_Therapy & the Counter-tradition: The Edge of Philosophy_ brings together leading exponents of contemporary psychotherapy, philosophers and writers, to explore how philosophical ideas may inform therapy work. Each author discusses a particular philosopher who has influenced their life and therapeutic practice, while questioning how counselling and psychotherapy can address human ‘wholeness’, despite the ascendancy of rationality, regulation and diagnosis. It also seeks to acknowledge the distinct lack of philosophical input and education in counselling and psychotherapy training. The chapters are rooted (...) in the Counter-Tradition, whose diverse manifestations include humanism, skepticism, fideism, as well as the opening of philosophy and psychology to poetry and the arts. This collection of thought-provoking essays will help open the discussion within the psychological therapies, by providing therapists with critical philosophical references, which will help broaden their knowledge and the scope of their practice. Therapy & the Counter-tradition: The Edge of Philosophy will be of interest to mental health professionals, practitioners, counselling and psychotherapy trainees and trainers, and academics tutoring or studying psychology. It will also appeal to those interested in psychology, meditation, personal development and philosophy. (shrink)

Contrary to the popular belief that feminism has gained a foothold in the many disciplines of the academy, the essays collected in Theorizing Backlash argue that feminism is still actively resisted in mainstream academia. Contributors to this volume consider the professional, philosophical, and personal backlashes against feminist thought, and reflect upon their ramifications. The conclusion is that the disdain and irrational resentment of feminism, even in higher education, amounts to a backlash against progress.

In an interesting article on Kierkegaard and the “Existential” Philosophy, contributed to the number of Philosophy for July 1941, Miss Dorothy Emmet counselled her readers to make themselves acquainted with the Journals of the famous Danish thinker, now rendered accessible to Englishmen ignorant of his language by the translation of Mr. Dru. I have taken her advice and am grateful to her for it. I am not indeed convinced that this self-revelation of a remarkable personality can be ranked among the (...) great autobiographies of the world. It seems to me to fall, if only on account of its lack of unity as a work of literary art, below the standard which such an estimate of it would imply. But it is undoubtedly both impressive in itself and important in view of the influence which its author, little known in his lifetime beyond a circle of the parochial narrowness of which he was painfully conscious, has come, long after his death, to exert upon the spiritual and intellectual life of Europe to-day. The present article, however, will not be concerned with the exposition or criticism of this or other writings of Kierkegaard, but with thoughts, more or less suggested by my reading of him, respecting the notion of God and its significance for philosophy. (shrink)

This article discusses what is involved in having full moral status, as opposed to a lesser degree of moral status and surveys different views of the grounds of moral status as well as the arguments for attributing a particular degree of moral status on the basis of those grounds.

Acknowledgments THROUGHOUT this book I cite the many people who have provided information on individual programs and activities. ...

The pregnancy of a 12-year-old girl provides the basis for a consideration of approaches to a dilemma brought about by conflicting expectations. Here, medical opinion is to reject action implied by the lack of Gillick competence and by a ‘parental responsibility’ claim adopted by the girl’s mother. Construction of the dilemma and the subsequent process, which sought resolution, illustrates that the Gillick ruling, and other guidelines intended to be helpful, can prove to be less so.

