This paper makes attempts to argue that language inevitably affects emotions, and philosophical therapy is possible through deconstruction of language; here the horizon of language is extended not only to its traditional usage, but also as thoughts. Emotions are perceived through our conditioned thoughts and hence by an analysis of the latter, the former will become clearer. The paper is a literature review of a few books by Jiddu Krishnamurti, a contemporary Indian Philosopher; and a book on Buddhist (...) logic. Since the paper is a literature review, it does not have any practical claim to support the points and hence is a speculative approach towards therapy. The paper also does not extend its claims to psychological views on language, rather restricts itself to purely philosophical approach. (shrink)

It is no exaggeration to say that the new topic of Korean philosophy in the 21st century is humanities therapy, more specifically philosophical therapy. However, criticism that the concepts and theories that make up humanities therapy are not clear can be raised. Therefore, I think that the conceptual clarification is necessary to establish this therapy academically against the this negative criticism. The problem, I have argued, is that because the concepts used in humanities therapy (...) are value-dependent, they are not free from the Open Question Argument implicated in the matter of fact-value gap elaborated by G. E. Moore. Therefore, it is necessary to objectify the epistemological uncertainty as a physicalistic epistemological perspective, in the diagnosis and treatment process of humanities treatment. To this end, I try to clarify the concept of humanities therapy through conceptual supervenience of mental causation, and to make the process and results of the therapy cognitively transparent. (shrink)

The metaphysician wants to go beneath surface phenomena and to get at the essence of things, But instead arrives at a "picture" suggested by everyday language. Eliminating pictures requires bringing out the facts of everyday use and is not positivism or psychoanalysis. Still pictures arrange facts and lead to theories though not giving underlying realities. Rather essence is in usage: "essence is expressed by grammar". Thus philosophical therapy leads to closer accord with the world.

The object of this essay is to discuss Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks inPhilosophical Investigationsand elsewhere in the posthumously published writings concerning the role of therapy in relation to philosophy. Wittgenstein's reflections seem to suggest that there is a kind of philosophy or mode of investigation targeting the philosophical grammar of language uses that gratuitously give rise to philosophical problems, and produce in many thinkers philosophical anxieties for which the proper therapy is intended to offer relief. Two (...) possible objectives of later Wittgensteinian therapy are proposed, for subjectivepsychologicalversus objectivesemanticsymptoms of ailments that a therapy might address for the sake of relieving philosophical anxieties. The psychological in its most plausible form is rejected, leaving only the semantic. Semantic therapy in the sense defined and developed is more general and long-lasting, and more in the spirit of Wittgenstein's project on a variety of levels. A semantic approach treats language rather than the thinking, language-using subject as the patient needing therapy, and directs its attention to the treatment of problems in language and the conceptual framework a language game use expresses in its philosophical grammar, rather than to soothing unhappy or socially ill-adjusted individual psychologies. (shrink)

In a recent article, Fabian Freyenhagen argues that we should understand first-generation Frankfurt School critical theory (in particular, the work of Adorno and Horkheimer) as being defined by a kind of ‘linguistic turn’ analogous to one present in the later Wittgenstein. Here, I elaborate on this hypothesis – initially by calling it into question, by detailing Herbert Marcuse’s extensive criticisms of Wittgenstein (and other analytic philosophers of language) in One-Dimensional Man. While Marcuse is harshly critical of analytic ordinary language philosophy, (...) he is much more sympathetic to a different sort of ordinary language philosophy, which he unpacks with reference to Karl Kraus. I show how, by getting Marcuse’s criticisms of Wittgenstein and other analytic philosophers, and lauding of Kraus, into view, we can better understand the first generation of the Frankfurt School as having practised a sort of ‘non-quietistic’ philosophical therapy (that may or may not have been the sort of thing that Wittgenstein himself had in mind). (shrink)

