ABSTRACT If we have a duty not to infect others, how far does it go? This question is often discussed with respect to HIV transmission, but reflection on other diseases like influenza raises a number of interesting theoretical issues. I argue that a duty to avoid infection not only yields requirements for persons who know they carry a disease, but also for persons who know they are at increased risk, and even for those who definitely know they are completely healthy. (...) Given the numerous ways in which human interaction facilitates the spread of communicable diseases, a maximum level of precaution would be very demanding – possibly unreasonably demanding. The ‘over‐demandingness problem’ is mostly invoked as a criticism of utilitarianism, as this theory requires moral agents to always maximise general welfare, even at significant cost for themselves. However, I argue that, with respect to precautions against infectious diseases like influenza, utilitarianism is able to avoid the over‐demandingness problem. A contractualist account, on the other hand, whilst able to explain how one's obligations to avoid infection can be limited, given that other persons have opportunities and responsibilities to protect themselves, in the end requires precautions that raise the over‐demandingness problem. (shrink)

Résumé Le principe de précaution engage les rapports entre la connaissance, les risques et l’action ; appréhendé d’un point de vue simultanément éthique et politique, il pose également un défi aux institutions et au public pour ce qui est de sa mobilisation dans le débat et de sa mise en œuvre dans l’action, en tant que principe possédant une portée générale. L’article propose une description des problèmes spécifiques que comporte, à cet égard, le choix des interprétations. Cette description conduit à (...) une appréciation positive du nouveau rôle dévolu aux démarches participatives dans la discussion des enjeux éthiques et des risques acceptables. (shrink)

Solar radiation management is a form of geoengineering that involves the intentional manipulation of solar radiation with the aim of reducing global average temperature. This paper explores what precaution implies about the status of solar radiation management. It is argued that any form of solar radiation management that poses threats of catastrophe cannot constitute an appropriate precautionary measure against another threat of catastrophe, namely climate change. Research of solar radiation management is appropriate on a precautionary view only insofar as (...) such research aims to identify whether any forms of solar radiation management could be implemented without creating new or exacerbating existing threats of catastrophe. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on finding better ways to conceptualize precaution. Precaution has now become an established principle of environmental governance, although it has not been distinguished from conventional risk assessment. It has been considered by some as the antithesis of risk assessment in the sense that it is done to avoid serious potential harm, without scientific certainty as to the likelihood, magnitude, or causation of that harm. The first and foremost task of this chapter is to show that (...) these concepts are non-overlapping. It also elaborates on the reasons why precaution should be taken seriously, and that, on the flipside, traditional risk assessment, or cost-benefit analysis, does not take precaution seriously because of its pervasive nature. This fact represents the ascendancy of a decision-making calculus that grew out of twentieth-century British moral theory and culminated in 1944 with the presentation of the doctrine now familiarly known as the theory of expected utility. (shrink)

Precaution is usually associated with the intuition that it is better to be safe than sorry, and/or that it is sometimes necessary to act in advance of scientific certainty to prevent harmful outcomes. At this point, we cannot entirely prevent climate change, but we can affect how harmful such change is. Adaptation may therefore be understood as a precautionary measure against the damage due to climate change. 'The' precautionary principle alone is too vague to shape adaptation policy, but a (...) limited catastrophic precautionary principle may productively guide adaptation policy makers. I argue in this paper that an explicit commitment to a precautionary approach based on the catastrophic precautionary principle could and should be made to strengthen the adaptation policies introduced at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (shrink)

(2013). Precaution and Proportionality: A Reply to Turner. Ethics, Policy & Environment. ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/21550085.2013.844572.