In most discussions of moral responsibility, an agent’s moral responsibility for harming or failing to aid is equated with the agent’s being blameworthy for having done wrong. In this paper, I will argue that one can be morally responsible for one’s action even if the action was not wrong, not blameworthy, and not the result of blameworthy deliberation or bad motivation. This makes a difference to how we should relate to each other and ourselves in the aftermath. Some people have (...) blown off their responsibility when they shouldn't have, and others have held themselves responsible – or second and third parties have held them responsible – as if they were wrongdoers and blameworthy when neither is the case. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine a heretofore ignored critic of Descartes on the heterogeneity problem: Anton Wilhelm Amo. Looking at Amo’s critique of Descartes reveals a very clear case of a thinker who attempts to offer a causal system that is not a solution to the mind-body problem, but rather that transcends it. The focus of my discussion is Amo’s 1734 dissertation: The Apathy [ἀπάθεια] of the Human Mind or The Absence of Sensation and the Faculty of Sense in the (...) Human Mind and their Presence in our Organic and Living Body. Amo’s discussion of the interaction, or lack thereof, of the mind and body hinges on the essential feature he identifies for the human mind—apathy, that is, impassivity. In this work, Amo engages explicitly with Descartes’s writing, which allows us to more precisely see the nature of his agreement and disagreement with the Cartesian metaphysics of mind. I proceed by treating Amo’s five stated criteria for spirit-hood which, in turn, reveal the kinds of causal connections that are possible for embodied spirits on his view. My aim is threefold: To lay out what I take to be Amo’s view of and arguments for the five criteria he takes to be required for a substance to be spirit. To locate Amo’s agreement and disagreement with Descartes. To suggest that Amo’s view on mind-body interaction involves a kind of occasional causation. (shrink)

In this paper the authors argue that the exploration of the nature of needs and rights should begin with the actually existing organization of care and of justice in society. The authors raise two key concerns with this organization: 1) the invisibility of care to some, and 2) the inaccessibility of rights to others. Recent work by care scholars has called attention to the ways the current organization of care work perpetuates the myth of self-sufficiency for some, while reducing others (...) to mere dependents. Law and Society scholars have demonstrated the problems of uneven access to legal remedies within the current organization of the legal system. Addressing these concerns simultaneously reveals both the problems of the current organization of needs and rights as well as illuminating alternative possibilities. The authors argue, first, that a justice perspective, based on rights is inadequate because its presumed universality is belied by the reality of the inaccessibility of rights to many. Second, the authors argue that a care perspective, currently formulated upon the assumption that only some people have needs, is also flawed because its presumed particularity distorts the human experience and subsequent policies. Instead, the authors need to conceive of care in a public way that permits both rights and needs to be understood as applicable to all. The authors propose some initial thoughts about how to create such a public concept of care. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, an entity has moral status if and only if it or its interest matters morally for its own sake. Some philosophers, who think of moral status in terms of duties and rights owed to an entity, allow that moral status can come in degrees, with only some beings having status of the highest degree – that is, full moral status (FMS). We critically review the competing accounts of what qualifies one for FMS. Some accounts demand cognitive sophistication, which (...) excludes many children, while others are inclusive of children but fail by (a) putting children morally on a par with most animals (experiencing subject of a life), (b) invoking criteria of dubious moral relevance (potentiality, membership in a biological species), or (c) not securing impartial moral status (special relationships). We end with our own account, which attempts to rectify such problems, addressing specifically the moral status of children. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to determine how Locke understands suspension and the role it plays in his view of human liberty. To this end I, 1) discuss the deficiencies of the first edition version of ‘Of Power’ and why Locke needed to include the ability to suspend in the second edition, then 2) analyze Locke’s definitions of the power to suspend with a focus on his use of the terms ‘source’, ‘hinge’, and ‘inlet’ to describe the power. I (...) determine from these descriptions that the ability to suspend is a passive power and is a necessary condition for the rational deliberation that Locke takes to be necessary for acting as a free agent. In 3) I connect Locke’s view of the power to suspend to his discussion in the sections that precede ‘Of Power.’ I argue that the kind of judgment that Locke endorses in his discussion of the Molyneux problem is also at work in acts of suspension. In 4) I apply my interpretation to Locke’s description of the connection between the power to suspend and liberty. In 5) I conclude with a discussion of a passage from the fifth edition of the Essay. Locke adds this passage to address worries raised by Limborch over the course of their correspondence. According to Chappell, it lends evidence to the view that Locke takes suspensions to be caused by undetermined volitions. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the geography of the botanical community in Paris, under the July Monarchy. At that time, the Muséum d’Histoire naturelle was at its institutional acme and, under the impulse of François Guizot, its budget was increasing dramatically. However, closer attention to manuscript sources reveals that the botanists of the time favoured other private institutions, located both on the Right and Left Banks of the Seine. The MHN was prestigious for its collections and professors but it was relatively (...) remote from the centre of Paris, and its plant samples were sometimes difficult to access. Several other first-class private herbaria granted liberal access to botanists: those of Jacques Gay, Phillip Barker Webb, and Benjamin Delessert. Thanks to their wealth, these plant amateurs had ownership of historical herbaria consisting of species types alongside rich botanical libraries. Botanists visiting Paris from foreign countries or other provinces of France also spent some time studying less general plant collections, like those of Count Jaubert, or specialized collections, like Montagne’s or Léveillé’s on cryptogams. Other botanists also enjoyed renown at the time, although they published little, if anything. Living in crammed apartments, literally in the middle of their plant samples, these botanists were key nodes in botanical networks, although they had no relation with the prestigious MHN. (shrink)

