This is a review of a book by Thomas Jay Oord.

The first chapter of this study presents the context for the current discussion. It looks at the reality of evil and the search for adequate answers to the problem of evil. The open theistic alternative is one among many struggles to find meaning in adversity. This chapter also presents the study method and the criteria adopted for analysing the open theistic proposal. -/- The second chapter examines earlier philosophical and theological conceptions of divine foreknowledge, divine control, human freedom (...) and contingencies. Two representatives were selected to explore three significant concepts of God: Classical Theism (CT), Molinism (M) and process theism (PT). -/- The third chapter answers when and why open theism started and what it represents. We have shown that although the coinage “open theism” (OT) was made by Richard Rice about forty years ago, the ideas this view propagates have precursory influences from a host of earlier philosophers and theologians like Jacob Arminius, Adam Clarke, Lorenzo McCabe, Jules Lequyer, and Gordon Olson. Also, there are traces of Socinianism and process theism in OT that open theists admit to. -/- The fourth chapter examines three attributes of God in OT: eternity, immutability, and divine aseity. Open theists argue that the classical notion of divine eternity is not biblical because such a notion amounts to a static view of time which does not help to resolve the tension between divine control and human freedom. OT claims that CT’s doctrine of divine immutability is a product of Greek philosophy, especially Platonism, which conflates divine immutability with immobility. Lastly, OT rejects the classical notion of divine aseity because God is relationally dependent upon His creatures, and in the end, He is a risk-taker. The fifth chapter deals with divine omniscience, divine control, human freedom and contingencies in OT. OT’s concept of divine control, omniscience and human freedom may be summarised thus: 1) At the dawn of creation, God endowed human beings with inherent powers and libertarian freedom. 2) The creation is an ongoing project with open routes. 3) Because of the openness and ongoing nature of the creation, new things are being supplied that were not part of the initial plan. 4) God accepts these additions, adjusts the divine plan, and takes responsibility for the outcome. 5) God’s knowledge is dynamic/present knowledge. The future is partly open and partly closed to God. 6) If God knows the future perfectly, humans would no longer be free since whatsoever God knows will necessarily come to pass. 7) Divine providence involves risk-taking as a result of the foregoing. -/- The sixth chapter is on OT’s concept of divine power, divine love and the problem of evil. OT denies that God could exemplify divine power and divine love maximally at the same time. As a result, love is the most essential attribute of God. OT argues that the classical doctrine of divine omnipotence is not biblical but a product of Greek philosophy. Open theists maintain that the New Testament understanding of Almightiness contradicts the loveless power that the classical notion of divine omnipotent propagates. -/- The last chapter first offers a personal reflection on the open view under three subheadings: 1) A few philosophical and theological issues in OT. 2) A theological/canonical reading of a few biblical passages that open theists reinterpreted, and 3) An argument that the supposed higher benefits of the open view might not be tenable. In the second place, it points out what might be learned from the open theistic alternative. Lastly, it makes some recommendations for further studies in the analytic philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. (shrink)

This article explores the paradox between the classical doctrine of divine aseity and the notion of divine self-limitation. Drawing from biblical narratives and theological concepts such as divine accommodation and kenosis, the article shows that God’s choice to enter into a temporal and relational interaction with creation affects God in such a way that God would not have been affected without the creation. Given the foregoing, open and relational theists conceptualised the notion of divine self-limitation in (...) which, as a result of the creation and human libertarian freedom, God cannot maximally exemplify his great-making properties upheld in traditional theism. I argued in this article that although God seems to become vulnerable because of the act of creation, He nevertheless remains a se because He is not only the source of his existence, but the creation of significant others could not cause God to lose his essential attribute of independence. Therefore, God is still omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, immutable and the like because the possession of these divine attributes does not rule out the possibility that God can enter into a temporal relationship with the creatures. Divine self-limitation predicates real limitations of God contrary to the negating language of the Scripture and, therefore, undermines God’s Almightiness.Contribution: It is argued in this article that although it may be possible to speak about God’s vulnerability because of his act of creation, which seems like a hard choice because He is omniscient, a weaker version of divine aseity that ascribes real limitations to God is not viable. (shrink)