This paper explores a framework for thinking about risks inherent in emerging technologies; given uncertainty about the magnitude—or even nature—of those risks, deliberation about those technologies is challenged. §1 develops a conceptual framework for risk, and §2 integrates that conception into cost-benefit analysis. Given uncertainty, we are often pushed toward precautionary approaches, and such approaches are explored in §3. These first three sections are largely literature review, and then a positive argument for how to think about the relationship between risk, (...) precaution, and uncertainty is offered in §4. (shrink)

Résumé La précaution a été critiquée non en elle-même, mais comme « principe », à la fois sur le plan juridique et scientifique. Les formulations du principe prêtaient à confusion, à cause du jargon « scientifique » utilisé (cf. absence de preuves, de « certitudes scientifiques »). Liée à l’urgence, la précaution ressortit à une philosophie de l’agir, qui comporte menace, vulnérabilité, anticipation, appréhension, et c’est de ce côté qu’il faut chercher la logique de la précaution. En premier lieu, une (...) « déduction sémantique a priori » (Derrida) permet de mettre en évidence les caractéristiques de la peur, qui justifie la précaution. En second lieu, un rappel de la tradition philosophique confirme cette déduction, rappel qui va d’Aristote ( Rhétorique : ce qu’est la peur et comment on est quand on l’éprouve ; Éthique à Nicomaque : le courage, l’intrépidité, la disposition acquise) à Heidegger ( Être et Temps : la peur comme disposition insigne, esquisse de l’angoisse, du souci, de la responsabilité, de la résolution), en passant par des étapes essentielles : Augustin (la cura, la curiosité), Kant (derniers écrits), Nietzsche ( Seconde Inactuelle ). Enfin, et en conclusion, la précaution apparaît non comme une démission de la connaissance, mais comme une incitation à mieux scénariser, à mieux gérer l’avenir, en cultivant une imagination anticipative, complémentaire de l’innovation. (shrink)

While there is an extensive literature on how the precautionary principle should be interpreted and when precautions should be taken, relatively little discussion exists about the fair distribution of costs of taking precautions. We address this issue by proposing a general framework for deciding how costs of precautions should be shared, which consists of a series of default principles that are triggered according to desert, rights, and ability to pay. The framework is developed with close attention to the pragmatics of (...) how distributions will affect actual behaviours. It is intended to help decision-makers think more systematically about distributional consequences of taking precautionary measures, thereby to improve decision-making. Two case studies—one about a ban on turtle fishing in Costa Rica, and one about a deep-sea mining project in Papua New Guinea—are given to show how the framework can be applied. (shrink)

It has been argued that the precautionary principle is incoherent and thus useless as a guide for regulatory policy. In a recent paper in Bioethics, Wareham and Nardini propose a response to the ‘precautionary paradox’ according to which the precautionary principle's usefulness for decision making in policy and regulation contexts can be justified by appeal to a probability threshold discriminating between negligible and non‐negligible risks. It would be of great significance to debates about risk and precaution if there were (...) a sound method for determining a minimum probability threshold of negligible risk. This is what Wareham and Nardini aim to do. The novelty of their approach is that they suggest that such a threshold should be determined by a method of public deliberation. In this article I discuss the merits of Wareham and Nardini’s public deliberation method for determining thresholds. I raise an epistemic worry about the public deliberation method they suggest, and argue that their proposal is inadequate due to a hidden assumption that the acceptability of a risk can be completely analysed in terms of its probability. (shrink)

Systemic risks are risks produced through interconnected non-wrongful actions of individuals, in the sense that an individual's action is a negligible cause of the risk. Due to scale effects of interaction, their consequences can be serious but they are also difficult to predict and assess via a risk assessment. Since we can have good reason to engage in the interconnected activities giving rise to systemic risk, we incur a concurrent collective responsibility to ensure that the risks are fairly distributed and (...) well regulated. James argues that fairness in this context requires taking reasonably available precautions ensuring for each risk-bearer a favourable ratio of expected benefits over expected losses. In sections 2 and 3 we argue that such a conception of fairness applies but only on the condition that the systemic risks created are irreversible risks and that the general background conditions of justice are imperfectly fair. When risks are reversible, compensatory justice can correct for unfairness in risk imposition. Where risks are irreversible, compensatory justice necessarily fails, giving rise to a collective responsibility to regulate fairly ex ante. Additionally, where background conditions of justice are fully fair and the systemic risk is well understood, risk bearers can be said to have consented to the systemic risk. If they are not fair, we argue that the primary political obligation should lie in fixing the fairness of the backgrounds of justice. A related reason for addressing the general background conditions of fairness is that James’ account of fairness in systemic risk imposition encounters a baseline problem. If expected risks and benefits are calculated again an unfair historic background condition, systemic risk imposition would not be fully fair. Section 4 shows why differences in evidentiary uncertainty as to probability and levels of harm and effective responses require a normatively appropriate response in the form of additional precautions. We show that the evidentiary standards set for risk-based cost-benefit analysis have a connection with deontology because they express a postulate of equal treatment in formal terms. Systemic risks can have different possible degrees of epistemological certainty due to factors of social and natural origin, such as more available research funding or higher degrees of complexity for some systemic risks but not others. These differences have to be mitigated by taking even greater precautions in difficult-to-research systemic risks. (shrink)

