Among the most complicated issues in the law of delict, in the case of multiple debtors, is to determine the scope of each co-debtor’s liability. The rule of proportional liability clearly favours debtors more than the aggrieved party. And, on the contrary, the solidary liability best suits the interests of the aggrieved party as the risk of co-debtor’s insolvency is transferred to the debtors. Furthermore, in the latter case, the debtors who attempt to allocate the scope (...) of their liability among themselves and fail to reach an agreement have to undergo two legal procedures: the first concerning the compensation to the creditor, and the second concerning the determination of the scope of their liability among themselves. Adequate balancing of the interests of the two parties (the debtor and the creditor) lies among the major tasks of tort law. Therefore, he law should seek specific rules instrumental in determining the scope of the co-debtor’s liability in the case of multiple debtors. The application of the rule of solidary liability is based on the assumption that individuals whose joint actions inflicted damage must compensate it together. (shrink)

Standard theories of liability say that X is liable to Y only if Y was harmed, only if X caused Y harm, and (usually) only if X was at fault. This article offers a series of criticisms of each of these claims, and use them to construct an alternative theory of liability in which the nature of X's having imposed a risk of harm on Y is central to the question of when X is liable to Y, and (...) for how much. The article ends with some conjectures on ignorance as an excusing condition. (shrink)

The author investigates the necessity of fault as the prerequisite of contractual civil liability. The author makes the conclusion that Lithuanian law, following most of the countries belonging to the civil law tradition and contrary to the common law systems, as well as Vienna convention, UNIDROIT principles, PECL and DCFR, begins with the theory that fault is a requirement for contractual liability. Strict liability in Lithuanian law is the exception of this general rule. Nevertheless, the author argues (...) that the general rule is subject to important exceptions, and the practical importance of these exceptions is as great as the cases falling within the general rule. In case of no agreement of the parties or any provision of law regarding fault as the necessary prerequisite for contractual liability, in Lithuania, similar to France, the distinction between the obligations to produce a given result and the obligations to use reasonable care is essential: according to Article 6.200(4) of the Lithuanian Civil Code (hereinafter – the CC), a party in breach of an obligation to use best efforts is liable for fault. (shrink)

A minimally responsible threatener is someone who bears some responsibility for imposing an objectively wrongful threat, but whose responsibility does not rise to the level of culpability. Minimally responsible threateners include those who knowingly commit a wrongful harm under duress, those who are epistemically justified but mistaken in their belief that a morally risky activity will not cause a wrongful harm, and those who commit a harm while suffering from a cognitive impairment which makes it prohibitively difficult to recognize and (...) act on what is morally required of them. The chapter argues that minimally responsible threateners can indeed be morally liable for the harms they impose. Put differently, culpability is not a necessary basis for liability. (shrink)

Who is responsible when an AI machine causes something to go wrong? Or is there a gap in the ascription of responsibility? Answers range from claiming there is a unique responsibility gap, several different responsibility gaps, or no gap at all. In a nutshell, the problem is as follows: on the one hand, it seems fitting to hold someone responsible for a wrong caused by an AI machine; on the other hand, there seems to be no fitting bearer of responsibility (...) for this wrong. In this article, we focus on a particular (aspect of the) AI responsibility gap: it seems fitting that someone should bear the legal consequences in scenarios involving AI machines with design defects; however, there seems to be no such fitting bearer. We approach this problem from the legal perspective, and suggest vicarious liability of AI manufacturers as a solution to this problem. Our proposal comes in two variants: the first one has a narrower range of application, but can be easily integrated in current legal frameworks; the second one requires a revision of current legal frameworks, but has a wider range of application. The latter variant employs a broadened account of vicarious liability. We emphasise strengths of the two variants and finally highlight how vicarious liability offers important insights for addressing a moral AI responsibility gap. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Jeff McMahan's "Just Cause for War". It defends a more permissive, and more traditional view of just war liability against McMahan's claims.

