A central question for psychologists, economists, and philosophers is how human lives should be valued. Whereas egalitarian considerations give rise to models emphasizing that every life should be valued equally, empirical research has demonstrated that valuations of lives depend on a variety of factors that often do not conform to specific normative expectations. Such factors include emotional reactions to the victims and cognitive considerations leading to biased perceptions of lives at risk (e.g., attention, mental imagery, pseudo-inefficacy, and scope neglect). They (...) can lead to a valuation function with decreasing marginal value and sometimes even decreasing absolute value as the number of victims increases. As a result, people spend more money to save an individual while at the same time being insensitive and apathetic to large losses of life, despite endorsing egalitarian norms. In this conceptual paper, we propose a descriptive model highlighting the role of different motivations and the conditions under which cognitions and emotions result in deviations from egalitarian normative valuations of human lives. (shrink)

This paper considers some issues to do with valuational presentations of consequence relations, and the Galois connections between spaces of valuations and spaces of consequence relations. Some of what we present is known, and some even well-known; but much is new. The aim is a systematic overview of a range of results applicable to nonreflexive and nontransitive logics, as well as more familiar logics. We conclude by considering some connectives suggested by this approach.

This paper introduces the logic _Q__L__E__T_ _F_, a quantified extension of the logic of evidence and truth _L__E__T_ _F_, together with a corresponding sound and complete first-order non-deterministic valuation semantics. _L__E__T_ _F_ is a paraconsistent and paracomplete sentential logic that extends the logic of first-degree entailment (_FDE_) with a classicality operator ∘ and a non-classicality operator ∙, dual to each other: while ∘_A_ entails that _A_ behaves classically, ∙_A_ follows from _A_’s violating some classically valid inferences. The semantics of (...) _Q__L__E__T_ _F_ combines structures that interpret negated predicates in terms of anti-extensions with first-order non-deterministic valuations, and completeness is obtained through a generalization of Henkin’s method. By providing sound and complete semantics for first-order extensions of _FDE_, _K3_, and _LP_, we show how these tools, which we call here the method of _anti-extensions + valuations_, can be naturally applied to a number of non-classical logics. (shrink)

Valuation is portrayed here as a dynamic and interactive process, not a static notion linked to willingness to pay. Valuation through economic measures can be built upon by creating trusting and legitimising procedures of stakeholder negotiation and mediation. This is a familiar practice in the US, but it is only beginning to be recognised as an environmental management tool in the UK. The introduction of strategic environmental and landuse appraisal plans for shorelines, estuaries, river catchments and rural landscapes, (...) combined with the mobilisation of protest around landuse proposals that are not seemingly justified on the basis of 'need' suggest that a more legitimate participatory form of democracy is required to reveal valuation through consensual negotiation. (shrink)

We give a valuation theoretic characterization for a real closed field to be recursively saturated. This builds on work in [9], where the authors gave such a characterization forκ-saturation, for a cardinal$\kappa \ge \aleph _0 $. Our result extends the characterization of Harnik and Ressayre [7] for a divisible ordered abelian group to be recursively saturated.

This paper investigates how people conceive and evaluate nature through language, in a climate change context. With material consisting of 1,200 answers to open-ended questions in nationally representative surveys in Norway, we explore what semantic roles and values the respondents attribute to nature as well as to how they interact with the public debate about climate change. We observe that different conceptions and valuations of nature are tied to different perspectives on the climate change issue: some address the responsibilities of (...) causing climate change, others its consequences, and others yet its potential solutions. The study provides knowledge about the variety of conceptions of nature that can be mobilised by individuals and suggests that policy measures and public communication could benefit by taking this diversity into account. (shrink)

Valuation consists in a positive or negative response by a subject S to an entity X. Any positive or negative response has a structure that involves a cognitive and a non-cognitive component, as well as a reason relationship between these. This structure is shown to be present in the explicit value judgement 'Hans is a kraut', and then also pointed out in the reflex-like feeding behaviour of a frog, where S treats X as providing an affordance. The conclusion is (...) that valuation need not involve mental states. The article ends with a discussion of the elusive question: what makes a response positive or negative? (shrink)

Values, Valuations, and Axiological Norms in Richard Rorty's Neopragmatism sympathetically discusses Richard Rorty's neopragmatist philosophy. This book brings together a range of interpretations and possibilities on a variety of humanistic topics, including philosophy, literature, culture, film, economics, social issues, politics, and more. Skowroński involves the work of philosophers such as Kant, Dewey, Santayana, and Kołakowski as he delves into various philosophical problems using the lens of Rorty’s neopragmatist thought.

