how to reconcile a deterministic world à la Newton with the intrinsically probabilistic universe of Gibbs, the relativistic universe of Einstein (...) and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle? Notes the parallelism among the questions Wiener is asking with the ones to which the Gold Medallist has devoted most of his scientific life. Presents a different point of view, as a tribute to the visionary ideas developed by Wiener. Discusses the "new physics" and the problems facing physics today, at the end of the twentieth century. (shrink)

The history of borrowing from natural sciences is a long one in social sciences. Today, paradigms dealing with information and communication are very often "used" as a source of inspiration for sociological theories. This contribution is focused on the French-speaking authors belonging to this trend. The reasons, the validity and the benefit for social sciences of this practice are investigated. The reasons are manifold. The importation is not intrinsically non valid. Any hypothesis can be laid down. The validation depends on (...) the verdict of the confrontation with the reality. The heuristic value of the theories surveyed proves to be generally low. Several characteristics of the problems studied by natural and social sciences remain quite different. There is still ground to support a specific methodology in sociology. © 1988. (shrink)

Since the early 1980s, we have seen a new influx of numerous geopolitical atlases. They have been produced to meet society's implicit need to fix the boundaries of international issues and the relationships of force between the various powers. These atlases clearly express established ideologies and allow us to determine various trends of thought; messages which the authors wish us to take on board by studying cartographic themes. This is the approach we will be taking in this article. In this (...) paper, we aim to show the epistemological development of geopolitical atlases. The first part of the article gives the general outline of the epistemological development of geopolitical atlases, in which two main periods stand out. The first corresponds with the 1980s, which can be described as a realist decade. The state was a geopolitical player that could not be overlooked within a bipolar world; maps showing conflicts between the two major powers and thematic maps showing an ideological clash between them are typical of the period. The second period, corresponding with the 1990s, begins with the fall of the regimes in the Soviet bloc. This period can be described as having a neo-realist approach, where the threat from the East had moved to terrorism and drug trafficking. The atlases follow the geopolitical development of the world and describe international structural changes. In conclusion, the paper will return to the important educational and informative role of atlases and their effects on the ideas they are able to disseminate amongst the population. © The British Cartographic Society 2006. (shrink)

Three-dimensional representation is becoming an effective supportfor the documentation of the state of conservation of heritage artefacts, for thestudy of its transformations and for cultural diffusion. 3D digitizationtechnologies now offer effective means to observe and analyze historicbuildings with more accuracy, completeness and timeliness. Nevertheless, itproduces a real problem of information overload. The growing mass of uninterpreteddata make emerge a need for innovative methodologies assistingdata processing, sorting and analysis by researchers who want to use it foradvancing the knowledge of cultural heritage. (...) Exploring the informationalvalue of these new representation systems allows introducing new approachesto the analysis of artefacts so distant in space but so close in features. This chapter presents someresearch avenues for defining a geometric /semantic description model ofarchitectural elements in order to integrate the informative value of 3Ddigitization in intelligible representations. (shrink)

Etude historique des conditions d’émergence du champ de recherches de la perception des risques ;analyse critique du paradigme psychométrique et de la théorie culturaliste, ainsi que des conceptions du risque qui les sous-tend. / Historical study of the emergence conditions of risk perception as a research field; critical analysis of the psychometric paradigm and cultural theory, as well as of the underlying risk conceptions.