This paper treats a heretofore-unnoticed concept in the history of the philosophical discussion of human freedom, a kind of freedom that is not defined solely in terms of the causal power of the agent. Instead, the exercise of freedom essentially involves the non-occurrence of something. That being free involves the non-occurrence, that is, the absence, of an act may seem counterintuitive. With the exception of those specifically treated in this paper, philosophers tend to think of freedom as intimately involved with (...) volition, the judging or deciding activity of the will that votes in favor of or against a proposed action. However, there are two thinkers who endorse a view where not willing constitutes human freedom. Our analysis focuses on the views of Malebranche and Locke. Both invoke a notion dubbed here as ‘absential suspension.’ On this view, freedom is associated not with the power of volition, but rather with this kind of suspension. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on moral personhood understood in terms of the notion of moral status. An entity is said to have moral status only if it or its interest matters morally for its own sake. Nonutilitarians tend to think of moral status in terms of entitlements and protections that can conflict with, and sometimes override, doing what would maximize the good and minimize the bad. If moral status comes in degrees, and if there is a status of the highest degree (...) (i.e., full moral status), then moral persons are those with full moral status. After giving a more precise account of it, we assess different views of what it takes to qualify for full moral status (some of which appeal to metaphysical notions of person). We also briefly discuss how metaphysical notions of personhood are put to moral use in utilitarian moral theorizing that eschews the notion of moral personhood. (shrink)

An important volume connecting classical studies with feminism, Feminism and Ancient Philosophy provides an even-handed assessment of the ancient philosophers' discussions of women and explains which ancient views can be fruitful for feminist theorizing today. The papers in this anthology range from classical Greek philosophy through the Hellenistic period, with the predominance of essays focusing on topics such as the relation of reason and the emotions, the nature of emotions and desire, and related issues in moral psychology. The volume contains (...) some new, ground-breaking essays on Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, as well as previously published pieces by established scholars like Martha Nussbaum and Julia Annas. It promises to be of interest to an interdisciplinary audience including those working in classics, ancient philosophy, and feminist theory. (shrink)

In Ethics 4, Spinoza argues that “A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death” (E4p67). Spinoza’s argument for this claim depends on his view of imagination, reason, and scientia intuitiva and on his notion of conatus. I explicate Spinoza’s view of life in terms of power (potentia) and show that Spinozan death amounts to reconfiguration rather than absolute annihilation. I then show that E4p67 reflects Spinoza’s well-known account (...) of the three kinds of knowing. Thinking of death is quintessentially imaginative and passive. The free person of E4p67 is in contrast a rational person. To reason, and as becomes especially clear E5, to experience scientia intuitiva, moreover is to think of things “without any relation to time, but [rather] sub specie aeternatitis”(E2p44c2) and to experience activity To the extent, then, that we are rational, free, and active, death is a non-issue. Indeed, to the extent that we are able to meditate on life sub specie aeternitatis, we actually experience joy, love (E5p20s, p32c), eternity (Sp23s), and “the greatest satisfaction of the Mind” (E5p27). (shrink)