Health care services are constantly assessed by their ability to accommodate values popular in contemporary societies. Autonomy, justice, and human dignity have for some time been among such values in the affluent West. Relative newcomers in the field are the notions of and which seem to attract, in particular, Continental European ethicists. a.

The commercialization of transgenic crops has engendered significant resistance from environmental groups and defensive responses from industry. A part of this struggle entails the politicization of science as groups gather evidence from the scholarly literature to defend a supportive or opposing position to transgenic crop commercialization. The authors argue that novel technology development and associated scientific uncertainty have led to two competing approaches to risk management: precaution and ex post trial and error. In this paper we use the controversies (...) over currently commercialized transgenic crops to analyze the debate over these competing approaches. We also suggest a hybrid approach that incorporates a precautionary selection process, but also relies on ex post trial and error after commercialization. This approach is labeled precaution through experience since the development of a technology’s characteristics would ideally take into account previous experience with similar technologies, or rather technologies with similar applications. The authors argue that substantial public participation and dialogue is needed to identify socially desirable crop traits to guide research and development. Policy tools are also recommended that provide incentives to private-sector firms to engineer the identified traits into crops. (shrink)

In reply to commentary on our target article, we supply further evidence and hypotheses in the description of ritualized behaviors in humans. Reactions to indirect fitness threats probably activate specialized precaution systems rather than a unified form of danger-avoidance or causal reasoning. Impairment of precaution systems may be present in pathologies other than obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), autism in particular. Ritualized behavior is attention-grabbing enough to be culturally transmitted whether or not it is associated with group identity, cohesion, or (...) with any other social aspect of collective ceremonies. (Published Online February 8 2007). (shrink)

Daniel Steel’s new book on the precautionary principle illustrates the need to work ahead to fuse perspectives of epistemology and philosophy of science with those of ethics to accomplish progress in the debate on the proper role of precaution in a broad selection of bioethical areas. Steel advances the territory greatly with regard to conceptual clarity and epistemology, but from a bioethics standpoint he is mistaken in discounting the need for ethical underpinnings of a sound theory of the precautionary (...) principle. (shrink)

Toute innovation, surtout si elle est qualifiée de démocratique, ne comporte pas sa justification par sa seule énonciation. L’ expérimentalisme démocratique ne se précipite pas vers une institutionnalisation de la participation citoyenne sans avoir analysé avec précaution ces deux moments que furent le Grand débat national et la Convention citoyenne pour le climat. Une innovation retient plus particulièrement l’attention ici : la présence d’un comité légistique pour transcrire les propositions des 150 membres de la Convention. N’a-t-on pas commis un contresens (...) comme beaucoup d’entrepreneurs de la participation qui en appellent à Habermas, alors qu’il défend l’État de droit plutôt que la politique délibérative? A-t-on pris un risque en soumettant le droit à une discussion faiblement instituée? Ces deux expériences sont des révélateurs du chemin qui reste à faire pour arriver à joindre le projet liant droit et démocratie avec des publics hétérogènes et pas comme « la fiction » qu’Habermas revendique. C’est donc un exercice de modestie dans lequel les citoyens apprennent qu’ils ne sont pas les explorateurs d’une terra incognita, ni en matière climatique et ni en matière institutionnelle. (shrink)