Open theists have generally affirmed that God exercises general sovereignty, seeking to achieve an overall providential goal related to our freely choosing to love Him, though the path to that goal is uncertain. This understanding of God's relationship to the world has the implication that God risks failure in achieving His purpose, since His success ultimately depends upon our free choices. In this paper, I first outline some concerns about the risks involved in God's exercising general sovereignty, and (...) then explain how an alternative 'hopeful' view alleviates these concerns. I conclude that the hopeful view is a promising alternative that deserves further exploration. (shrink)

Open theists argue that God's relationship to time, as conceived in classical theism, is erroneous. They explain that it is contradictory for an atemporal being to act in a temporal universe, including experiencing its temporal successions. Contrary to the atemporalists, redemptive history has shown that God interacts with humans in time. This relational nature of God nullifies the classical notion of God as timelessly eternal. Therefore, it lacks a philosophical and theological basis. Because God is in time, (...) He does not know all future contingencies and, therefore, changes. This study examines open theism's appropriation of the A and B theories of time to the divine-human relationship. The study argues that divine temporality does not solve the tension of divine-human relationships, especially in relation to the future. Further, historical divine temporality does not negate the fact of divine atemporality. It mainly stems from God's choice to create temporal creatures and His relationship with them. Furthermore, if it is not logically and metaphysically contradictory for an omnipresent being to act in space, then it follows that an atemporal being can act in time. Whether time is understood from the metric or psychological point of view, it does not transcend God, and therefore, the limitation it places on human creatures with respect to the future does not apply to God. Lastly, although a few philosophers reject the notion of eternity as timelessly eternal, the doctrine has a philosophical and theological basis in the Scripture. (shrink)

The theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, which is deeply rooted in classical Christology and Lutheran orthodoxy, has close affinities with views about the nature of God and God’s relationship with the world that has recently been labeled “open theism.” Bonhoeffer’s concepts of God, freedom, providence and ethics provide relational views of God with firm theological credentials and exemplify a strong integration of philosophy and theology.

A number of thinkers today, including open theists, find reasons to attribute temporality to God. According to Robert W. Jenson, the Trinity is indispensable to a Christian concept of God, and divine temporality is essential to the meaning of the Trinity. Following the lead of early Christian thought, Jenson argues that the persons of the Trinity are relations, and these relations are temporal. Jenson’s insights are obscured, however, by problematic references to time as a sphere to which God (...) is related. Schubert M. Ogden gives the notion of divine temporality coherent content by arguing that God’s actuality is best understood as an unending succession of experiences. This paper was delivered in the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)

Dean Zimmerman has made significant contributions to metaphysics, philosophy of time, and philosophy of religion. In this paper, I set my focus on Zimmerman’s approach to God, time, and creation. Zimmerman has defended a model of God called open theism on which God is essentially temporal. In this paper, I will first articulate open theism. Then I will explore a series of puzzles related to God’s perfect rationality and creation. These can be stated as the following three questions. (...) Why didn’t God create sooner? Why did God create anything at all? Why did God create this universe in particular? (shrink)

Rik Peels ( 2016 ) treats divine repentance as a biblical theme and presents this theme as a paradox in which divine repentance, divine omniscience and divine moral perfect goodness are an inconsistent triad. To solve this paradox, Peels suggests that God does not know about some of his own future acts, and distinguishes his solution from open theism, although he accepts that open theism can also escape the paradox. In this work, I criticize Peels’ account of divine (...) repentance from an open theist perspective. My first criticism concerns his dismissal of open theism as an untenable account of divine omniscience. In my second criticism, I point out that the philosophical motivations of open theism entail its success in dealing with the paradox. On the other hand, I argue that Peels’ account of divine repentance is philosophically unmotivated, and as an ad hoc solution to the paradox, it undermines God’s omniscience and subordinates it to divine repentance. In my third criticism, I address three implications that Peels attributes to his view. I emphasize that these implications have been described by open theists as strengths of their view, and compare Peels’ account and open theism in relation to them. (shrink)