Adil Ahmad Haque argues that civilians who contribute to unjust lethal threats in war, but who do not directly participate in the war, are not liable to defensive killing. His argument rests on two central claims: first, that the extent of a person’s liability to defensive harm in virtue of contributing to an unjust threat is limited to the cost that she is initially required to bear in order to avoid contributing, and, second, that civilians need not bear lethal (...) costs in order to avoid indirectly contributing to unjust lethal threats. I argue that Haque’s defence of each claim fails. (shrink)

Jeff McMahan has argued against the moral equivalence of combatants (MEC) by developing a liability-based account of killing in warfare. On this account, a combatant is morally liable to be killed only if doing so is an effective means of reducing or eliminating an unjust threat to which that combatant is contributing. Since combatants fighting for a just cause generally do not contribute to unjust threats, they are not morally liable to be killed; thus MEC is mistaken. The problem, (...) however, is that many unjust combatants contribute very little to the war in which they participate—often no more than the typical civilian. Thus either the typical civilian is morally liable to be killed, or many unjust combatants are not morally liable to be killed. That is, the liability based account seems to force us to choose between a version of pacifism, and total war. Seth Lazar has called this “The Responsibility Dilemma”. But I will argue that we can salvage a liability-based account of war—one which rejects MEC—by grounding the moral liability of unjust combatants not only in their individual contributions but also in their complicit participation in that war. On this view, all enlistees, regardless of the degree to which they contribute to an unjust war, are complicitously liable to be killed if it is necessary to avert an unjust threat posed by their side. This collectivized liability based account I develop avoids the Responsibility Dilemma unlike individualized liability-based accounts of the sort developed by McMahan. (shrink)

According to the dominant position in the just war tradition from Augustine to Anscombe and beyond, there is no "moral equality of combatants." That is, on the traditional view the combatants participating in a justified war may kill their enemy combatants participating in an unjustified war - but not vice versa (barring certain qualifications). I shall argue here, however, that in the large number of wars (and in practically all modern wars) where the combatants on the justified side violate the (...) rights of innocent people ("collateral damage"), these combatants are in fact liable to attack by the combatants on the unjustified side. I will support this view with a rights-based account of liability to attack and then defend it against a number of objections raised in particular by Jeff McMahan. The result is that the thesis of the moral equality of combatants holds good for a large range of armed conflicts while the opposing thesis is of very limited practical relevance. (shrink)

Collective Liability in Islam: The ʿĀqila and Blood-Money Payments. By Nurit Tsafrir. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. xviii + 167. $99.99.

Legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania establish several types of material liability of workers engaged in labour (professional) relations: material liability applied pursuant to the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the LC) and material liability applied pursuant to the Law on Public Service of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the LPC). In the present article, theoretical and practical aspects of material liability of Lithuanian public servants for (...) material damage caused are analysed. The authors of the article study the conditions for the application of the material liability and identify the main circumstances that must be determined in applying this type of legal compulsion. Furthermore, the authors investigate the relation between the material and disciplinary liabilities, study the limits of the application of labour law norms (that regulate material liability of employees) and civil law norms (regulating personal civil liability) in professional legal relations, identify the means and procedure for solving disputes arising in the application of the material liability. Practical mistakes in the application of the material liability of public servants and violations are analysed on the basis of a rather sparse case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania related to the material liability. (shrink)

The courts have experienced difficulty in justifying the imposition of liability to third parties for negligent misstatements. The justifications ordinarily invoked relate to notions of assumption of responsibility and detrimental reliance. These can be seen, in turn, to rest upon a normative framework of give and take (or «mutuality») between statement makers and third party recipients. This article challenges the cogency of that normative framework and offers an alternative based upon the remedial nature of tort, which has traditionally focused (...) upon the particular interactions by which wrongdoers have caused harm to others. The most important indicators of liability to third parties relate, in turn, to normatively significant features of the causal sequence between acting and the infliction of harm. These indicators, it is submitted, are (i) actual knowledge of the likelihood of harm if care is not taken and (ii) the tightness of the causal connection. (shrink)

Many climate ethicists maintain that climate policy costs should be borne by those who historically emitted the most greenhouse gases. Some theorists have recently argued, however, that actors only became liable for emitting once the emissions breached legitimate legal regulation governing emissions. This paper challenges this view. Focusing on the climate responsibility of states, it argues that even if we assume that legitimate legal regulation is needed to remove excusable ignorance of entitlements to emit or is constitutive of such entitlements, (...) it does not follow that states should be exonerated from responsibility for all pre-legal emitting. This is because the pre-legal emissions may have violated moral duties not to behave recklessly and to promote the emergence of the relevant regulation. The paper closes by noting how grounding liability for emitting in such duties complicates the link between past emissions and liability. (shrink)