Progression d'un concept, le mal radical, dans trois textes :La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison , Le système de l'Ethique , et Le Traité de 1809 . Origine ultime du mal :libre arbitre ou détermination ?Responsabilité et liberté du mal. Mal moral et métaphysique du mal/ Advance of a concept: radical evil, in three readings: Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason , System of Ethics , and Treatise of 1809 .Ultimate origin of evil: free will or (...) determination? Responsibility and freedom to evil. Moral evil and metaphysics of evil. (shrink)

General Introduction The process of the institutionalisation of law that started at the end of the 18th century was followed by a general wave of codification throughout Europe. The French codification of 1804 was exemplary for all the others. The “law in books” was complete, certain, clear, and undisputable. From then on, the law in books had priority over the “law in action”. Law in books was a critique of law in action that preceded the French Revolution. Judicial activism was (...) proscribed, and judges were called to apply the rules issued by the legislator. This ideal of the French Revolution is still framing our pattern of legal thinking. It is dominant throughout the 19th century with the école de l’exégèse in France, Begriffjurisprudenz in Germany, and analytical jurisprudence in Anglo-American legal systems. Legal formalism or the deductive application of rules is the only form of judicial reasoning that is allowed. The science of law, as a consequence, was confined to a theoretical support and elaboration of this judge-centred approach to law. This view on law and legal science persisted throughout the last century. It started being criticized in the late 1960s, a critique that paved the path for a more active role of the judge. New theories of interpretation were proposed so as to supplement the law in books with theoretically justified methodologies to determine its meaning. The findings of legal theory are still, to a large extent, premised on the central role of the judge in the legal system. Although this evolution may be applauded for having contributed to a more dynamic attitude towards the law, the role of the legislator remains largely underexposed. Legal theory takes the law as “just there”, and limits its theoretical undertakings to law as it is. Law, so it is said, is the result of political decision-making. Once it comes into being however, it is separated from politics. Politics, that is, is thought of as impure, at least when compared to the methods of legal reasoning and decision-making. This brings us to the theme of this book. Some of the questions I propose to explore are: Where does the law come from? What are the premises of a theory that considers law separated from politics? What does it mean for a legislator to be bound to the rules of a constitution throughout the process of legislation? Does the constitution consist of rules to be followed by the legislator or is its role merely confined to be a political programme? These and other questions frame the main problem this book proposes to deal with. They are triggered by the fact of the exponential growth of today’s legal systems. Complaints about both the increasing volume of legislation and its decreasing quality in most European countries have raised the question as to whether collaboration between legislators and legal theory can help to articulate and to solve that problem. As a matter of fact, although the complaints are made with an ever-stronger voice, solutions are by no means obvious. Legislation as a matter of politics is not rational. Politics is a power game, resulting in compromises that are framed into a legislative or statutory structure. This power game seems to have its own logic, the results of which most of the time outweigh any other form of logic. Legal theory for its part is considered, from the perspective of politics at least, to be a “theoretical” approach to legal problems. It contributes to the description and systematisation of existing valid law. It shows up, like Minerva’s owl, after the sunset of legislative activity. From that perspective, there is not much hope that legal theory can usefully intervene in the process of legislation or regulation, i.e. before or during the creation of rules. Legal theory then is confined to “legal science” or “legal dogmatics”. I propose to consider the problem of legislation from another angle. The premises of the problem are that, although legislation and regulation is the result of a political process, they can be the object of a theoretical study. Using an approach analogous to e.g. Hans Kelsen in legal theory ,the main idea is not to primarily focus on the content of rules and concepts, but rather on the structure and function of legal systems. In the approach of this book, the focal point is on problems that are common to most legal systems and not on the characteristics, viz. the content of concepts that are specific for one or