A central project of Enlightenment thought is to ground claims to natural freedom and equality. This project is the foundation of Suchon’s view of freedom. But it is not the whole story. For, Suchon’s focus is not just natural freedom, but also the necessary and sufficient conditions for oppressed members of society, women, to avail themselves of this freedom. In this paper I, first, treat Suchon’s normative argument for women’s right to develop their rational minds. In Section 2, I consider (...) Suchon’s three necessary and sufficient conditions for freedom, and the manners in which women are blocked from meeting them. The normative argument together with the obstacles to women meeting the conditions for freedom raises the question of how to get women into a position where they can enjoy the freedom to which they are entitled. In Section 3, I outline Suchon’s answer: women must live a life without attachment. I argue this answer situates Suchon both chronologically and theoretically between the Béguines, a medieval women’s spiritual movement, and 20th century feminist separatism. I conclude that Suchon’s view of freedom is radical, both for its time and ours, and deserves greater attention from historians of philosophy and of feminist thought. (shrink)

The neuro-enhancement Modafinil promises to dramatically increase users' waking hours without much sacrifice to clarity of thought and without serious side effects (inducing addiction). For Modafinil to be advantageous, its usage must enable access to goods that themselves improve the quality of one's life. I draw attention to a variety of conditions that must be met for an experience, activity or object to improve the quality of one's life, such as positional, relational, and saturation conditions, as well as it's being (...) good for its own sake. I discuss and describe the contexts in which widespread usage (legal or not) of Modafinil would undermine these conditions being met, and thus users would fail to significantly improve the quality of their lives and would in fact potentially make both themselves and nonusers worse off in important respects thus far overlooked by critics. In the right contexts, where free time is protected and prolonged, Modafinil does have a variety of potential benefits including, most interestingly, a distinctive form of agency possible only in free time. The potential disadvantages and advantages highlighted in this article are relevant not only to public institutions deciding whether to legalize Modafinil's use as an enhancement but also to individuals deciding whether to use it illegally, as well as to the questions of how and whether to alter key features of one's context (e.g. regulating work hours or extending social services) rather than, or in addition, to regulating the use of enhancement drugs such as Modafinil. (shrink)

JohnLocke’s 1700–1702 correspondencewith Dutch Arminian Philippus van Limborch has been taken by commentators as the motivation for modifications to the fifth edition of “Of Power,” the chapter in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that treats freedom. In this paper, I offer the first systematic and chronological study of their correspondence. I argue that the heart of their disagreement is over how they define “freedom of indifference.” Once the importance of the disagreement over indifference is established, it is clear that when (...) Locke altered parts of “Of Power” as a reaction to Limborch’s questioning, he did so in the interest of further clarifying and solidifying his view, not changing it. Seeing how they disagree over indifference also allows us to see the correspondence as showcasing the conflict between intellectualism, the view that cognitive states determine the will, and voluntarism, the view that the will alone determines action. (shrink)

_Philosophers on Race _adds a new dimension to current research on race theory by examining the historical roots of the concept in the works of major Western philosophers.

In EN II.1, Aristotle claims that our nature is inadequate for moral virtue. We are not, he says, in the same relation to virtue as a stone falling to earth; moral excellence is neither by nature nor contrary to our nature but reached by habituation . Other texts such as Pol. I.13 and Pol. VII.12 about natural capacities, as well as those like Phys. II.1 and Meta. V.4 about physis in general, complicate the picture concerning the bases for moral excellence (...) in EN. This essay considers the range of applications of physis, focusing on the practical works, so as to examine the extent to which Aristotle thinks moral and political nature is amenable to external determinants such as cultural education. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the relation between Bateson and Guattari’s ecological thoughts: two thinkers whose ecological ideas at first sight have a lot in common. In order to show the difference between the thoughts of both thinkers, I will take my clue from Guattari’s remark that he parts ways with Bateson on the role of context. Explaining the role of context in both authors will allow me to show how Guattari’s thought implies both an endorsement and a critique of (...) cybernetics, and, specifically, promoting a machinic rather than cybernetic ecology. I will conclude by indicating what is at stake in this distinction. (shrink)