The Moral Responsibility Account of Liability to Defensive Harm (MRA) states that an agent becomes liable to defensive harm if, and only if, she engages in a foreseeably risk-imposing activity that subsequently threatens objectively unjustified harm. Advocates of the account contend that liability to defensive harm is best understood as an aspect of distributive justice. Individuals who are liable to some harm are not wronged if the harm is imposed on them, and liability to defensive harm thus (...) helps ensure that harm is borne by whoever has least of an objection of justice against being burdened with it—or so advocates of the MRA insist. In this paper, I argue that liability to defensive harm is not grounded in considerations of distributive justice. While it depends on the wider societal context what allocation of a burden is distributively most just, liability to defensive harm is a distinctly localised affair. I propose that liability to defensive harm is best understood as part of the enforcement dimension of our rights to non-interference. Framing liability in this way does not invalidate the MRA. It does, however, render subjective impermissibility accounts of liability particularly promising. (shrink)

Criminal liability of legal entities was legitimized in the Republic of Lithuania eight years ago, and in the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 8 June 2009, a conclusive confirmation on its accordance with the Constitution was made. It should be noted that the extension of the concept of criminal offense subject has received considerable attention of Lithuanian scientists. It was obvious that this penal law novel would cause many problems and, surely, it has become a reason of many (...) doubts in the judicial practice. However, despite the fact that a fairly broad scientific analysis of the topic under consideration has been made, none of the Lithuanian authors has ever addressed the issue regarding the sources of the criminal liability of legal entities. (shrink)

According to Jonathan Quong’s _moral status account_ of liability to defensive harm, an agent is liable to defensive harm only when she mistakenly treats others as if their moral status is diminished (for example, as if they lack a right that they in fact possess). Quong argues that, by the lights of the moral status account, a conscientious driver (Driver) who faultlessly threatens to kill Pedestrian is not liable to defensive harm. Quong argues that Driver’s action is evidence-relative permissible, (...) despite the risks it imposes, because the general practice of prudent driving is permissible. The practice is permissible because (a) its risks do not disproportionately fall on some groups rather than others, (b) the threatened harms are incidental, and (c) the risk that driving imposes is acceptable in light of the benefits everyone derives from driving. Because the correct moral theory tells us that prudent driving is permissible, Pedestrian lacks a right that Driver refrain from driving. Hence, Driver does not, by driving, treat Pedestrian as lacking a right that Pedestrian in fact possesses. Driver is not liable to defensive force. I argue, against Quong, that cost–benefit analyses of types of risky activity cannot justify individual tokens of risk imposition. Actions that risk incidentally harming others must be justified by the prospective benefits of that token action. Hence, Driver’s imposition of risk on Pedestrian cannot be justified by the benefits of the general practice of driving. I argue that the permissibility of Driver’s imposing risk on Pedestrian via prudent driving turns on whether Driver is willing to internalise at least the foreseeable costs of that risky action. One can lack a right that a person refrain from performing a risky action whilst possessing a right not to be harmed by that risky action. Even if Pedestrian cannot reasonably demand that Driver refrain from driving, she can reasonably demand that Driver refrain from forcing her to bear the costs of his driving. (shrink)

When states perpetrate injustices, do their individual citizens develop liabilities to repair such wrongdoings? Most existing accounts of citizens’ liabilities for state-perpetrated injustices, whilst applicable across certain democratic contexts, struggle to provide robust accounts of the grounds and nature of liabilities for citizens in non-democratic contexts. This problematically leaves a lacuna when it comes to the responsibilities and appropriate responses of citizens in these states. This article advances a distinctive two-pronged authorisation-based account applicable to non-democracies. Objective authorisers are individuals who (...) derive presumptive benefits, are comparably better-off under, and can reliably influence the decision-making processes over the injustice perpetrated by the state. Subjective authorisers are citizens who autonomously endorse their state as credible interpreters and upholders of their aims in relation to the injustices in question. Both objective and subjective authorisers of the state in relation to particular injustices perpetrated, are liable to compensate, actively oppose, and commemorate the victims of state-perpetrated injustices. This account will be shown to be empirically applicable to a large number of minimally decent non-democratic states, where the political elite enjoy moderate popular support over their incorporation and reflection of citizen interests and preferences in their governance, despite the absence of formal democratic electoral mechanisms. This authorisation-based view differs from existing accounts oriented around complicity and participatory intentions, in better accounting for non-participants who are nevertheless intuitively liable for the actions of their authorised state, as well as circumventing structural shortcomings affecting complicity-centric accounts. (shrink)