Valuations are ubiquitous. We may be for or against genetically modified food; we find some politicians irresponsible; we prefer Beethoven to rock ‘n’ roll or vice versa; some enjoy bird-watching while others find it boring; and we may think that we have to tighten up on green-house gas emissions. Valuing is pervasive and often we are not even aware that we are valuing. However, many of our valuations are ill grounded and rationally defective. They are frequently based on misinformation, sloppy (...) thinking, prejudice, and are biased in many ways as psychological research shows. For this reason there is widespread agreement among phi-losophers that we need an account of substantive valuational rationality, both for the theory of practical reasoning and for ethics as well. My main object in this paper is to outline such an account and to present a principle that allows a non-technical rational criticism of valuations. (shrink)

I explore three points about the relationship between C.I. Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism and W.V. Quine’s naturalized epistemology inspired by Robert Sinclair’s Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. First, I highlight Lewis’s long-standing commitment to Platonism about meaning and its connection to his reflective philosophical method and rejection of a linguistic account of analyticity. Second, I consider Sinclair’s claim that “Lewis’s epistemology provides no indication concerning how, despite different sensory experiences, we still come to agree on what we are talking (...) about and what counts as evidence” (2022, 113). I find more hints, especially in Lewis’s account of how we verify that two people share meaning in common. However, some of the pragmatic and broadly empirical factors Lewis appeals to are not part of Quine’s naturalized epistemology. Finally, I relate these points to Quine’s (1953/1980) claim to advance a more “thorough pragmatism” than Lewis. Quine does not say much about action, value, and ethics, but these are central parts of Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism and a source of his reluctance to abandon those parts of his epistemology that Sinclair argues Quine found dispensable. (shrink)

We define and study abstract valuation semantics for logics, an algebraically well-behaved version of valuation semantics. Then, in the context of the behavioral approach to the algebraization of logics, we show, by means of meaningful bridge theorems and application examples, that abstract valuations are suited to play a role similar to the one played by logical matrices in the traditional approach to algebraization.

Economics takes an individualistic approach to human behaviour. This is reflected in the use of ‘contingent valuation’ surveys to conduct cost benefit analysis for economic policy evaluation. An individual's valuation of a policy is assumed to be unaffected by the burdens it places on others. We report a survey experiment to test this supposition in the context of climate change policy. Willingness to pay for climate change mitigation was higher when richer individuals were to bear higher costs than (...) when, as is usual, no explicit information was provided about cost distribution. This result is inconsistent with the usual interpretation of contingent valuation data. It also suggests that the data may be biased indicators of policy acceptance. Additional survey questions suggest that a collective mode of reasoning is common. (shrink)

We study the algebraic implications of the non-independence property and variants thereof on infinite fields, motivated by the conjecture that all such fields which are neither real closed nor separably closed admit a henselian valuation. Our results mainly focus on Hahn fields and build up on Will Johnson’s “The canonical topology on dp-minimal fields” :1850007, 2018).