An effective application of thePrecautionary Principle (PP) hinges on thestipulation that, ``a lack of scientificcertainty shall not be used as a reason forpostponing measures.'' The practicalconsequences of this expression are presentlynot clear enough in most contexts of use toenable constructive communication and thereforethe PP is not sufficiently operational now. Apragmatic and fundamental methodology forunderstanding scientific (un)certainty indifferent practical contexts needs to be put inplace to create a communicative basis foreffective precaution. Lack of clarity aboutproblem definition and problem ownershipcreates artificial (...) controversies that willobstruct a precautionary approach. Given thefact that different practical contexts ofscientific (un)certainty exist, it may seemfrom one context as if no precaution iswarranted whereas concerns from anotherrelevant context may suggest otherwise.Therefore, an integrative methodologicalframework for communicating about scientific(un)certainty is sorely needed in internationalpolicy-making. By putting a focus on therelevance of specified research questions forthe objective of taking precaution, acommunicative methodology may be adopted thatis dedicated to the design properties of asustainable future. Precaution cannot beoperationalized without a methodological basisthat allows for effective transparency andevades the stalemates of artificialcontroversy. Existing debate methodologies haveso far not managed to accommodate thesepressing demands. (shrink)

How cautious should regulators be? A standard answer is consequentialist: regulators should be just cautious enough to maximize expected social value. This paper charts the prospects of a nonconsequentialist - and more precautionary - alternative. More specifically, it argues that a contractualism focused on ex ante consent can motivate the following regulatory criterion: regulators should permit a socially beneficial risky activity only if no one can be expected to be made worse off by it. Broadly speaking, there are two strategies (...) regulators can use to help risky activities satisfy this criterion: regulators can mandate strict safety standards that protect those who would otherwise stand to lose, and they can require that some of the benefits of the activity be redirected to them. In developing these themes, the paper aims to provide a theoretical grounding for those who oppose using risk-cost-benefit analysis as the primary regulatory standard, and in particular, for advocates of the precautionary principle. (shrink)

This article explores the consequences of falling costs of solar and wind power for the ethics of climate change mitigation. We suggest that price competitiveness of renewables reveals a divergence of interest between fossil fuel consumers and producers: cheap renewables strengthen precautionary arguments for aggressive mitigation for consumers but threaten the economic base of producers. As existing applications of the precautionary principle to climate change do not address this issue, we develop a novel approach based on lexical utilities. Given the (...) premise that climate catastrophe entails economic catastrophe but not vice versa, we argue that both producers and consumers should favor mitigation. (shrink)

The precautionary principle brings a special challenge to the practice of evidence-based public health decision-making, suggesting changes in the interpretative methods of public health used to identify causes of disease. In this paper, precautionary changes to these methods are examined: including discounting contrary evidence, reducing the number of causal criteria, weakening the rules of evidence assigned to the criteria, and altering thresholds for statistical significance. All such changes reflect the precautionary goal of earlier primary preventive intervention, i.e. acting on insufficient (...) evidence, the least amount, or minimum level, of evidence for causation. Evaluating the impact of these changes will be difficult without a careful study of how well the current methods of causal inference work, their theoretical foundations, and the ethical implications of their applications. That research program will be most productive if it is jointly developed by public health professionals trained in the ethics and philosophy and by bioethicists and philosophers trained in the theories, methods, and practice of public health. (shrink)

After a brief reconstruction of the principle of precaution’s juridical rising, I will discuss in short the question of the juridical nature of the same principle and then examine some of its extra-juridical implications, showing how the intrinsic logic of the principle of precaution implies a strict connection with the needs and proper forms of a conception of democracy as participative.

The events surrounding COVID-19, combined with the mandatory quarantines widely imposed in Asia and Europe since the virus outbreak, have reignited discussion of the balance between individual rights and liberties and public health during epidemics and pandemics. This article analyses this issue from the perspectives of precaution and necessity. There is a difficult relationship between these two seemingly opposite principles, both of which are frequently invoked in this domain. Although the precautionary principle encourages the use of quarantines, including mandatory (...) quarantines, and associated restrictive measures, the principle of necessity puts a break on such measures. The COVID-19 pandemic reveals once again the different interrelations between these two principles. However, the alleged conflict between the PN and the PP is based on a superficial analysis. The relation between these two principles is far more complex, as this article will demonstrate. (shrink)