This paper offers an economic analysis of one aspect of the possible liability for incorrect information traded on information markets: expert liability for incorrect asset valuation. The article does not address the questions of whether and under what circumstances an expert should bear contractual liability for an incorrect valuation. Rather, it assumes such contractual liability towards the person who has solicited the opinion and focuses instead on analyzing the circumstances under which the expert’s liability should (...) be extended to third parties as well. (shrink)

This article focuses on the problem of criminal liability for unlawful engagement in economic activities, analyses the emergence and development of this norm in criminal law and the ways of its optimal explanation. Special attention is paid to the problem of identification of illegality of activities, based on specific tax and economic regulation. The study concludes that criminal liability must be limited to a violation of fundamental requirements for the legality of business, and does not include particular abuses (...) occurring in legal business. The author also deals with the criteria of delimitation of criminal and administrative liability for unlawful engagement in economic activities. Under Article 202(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, application of criminal liability is limited by two alternative conditions: either a person illegally undertakes activity in entrepreneurial way or on a large scale. According to the paper, the above-mentioned regulation lacks clarity and leads to the risk of unfounded prosecutions. The author gives practical examples, where on the basis of inexplicable criterion of an entrepreneurial way, criminal charges are filed in respect of petty economic activities. Such practice is incompatible with the purposes and principles of criminal law. The paper proposes to delete the criterion of an entrepreneurial way from the definition, leaving the possibility of criminal liability only in case of large scale illegal economic activity. The article also substantiates the conclusion that prohibited business activities provided for in Article 202(2) of the Criminal Code actually defies logical explanation and should be removed from the regulation. At the end of the article, the author offers a sample of optimal legal wording of unlawful engagement in economic activities in criminal law. (shrink)

In 2021, there was a significant amendment to the legislation on medical experimentation. In particular, Chapter 4 of the Law of December 5, 1996 on the Profession of Physician and Dentist (Journal of Laws 2023, item 1516) was amended, in which the prerequisites of legally relevant consent given by the participant in the experiment or by other entities that express a position on their behalf were specified. In addition, procedures related to the opinion of the research project by the so-called (...) bioethics committee were described. Its members were obliged to maintain confidentiality with regard to information obtained in connection with the fulfilled function. These norms became protected by criminal sanctions, set forth in the amended Article 58 of the law. New generic types of criminal acts were introduced, primarily aimed at protecting the participant's right to self-determination, the voluntariness of participation in the experiment, and the confidentiality of data submitted by the experimenters in their proposals to bioethics committees. These norms fill in the gaps that have existed so far in the criminal law protection of these values. The article systematically discusses the generic types of criminal acts that have been penalized in Article 58 (4) to (6) of the referenced law. Their object of protection, object side, subject, subject side, punishability and potential confluence with other regulations are presented. The historical-dogmatic justification for the introduction of these regulations is also shown. (shrink)

A minimally responsible threatener is someone who bears some responsibility for imposing an objectively wrongful threat, but whose responsibility does not rise to the level of culpability. Minimally responsible threateners include those who knowingly commit a wrongful harm under duress, those who are epistemically justified but mistaken in their belief that a morally risky activity will not cause a wrongful harm, and those who commit a harm while suffering from a cognitive impairment which makes it prohibitively difficult to recognize and (...) act on what is morally required of them. The chapter argues that minimally responsible threateners can indeed be morally liable for the harms they impose. Put differently, culpability is not a necessary basis for liability. (shrink)

Should there be civil liability when a person who could easily and without risk rescue another fails to do so? It is argued that the failure to act does not cause the harm that follows, and that the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction provides no basis for liability. In spite of this, it is maintained that there can sometimes be a duty to rescue, and even a right to be rescued, even in the absence of a voluntary undertaking or an explicit (...) assumption of responsibility.There are convincing arguments for some sort of legal recognition of a duty to rescue, but these arguments do not support tort liability. Nor is a case for tort liability made with the argument that a growth of tort law in this direction would be compatible with the values most centrally involved in the division between torts and contracts. Furthermore, there is a case against tort liability — namely, that the purpose of tort liability is to compensate, that there are certain sorts of situations in which compensation is apposite, and that failure to rescue does not fit into these categories. Criminal liability is the appropriate way for the law to recognize a duty to rescue. (shrink)