This brief critique of Frances Kamm’s Bioethical Prescriptions (Oxford University Press, 2013) focuses on the phenomenon of philosophers taking on roles outside of academia, which Kamm discusses in chapter 24, “The Philosopher as Insider and Outsider: How to Advise, Compromise, and Criticize.” Kamm discusses various conflicts that can arise for philosophers who serve as advisors on governmental commissions. One goal many philosophers have in joining such commissions is (a) to promote the public good (p. 527), but this can come into (...) conflict with (b) the goals and norms governing one as a philosopher, as well as with (c) the goals and norms governing philosophers qua advisors to the governmental commissions. Kamm’s view is that (c) has precedence, up to a point, over (a) and (b). Questions that I explore are (1) what are the norms constitutive of being a philosopher; (2) how do the norms constitutive of other roles philosophers enter into differ from those of advisors to commissioners; and (3) when and why do some of the norms and goals outlined by Kamm take precedence over others? (shrink)

This article critically examines the relationship between shared residence and contact after the breakdown of the parents’ relationship. It examines the background to the government’s main emphasis on methods of monitoring, facilitating and enforcing contact as the most efficacious method of proceeding in respect of the law reform agenda, focussing particularly on the potential impact of punitive enforcement measures on primary carers, usually mothers. The article sets the discussion within its wider cultural context in respect of fathers’ rights claims that (...) family law currently favours mothers, and shows how recent legal developments constitute part of a package to manage post-separation relationships between parent and children. It also examines some of the emerging case law to show how the judiciary is using shared residence orders and transfer of residence to deal with protracted and very difficult contact disputes, and in ways which were not anticipated when shared residence orders were first introduced. Drawing on feminist legal commentaries the argument will be made that the use of transfer of residence and shared residence orders in these disputes is extremely worrying, especially in light of the growing body of empirical research which heralds caution. The article will conclude by suggesting that far from favouring mothers, both the law reforms and the case law effectively construct mothers as integral to the problem of contact. They are treated as the site of and solution to the ‚problem’ of contact, and the means of dealing with the problem is by increasingly punitive measures which are inappropriate in a family law context. At the same time non-residential fathers who do not uphold contact escape legal sanctions. (shrink)

For Simone de Beauvoir, the opposition of subjects is not inescapable as it may be resolved by a relation of reciprocal recognition. I discuss formulations of reciprocity and the problem of the other as outlined in Beauvoir's 1927 diary and her memoir, La Force de l'âge, then turn to examine the account of lesbianism in Le Deuxième sexe.

"J’étais morte, mais pas enterrée, et c’est la philosophie qui m’a ramenée à la vie. Comme une mère, elle m’a non seulement donné la vie en me donnant accès à ma vie intérieure par l’élargissement de ma conscience, mais elle m’a également appris à vivre, c’est-à-dire comment agir au mieux dans la vie quotidienne. Tout au long de ses réflexions et de son témoignage, l’auteure affirme haut et fort que la philosophie peut sauver des vies, car elle rend possibles la (...) conversion du regard et la prise en charge de sa propre liberté."--Résumé de l'éditeur. (shrink)

Since the mid-1990s, there has been a rise in the number of deaths of undocumented Mexican migrants crossing the U.S./Mexican border. Who is responsible for these deaths? This article examines the culpability of (1) migrants, (2) humanitarian volunteers, (3) the Mexican government, (4) the U.S. government, and (5) U.S. businesses. A significant portion of the blame is assigned to U.S. free trade policies and U.S. businesses employing undocumented immigrants.