Cet article porte sur l’introduction du principe de précaution en matière de gestion du jeu. Il repose sur les réflexions suggérées par deux recherches effectuées au cours des dernières années par le Laboratoire d’éthique publique. Ainsi, il tente de répondre aux questions posées par ces deux recherches précédentes : comment gérer de façon responsable? Au nom de quel principe agir? Où tracer la limite de ce qu’il devrait être ou non permis de faire dans la commercialisation et l’exploitation des jeux (...) de hasard et d’argent? Les auteurs tentent donc de démontrer que l’adoption par l’État du principe de précaution lui permettrait de faire preuve de plus de rigueur dans la gestion d’une industrie qui pose de sérieux problèmes de santé publique. (shrink)

The maximin rule can be used as a formal version of the precautionary principle. This paper evaluates the feasibility and the intuitive plausibility of this decision rule. The major conclusions are: (1) Precaution has to be applied symmetrically. (2) Precaution is only possible when outcomes are comparable in terms of value, so that it can be determined which outcome is worst. (3) Precaution is sensitive to standards of possibility. Far-away scenarios have to be excluded, and it is (...) difficult to find a principled way to draw the line. (4) Precaution is sensitive to the framing of decision problems. Local cautiousness may add up to global incautiousness. (shrink)

The precautionary principle is frequently invoked in environmental law and policy, and the debate around the principle indicates that there is little agreement on what 'taking precautions' means. The purpose of the present paper is to provide an improved conceptual foundation for this debate in the form of an explication of the concept of precaution. Distinctions between precaution and two related concepts, prevention and pessimism, are briefly discussed. The concept of precaution is analysed in terms of precautionary (...) actions. It is argued that precautionary actions are implicitly assumed to be precautionary with respect to something, and that this assumption should be made explicit. A definition of a precautionary action involving three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (intentionality, uncertainty and reasonableness) is proposed, and the implications of this analysis for the debate on the precautionary principle are discussed. (shrink)

Since a couple of decades, the notion of a precautionary principle plays a central and increasingly influential role in international as well as national policy and regulation regarding the environment and the use of technology. Urging society to take action in the face of potential risks of human activities in these areas, the recent focus on climate change has further sharpened the importance of this idea. However, the idea of a precautionary principle has also been problematised and criticised by scientists, (...) scholars and policy activists, and been accused of almost every intellectual sin imaginable: unclarity, impracticality, arbitrariness and moral as well as political unsoundness. In that light, the very idea of precaution as an ideal for policy making rather comes out as a dead end. On the basis of these contrasting starting points, Christian Munthe undertakes an innovative, in-depth philosophical analysis of what the idea of a precautionary principle is and should be about. A novel theory of the ethics of imposing risks is developed and used as a foundation for defending the idea of precaution in environmental and technological policy making against its critics, while at the same time avoiding a number of identified flaws. The theory is shown to have far-reaching consequences for areas such as bio-, information- and nuclear technology, and global environmental policy in areas such as climate change. The author argues that, while the price we pay for precaution must not be too high, we have to be prepared to pay it in order to act ethically defensible. A number of practical suggestions for precautionary regulation and policy making are made on the basis of this, and some challenges to basic ethical theory as well as consumerist societies, the global political order and liberal democracy are identified. (shrink)

Medical technologies, including nanomedicine products, are intended to improve health but in many cases may also create their own health risks. Medical products that create their own health risks differ from most other risk-creating technologies in that the very purpose of the medical technology is to prevent or treat health risks. This paradox of technologies intended to reduce existing risks that may have the effect of creating new risks has two conflicting implications. On one hand, we may be more tolerant (...) of health risks from medical technologies because these products are intended to, and often do, reduce overall health risks and improve our health. The health benefits of a medical technology may outweigh the unavoidable adverse effects of that same technology in an individual patient or in the overall treated population. (shrink)

The emergence of synthetic biology holds the potential of a major breakthrough in the life sciences by transforming biology into a predictive science. The dual-use characteristics of similar breakthroughs during the twentieth century have led to the application of benignly intended research in e.g. virology, bacteriology and aerobiology in offensive biological weapons programmes. Against this background the article raises the question whether the precautionary governance of synthetic biology can aid in preventing this techno-science witnessing the same fate? In order to (...) address this question, this paper proceeds in four steps: it firstly introduces the emerging techno-science of synthetic biology and presents some of its potential beneficial applications. It secondly analyses contributions to the bioethical discourse on synthetic biology as well as precautionary reasoning and its application to life science research in general and synthetic biology more specifically. The paper then identifies manifestations of a moderate precautionary principle in the emerging synthetic biology dual-use governance discourse. Using a dual-use governance matrix as heuristic device to analyse some of the proposed measures, it concludes that the identified measures can best be described as “patchwork precaution” and that a more systematic approach to construct a web of dual-use precaution for synthetic biology is needed in order to guard more effectively against the field’s future misuse for harmful applications. (shrink)