Developments in contract law over the past century have led to the proliferation of interpretive theories according to which contract law is no longer a sui generisi legal branch. It is widely accepted that if there is a sui generis contractual obligation, it must somehow be based on the wills of the parties. But a new orthodoxy in contract theory claims that the role of the will of the parties in contract law has been progressively shrinking due to judicial doctrines (...) within the law of contract and also to general statutory provisions. It is no longer apparent that there is any interesting sense in which contractual liability is based on the will of the parties. Hence, so it is claimed, contract law has lost its sui generis nature. The article challenges this new orthodoxy. But rather than reverting to the old orthodoxy—the will theory of contracts (or its contemporary rendition, contract as promise)—it argues that we should resist being forced to choose between them. The article argues that the purpose of contractual liability is to support the practice of voluntary obligations. This view preserves an important connection between contractual liability and voluntary undertakings and meets the objections that beset the will theory. (shrink)

Political contestability is an important issue in the ethical analysis of corporate political activity (hereafter CPA). Though previous studies have proposed analytical frameworks for creating contestable political systems, these studies conceive firm-level factors such as size and wealth as the main (and perhaps, only) determinants of contestability. This relegates the influences of informal managerial-level attributes such as tribalism, especially in ethnically diverse contexts where politics and tribe are inseparable. In this article, I explore the linkages between managers’ tribal identity and (...) political contestability among firms in Ghana. I found that contestability is affected by _tribal consonance_ (similarity) and _tribal dissonance_ (difference) between corporate executives and policymakers. I also found that dissonance creates _liability of tribe_, which causes contestability problems in all four stages of the CPA process—i.e., _political planning_, _political access, political voice_, and _political influence_. Overall, this article extends the micro–macro link of political connections from performance to the ethics of political competition and contestability. It offers important contributions to the literature, advances insightful implications for practice, and outlines useful future research directions. (shrink)

The United Kingdom case R v Lee EWCA Crim 1404 resulted in a pharmacist being convicted for an inadvertent dispensing error and paved way for the decriminalisation of such errors by way of a due diligence defence enacted in 2018. In relation to Hong Kong, what is its legal position for dispensing errors, and can it follow the decriminalising steps of UK? The primary objective of this paper is to explore whether and how HK can reach the normative position for (...) a dispensing error legal regime: I posit that the normative position for healthcare professional liability for dispensing errors should prioritise the public interest of minimisation of future dispensing errors over the retribution of past wrongs; I illustrate HK’s current position for the liabilities of HCPs on dispensing errors, focusing analysis on the relatively controversial aspects of HK’s criminal liability, referencing the landmark cases Hin Lin Yee v HKSAR 13 HKCFAR 142 and Kulemesin v HKSAR 16 HKCFAR 195 to assist my analysis of the requisite mental element for relevant statutory offences; through comparison with UK’s development post-R v Lee and application of Rule of Law principles, HK’s current position is critiqued, coming to the conclusion that while there are compelling reasons for the decriminalisation of dispensing errors in HK, the prerequisite for this to happen is an overhaul of regulatory frameworks by significantly increasing levels of accountability. (shrink)

The responsible corporate officer doctrine is, as a formal matter, an instance of strict criminal liability: the government need not prove the defendant’s mens rea in order to obtain a conviction, and the defendant may not escape conviction by proving lack of mens rea. Formal strict liability is sometimes consistent with retributive principles, especially when the strict liability pertains to the grading of an offense. But is strict liability consistent with retributive principles when it pertains, not (...) to grading, but to whether the defendant has crossed the threshold from noncriminal to criminal conduct? In this essay, I review the two most plausible arguments supporting an affirmative answer in the context of the RCO doctrine. First, perhaps this doctrine reflects a rule-like form of negligence, akin to a rule that prohibits selling alcohol to a minor. Second, perhaps this doctrine expresses a duty to use extraordinary care to prevent a harm. Neither argument is persuasive. The first argument, although valid in some circumstances, fails to explain and justify the RCO doctrine. The second argument, a duty to use extraordinary care, is also inadequate. If “extraordinary care” simply means a flexibly applied negligence standard that considers the burdens and benefits of taking a precaution, it is problematic in premising criminal liability on ordinary negligence. If instead it refers to a higher duty or standard of care, it has many possible forms, such as requiring only a very slight deviation from a permissible or justifiable standard of conduct, placing a “thumb” on the scale of the Learned Hand test, identifying an epistemic standard more demanding than a reasonable person test, or recognizing a standard that is insensitive to individual capacities. However, some of these variations present a gratuitous or incoherent understanding of “negligence,” and none of them sufficiently explain and justify the RCO doctrine. (shrink)

Workplace exposure to SARS-CoV-2 has sickened workers and, subsequently, their family members. Family members might be able to recover from the employer in a negligence action using “take-home” liability theory.