more legal systems. The creation of law, so is my claim, has become a problem. Kelsen’s approach leaves legislation and regulation – apart from their formal validity aspects – outside the scope of study. The creation of rules relies on value judgments that are according to him not fit for theoretical study. In short, the creation of legal rules is a matter of politics and politics is not fit for scientific study. This position is an understandable one, though it is only partially acceptable. Rule creation is a matter of choice. The legitimation of this choice is found in the democratic character of the regulating process and not in some science of values. In other words, would one try to mould legislation into the frame of a science, we would face something like “scientific politics”, as Marxism propagated, and which is, for several reasons, unacceptable. A different standpoint is to study legislative problems from the angle of legal theory. This approach I propose to call legisprudence. The object of study of legisprudence is the rational creation of legislation and regulation. As to its method, it makes use of the theoretical insights and tools of current legal theory. Whereas the latter has been dealing most of the time dealing with problems of the application of law by the judge, legisprudence explores the possibilities of the enlargement of the field of study as to include the creation of law by the legislator. Within this new approach, a variety of new question and problems – e.g. the validity of norms, their meaning, the structure of the legal system, etc. - are raised. They are traditionally dealt with from the perspective of the judge or are taken for granted by classical legal theory. However, when shifting our attention from the judge to the legislator, the same questions arise: In what sense does the legislator have to take the systematicity of the legal order into account? What counts as a valid norm? What meanings can be created and how? to mention but a few. Traditional legal science or legal dogmatics covers many of these questions with the cloak of sovereignty. Legislators are sovereign, they decide what will count as a valid norm, and its meaning. Whether and how a rule and its meaning fit with the legal system, is then a matter of interpretation – and this is the task of the judge and the legal scientist. On this view, the process of legislation seems to be inappropriate for theoretical inquiry. After long decades of legalism in legal reasoning, it can be said that the dominant views in legal theory resulting from that, have precisely barred the way for inquiring into the position of the legislator. Everything happens behind the veil of sovereignty as far as legislation properly so called is concerned, and behind the veil of legality when it comes to the execution of legislative acts. These veils conceal a great part of ignorance related to the possibilities of an alternative theoretical reflection on rule making. Sovereignty itself, so one can say, creates silence about this alternative, so that it becomes “sovereignty in silence” . Sovereignty of the ruler prevents his rules from being questioned in any other than binary terms. Validity is a good example of that. The only question that is worthwhile putting is: Is this propositional content a valid rule yes or no? As a consequence, questions on its efficacy, effectivity, efficiency, or acceptability are not in order. The claim of legisprudence is that these questions, like others, are important ones, and that they can be analysed with the help of legal theory. The book is divided into three parts. In the first part, I propose to explore the three basic tenets of the Modern philosophical project as Descartes inaugurated it. These three tenets are: rationality, the individuality of the subject, and freedom. A brief sketch of what is meant by them is offered in the first chapter. Rationality as it is dealt with in the Modern philosophical project means that what is rational is self-evident. Self-evidence is certainty and certainty is the mark of truth. The question for whom something is certain is however left out of view. The subject, that is, has himself immediate access to reason and truth upon the use of his rational capacities. The latter are presumed to be identical in and for all. The subject’s reflection on himself leads to the true insight that he is a res cogitans. The subject thinks of himself as an ”I”, that is, as an individual. Others are not thought of as others, but rather as representations or ideas. The subject as an individual is a product of thought, that is, upon the Modern approach of rationality, a theoretical idea. As a result of rationality as self-evidence and the subject as an individual, practical reason is confined to free will. Freedom as the third basic tenet of the Modern philosophical project is limited to following the commands of God and the rules of the country. These commands and rules are found “out there”, without questioning either their origin or their purpose. The