One of the initial obstacles to the study of the theory of value is the fact that practically every author whom the student consults on the subject characterizes value and valuation differently, and seems to trace them ultimately to a different source. For example, one writer will formulate a theory of value in terms of pain and pleasure ; another, in terms of feeling ; another, in terms of desires or wants ; still others, in terms of “requiredness”, of (...) interest, of striving ; and so on. (shrink)

This expository paper presents an application, to the modal logic S4, of the valuation semantics technique proposed by Loparić for the basic normal modal logic K. In previous works we presented a valuation semantics for the minimal temporal logic Kt and several other systems modal and temporal logic. How to deal with S4, however, was left as an open problem—although we arrived at a working definition of \(A_1,\ldots,A_n\) -valuations, we were not able to prove an important lemma for (...) correctness. In this paper we solve this, presenting valuations for S4. (shrink)

This paper reports a Contingent Valuation application to estimate the non-market costs and benefits of hydro scheme developments in an Icelandic wilderness area. A deliberative group -based approach, called Market Stall, is compared to a control group consisting of conventional in-person interviews, in order to investigate flaws of Contingent Valuation, such as poor validity and protest responses. Perceived property rights suggested the use of willingness-to-accept in compensation for wilderness loss and willingness-to-pay for hydro scheme benefits. The study is (...) novel as it applies participant behaviour observation to gain insights into the shortcomings of conventional data collection modes. Main drawbacks with in-person interviews were found to be low motivation, standardised information and time pressure which hindered individuals from carefully considering their preferences. Market Stall performed better in the study: welfare estimates were more easily explained by socio-economic variables, the non-response rate was lower, and respondents were more engaged. Our research findings also suggest that participant behaviour can be used to supplement conventional validity tests. (shrink)

For paediatric medicine to advance, research must be conducted specifically with children. Concern about poor recruitment has led to debate about payments to child research participants. Although concerns about undue influence by such ‘compensation’ have been expressed, it is useful to determine whether children can relate the time and inconvenience associated with participation to the value of payment offered. This study explores children's ability to determine fair remuneration for research participation, and reviews payments to children participating in research. Forty children (...) were interviewed before outpatient visits at two London Hospitals: Great Ormond Street Children's Hospital and the Whittington Hospital District General Hospital. Children were asked to value their involvement in two hypothetical research scenarios – the first an ‘additional blood sample’, the second also involving daily oral oil capsules taken for a fortnight before further venesection. Background knowledge about familiarity with money, and experience with hospitalisation was assessed. The mean valuation of involvement in the second scenario (£13.18) was higher than in the first (£2.84) (p<0.001). This higher valuation persisted when children were categorised into groups ‘aged 12+’ and ‘below 12’. Those undergoing a blood test on the day placed a higher valuation on participation in the second scenario (£10.43, £21.67, p=0.044). These children aged 8–16 demonstrated the capacity to discern a fair valuation for participation in medical research. The monetary sums are influenced by the time and inconvenience involved in the research, and by the extent of recent experience with hospital procedures. The authors review current ethical thinking regarding payments to child research participants and suggest that a fair wage model might be an ethically acceptable way to increase participation of children in research. (shrink)

We study the question of $\mathcal {L}_{\mathrm {ring}}$ -definability of non-trivial henselian valuation rings. Building on previous work of Jahnke and Koenigsmann, we provide a characterization of henselian fields that admit a non-trivial definable henselian valuation. In particular, we treat the cases where the canonical henselian valuation has positive residue characteristic, using techniques from the model theory and algebra of tame fields.

Contingent valuation of people's willingness to pay has rapidly become the method of choice to value all manner of environmental damages. The correct measure is, however, the sum people require to compensate them for such losses, an amount which will normally be far larger than their willingness to pay. And on present evidence, responses to contingent valuation questions are not likely to represent any measure of economic values. The results of these valuation practices will, therefore, bias environmental (...) policies and distort incentives. (shrink)

A general mathematical framework, based on countable partitions of Natural Numbers [1], is presented, that allows to provide a Semantics to propositional languages. It has the particularity of allowing both the valuations and the interpretation Sets for the connectives to discriminate complexity of the formulas. This allows different adequacy criteria to be used to assess formulas associated with the same connective, but that differ in their complexity. The presented method can be adapted potentially infinite number of connectives and truth values, (...) therefore, it can be considered a general framework to provide semantics to several of the known logic systems (eg, LC, L3 LP, FDE). The presented semantics allow to converge to different standard semantics if the separation complexity procedure is annulled. Therefore, it can be understood as a framework that allows greater precision (in complexity terms) with respect to formula satisfaction. Naturally, because of how it is built, it can be incorporated into non-deterministic semantics. The presented procedure also allows generating valuations that grant a different truth value to each formula of propositional language. As a positive side effect, our method allows a constructive proof of the equipotence between N and N^n for all Natural n. (shrink)