À première vue, la précaution n’a plus de rôle majeur à jouer face aux risques liés aux changements climatiques dont l’origine anthropique est désormais avérée. Elle aurait ainsi laissé la place en partie à la prévention, ce qui n’a rien de surprenant puisque ces deux approches s’inscrivent dans un continuum. Les risques générés par les changements climatiques ont cependant la particularité d’être des risques globaux à la fois en raison de la multiplicité des acteurs qui en sont à l’origine et (...) de la portée des préjudices qui découlent de leur réalisation. Or il reste au moins deux éléments d’incertitude scientifique qui concernent, d’une part, les liens entre les effets globaux des changements climatiques et les effets au niveau local et, d’autre part, les interactions possibles entre risques multiples. Face à ces éléments d’incertitude variables, la précaution est le curseur permettant de déterminer à un instant précis l’acceptabilité sociale des risques. L’approche de précaution constitue l’origine et le principe directeur d’un processus de recherche et de décision caractérisé par la pluralité : des situations de précaution ouvrent la voie à des degrés de précaution et à différents niveaux de mesures de précaution. Cette dynamique se manifeste du point de vue juridique au niveau du processus d’identification des risques, de la détermination des obligations des Etats et enfin de l’engagement de leur responsabilité. (shrink)

The Convention on Biological Diversity opens the possibility to negotiate a legally binding Biosafety Protocol to assess and minimize risks in the field of transboundary transfer, handling, and use of organisms modified by genetic engineering. Two principles— the Precautionary Principle and the Principle of Familiarity—guiding the risk assessment as basis of import decisions on such organisms are discussed. Developing and European industrialized countries favor the Precautionary Principle. The U.S., Australia, Japan, and some others call for the Principle of Familiarity. These (...) two principles exhibit opposite effects on scientific progress in general and on scientific methodology of risk assessment in particular. With the example of risk assessment by the U.S. company Monsanto discussed below, it could be illustrated that the Principle of Familiarity opens the way for superficial evaluations based on citing arbitrary references while the Precautionary Principle is an incentive for developing and applying sound methodology in experimental risk assessment. on the transboundary transfer of such LMOs, for example, on the international exchange of and trade with transgenic seeds, grains, animals, or bacteria. The negotiations are based on Articles 19.3 and 8(g) of the Convention on Biological Diversity, elaborated during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, and on Decision II/5 of the Second Conference of the Parties to this Convention in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 1995 (see the appendix; for more documents, see www.biodiv.org). Until the Fourth Conference of the Parties in 1998, 172 states ratified this convention. This conference decided to finish the Biosafety Protocol in February 1999. In 1998, transgenic crops were allowed to be planted in eight (75%) countries of the world. As the country with the largest acreage of transgenic crops and as the main trader of LMOs, the United States cannot become a member of the protocol until it has ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity. (shrink)

Ritualized behavior, intuitively recognizable by its stereotypy, rigidity, repetition, and apparent lack of rational motivation, is found in a variety of life conditions, customs, and everyday practices: in cultural rituals, whether religious or non-religious; in many children's complicated routines; in the pathology of obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD); in normal adults around certain stages of the life-cycle, birthing in particular. Combining evidence from evolutionary anthropology, neuropsychology and neuroimaging, we propose an explanation of ritualized behavior in terms of an evolved Precaution System (...) geared to the detection of and reaction to inferred threats to fitness. This system, distinct from fear-systems geared to respond to manifest danger, includes a repertoire of clues for potential danger as well as a repertoire of species-typical precautions. In OCD pathology, this system does not supply a negative feedback to the appraisal of potential threats, resulting in doubts about the proper performance of precautions, and repetition of action. Also, anxiety levels focus the attention on low-level gestural units of behavior rather than on the goal-related higher-level units normally used in parsing the action-flow. Normally automatized actions are submitted to cognitive control. This “swamps” working memory, an effect of which is a temporary relief from intrusions but also their long-term strengthening. Normal activation of this Precaution System explains intrusions and ritual behaviors in normal adults. Gradual calibration of the system occurs through childhood rituals. Cultural mimicry of this system's normal input makes cultural rituals attention-grabbing and compelling. A number of empirical predictions follow from this synthetic model. (Published Online February 8 2007) Key Words: childhood ritual; compulsion; event boundaries; evolutionary psychology; obsessive-compulsive disorder; ritual; thought intrusion. (shrink)