Within hospital settings, chaplains offer emotional support, spiritual counseling, and healing services to patients and simultaneously address ethical considerations by upholding confidentiality and impartiality. This study examines the impact of chaplains in hospital settings on patients, families, and healthcare teams by analyzing diverse case studies and personal anecdotes. Further, it highlights the significant spiritual and pastoral roles of chaplains, which potentially contribute to ethical decision-making in end-of-life situations. Results reveal that chaplains play a crucial and dynamic role in providing ethical (...) support to patients, families, and healthcare personnel. Additionally, the traits possessed by chaplains can help ensure the continuous provision of care and adherence to best practices. This study further examines the various ethical conflicts of interest that may occur when chaplains participate in and discuss effective conflict management strategies. Finally, it contributes to the ongoing academic discussion on chaplains’ role in and impact on patient-centered care and ethical decision-making within healthcare organizations. (shrink)

The notion of homonymy has been of perennial philosophical interest to scholars of Aristotle from ancient Greek commentators to modern thinkers. Across historical periods, certain issues have remained central, such as the nature of Aristotelian homonymy, its relation to synonymy and analogy, and whether the concept undergoes change throughout the corpus. In addition, fundamental questions concerning the use of homonymy in regard to dialectical practice and scientific inquiry are raised and discussed. It is argued that there are two aspects to (...) Aristotelian homonymy, negative and positive in function, which provide complementary roles in regard to dialectic and science. (shrink)

Experience from a three-year Home Office funded evaluation of a project intended to reduce school exclusions is used to explore methodological dilemmas raised by the current emphasis upon 'evidence-based' policy formation. The social construction of school exclusion rates poses problems of reliability and validity, especially when such rates are simultaneously being used for target setting. In principle, the concept of 'evidence-based' can refer to a wide variety of research questions and appropriate research methodologies. Despite this, moves towards interpreting 'evidence-based' as (...) predominantly measurement and outcomes oriented can be found both in government evaluation guidelines and in procedures for systematic reviews of research. Given the complexity of educational innovations, any neglect of research into the processes of change in naturalistic settings will not only lead to a restricted awareness of a project's impact but also to a failure to understand what certain apparent outcomes actually mean. (shrink)

Spinoza is often conceived as a highly intellectualist philosopher, and it is tempting to read human freedom without attention to its material basis. In this paper, I study Spinoza's claim that the more the body can undergo, the more the mind can know in order to establish Spinoza's view of freedom under the attribute of extension.

ABSTRACT:In 1740, Joanna Stephens (fl. 1720–1741) produced a recipe for a tonic that she claimed cured bladder stones. Although she had the support of some notable and powerful men in the medical community and empirical evidence that her tonic worked, it took two years of petitioning, discussing, and even (unsuccessfully) crowd-sourcing before Parliament relented and awarded her the sum she requested to take her tonic public. Stephens’s interaction with the scientific community serves as a case study for how epistemic credibility (...) shapes how communities hear, interpret, and react to testimonies of knowledge claims from marginalized community members. Stephens’s position as an outsider, both qua woman and qua experimentalist, meant that she was effectively and almost immediately written out of her own story by learned and powerful men with who had both vested interests in the cure for the stone and epistemic prejudices that made it impossible for them to hear Stephens’s claim that she had made a discovery. (shrink)

This chapter considers evidence from Spinoza’s Ethics, Theologico-Political Treatise, and correspondence to clarify his account of philosophical pedagogy and his analysis of the shift from imagining, characterized by inadequate ideas and passive affects, to reasoning and intuitive understanding, which consist of adequate ideas and active affects. Central issues in Spinoza’s account of how to make a philosopher include the tasks of teachers, the cultivation of the desire to learn, and the doctrine of the common notions. The chapter reads the Ethics (...) as a theoretical, systematic account of human development and philosophical education and as a practical, pedagogical intervention designed to transform the reader. It looks to Spinoza’s presentation of Christ as intellectual knower and teacher par excellence in the Theologico-Political Treatise and to parallels there with the Ethics. Both Christ and Spinoza himself employ “common and true notions” for philosophical teaching. (shrink)

Ivancovsky et al.'s Novelty-Seeking Model suggests several mechanisms that might underlie developmental change in creativity and curiosity. We discuss how these implications both do and do not align with extant developmental findings, suggest two further elements that can provide a more complete developmental account, and discuss current methodological barriers to formulating an integrated developmental model of curiosity and creativity.