main critique of the Modern philosophical project as it is briefly set out in the first chapter is that it is based on the so-called "scholastic fallacy”. This fallacy involves that rationality is presupposed identical in everyone’s head. On the supposition that all subjects are ontologically rational as Descartes suggests, their use of their rational capacities would result in an identical outcome that is truth. The universality of reason is, however, a hidden premise of the Modern philosophical project. It unfolds from a “view from nowhere”. This view of rationality is challenged as an unreflected one, and the methodological device of this book is to avoid this type of fallacies. Chapter 2 focuses on the idea of science as it comes up with the Modern philosophical project. The infinite universe is substituted for the Aristotelian closed world. Mathematics becomes the appropriate method of the scientia nova that Descartes and Galileï initiate. As Descartes’ method aims at being a mathesis universalis it is believed to include the aptitude to deal with any problem, theoretical as well as practical. The subsequent epistemologization of philosophy tacitly presupposes that mathematics belongs to the very nature of reality. From there, it follows that philosophy is thought of as a theory of reality. On an alternative view, mainly advocated by, e.g. Heidegger, it is claimed that mathematics as a method of science is a matter of choice. If the method is a matter of choice, the scientia nova can be articulated as a liberation from the shackles of ecclesiastical authority, and hence as a matter of freedom. Another consequence is that the scientia nova can articulate true propositions about reality, without having direct access to it. The distinction between a theory of reality and a theory about reality is illustrated with the help of the conflict between Galileï and the Church. Chapter 3 concentrates on the subject and rationality. Both the subject and rationality are put in context, that is, a context of participation. With this approach, I propose to challenge the self-evidentiary character of rationality as well as the idea of the isolated and ontologically anchored Cartesian subject. Relying on George Herbert Mead’s theory of the subject, I argue that the subject is first and foremost an “intersubject”. The subject, it is argued, is a social subject whose self emerges through interaction with others. The substitution of a subject of meaning for a subject of truth concretises the critique of the Cartesian subject in the first chapter. Both the subject and meaning, so it is argued, emerge from interaction in a context of participation. The subject’s self includes a social as well as an individual pole. These two poles and the interaction between them have been neglected throughout the Modern philosophical project. By articulating them, an attempt is made to take the subject qua subject seriously. A similar contextualisation is operated with rationality. Rationality, even in its rationalistic appearance, is not self-revealing. The idealisation of rationality in the Modern philosophical project, that is, its decontextualisation, obscures the fact that it is historically situated. This situatedness refers to its emergence and operation in a specific context. This recontextualisation shows it as one conception of rationality among others. The Modern philosophical project held its conception of rationality to be a reflection of reality, upon its belief in the direct access to the latter. The distinction between conceptions on the one hand and a concept on the other is the methodological device that serves to further articulate the concept of freedom. This is the theme of chapter 4. Freedom is related to the emergence of science in the 17th century. While the subject and rationality were connected to a context of participation in the foregoing chapters, attention will be drawn to the characteristics of the concept of freedom in this chapter. The basic premise of the theory of freedom proposed in this chapter comes to saying that in the absence of any external limitation, subjects are free to act as they please. If they want to act, however, freedom unlimited as it is called must be determined. This means that from the infinite range of possibilities, a choice has to be made. Without a choice, everything remains possible though no action can occur. To make a choice implies that the concept of freedom is concretised. This concretisation is called a conception. Action is possible, so it is argued further, on two types of conceptions. One is a conception of freedom, the other a conception about freedom. A conception of freedom is a conception of the subject himself; a conception about freedom on the contrary is a conception of someone else. On the basic premise of the theory of freedom advocated throughout the book, freedom is unlimited. This includes a priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom. Therefore, his acting on conceptions about freedom must be