We give a definition, in the ring language, of Zp inside Qp and of Fp[[t]] inside Fp), which works uniformly for all p and all finite field extensions of these fields, and in many other Henselian valued fields as well. The formula can be taken existential-universal in the ring language, and in fact existential in a modification of the language of Macintyre. Furthermore, we show the negative result that in the language of rings there does not exist a uniform definition (...) by an existential formula and neither by a universal formula for the valuation rings of all the finite extensions of a given Henselian valued field. We also show that there is no existential formula of the ring language defining Zp inside Qp uniformly for all p. For any fixed finite extension of Qp, we give an existential formula and a universal formula in the ring language which define the valuation ring. (shrink)

In this paper, we present valuation semantics for the Propositional Intuitionistic Calculus (also called Heyting Calculus) and three important subcalculi: the Implicative, the Positive and the Minimal Calculus (also known as Kolmogoroff or Johansson Calculus). Algorithms based in our definitions yields decision methods for these calculi. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p125.

In the philosophy of perception, olfaction is the perennial problem child, presenting a range of difficulties to those seeking to define its proper referents, and its phenomenological content. Here, we argue that many of these difficulties can be resolved by recognizing the object-like representation of odors in the brain, and by postulating that the basic objects of olfaction are best defined by their biological value to the organism, rather than physico-chemical dimensions of stimuli. Building on this organism-centered account, we speculate (...) that the phenomenological space of olfaction is organized into a number of coarse affective dimensions that apply categorically. This organization may be especially useful for coupling sensation to decision-making and instrumental action in a sensory modality where the stimulus space is especially complex and high-dimensional. (shrink)

Is there anything irrational, or self-undermining, about having "inconsistent" attitudes of caring or valuing? In this paper, I argue that, contra suggestions of Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor, the answer is "No." Here I focus on "valuations," which are endorsed desires or attitudes. The proper characterization of what I call "valuational inconsistency" I claim, involves not logical form (valuing A and not-A), but rather the co-possibility of what is valued; valuations are inconsistent when there is no possible world in which (...) what is valued can co-exist. Essentially conflicting valuations, I show, are no worse for an agent than contingently conflicting ones, which are common and no threat to rationality or well-being. Partly based on reflections about a conflicted mother, who values staying at home and also having a career, I argue that valuational inconsistency does not render a person unable to act, does not make a person's actions ineffective because of vacillation, does not undermine a person's autonomy, and need not make a person dissatisfied with himself. I defend my characterization of inconsistency as an apt one; I offer some reasons to value inconsistency itself; and I draw out some implications for coherence thinking in moral philosophy. (shrink)

We prove that every convexly ordered valuation ring has a unique completion as a uniform space, which furthermore is a convexly ordered valuation ring. In addition, we give a model theoretic characterisation of complete convexly ordered valuation rings, and give a necessary and sufficient condition for the completion of a convexly ordered valuation ring to be a real closed ring.

The origins of both economic and philosophical value theory are examined and shown to be closely related. The status of neo-classical value theory is that it is internally flawed in any attempt to describe the real world. Cost-benefit analysis as it applies to the valuation of environmental agents relies upon the claim that this neo-classical theory has a particular status in optimal welfare maximisation and, therefore, suffers the same problems of internal consistency. Economic valuation of the environment is (...) not a scientific process derived from external law but a social process relying upon social agreement. Alternatives to economic valuation are considered and may possess a more plausible social base. However, all environmental valuation is at odds with beliefs based upon the existence of objective and intrinsic values. (shrink)