The paper develops and addresses a major challenge for therapeutic conceptions of philosophy of the sort increasingly attributed to Wittgenstein. To be substantive and relevant, such conceptions have to identify “diseases of the understanding” from which philosophers suffer, and to explain why these “diseases” need to be cured in order to resolve or overcome important philosophical problems. The paper addresses this challenge in three steps: With the help of findings and concepts from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, it redevelops (...) the Wittgensteinian notion of “philosophical pictures.” Through a case study on seminal versions of familiar mind-body problems, it examines how such pictures shape philosophical reflection and generate ill-motivated but captivating problems. Third, it shows that philosophical pictures are constitutive of “diseases of the understanding,” in a quite strict sense of the term. On this basis, the paper explains when and why philosophical therapy is required. (shrink)

Abstract: The notion that philosophy can be practised as a kind of therapy has become a focus of debate. This article explores how philosophy can be practised literally as a kind of therapy, in two very different ways: as philosophical therapy that addresses “real-life problems” (e.g., Sextus Empiricus) and as therapeutic philosophy that meets a need for therapy which arises in and from philosophical reflection (e.g., Wittgenstein). With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive (...) and clinical psychology, and from cognitive linguistics, the article shows that both philosophical projects address important and literally therapeutic tasks and explains how they can do so with genuinely philosophical argument and analysis. This brings into view new applications for philosophy, a need for therapy in core areas of the subject, and the outline of a new approach to meet what will be shown to be a central need. (shrink)

This thesis shows what we may learn about ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism, Indian Madhyamaka Buddhism, and their potential as philosophical therapy, by examining the two traditions in conjunction. It aims to accomplish three goals: present a robust comparison of Pyrrhonism and Madhyamaka; demonstrate that significant insights may be gained from this juxtaposition; and show that these two traditions challenge current ways of doing philosophy. -/- The thesis starts by examining the preconditions of fruitful cross-cultural research; it is shown that (...) ascribing too much or too little importance to context (radical relativism and universalism, respectively) is problematic. Previous comparisons of Pyrrhonism and Madhyamaka have paid little attention to such methodological considerations, which has led to crucial shortcomings. This is unfortunate, because their remarkable parallels demand a representative, accessible overview. Having laid the necessary foundations, the thesis presents such an overview. A therapeutic framework is employed to systematically compare the two traditions, including their diagnoses of disturbance, their proposed cures, and their promised cured conditions. Such themes allow for systematically outlining their similarities and differences and to limit arbitrariness and bias. -/- Despite their striking similarities, very few attempts have been made to learn about Pyrrhonism and Madhyamaka by studying them in conjunction. This thesis corrects this oversight by demonstrating that such cross-cultural research enables us to shed new light on persistent ambiguities and allows us to bolster and defend both traditions. For example, it is demonstrated that Madhyamaka can shine a new light on one of the, if not the most vexed question regarding Pyrrhonism: what is the scope of suspension of judgment? -/- Finally, this thesis shows that Pyrrhonism and Madhyamaka challenge the practice of philosophy itself. It is demonstrated that contemporary schools of thought akin to Pyrrhonism and Madhyamaka may share their therapeutic potential. If so, then certain contemporary philosophies are able to alleviate distress and instil a sense of tranquillity. This means we must expand our understanding of what philosophy can do. After all, if contemporary philosophy can change our experience of the world for the better, it has a much greater potential than is currently believed—both in terms of audience and impact. (shrink)

How is it that speakers can get to know the meaning of any of indefinitely many sentences they have never encountered before? - the 'problem of linguistic creativity' posed by this question is a core problem of both philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics, and has sparked off a considerable amount of work in the philosophy of mind. The book establishes the failure of the familiar - compositional - approach to this problem, and then takes a radically new start: It (...) develops core elements of the later Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, and puts them to work to 'dissolve' the problem to prove it ill-framed by clarifying the questions posing it and breaking the spell of mistaken analogies informing it. This sharply focused monograph thus copes with a crucial problem that turns out to be a lot tougher than generally thought, and presents a precise and rigorous demonstration of an unfamiliar and exciting philosophical approach. (shrink)