justified. This requirement of justification is connected to the idea of freedom as principium. A principium has a twofold meaning. The first is a starting point; the second is that a principle is also a leitmotiv. Freedom unlimited is the starting point of political philosophy as it is found in Hobbes and Rousseau. They will be our main discussion partners throughout the book. Their theory of the social contract as the basis of the construction of political space is premised by the idea of freedom unlimited. They do neglect though the second aspect of freedom as principium, that is, freedom as the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. This aspect is briefly elaborated in chapter 4 where Hobbes’ theory is diagnosed as a theory about freedom, while it purports to be a theory of freedom. Freedom as principium and the priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom that it involves is identified as the basic principle of legisprudence. It holds, summarizing, that law can only be legitimate if it is legitimated to operate as an alternative for failing social interaction. The idea of freedom as principium will be elaborated in chapter 8 where I proceed to the identification of the principles of legisprudence. The second part of the book is dedicated to the problem of legalism and legitimation. Chapter 5 explores the reason for the absence of a theory of legislation until now. The main reason is that law, from the very beginning of the Modern philosophical project, is unfolded as a reflection of reality. The obscuration of the embedment of law in the realm of politics is explained as a strategy of practical reason. This strategy is at the basis of what is identified as strong legalism. Strong legalism is the dominant pattern of thought in legal thinking. It holds that normativity is a matter of rule following, irrespective of where the rules come from. It easily fits the idea of the provisional morality Descartes has sketched, but that never came to a real end. The main characteristics of strong legalism are pointed from a reading of Hobbes and Rousseau. The characteristics identified are: representationalism, universality or the neglect of the time dimension, concealed instrumentalism, and etatism. These characteristics of the legalistic thought pattern are supported and corroborated by a type of legal science that finds its roots in the Modern philosophical project. Over against this form of legalism that is labelled “strong legalism” chapter 6 explores the contours of a different brand of legalism that I propose to mark as “weak legalism”. Weak legalism or “legalism with a human face” comprises a critique of strong legalism in that the latter neglects the position of the subject qua subject. As it will be discussed in the first part of the book, the Modern philosophical project makes the subject the preponderant actor in reality. He is, however, an actor in a play written in advance by others and not an auctor or an agent. To take the subject qua subject seriously, as weak legalism purports, entails placing him in a context with others. This part of chapter 6 joins the insights articulated in the first part of the book, more specifically in chapter 2. Others, and not just “otherness” as a representation of the subject, belong to the subject’s context. If it is in this context that the self and meaning emerge, this process is not necessarily conflict-free. Hobbes and Rousseau conclude from this fact that social interaction leads to war. It provides them with an argument to substitute interaction based on legal rules from social interaction based on conceptions of freedom. The former are issued by the sovereign and can be qualified as conceptions about freedom. Hobbes and Rousseau hold that this substitution is ipso facto legitimate. On the theory of freedom that was sketched out in chapter 4, this substitution however needs to be legitimated. Chapter 7 deals with the issue of legitimation. I distinguish to begin with between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories of legitimation. On the former, law is legitimated if it corresponds to at least one transcendent true norm. On the latter, no transcendent content is available. This is proper to a democratic theory of legitimation upon which the demos determines the ends of action as well as the means to realise them. Apart from this difference between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation process they embrace is the same. This dynamic refers to the direction of the legitimation chain. In jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation chain runs from a transcendent norm to a rule of the sovereign. In non-jusnaturalistic theories exemplified by Hobbes and Rousseau the dynamics of the chain runs from an initial consent to the social contract to the set of rules issued by the sovereign. The dynamic of the chain in both type of theories, so it is argued, is irreversible. The operationalisation of political space ensuing from the social contract is what