Contingent valuation of the environment has proven popular amongst environmental economists in recent years and has increased the role of monetary valuation in public policy. However, the underlying economic model of human psychology fails to explain why certain types of stated behaviour are observed. Thus, good scope exists for interdisciplinary research in the area of economics and psychology with regard to environmental valuation. A critical review is presented here of some recent research by social psychologists in the (...) US attempting to explain stated behaviour in contingent valuation. Attitudinal scales have been used to analyse the role of ecocentric, biocentric and altruistic motives for giving. However, the research is shown to draw some potentially misleading conclusions and be unrepresentative of contingent valuation. Two recent economic studies using contingent valuation are then reported and shown to have identified non-economic motives for WTP. The complexity of value formation and expression is found to go far beyond that generally accepted by economic models. Greater consideration of the role played by attitudes and ethical considerations then becomes relevant to the interpretation of results being used in standard cost-benefit analysis and environmental policy. (shrink)

Economic environmental valuation remains a much debated and contested issue. Concerns have been voiced that it is unable to capture the manifold immaterial values of ecosystems due to conceptual and methodological issues. Thus, additional value categories (social values) as well as novel valuation approaches like deliberative (monetary) valuation are areas of growing interest, yet the theoretical foundations are rather weak. Against this background, this article aims to develop a consistent conceptual framework for making sense of social values (...) in economic environmental valuation. Based on a holistic view of society and individuals, the role of institutions, the social environment, culture and transcendental values is emphasised. To synthesise diverging concepts of value into an economic concept and to account for the multidimensionality of social values, the framework consists of three spheres: social, natural and contextual. The novel framework demonstrates that social values may be integrated into a preference-based utility framework when denoting a holistic understanding of social preferences and human embeddedness in nature and society. (shrink)

‘Contingent Valuation ’ is a method often used to make decisions about environmental issues. It is used to elicit citizens’ preferences at the location of a specific facility, new road and the like. I argue that even if we could elicit a truly informed and ‘free’ choice, the method would remain flawed, as 1) all ‘local’ activity also has far-reaching environmental consequences; 2) majority decisions may support chices that adversely affect minorities; 3) even with full information, consenting to harms (...) like significant alterations of our normal functioning or health, or genetic mutations, may not be morally acceptable. (shrink)

Market-like devices that enact quantification and monetization processes (QM) underpin a growing number of valuation practices, but the widespread take-up of QM has given rise to the ‘cooptation charge’: for all the good intentions and results produced by those who deploy QM, they are complicit in reinforcing problematic neoliberal tendencies. A political discourse-theoretical perspective, combined with a pragmatist scholarship that has made significant advances in our understanding of QM, suggests that the cooptation charge relies on an overly simplified picture (...) of both QM and neoliberalism. However, while we acknowledge this as an important advance, we argue that the normative, political, and ideological significance of QM remains surprisingly underspecified. We still lack a convincing theoretical framework that provides a more rounded multi-dimensional critical perspective within which to navigate the evaluative dilemmas produced by these increasingly widespread techniques, including cooptation worries. Drawing on the logics approach of the Essex school of political discourse theory, we develop a framework that brings together the strategic, normative, and ideological dimensions that otherwise tend to be treated separately in the literature, allowing a fuller assessment of such technologies. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore disciplinary variation in valuation practices by comparing the way research groups accumulate credibility across four epistemic cultures. Our analysis is based on case studies of four high-performing research groups representing very different epistemic cultures in humanities, social sciences, geosciences and mathematics. In each case we interviewed about ten researchers, analyzed relevant documents and observed a couple of meetings. In all four cases we found a cyclical process of accumulating credibility. At the same time, we (...) found significant differences in the manifestation of the six main resources that are part of the cycle, the mechanisms of conversion between these resources, the overall structure and the average speed of the credibility cycle. The different ways in which the groups use data and produce arguments affect the whole cycle of accumulating credibility. In some cultures, journal publications are the main source of recognition, but in others one can earn significant amounts of recognition for conference contributions or service to the academic community. Moreover, the collaboration practices in the respective fields strongly influence the connection between arguments and publications. In cultures where teams of researchers collaboratively produce arguments, it is more strongly embedded in the process of writing publications. We conclude that the credibility cycle can only be used as an analytical tool to explain the behavior of researchers or research groups when taking differences across epistemic cultures into account. (shrink)