The modern times proclaimed ‘God’s death’ and the post‐modern times did ‘the death of Man/Subject. And recently our society suffers from ‘the death of the humanities’. The death appearing along with is ‘the death of philosophy’. What on earth does the notice of death of philosophy mean by in the life of human beings living in the modern times? This writer is groping for the point to revive the modern significance of philosophy facing the tragic situations called ‘Death’ through the (...) inquiry of the rendezvous between philosophy and therapy. This writer will study the features of the philosophical therapy in philosophizing in the ancient times, firstly in the relation of philosophy and therapy, secondly the soul as the subject and object of mind‐therapy, thirdly the self‐awareness (gnôthiseautón) as the way of mind‐therapy, fourth the self‐care (epimeleia heautou) as the goal of mind‐therapy, and finally the dialogue as the method of mind‐ therapy, during which I am going to form a solid foundation instead to study the spirit of philosophical therapy dwelling in philosophizing. (shrink)

철학치료의 주된 치료 대상은 인간의 마음이다. 유학은 인간의 삶과 존재를 가장 중요한 문제로 삼는 학문이다. 심성론과 수양론이 유학의 기본 토대가 되는 것도 이 때문이다. 철학치료가 대상으로 삼고 있는 것이 ‘마음의 병’이라는 점에서, 유학을 치료에 응용할 수 있으리라는 기대는 충분히 가질 수 있다. 이 글은 철학치료에 있어 유가 수양론의 현실 응용 가능성을 모색한 것이다. 동양의 전통 관점에서 질병은 인간의 마음에서 비롯된 것이다. 形神 일체는 동양의학의 기본 전제이며, 그 점에서 동양에서 철학치료의 전통은 꽤나 오래된 셈이다. 『내경』은 형이상학적 존재론과 자연관, 그리고 인간의 마음이 (...) 서로 연관되어 있다고 본다. 그러므로 의사는 사람의 신체 구조와 함께 인간과 자연 관계에 대한 통찰력이 있어야 한다. 동양 의학에서 치료술과 함께 수양론이 강조되는 이유도 여기에 있다. 유가는 인간의 특성을 마음이 신체를 주재할 수 있는 능력을 가지고 있다는 데서 찾는다. 이는 맹자 철학에서 뚜렷하게 나타난다. 맹자는 인간을 규정하는 데 있어 생물학적 특성이나 기능적 요소를 들지 않고, 仁義가 인간의 특성이라고 하였다. 인간이 금수와 다른 특징은 그가 사욕의 제약을 벗어나 스스로 주재할 수 있는 능력을 지녔다는 데 있다. 인간의 마음은 선한 본성을 지니고 있지만, 동시에 감정과 정서를 나타내는 곳이다. 여기에서 마음은 욕망의 유혹에서 자유롭지 못하다. 이 욕망을 조절하지 못할 때 인간은 자기 마음의 본래 모습을 상실하게 된다. 이 마음의 상실이 ‘마음의 병’이라 할 수 있다. 오늘날 우리 사회에 널리 퍼져있는 ‘마음의 병’은 바로 이 욕망을 제어하지 못하고 마음의 본성을 상실한 데서 유래된 것이다. 철학치료의 필요성도 여기에 있다. 유가 수양론은 자신의 마음을 지키고 배양함으로써 마음의 본래 모습을 드러내는 것을 목적으로 삼는다. 마음의 확보가 곧 자기실현의 출발점인 것이다. 맹자는 마음을 기르는 데는 욕심을 적게 하는 것보다 좋은 것이 없다고 한다. 이는 욕망을 줄여 마음의 동요와 은폐를 막음으로써 본래 마음을 보존할 수 있다고 지적한 것이다. 마음의 능력은 자신의 존재 가치를 자각하는 데 있다. 그리고 이 마음의 능력이 적극적으로 발휘될 때 마음의 장애도 제거될 수 있을 것이다. 이 점에서 유가 수양론은 오늘날 철학치료에 있어 충분히 응용할 만한 가치를 지니고 있다 할 수 있다. (shrink)