McMahan argues that justification defeats liability to defensive attack (which would undermine the thesis of the "moral equality of combatants"). In response, I argue, first, that McMahan’s attempt to burden the contrary claim with counter-intuitive implications fails; second, that McMahan’s own position implies that the innocent civilians do not have a right of self-defense against justified attackers, which neither coheres with his description of the case (the justified bombers infringe the rights of the civilians) nor with his views about (...) rights forfeiture, is unsupported by independent argument, and, in any case, extremely implausible and counter-intuitive; and third, that his interpretation of the insulin case confuses the normative relations between an agent’s justification and non-liability on the one hand and permissible or impermissible interference with the agent’s act on the other. Similar confusions, fourth, affect his discussion of liability to compensation. (shrink)

In most cases, liability in tort law is all-or-nothing—a defendant is either fully liable or not at all liable for a claimant's loss. By contrast, this paper defends a causal theory of partial liability. I argue that a defendant should be held liable for a claimant's loss only to the degree to which the defendant's wrongdoing contributed to the causing of the loss. I ground this principle in a conception of tort law as a system of corrective justice (...) and use it to critically evaluate different mechanisms for “limiting” liability for consequences of wrongdoing and for “apportioning” liability between multiple wrongdoers. (shrink)

According to Jeff McMahan, a person is liable to be killed in self-defense if the person has acted in such a way that to kill him would neither wrong him nor violate his rights. This account of self-defense has spawned something of a cottage industry in the philosophical literature of such “liability-based accounts.” Liability-based accounts of self-defense, however, are deficient for two reasons. First, they fail to account for the moral residue that remains in the wake of the (...) justified killing of another human being. Second, they are incapable of explaining cases in which people rationally opt not to kill in cases of justified self-defense. As an alternative, the chapter offers a reasons-based account of self-defense and demonstrates its capacity both to avoid counterintuitive views regarding the moral position of those who kill in self-defense and to explain a wider range of salient considerations regarding the morality of self-defense. (shrink)

Beginning with the seminal work by Williams and Nagel, moral philosophers have used auto accident hypotheticals to illustrate the phenomenon of moral luck. Moral luck is present in the hypotheticals because two equally careless drivers are assessed differently because only one of them caused an accident. This Article considers whether these philosophical discussions might contribute to the public policy debate over compensation for auto accidents. Using liability and insurance practices in the United States as an illustrative example, the Article (...) explains that auto liability insurance substantially mitigates moral luck and argues that, as a result, the moral luck literature is unlikely to make a significant contribution to this public policy debate. The debate would benefit more from philosophical analysis of victims’ luck, which is not as substantially mitigated by liability insurance. (shrink)

Complex technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) can cause harm, raising the question of who is liable for the harm caused. Research has identified multiple liability gaps (i.e., unsatisfactory outcomes when applying existing liability rules) in legal frameworks. In this paper, the concepts of shared responsibilities and fiduciary duties are explored as avenues to address liability gaps. The development, deployment and use of complex technologies are not clearly distinguishable stages, as often suggested, but are processes of cooperation (...) and co-creation. At the intersections of these stages, shared responsibilities and fiduciary duties of multiple actors can be observed. Although none of the actors have complete control or a complete overview, many actors have some control or influence, and, therefore, responsibilities based on fault, prevention or benefit. Shared responsibilities and fiduciary duties can turn liability gaps into liability overlaps. These concepts could be implemented in tort and contract law by amending existing law (e.g., by assuming that all stakeholders are liable unless they can prove they did not owe a duty of care) and by creating more room for partial liability reflecting partial responsibilities (e.g., a responsibility to signal or identify an issue without a corresponding responsibility to solve that issue). This approach better aligns legal liabilities with responsibilities, increases legal certainty, and increases cooperation and understanding between actors, improving the quality and safety of technologies. However, it may not solve all liability gaps, may have chilling effects on innovation, and may require further detailing through case law. (shrink)