Society Semantics, introduced by W. Carnielli and M. Lima-Marques, is a method for obtaining new logics from the combination of agents of a given logic. The goal of this paper is to present several generalizations of this method, as well as to show some applications to many-valued logics. After a reformulation of Society Semantics in a wider setting, we develop in detail two examples of application of the new formalism, characterizing a hierarchy of paraconsistent logics called Pn and a hierarchy (...) of paracomplete logics In. We also propose three further generalizations, obtaining Society Semantics for several many-valued logics, including a hierarchy of logics called In Pk which are both paraconsistent and paracomplete. (shrink)

In science and technology studies today, there is a troubling tendency to portray actors in the biosciences as “cultural dopes” and technology as having monolithic qualities with predetermined outcomes. To remedy this analytical impasse, this article introduces the concept styles of valuation to analyze how actors struggle with valuing technology in practice. Empirically, this article examines how actors in a bioscientific laboratory struggle with valuing the properties and qualities of algorithms in a high-throughput setting and identifies the copresence of (...) several different styles. The question that the actors struggle with is what different configurations of algorithms, devices, and humans are “good bioscience,” that is, what do the actors perform as a good distribution of agency between algorithms and humans? A key finding is that algorithms, robots, and humans are valued in multiple ways in the same setting. For the actors, it is not apparent which configuration of agency and devices is more authoritative nor is it obvious which skills and functions should be redistributed to the algorithms. Thus, rather than tying algorithms to one set of values, such as “speed,” “precision,” or “automation,” this article demonstrates the broad utility of attending to the multivalence of algorithms and technology in practice. (shrink)

Given a Henselian valuation, we study its definability (with and without parameters) by examining conditions on the value group. We show that any Henselian valuation whose value group is not closed in its divisible hull is definable in the language of rings, using one parameter. Thereby we strengthen known definability results. Moreover, we show that in this case, one parameter is optimal in the sense that one cannot obtain definability without parameters. To this end, we present a construction (...) method for a t-Henselian non-Henselian ordered field elementarily equivalent to a Henselian field with a specified value group. (shrink)

The issue of intrinsic values is often a point of disagreement and sometimes confusion between ethicists and economists. Ethicists often criticise economic modes of valuation for failing to take account of intrinsic values. In response, economists have proposed a number of different types of value meant to account for intrinsic values within an economic framework. However, many ethicists have criticised these notions as inadequate substitutes for ethical understandings of intrinsic value. One reason for confusion about this issue is that (...) there are many different meanings of ‘intrinsic value’ within ethics. This chapter identifies those meanings and the differences among them, and considers how well the types of value proposed within economics can capture them. (shrink)

In this paper, the author revisits “the emotive theory of value” and argues that values are not entities but nothing other than “linguistic fictions”. Accordingly, valuations—i.e., valuing actions—can be defined as approving or disapproving attitudes of a subject to some object. In this perspective, values cannot be true or false: What we can do is just compare them with regard to strength. As a consequence, value judgments are to be understood as sentences which are used either to say that a (...) subject s values an object o positively or negatively, or to express (evince) a valuation. The author then shows some relations between normative and evaluative discourses. First, he claims that norms as well as valuations are not true or false. Second, he argues that both may be explained or justified, even if the former are usually justified teleologically whereas the latter are explained referring back to the subject's background and life‐style. Third, he notes that a legal order originates from the fact that valuations “crystallize” into norms. Finally, the author examines some further questions related to his analysis. In particular, he argues that the different realms of values, e.g., morals, aesthetics, politics, etc., do not correspond to different evaluative attitudes, but to different phenomena and diverse spheres of human life. (shrink)