legislation is about according to the Modern philosophical project. Taken as it stands, the initial consent of the subjects to the social contract or their proxy to the sovereign is an action on a conception of freedom. They do give, though, a proxy to the sovereign to issue subsequent limitations of their freedom that are yet unknown when subscribing the contract .From the “moment” of the contract, the sovereign is legitimated in substituting conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom. The initial proxy contained in the contract covers any of his limitations of freedom. As both Hobbes and Rousseau argue, the rules of the sovereign are always morally correct. As a consequence, they cannot be criticized for whatever reason. Would this be possible then the chain of legitimation initiated by the social contract would be reversed. On strong legalism, however the chain is unidirectional. The sovereign transforms any propositional content into a true norm, which allows for the qualification of sovereignty as a black box. Chapter 7 ends with the articulation of some possibilities of reversing the chain of legitimation in what is called the proxy model. On this idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain, a more general approach is initiated. This approach leads to the claim that a legislator’s limitations of freedom are to be justified. They are deemed legitimate and legitimated on a general proxy. The latter however affects he reflexive character of freedom of the subject. On the idea of a general proxy, any of his conceptions of freedom can a priori be replaced by conceptions about freedom. The general approach to the idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain comes to say that this substitution must be justified. Sovereigns, that is, should give reasons for their rules. This is basically what legisprudence as a theory of rational legislation comes to. Its more concrete articulation is the topic of the third part of the book. Chapter 8 starts with the exploration of an alternative for the proxy model of legitimation that was investigated in the previous chapters. The alternative is labelled the trade-off model. On this model, the subjects trade off conceptions of freedom for conceptions about freedom. This comes to saying that the substitution of conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom must be justified. No rule can be held legitimate if this justification or legitimation is lacking. The trade off model is based on freedom as principium in its twofold meaning. Freedom unlimited as was argued in chapter 4 is both the starting point and the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. It follows from there that subjects are primarily to act on conceptions of freedom. A substitution of a conception about freedom for conceptions of freedom can only be legitimate if it is legitimated or justified as an alternative for failing social interaction. This is the first principle of legisprudence that is called the “principle of alternativity”. The second principle is the principle of necessity of the normative density. Rules should not automatically contain sanctions. If sanctions are included, this requires a specific justification. Rules with a sanction embrace a double reduction of freedom. First, the pattern of behaviour is imposed and second its realisation is enforced. Before realising a rule with the help of force alternative means of achievement of its goals are to be outweighed. The third principle of legisprudence is the principle of temporality. The limitation of freedom on a conception about freedom must be justified as “on time”. Any justification is embedded in a context. This means that if it is successful it will only be temporarily so. The principle of temporality then requires a justification over time, and not only on the moment that a rule is issued. The principle of coherence is the fourth principle of legisprudence. It requires that rules, both judicial and legislative make sense as a whole. The principle of coherence thus identified is elaborated in a theory that I propose to call the “level theory of coherence”, and that makes part of legisprudence. At the end of the chapter, the principles of legisprudence are focused on from the position of the legislator before they are further explored in chapter 9. This chapter concretises the operationalisation of the principles of legisprudence. The principles of legisprudence, so it is argued, are to be read within the context of one another. Upon weighing and balancing their relative weight in the process of legislation, the ruling of the sovereign can be said to be legisprudentially optimal. Legisprudential optimality on its turn is further concretised in chapter 10. The sovereign has to discharge of his duties throughout the legislative process while taking the circumstances of legislation into account. These circumstances are the fact that subjects interact with each other on the basis of conceptions of freedom. These circumstances result from