Yi Hwang 李滉 , also known as Yi T’oegye 李退溪, was a prominent Korean scholar of Confucian philosophy during the Chosŏn 朝鮮 dynasty. He reinterpreted the Zhu Xi 朱熹 school of neo-Confucianism, taking reverent seriousness as the core principle of his philosophy. He studied various symptoms observed in the human mind and suggested the notion of reverent seriousness as a primary therapeutic method. His theory of kyŏng proposed the stages of philosophical therapy, which are uniquely found in Eastern (...) philosophy and are clearly distinct from Western theories of philosophical therapy. As the methodology for such a therapy, he examined the study of “not-yet-aroused and already-aroused” while seeking unification with the Way of Heaven. The study of quiet-sitting and reading , which he applied to his therapy, is included in the general category of holistic therapy based on “abiding by kyŏng” , translating into wide-ranging therapeutic effects. (shrink)

오늘날 많은 현대인들이 불안·우울증·공황장애 등의 정신적 질병이나 존재 의미의 상실에 시달리고 있다. 그간 이러한 정신적 질병에 대한 치료는 대체로 약물과 수술을 통 한 의학적 치료가 주된 방법이었다. 그러나 이러한 의학적 치료만으로는 현대인의 정신적 인 고통이 제대로 치유되지 않는다. 그래서 새로운 대안들이 모색되고 있다. 그 가운데 ‘철학상담’, ‘철학치료’, ‘임상철학’과 같은 철학적 접근도 있다. 철학치료는 철학실천의 한 분야로서 철학하는 행위 - 내면적 성찰과 철학적 대화 - 를 통해 심리적 또는 인간실존 의 문제를 해소해 나가는 것을 목적으로 한다. 니체와 붓다에게서 그 한 방편을 (...) 찾고자 한 다. 비록 시대와 언어는 다르지만 그들에게서 철학치료적 유사점을 찾을 수 있다. 붓다는 끊임없이 변화하고 영원하지 않은 실체의 속성을 파악해 그것에 집착하지 않음으로써 고 통을 벗어나고자 한다면, 니체는 힘에의 의지를 통해 고통을 극복하고자 한다. 이런 점에 서 양자에게는 불안, 우울, 존재의 의미 상실 같은 정신적 고통을 치유할 수 있는 지혜가 담겨 있다. 니체와 붓다는 형이상학적 문제가 아니라 언제나 구체적인 현실의 문제에 관심 이 많다. 또한 그들은 과거나 미래의 문제가 아닌 현재의 문제를 해결하려고 한다. 이런 관점에서 필자는 첫째, 실체적 주체를 부정하는 니체의 주체 해체와 붓다의 무아사상을 비 교함으로써 ‘나’를 제대로 인식하는 방법을 제시하고자 한다. 둘째, 니체의 관점주의와 붓 다의 연기법을 비교함으로써 내담자에게 ‘나’가 실체적 존재가 아니라 관계적 존재임을 깨 닫게 하고자 한다. 그 결과, 니체와 붓다의 사유 방법은 내담자에게 구체적인 현실과 생생 한 현재를 살아갈 수 있도록 하는 데 도움이 될 것이다. (shrink)

_Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy_ provides new foundations and methods for the revolutionary project of philosophical therapy pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The book vindicates this currently much-discussed project by reconstructing the genesis of important philosophical problems: With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, the book analyses how philosophical reflection is shaped by pictures and metaphors we are not aware of employing and are prone to misapply. Through innovative case-studies on the genesis (...) of classical problems about the mind and perception, and on thinkers including Locke, Berkeley and Ayer, the book demonstrates how such autonomous habits of thought systematically generate unsound intuitions and philosophical delusions, whose clash with reality, or among each other, gives rise to ill-motivated but maddening problems. The book re-examines models of therapeutic philosophy, due to Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin, and develops an approach that may let us overcome philosophical delusions and the problems they engender. In this way, the book explains where and why therapy in called for in philosophy, and develops techniques to carry it out. (shrink)