La présente contribution analyse les deux risques auxquels sont confrontés l’administration pénitentiaire et son personnel, les surveillants notamment, dans leur lutte contre la radicalisation : le risque de la protection insuffisante de la société face à des conversions non repérées et susceptibles d’aboutir à des actes violents de type terroriste, d’une part, et, d’autre part, le risque du signalement systématique pouvant conduire au renforcement du sentiment de discrimination chez certains détenus et, paradoxalement, constituer un terrain favorable au développement de la (...) radicalisation violente. Pour dépasser ces deux risques, il est proposé, à partir de données de terrain, une application équilibrée du principe de précaution qui devrait reposer sur une meilleure formation des personnels par la pratique, entre autres, de l’interprétation croisée. (shrink)

La présente contribution analyse le rôle du principe de précaution lorsque des médicaments ou des vaccins exposent les patients à un risque d’atteintes corporelles. S’il était pleinement consacré en droit de la responsabilité civile, le principe de précaution permettrait de faire peser sur les laboratoires pharmaceutiques, non seulement la charge des dommages que les médicaments ou les vaccins causent, mais encore celle des risques graves et irréversibles, même scientifiquement incertains, auxquels ils exposent les patients, ce qui peut sembler injuste. L’examen (...) du droit positif montre cependant que le principe de précaution a d’ores et déjà contribué à assouplir les conditions de la responsabilité civile en matière de médicaments et de vaccins. (shrink)

La notion de risque est mal comprise. Elle est intrinsèquement liée à notre perception de ce qu’est le hasard, aux peurs et aux biais cognitifs résultants de notre histoire individuelle et collective. Dans un monde de plus en plus chaotique, soumis au dictat du temps et avide d’émotions, il est dangereux de voir dans les chiffres et les algorithmes de nouveaux oracles. Accompagnant l’éducation au discernement, la confiance est un élément vital de la gouvernance dans le changement de paradigme qui (...) nous traverse. Car si la prévention est salutaire, la précaution, établie comme principe, ouvre la voie à des obscurantismes. Familier des chiffres et des usages du système d’information, nous proposons dans une première section des éléments de lecture pour comprendre que ce qui compte avant tout dans la gouvernance, c’est ce que l’on souhaite voir advenir. Une seconde section est l’occasion de toucher du doigt les limites des chiffres et du bon sens à travers un exemple pédagogique sur le questionnement du dépistage systématique, qui a agité, un temps, les débats pendant la gestion de la pandémie de la Covid-19 en France en ce début d’année. (shrink)

This paper aims to scrutinize how the notion of risk should be understood and applied to possibly catastrophic cases. I begin with clarifying the standard usage of the notion of risk, particularly emphasizing the conceptual relation between risk and probability. Then, I investigate how to make decisions in the case of seemingly catastrophic disasters by contrasting the precautionary principle with the preventive (prevention) principle. Finally, I examine what kind of causal thinking tends to be actually adopted when we make decisions (...) on emergent cases. My arguments are mainly based on Japan's 2011 massive earthquake and nuclear power station accident. Masaki Ichinose. (shrink)

Environmental risk assessment is often affected by severe uncertainty. The frequently invoked precautionary principle helps to guide risk assessment and decision-making in the face of scientific uncertainty. In many contexts, however, uncertainties play a role not only in the application of scientific models but also in their development. Building on recent literature in the philosophy of science, this paper argues that precaution should be exercised at the stage when tools for risk assessment are developed as well as when they (...) are used to inform decision-making. The relevance and consequences of this claim are discussed in the context of the threshold of the toxicological concern approach in food toxicology. I conclude that the approach does not meet the standards of an epistemic version of the precautionary principle. (shrink)