the theory of freedom that was set out in chapter 4 and further elaborated in the subsequent chapters. The duties of the sovereign throughout the process of legislation amount to a duty of fact finding, problem formulation, weighing and balancing of alternatives, prognosis, retrospection, taking future circumstances into account and finally a duty to correction. Finally, a brief sketch is offered of the concept of validity according to legisprudence. Apart from the necessity of formal validity, both efficacy and axiological validity are briefly commented upon. From the diagnosis of some theories of validity that mainly focus on only one of the aspects of validity, the concept of validity according to legisprudence is called “network validity”. Projects like this book would never begin, let alone come to an end, without the help of a large number of people. I will not enter into a detailed description of their contribution. Suffice to mention their names with the hope that they will recognize some of their thoughts, reflections, critiques and encouragements somewhere in the book. The persons that come to my mind are Aulis Aarnio, Maurice Adams, Manuel Atienza, John Bell, Samantha Besson, Guido Calabresi, Tom Campbell, Carine Caunes, Emilios Christodoulidis, Wochiech and Aga Cyrul, Martine de Clerq, Pieter Dehon, Erwin Depue, Johan Desmet, David Dhooge, Guillaume Drago, Hugues Dumont, Philip Eijlander, Michiel Elst, René Foqué, Benoit Frydman, Tito Gallas, Philippe Gérard, René Gonzalez, Guy Haarscher, Mark Hunyadi, Sheldon Leader, Maria-Isabelle Köpke-Tinturé, Neil MacCormick, Francesco Laporte, Luzius Mader, Frank Michelman, Charles-Albert Morand, Dwight Newman, François Ost, Juliane Ottmann, Richard Parker, Trinie Parker, Aleksander Peczenik, Chaïm Perelman, Vlad Perju, Kauko Pietillä, Juha Pöhöynen, Daniel Priel, Pekka Riekinen, Thomas Roberts, Eric Rossiaux, Geoffrey Samuel, Jerzy Stelmach, Andreas Takis, Benoît Timmermans, Philippe Thion, Hannu Tolonen, Michel Troper, François Tulkens, Stamatios Tzitzis, François Vallançon, Koen Van Aeken, Wibren Van der Burg, Mark Van Hoecke, Michiel Vandekerckhove, Frederik Vandendriesche, Rob van Gestel, Scott Veatch, Roger Vergauwen, Amaryllis Verhoeven, Michel Villey, Jeremy Waldron, Kenneth Winston, Willem Witteveen, Wochiech Zadurski and Marek Zyrk-Zadurski. Thomas Roberts helped me with the linguistic corrections of the text. I have a special debt to Mark Van Bellingen and Lilly De Vooght for their views on the context of participation, the idea of a hermeneutical point of view and their critique on the “view from nowhere”. 1 Table of Contents 2 3 General Introduction – v 4 5 Table of Contents - xv 6 PART I THE MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL PROJECT AND ITS CRITIQUES Chapter 1 The Modern Philosophical Project I. Introduction - 5 1. Doubts and Certainty - 5 2. Questions, Open and Closed - 8 II. Three Basic Tenets of the Modern Philosophical Project: Rationality, Individualism, and Freedom - 10 1. The Rationality of Rationality - 11 2. Individualism or the Subject as an Individual - 16 a. Realism and Nominalism - 17 b. The Subject as an Individual - 21 3. Freedom - 27 a. Freedom and the Ontology of Separation - 28 b. Freedom in the Modern Philosophical Project - 32 III. Methodology :Avoiding the Scholastic Fallacy - 40 7 Chapter 2 Science as Freedom I. Introduction - 45 II. The Mechanism and Worldview - 45 III. From Thinking to Knowing - 53 IV. Addendum :Faith and Science - 59 8 V. Philosophy as Epistemology ?– 63 Chapter 3 The Self and Rationality I. Introduction - 71 II. Subjectivity as Intersubjectivity: A Critique of the Cogito - 76 III. The Elusive Subject - 81 IV. Rationality in Context: Reasonableness – 85 V. Conclusion - 100 Chapter 4 Freedom I. Introduction - 103 II. The Perspective of Freedom - 105 III. Methodological Preliminary: Concepts and Conceptions - 109 IV. Freedom :Concept and Conceptions - 114 V. The Politics of Freedom :Thomas Hobbes - 119 VI. Freedom as Principium and the First Principle of Legisprudence - 128 VII. Short Plan of the Exposé of Part II - 139 PART II LEGALISM AND LEGITIMATION Chapter 5 Strong Legalism or the Absent Theory of Legislation I. Introduction - 145 9 1. An Initial Exploration: Legalism as a Strategy - 147 2. The Main Characteristic of Strong Legalism: the Separation of Law and Politics - 150 II. Strong Legalism as a Thought Pattern - 156 10 1. Representation: the Path to Strong Legalism - 156 a. Representation-Reproduction and Representation-Construction - 156 b. Representation in the Napoleonic Codification :the Naturalisation of Law - 160 2. No Time for Time: Timelessness and the Validity of Law – 166 a. Time and Social Contract – 168 b. Time and Legislation – 175 3. Concealed Instrumentalism – 178 4. Etatism and Sovereignty - 187 5. Strong Legalism and the Contribution of Legal Science - 198 a. The Semantics of Strong Legalism: the Plain Meaning Doctrine – 199 b. Rationality of the Legislator – 201 III. Strong Legalism’s Ideology - 203 IV. Summary :a General View of Strong Legalism - 207 11 Chapter 6 Towards Weak Legalism or Legalism with a Human Face I. Introduction - 211 12 II. Law v. Politics - 213 13 III. Representation and Instrumentalism - 215 1. Is There Some Place Left for the Subject ?