본 논문에서는 『주역』을 중심으로 우환의식이라는 동양의 독특한 사고를 살펴보고자 한다. 우리는 흔히 우환과 우환의식을 구분하지 않고 사용한다. 그러나 우환은 마음 안에 걱정이 있는 상황이다. 그러한 상황 속에 놓여 있는 인간은 제대로 주변을 인식하거나 판단할 수 없다. 이에 반해 우환의식은 고난이나 곤경에 처한 인간의 심리상태인 우환을 적극적으로 개선해 나가고자 하는 의식적 깨달음이자 행위이다. 따라서 우환이 생겼다고 하더라도 우환의식을 가지면 현재의 상황을 개선시키고 나아갈 수 있는 발판이 될 수도 있다. 이러한 우환의식은 인간의 주체성에 대한 자각으로부터 출발한다. 이는 자기 상황에 대한 책임 및 (...) 결정을 외재의 신에게 맡기는 것 이 아니라 스스로의 행위의 결과로서 책임을 지겠다는 태도이다. 이러한 우환의식이 『주역』의 발생배경이 되었다. 은말주초에 제작된 『주역』은 믿음의 대상이 ‘신’에서 점점 인간 행위에 대한 노력과 결과로 바뀌어가는 시대적 배경 속에서 등장했다. 이런 변화는 인간의 주체성이 도덕적 책임의식으로 나아가는 발로가 되었다. 기존의 사고라면 우환이 닥쳤을 때 하늘에 제사를 지내고 그 뜻을 알아내려는 것에 더 중점을 두었는데 반해, 『주역????에 서는 하늘의 뜻도 중요하지만 그 보다는 개인이 스스로 우환에 당면했을 때 극복하기 위해 어떻 게 행동해야하는가에 역점을 두고 있다. 『주역』에서 우환을 극복하는 방법은 두 가지가 있다. 그것은 계신공구와 무구이다. 삼가고 두려워하는 마음을 가지고 항상 나의 행동을 돌아보고 반성 하는 태도이다. 여기에서 우환의식의 철학치료적 요소가 드러난다. 우리는 길흉화복을 주어진 결과로서 수동적으로 받아들이는 것이 아니라 자신의 행위에 의해 얼마든지 개선할 수 있는 변 화의 상황으로 인식하게 되면 더 이상 주어진 상황에 휘둘리지 않고 상황을 적극적으로 개선해 나가려는 의지를 가질 수 있다. 바로 자기 주체적인 삶을 살 수 있는 것이다. 이에 본 연구에서 는 우환의식을 통한 삶의 적극적인 태도가 필요하다고 본다. 또한 이러한 태도가 철학치료로서 충분한 가치가 있음을 밝히고자 한다. (shrink)

이 글은 노장(老莊)의 언어와 실재에 대한 문제의식과 관점을 철학 치료주의 관점에서 재구성한 것이다. 노장 사상에서 철학 치료주의는 ‘철학 실천(philosophy practice)’을 가리키며, 그것을 제시한 궁극적인 목적은 ‘언어(language)’와 ‘실재(reality)’의 균열에서 비롯되는 ‘철학적 질병(philosophical disease)’을 규명하고 이를 적극적으로 치료하려는 데 있다. 이러한 문제의식과 구도를 고려할 때, 노장의 철학 치료주의는 일종의 언어 철학적 치료주의로 규정할 수 있는데, 이러한 목적을 성취하기 위해서 노장은 무엇보다도 기존의 도(道)와 사물의 실재성에 대한 사람들의 잘못된 인식과 판단을 해체하려고 시도한다. 노장이 보기에 언어와 실재 사이의 분열의 근본 원인은 언제나 부단한 (...) 운동을 전개하는 실재에 대한 언어의 양가적 분절(double-headed articulation)에 기초한 규정에 있다. 따라서 그것을 보다 효과적으로 치료하려면 이러한 언어적 인식과 존재의 실재성의 본질적 차이에 대한 예민한 통찰이 필요하며, 나아가 일종의 노에시스적 역전(noetic reversal)에 근거한 언어적 전회가 필요하다. 이처럼 인식 전환과 실천 행위를 통해 얻게 되는 참된 지혜는 기존의 지배 담론과 가치 규범에 의해 은폐되어온 도와 사물의 본래적 실재성과 존재의 논리를 온전히 밝혀주는 동시에 언어적 인식과 존재의 실재성이 서로 조화를 이룰 수 있는 새로운 길을 열어준다. 그 핵심은 기존의 기표(Signifiant)와 기의(Signifié)의 고정성과 폐쇄성을 부단히 해체하는 동시에 재구성하는 언어 행위를 통해서 탈-은폐된 자아의식을 형성하고 표현하는 것이다. 그리고 이러한 지혜와 언어 행위에 근거한 개체의 사유 방식과 삶은 사물의 경제적ㆍ사회적ㆍ정치적 유용성에 기초한 기술적 관심(technische Interesse)과 담론의 제약을 벗어나 진정한 자발성과 개방성을 토대로 한 인식과 삶을 구가하게 된다. 이것이 곧 노장이 철학 치료주의의 한 유형으로서 언어 철학적 치료주의를 제시한 궁극적 이념이다. (shrink)