When Alain Locke developed a philosophy of valuation that he termed “functional relativism,” he contrasted his position to “value realism,” apparently because he wanted to keep valuations free from being bound to status quo existence. This article considers Locke's philosophy of valuation in relation to the “realism” of Charles S. Peirce in order to show that there is an approach to realism that answers to requirements of dynamic, evolutionary growth and creativity. The argument begins by placing Locke's cardinal (...) values onto a compass-like diagram inspired by Black Elk's ritual acknowledgment of cardinal directions. The illustration of a hoop of valuation is used to explore the usefulness of thinking in terms of diagrams, with explicit reference to Peircean semiotics. Next the article pursues a context of valuation developed through the psychical philosophy of George Herbert Mead and recent work on Peircean realism. It shows how valuation may be viewed as an exercise in freedom, not confined to status quo existence. Sources of error are acknowledged and reviewed. In the end, Peirce's choice of realism versus nominalism is found to be consistent with Lockean commitments to shared living in communities of inquiry. A Lockean philosophy of valuation, therefore, is not necessarily antirealist. (shrink)

Surprisal and Valuation in the Predictive Brain.

The use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in environmental decision-making and the contingent valuation (CV) technique as input into traditional CBA to elicit environmental values in monetary terms has stimulated an extensive debate. Critics have questioned the appropriateness of both the method and the technique. Some alternative suggestions for the elicitation of environmental values are based on a social process of deliberation. However, just like traditional economic theory, these alternative approaches may be questioned on their implicit value judgements regarding the (...) legitimacy of the social-political organisation of the process of value elicitation. Instead of making assumptions a priori, research efforts should be focused on the processes by which actual public attitudes and preferences towards the environment can best be elicited and fed into environmental or other public policy decision-making. In the study presented in this paper, support was found for both the individual WTP based approach and a participatory social deliberation approach to inform the environmental decision-making process, suggesting that a combination of both approaches is most appropriate. (shrink)

As conceptual and theoretical discussions on environmental valuation approaches have advanced there is growing interest in the impact that valuation has on decision making. The perceived legitimacy of the outputs of valuation studies is seen as one factor influencing their impact on policy decisions. One element of this is ensuring that participants of valuation processes see the results as legitimate and would be willing to accept decisions based on these findings. Here, we test the perceived legitimacy (...) to participants of two approaches to deliberative monetary valuation, deliberated preferences and Deliberative Democratic Monetary Valuation, in the context of marine planning in the Clyde estuary in Scotland. We compare and contrast deliberated preference and deliberative democratic monetary valuation and track their emergence as responses to critiques of conventional stated preference approaches. We then present the results of our case study where we found that deliberative democratic monetary valuation produced valuations that were perceived as more legitimate that deliberated preference as the basis for decision making by those involved in the valuation process. (shrink)

This article examines valuation and payment practices of psychoanalysts in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Psychoanalysts do not use explicit sliding scales but rather reach an agreement about fees in conversation with the patient. This negotiation is conducted with some principles of gift-giving, where parties try to give more, rather than through competitive bargaining (an inverted bazaar). Drawing on the sociology of money, morals and markets, and valuation studies literatures, I distinguish four factors to explain this: 1) Some formally produced (...) prices as well as market mechanisms shape benchmarks for fees, but the peculiar service psychologists offer (which makes quality judgments hard), the way patients and therapists are matched, and the lack of public information about prices allow for high flexibility in price-setting; these are structural factors that remain unsaid in the conversation on fees. 2) A professional narrative that highlights a responsibility towards patients that should not be contaminated by economic interest. 3) Psychoanalysts’ elaborations on the meanings of the payment, which should reflect the uniqueness of each patient and the bond analyst-patient and symbolize the patient’s commitment to treatment, involving a cost and a loss beyond the economic. 4) The prevalence of cash, face-to-face payment without intermediaries, which helps desacralize the analyst and disentangle the session from the rest of the economic life of the analyst, but impedes evading moralization of the transaction. Payments in psychoanalysis are delicate arrangements, and analysts often stress about valuation and payments. They have to be careful to ensure this flexibility results in morally acceptable transactions. (shrink)