– 215 2. From Representation to Symbolisation - 225 3. Self and “Otherness” v. Self and Others - 232 4. Meaning, Interaction, and Legal Rules - 236 5. Interaction and Conflict - 243 6. Interaction as Conflict :Law’s Alternative - 249 Chapter 7 Legitimation and Democracy I. Introduction – 261 II. Justnaturalistic and Non-Jusnaturalistic Models of Legitimation – 263 III. The Construction of Political Space: the Proxy Model of Legitimation – 269 IV. The Operationalisation of Political Space: Legislation – 276 V. The Concept of Freedom and the Epistemologization of Philosophy – 280 VI. Rights – 286 VII. Sovereignty or the Black Box in the Legitimation Chain – 292 VIII. Reversals in the Legitimation Chain - 298 IX. Strong Legalism and Legisprudence: Two Ways of Reading a Constitution - 302 PART III LEGISPRUDENCE 14 Chapter 8 From Proxy to Trading Off: the Principles of Legisprudence I. Terminological Clarification - 309 II. Introduction - 312 III. The Trade-off Model - 313 IV. The Principle of Alternativity as the First Principle of Legisprudence – 325 1. The PA and Freedom as Principium – 326 2. The Ethical Bearing of the PA - 332 V. The Principle of Necessity of the Normative Density as the Second Principle of Legisprudence - 338 VI. The Principle of Temporality as the Third Principle of Legisprudence - 348 VII. The Principle of Coherence as the Fourth Principle of Legisprudence - 353 1. Introduction - 353 2. The PC and the Level Theory of Coherence - 359 a. Coherence0 as Coherence Unaffected by Time - 360 b.The First Level of Coherence: Coherence1 as Coherence as Affected by Time – 364 i. Coherence1 Arguments and the Judge - 364 ii. Coherence1 Arguments and the Legislator - 369 c. The Second Level of Coherence :Coherence2 as Systematicity in Decision Making - 374 i. Coherence2 Arguments and the Judge - 374 ii. Coherence2 Arguments and the Legislator - 381 d. The Third Level of Coherence :the Analytical Theory of a Legal System - 384 VIII. The Principles of Legisprudence and the Legislator – 394 IX. The Principles of Legisprudence Related - 403 15 Chapter 9 The Principles of Legisprudence Further Explored. Legisprudential Optimality 16 17 I. Introduction - 409 18 II. The PA and the Appropriate Level of Intersubjectivity - 412 III. The PN and Ruling Without Sanctions as an Alternative - 421 IV. The PT and Justification over Time - 430 19 V. The PC as part of the context of the PA, the PN and the PT – 434 VI. Legisprudential Optimality - 437 Chapter 10 Legisprudential Optimality :Freedom and the Duties of the Sovereign, Structural Rationality, and Validity I. Introduction - 441 II. The Circumstances of Legislation - 441 III. The Circumstances of Legislation and the Duties of the Sovereign: the Dynamics of Legisprudence - 444 1. The Duty of Fact Finding - 444 2. The Duty of Problem Formulation - 447 3. The Duty to Weigh and Balance Alternatives - 450 4. The Duty of Prognosis - 451 5. The Duty of Retrospection - 453 6. The Duty of Prospection or the Duty to Take Future Circumstances into Consideration - 453 7. The Duty to Correction - 455 IV. The Rationality of Legislation: Structural Rationality - 456 V. Structural Rationality and the Validity of Law :Network Validity - 465 1. Introduction - 465 2. Theories of Validity - 467 a. Formal Validity - 468 b. Factual Validity :Realism, American and Scandinavian - 470 c. Axiological Validity - 472 3. Network Validity - 474 a. Formal Validity - 474 b. Factual Validity - 475 c. Axiological Validity – 477 General Conclusion - 483 Selected Bibliography - 487. (shrink)

This paper presents the medical practice according to the occidental philosophy. Relationships with the concept of " love " (eros, philia, agapej will be described, and the concept of dignity and autonomy as well. The reflection will focus on the end of life aspects. Although medicine cannot avoid morality, ethic, and deontology, it is also part of philosophy and must warrant the respect of human dignity, especially when a physician helps a patient to die.

With their focus on documents, interpretation and intersubjectivity, Web 2.0 technologies have surprising analogies with philosophical hermeneutics, the theory of texts interpretation. Philosophical hermeneutics was generalised from biblical hermeneutics by Dilthey in the 19th century, and chosen as an alternative to positivism as a foundation for the epistemology and methodology of the humanities and social sciences. This article explores how Web 2.0 technologies might better meet the needs of social and human sciences than traditional information technologies that are historically bound (...) with logical positivism. Illustrations are provided from archaeology and sociology, two social and human sciences which were early adopters of punched cards and computers. (shrink)