This chapter discusses blameworthiness for problematic acts that an agent does inadvertently. Blameworthiness, as opposed to liability, is difficult to make sense of in this sort of case, as there is usually thought to be a tight connection between blameworthiness and something in the agent’s quality of will. This chapter argues that in personal relationships we should sometimes take responsibility for inadvertent actions. Taking on responsibility when we inadvertently fail in our duties to our loved ones assures them that (...) we respect them, take them seriously, and want to be respected and taken seriously in turn. The chapter ends with a defence of the claim that this is a genuine sort of blameworthiness. -/- . (shrink)

This article elaborates upon and defends the distinction between “primary duty” claims and “primary liability” claims in private law introduced in a previous article. In particular, I discuss the relevance of the distinction to the debates over fault and strict liability and “duty skepticism” and to the relationship between primary and remedial rights. I argue that the tendency to assume that all claims in private law arise from a breach of duty is a source of error and confusion. (...) As a prelude to the discussion, I set out an analysis of a claim or remedial right in private law as a Hohfeldian power correlated with a remedial liability. I also consider whether primary-liability claims can be formulated in terms of the legal relations found in Wesley Hohfeld's scheme, and I make some general comments about Hohfeldian analysis. (shrink)

This article discusses the problematic aspects relating to the employee dismissal based on application of the disciplinary liability. It contains analysis of two grounds for termination of the employment contract without any previous notice: 1) imposing several disciplinary sanctions upon the employee in the course of twelve months, and 2) the employee has only one breach of labour discipline but a gross one. The article is based on legal acts and judgements of Judicial Assemblies of the Civil Division of (...) the Supreme Court of Lithuania and resolutions of the Senate of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in order to provide the legislative execution practice as well as reveal the problems in this field of labour law. (shrink)

In contrast to theoretical discussions about potential professional liability of clinical ethicists, this report gives the results of empirical data gathered in a national survey of clinical medical ethicists. The report assesses the types of activities of clinical ethicists, the extent and types of their professional liability coverage, and the influence that concerns about legal liability has on how they function as clinical ethicists. In addition demographic data on age, sex, educational background, etc. are reported. The results (...) show that while nearly one third (28.9%) of the ethicists regularly make recommendations about patient care, only 10.8% of them regularly make entries in the medical record; only approximately half (53.0%) of them are covered by professional liability (malpractice) insurance; and the vast majority (84.3%) of them say that concerns about legal liability do not influence the way they function as clinical ethicists. (shrink)

In this contribution we will explore some of the implications of the vision of Ambient Intelligence (AmI) for law and legal philosophy. AmI creates an environment that monitors and anticipates human behaviour with the aim of customised adaptation of the environment to a person’s inferred preferences. Such an environment depends on distributed human and non-human intelligence that raises a host of unsettling questions around causality, subjectivity, agency and (criminal) liability. After discussing the vision of AmI we will present relevant (...) research in the field of philosophy of technology, inspired by the post-phenomenological position taken by Don Ihde and the constructivist realism of Bruno Latour. We will posit the need to conceptualise technological normativity in comparison with legal normativity, claiming that this is necessary to develop democratic accountability for the implications of emerging technologies like AmI. Lastly we will investigate to what extent technological devices and infrastructures can and should be used to achieve compliance with the criminal law, and we will discuss some of the implications of non-human distributed intelligence for criminal liability. (shrink)

:Strict liability in tort law is thought by some to have a moral counterpart. In this essay I attempt to determine whether there is, in fact, strict liability in the moral domain. I argue that there is, and I critically evaluate several accounts of its normative foundations before suggesting one of my own.

The paper considers the proper method for theorizing about criminal jurisdiction. It challenges a received understanding of how to substantiate the right to punish, and articulates an alternative account of how that theoretical task is properly conducted. The received view says that a special relationship is the ground of a tribunal’s authority to prosecute and, hence, that a normative theory of that authority is faced with identifying a distinctive relation. The alternative account locates prosecutorial standing on an institution’s capacity to (...) address the basic reasons generating criminal liability. This reframes the normative issues at stake, and has the result that various, perhaps quite heterogeneous, considerations can substantiate penal authority. It also eliminates the existence of a special relation as a necessary condition for legitimate criminal accountability. The argument proceeds by offering an analysis and account of universal jurisdiction. Not only does the alternative elegantly perform where the received view struggles, it can accommodate much of what motivates the pursuit of relational ties in existing efforts to vindicate jurisdictional conclusions. (shrink)