Edward Erwin's clear analysis addresses some of the fundamental questions on behavior therapy that remained in 1978, when this book was first published.

It seems uncontroversial that Buddhism is therapeutic in intent. The word ‘therapy’ is often used, however, to denote methods of treating medically defined mental illnesses, while in the Buddhist context it refers to the treatment of deep-seated dissatisfaction and confusion that, it is claimed, afflict us all. The Buddha is likened to a doctor who offers a medicine to cure the spiritual ills of the suffering world. In the Pāli scriptures, one of the epithets of the Buddha is ‘the (...) Great Physician’ and the therapeutic regimen or healing treatment is his teaching, theDhamma. This metaphor is continued in later literature, most famously in theSaddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, where the Buddha is said to be like a benevolent doctor who attempts to administer appropriate medicine to his sons. In the Mahāyāna pantheon, one of the most popular of the celestial Buddhas is Bhaiṣajyaguru, the master of healing, who is believed to offer cures for both the spiritual and more mundane ailments of sentient beings. The four truths, possibly the most pervasive of all Buddhist teachings, are expressed in the form of a medical diagnosis. The first truth, that there is suffering (dukkha), is the diagnosis of the disease. The second truth, that suffering arises from a cause (or causes), seeks to identify the root source of the disease. The third truth, that suffering can be ended, is a prognosis that the disease is curable. The fourth truth describes the path to end suffering, and is the prescription of treatment. (shrink)

In this study, we examine the philosophical bases of one of the leading clinical psychological methods of therapy for anxiety, anger, and depression, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). We trace this method back to its philosophical roots in the Stoic, Buddhist, Taoist, and Existentialist philosophical traditions. We start by discussing the tenets of CBT, and then we expand on the philosophical traditions that ground this approach. Given that CBT has had a clinically measured positive effect (...) on the psychological well-being of individuals, it becomes important to study the philosophical foundations on which this therapy is based. (shrink)

Of the many interrelated themes in Pierre Hadot's Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, two strike me as having a particular centrality. First, there is the theme of attention to the present instant. Hadot describes this as the ‘key to spiritual exercises’, and he finds the idea encapsulated in a quotation from Goethe's Second Faust: ‘Only the present is our happiness’. The second theme is that of viewing the world from above: ‘philosophy signified the (...) attempt to raise up mankind from individuality and particularity to universality and objectivity’. Insofar as both attention to the present and raising oneself to an objective view imply the mastery of individual anxiety, passion and desire, they belong to a single conception, that conception being one of a ‘return to the self’: Thus, all spiritual exercises are, fundamentally, a return to the self, in which the self is liberated from the state of alienation into which it has been plunged by worries, passions, and desires. The ‘self’ liberated in this way is no longer merely our egoistic, passionate individuality: it is our moral person, open to universality and objectivity, and participating in universal nature or thought. (shrink)