In some applications to human beings, the precautionary principle seems to raise specific ethical concerns. For instance, it has been used by a business owner in a court of justice to justify his refusal to hire applicants with a certain geographical origin for safety reasons. Or in public management, the precautionary principle has been used to exclude men who have sexual relations with men from donating blood on the basis of a higher HIV prevalence in this group. Does not the (...) precautionary principle here amount to justifying a form of discrimination? To help analyze what is at stake from a decision-theoretic viewpoint and to consider the possibility of ethical catastrophes, we offer a lexical utility model of the precautionary principle, which generalizes a previous model by Bartha and DesRoches (Synthese 199:8701–8740, 2021), Steel and Bartha (Risk Anal https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13892, 2022). Traditional expected utility theory also comes out as a special case of the model. Our proposal opens new perspectives for considering ethical dilemmas within a precautionary approach. It is intended to serve as a guiding tool for management teams in socially responsible companies, public institutions, and government agencies. (shrink)

The last decade has seen significant developments in UK health policy, with are largely claimed to be evidence based. However, such a characterisation ought, in many cases, to be questioned. Policies can be broadly understood as based primarily on either a logical or empirical case. In the absence of relevant empirical evidence, policymakers understandably appeal to logical cases. Once such evidence is available, however, it can inform policy and enable the logical case to be set aside. Such a linear policy (...) process is not always the reality, and logical cases often continue to guide policy decisions in direct opposition to empirical evidence. In this paper, I discuss two recent examples of this disconnect between logical and empirical cases in UK health policy. The first—organ donation—illustrates an example of a significant policy change being made in opposition to the evidence. I refer to this as the improvidence approach. The second—abortion—provides an example of policymakers not making a change that has extensive supporting data. I refer to this using the more recognisable language of the precautionary approach. Ultimately, I argue that both the improvidence and precautionary approaches are examples of problematic public policy where policymakers provide no explicit justification for going against the evidence. (shrink)

Résumé Le principe de précaution connaît une large diversité d’interprétations qui encourage les prises de positions les plus tranchées. Malgré certaines particularités épistémologiques, il faut lui reconnaître une pertinence au plan normatif, dès lors que, pour lui conserver un caractère substantif, sa définition générique se double d’une extension logique. Sa portée et la « révolution copernicienne » qu’il représente sont appréciées précisément : c’est que la mêlée relève d’une opposition de cosmologies. Mais après Jonas, la nature des difficultés écologiques contemporaines (...) souligne tout à la fois sa nécessité et son impossibilité. Bergson et Nietzsche ou Lévi-Strauss suggèrent peut-être une alternative à l’esprit de précaution à visée environnementale qui puisse surmonter un naufrage philosophique. (shrink)

L’auteure retrace les controverses qui ont émaillé l’histoire du principe de précaution en France dans les trente dernières années après son adoption au niveau international et européen. Elle montre que le principe de précaution constitue une dimension nouvelle de la rationalité adaptée aux défis de la société contemporaine.

Depuis plusieurs années, le principe de précaution prend de l’ampleur et voit ses contours se modeler et se définir, aussi bien à l’échelle internationale qu’européenne ou française. Malgré tout, il n’a pas la même importance, en fonction de l’échelle à laquelle on se place, et tend à être confondu avec le principe de prévention, deux notions pourtant totalement distinctes. Plus que jamais les questions de climat, de biodiversité, de justice sociale, de gestion des deniers publics ou encore de valorisation et (...) de gestion des ressources sont au cœur des problématiques gérées par les territoires et notamment, par les communes, premier échelon territorial de décision. Le principe de précaution qui inonde l’ensemble de ces matières voit ses contours réduits en France, notamment par une jurisprudence autocentrée, préférant faire la part belle aux questions franco-française d’organisation territoriale, plutôt que d’appliquer un principe qui devient universel, favorisant ainsi l’inertie de l’État central plutôt que l’action locale. Une situation qui ne saurait perdurer davantage. (shrink)