The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (UN-SDGs) offer a comprehensive framework for global sustainable development, embraced by both UN member states and multinational enterprises (MNEs). The SDGs take a holistic approach and emphasize the need to align public- and private-sector actions. However, understanding the effectiveness of the SDG framework in coordinating stakeholder actions remains a challenge. This study explores how MNEs engage with the SDGs as a function of their home countries’ SDG profiles. Leveraging institutional theory, we test competing mechanisms (...) by analyzing sustainability reports from 150 MNEs across 23 countries. Our results suggest that MNEs’ engagement with the SDGs aligns most closely with a “liability of origin” explanation, with firms showing greater SDG engagement when their home countries have lower progress on the SDGs. However, at the individual SDG level, the engagement patterns are more nuanced. Our findings have important implications for both theory and practice, providing insights into the complex dynamics that shape MNEs’ engagement with the SDGs and offering guidance for policymakers and businesses seeking to enhance their contributions to sustainable development. (shrink)

This article presents the conception of negligent account management, analyses the rules of the criminal act that govern criminal liability for negligent account management, by focussing on the form of guilt and the problem of its content. The plenary session’s conclusion that the two offences – failure to administer bookkeeping and failure to protect the bookkeeping documents – can be committed both intentionally and negligently is disputed in this article. The adoption of the new Criminal Code in 2000, setting (...) the form of guilt and its content in criminal cases for negligent account management, posed no significant problems – the court practice and legal literature followed the attitude that this crime could be committed only negligently. According to Article 16(4) of the Criminal Code 2000, a person is punished for negligent commission of a crime or a misdemeanour only in individual cases stipulated in the Special Part of the Criminal Code. The problem was that no “individual case” was foreseen in Article 223 of the Criminal Code that imposed liability for negligent bookkeeping. This created preconditions for deviating from pre-existing case-law under which this crime could be qualified as negligent. Only in 2009 the Criminal Division of the Lithuanian Supreme Court concluded in its plenary session that Article 223 of the Criminal Code provided liability for criminal record-keeping and accounting only if committed negligently as a form of guilt, and other activities pursuant to this Article might be committed intentionally and recklessly. The plenary session identified a loophole of criminal law and created preconditions for the formation of uniform court practice. Only the legislator can remove the loophole of criminal law identified by the Supreme Court of Lithuania. The author states that all of the acts named in Article 223 of the Criminal Code can be committed negligently and suggests applying the rule contained in Article 16(4) of the Criminal Code to Article 223 of the Criminal Code. All of these findings are based on historical, grammatical and logical interpretation of the “neglect” concept and the analysis of Articles 222 and 223 of the Criminal Code. (shrink)

It is easy to understand the apparent appeal of strict liability to policymakers and legal reformers seeking to reduce crime: if the criminal law can do away with its traditional culpability requirement, it can increase the likelihood of conviction and punishment of those who engage in prohibited conduct or bring about prohibited harm or evil. And such an increase in punishment rate can enhance the crime-control effectiveness of a system built upon general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous. Similar (...) arguments support the use of criminal liability for regulatory offenses. Greater punishment rates suggest greater compliance. But this analysis fails to appreciate the crime-control costs of strict liability. By explicitly providing for punishment in the absence of moral blameworthiness, the law undermines its moral credibility with the community and thereby provokes subversion and resistance instead of the cooperation and acquiescence it needs for effective crime control. More importantly, the system’s lost moral credibility undermines the law’s ability to harness the powerful forces of stigmatization, social influence, and internalized norms. Given the serious limitations inherent in the real-world application of general deterrence and preventive detention programs, the most effective crime-control strategy is to build the criminal law’s reputation for being just, which means avoiding the use of strict liability. (shrink)

The principal theme of this paper is secondary liability ‐ to what extent should we hold those who cooperate in wrongdoing and illicit behavior accountable? We probe this question by considering a lawsuit filed by the entertainment industry against the file‐swapping services of Grokster and StreamCast. Our focus is on the legal and moral implications of this case. We argue that the courts, which have so far ruled in favor of the defendants, have misapplied the socalled Sony precedent for (...) two reasons. The business model of these companies depends on copyright infringement with advertising volume directly proportionate to the level of that infringement. Also, Sony’s safe harbor should not apply if there is active inducement of infringement. The key ethical question is the extent to which technological innovators must design and write their code to deal with infringement ex ante. We argue that purveyors of peerto‐ peer technology are formal cooperators in wrongdoing if they deliberately configure their system to enable the illicit copying of copyrighted music and movie files. We also consider the conditions for unjustifiable material cooperation, and propose these conditions as a normative standard especially relevant for software vendors. (shrink)