Examined the role of philosophical beliefs in psychotherapy approach preference. It was hypothesized that trainees would prefer approaches that most closely correspond to their personal philosophical beliefs. 59 students were given audiotaped presentations. Three dimensions of the Ss' philosophical commitments were examined in relation to their relative preferences for 3 therapy approaches: rationalist, constructivist and behavioral. Results show that Ss tended to prefer a specific approach that most corresponded to their own ontological, epistemological and causal commitments. (...) This suggests a role for philosophical beliefs in therapists' preferences for different theoretical orientations. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s comparison of philosophical methods to therapies has been interpreted in highly different ways. I identify the illness, the patient, the therapist and the ideal of health in Wittgenstein’s philosophical methods and answer four closely related questions concerning them that have often been wrongly answered by commentators. The results of this paper are, first, some answers to crucial questions: philosophers are not literally ill, patients of philosophical therapies are not always philosophers, not all philosophers qualify as therapists, (...) the therapies are not necessarily to be thought of as psychological therapies and the ideal of health does not consist in the end of philosophy. Second, the paper shows that the comparison has had a misleading effect, because properties of therapies have been illegitimately projected onto the philosophical methods advanced by Wittgenstein. (shrink)

First published in 1977, Emotion, Thought and Therapy is a study of Hume and Spinoza and the relationship of philosophical theories of the emotions to psychological theories of therapy. Jerome Neu argues that the Spinozists are closer to the truth; that is, that thoughts are of greater importance than feelings in the classification and discrimination of emotional states. He then contends that if the Spinozists are closer to the truth, we have the beginning of an argument to (...) show that Freudian or analytic therapies make philosophic sense. Throughout the book, careful attention is paid to modern discussions in philosophy of mind and psychology, and materials from anthropology and other relevant disciplines are considered. At the centre of the discussion is the notion of ‘thought-dependence’. Therapies for psychological disorders are placed along a spectrum in accordance with the role they assign to thoughts. The Spinozist view of the emotions can be seen as at the extreme thought end of a corresponding spectrum of theories of the emotions. The book suggests that this stream may help explain the spectrum of therapeutic theories and the possibilities that exist for psychological development and change. This book will be of interest to students of philosophy, psychology and counselling. (shrink)

Argues that Wittgenstein's early ethical notion of agreement with the world pivoted to become his later therapeutic notion of agreement with living forms, which satisfies the conditions necessary for a full therapeutic philosophy.

Knowing, either by the light of natural reason or by the light of Christian revelation, that homosexuality is a disordered condition is not sufficient for its being ethically permissible to direct self-identified homosexual persons toward just any treatment that aims to modify sexual orientation. For example, such an undertaking would be morally impermissible in cases where the available “treatments” are known to be both futile and potentially damaging to persons undertaking them. I, therefore, introduce this edition of Christian Bioethics by (...) reflecting on (a) the position of homosexuality in our current psychiatric nosology, (b) problems with drawing causal inferences from the outcomes of psychotherapy studies, and (c) the advantages and disadvantages of appealing to traditional categories of sexual orientation in this discussion, all with an eye toward more deeply elucidating core ethical concerns involving the intentional psychotherapeutic modification of sexual orientation. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction The Issue of Textual Difficulties and Style The PI Preface Baker's Contextualism Applying the Right Kind of Context Conclusions and Further Issues.

최근 심리치료 혹은 마음치유의 현장에서 이전과는 다른 새로운 마음치유술 및 이론이 대두하고 있다. 일명 ‘인지행동치료 제3 흐름’이라는 이름 하에 진행되고 있는 현상이 바로 그것이다. 현상적으로 보면, 인지행동치료 제3 흐름은 동서양 마음치유술 및 사상의 만남이라고 할 수 있다. 본고는 이 인지행동치료 제3 흐름의 철학사상적 정체성을 밝히는 시도이다. 이를 위해 필자는 우선 인지행동치료 제3 흐름을 그에 선행하는 제1, 제2 흐름과의 상관관계 속에서 간단하게 묘사한다. 그리고 나서 그것들의 배후에 깔려 있는 철학사상적 기반에 대해 논하고 그리고 이러한 시각의 배후에서 그것들을 서로 대조한다. 동서양 마음치유술 (...) 및 사상의 만남이라 할 수 있는 인지행동치료 제3 흐름은 무아(無我)를 강조하는 불교전통의 마음치유술에 크게 영향을 받고 있다. 그것을 이론적으로 체계화하는데 있어서 사용되는 서구식 사고 및 사상이 바로 기능주의 및 내재적 맥락주의이다. 이 사상들 속에서 불교의 무아사상이 서구식으로 재현되고 있는 것으로 보인다. 본고는 이 점을 드러내는데 논의를 집중한다. 다만 논의의 후반부에 가서는 인지행동치료 제3 흐름의 또 다른 하나의 특징으로 체화인지(혹은 행화주의)와의 친화성이 언급된다. (shrink)

In my paper, I propose to investigate the philosophical underpinnings of representative indigenous Japanese psychotherapeutic approaches, particularly that of Morita and Naikan therapies, that have, at their foundations, distinctly Buddhist psychological tenets, and that offer to deal with mental health issues in a manifestly different way compared with their western counterparts. I offer a comprehensive account of how the characterizations of madness and mental illness have been shifting over the last two hundred years in Japanese society and culture, and (...) how this has affected mental health care in Japan. Finally, the ways in which modern day thinkers, such as Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki and Keiji Nishitani have been re-shaping the concepts of the self in Japanese religion and philosophy while, at the same time, taking care to remain faithful to the original East Asian sensibilities will also be expounded and connected to the themes of mental health and mental illness. (shrink)

_Therapy & the Counter-tradition: The Edge of Philosophy_ brings together leading exponents of contemporary psychotherapy, philosophers and writers, to explore how philosophical ideas may inform therapy work. Each author discusses a particular philosopher who has influenced their life and therapeutic practice, while questioning how counselling and psychotherapy can address human ‘wholeness’, despite the ascendancy of rationality, regulation and diagnosis. It also seeks to acknowledge the distinct lack of philosophical input and education in counselling and psychotherapy training. The (...) chapters are rooted in the Counter-Tradition, whose diverse manifestations include humanism, skepticism, fideism, as well as the opening of philosophy and psychology to poetry and the arts. This collection of thought-provoking essays will help open the discussion within the psychological therapies, by providing therapists with critical philosophical references, which will help broaden their knowledge and the scope of their practice. Therapy & the Counter-tradition: The Edge of Philosophy will be of interest to mental health professionals, practitioners, counselling and psychotherapy trainees and trainers, and academics tutoring or studying psychology. It will also appeal to those interested in psychology, meditation, personal development and philosophy. (shrink)

The paper clarifies therapeutic ideas about philosophical method which Wittgenstein puts forward in his "Big Typescript". It does so by analysing how Wittgenstein treats the question 'What is meaning?', in that part of the same work from which the opening sections of his "Philosophical Investigations" derive. On this basis, the paper explains why Wittgenstein set himself a therapeutic goal, why this is reasonable, and how he sought to attain that goal without 'pronouncing new truths about the subject of (...) the investigation', viz. meaning. (shrink)

An important strand of current experimental philosophy promotes a new kind of methodological naturalism. This chapter argues that this new ‘metaphilosophical naturalism’ is fundamentally consistent with key tenets of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy, and can provide empirical foundations for therapeutic conceptions of philosophy. Metaphilosophical naturalism invites us to contribute to the resolution of philosophical problems about X by turning to scientific findings about the way we think about X – in general or when doing philosophy. This new naturalism encourages us to (...) use resources from psychology that can empirically vindicate precisely some of the most controversial aspects of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy: They can establish the need, and provide key tools, for something worth calling ‘therapy’, in philosophy. As ‘pudding proof’ this chapter shows how methods and findings from psycholinguistics motivate and facilitate a therapeutic approach to a characteristically philosophical problem: ‘the problem of perception’. (shrink)