This article is comprised of a dialogue between Pentecostal-Charismatic and Process-Relational theologies on the perennial issue of miracles. The language of supernaturalism, widely employed by Pentecostal-Charismatic theologians, is contrasted with the metaphysical naturalism of Process-Relational theology; it is proposed that a philosophically and scientifically sensitive theology of miracles is possible through a synthesis of both traditions. Themes such as nonmaterialism over materialism, spiritual experience, and prayer for healing miracles are explored. A theology of miracles, mutually informed by both (...) Pentecostal-Charismatic and Process-Relational theologies, may focus less on whether or not miracles are possible, but instead focus more on what kind of miracles human beings might value most. By mutually engaging a theology of nonsupernatural, metaphysically grounded miracles, Pentecostal-Charismatic and Process-Relational theologians may collaborate to establish the groundwork for creative scientific enterprises, especially in the non-Western world where Pentecostalism continues to experience its most rapid growth, Such perspectives may eventually lead to cutting-edge discoveries about the fundamental nature of, and God's interaction with, reality itself. Implications for future research are proposed. (shrink)

A common type of argument against the existence of God is to argue that certain essential features associated with the existence of God are inconsistent with certain other features to be found in the actual world. for an analysis of the different ways to deploy the term “God” in philosophical and theological discourse and for an analysis of the logical form of arguments for and against the existence of God.) A recent example of this type of argument against the existence (...) of God is based on the assumption that there are random processes or chancy states of affairs in the actual world that contradict God being absolute sovereign over his creation: Chancy states of affairs are said to entail a denial of divine providence or omniscience. argues that “classical Big Bang cosmology is inconsistent with theism due to the unpredictable nature of the Big Bang singularity.”) More often than not, however, this apparent conflict is formulated only intuitively and lacks sufficient conceptual clarification of the crucial terms involved. As a consequence, it is seldom clear where the conflict really lies. In what follows, I first provide a brief analysis of chance and randomness before I turn to cosmological and evolutionary arguments against the existence of God that in some way or other are based on chance and randomness. I end by way of comparing three popular conceptions of God as regards their ability to deal with God’s relation to a world of chance and randomness. Neither classical theism, nor open theism, nor indeed process panentheism has difficulties in accounting for God’s relation to a world of chance and randomness. (shrink)

The Birkhoff-Maltsev problem asks for a characterization of those lattices each of which is isomorphic to the lattice L(K) of all subquasivarieties for some quasivariety K of algebraic systems. The current status of this problem, which is still open, is discussed. Various unsolved questions that are related to the Birkhoff-Maltsev problem are also considered, including ones that stem from the theory of propositional logics.

In this essay I use the notion of divine values, those values analytically assigned to the concept of God, as a means of understanding replies to criticisms of open theism. I begin by orienting open theism according to the divine values open theist’s embrace within the larger context of relational theology. I then present three criticisms, a theological criticism, a practical criticism and a philosophical criticism and an open theist reply to each. Finally, I attempt (...) to show the underlying motivation which unifies the open theist’s responses and points out where progress can be made in such discussions. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)

The paper is the summary of a wider work, a research program. The hypothesis is that if Fundamental Ontology is apophatic – that is, if it has the same dialectical nature (relationality-substantiality) as the Trinity – we can accept that Trinity is also apophatic. The apophatic-relational explanation may sound odd, but it is the most honest one, because it does not hide the problems under the carpet. What emerges is a coherent form of Trinitarian Theism – since there is (...) correspondence between the human (un)ability to know the two levels of reality (the World and God) – that is based on an inevitable relational-apophatic paradigm. The apophaticism that we see in the Trinity (and in ontology) ensures that Trinitarian Theism can neither be proven nor disproven. (shrink)

For some time now, I have written and talked about Thomas Jay Oord as the most "cutting edge" person on the theological scene today. This may sound like a bold claim, but what Oord has accomplished in bridging the gap between evangelicals and liberals is remarkable both in terms of background and personal commitment. He has a foot in the evangelical camp, yet as a product of Claremont Graduate University, he has another foot solidly in the liberal camp. Intellectually, at (...) least, Oord has had an easygoing relationship with both camps. As a result of his indefatigable efforts, the Open and Relational Theologies Group of the American Academy of Religion has been one of the best attended and most successful groups... (shrink)

Theists in general and Christians in particular have good grounds for affirming divine action in relation to twenty-first-century science. Although humans cannot perceive with their five senses the causation—both divine and creaturely—at work in our world, they have reasons to believe God acts as an efficient, but never sufficient, cause in creation. The essential kenosis option I offer overcomes liabilities in other kenosis proposals, while accounting for a God who acts personally, consistently, persuasively, and yet in diversely efficacious ways. (...) We can reasonably infer that the love, beauty, and truth expressed in creation derive from divine and creaturely causation. (shrink)

After an opening chapter, in which he defends an objectivist theory of moral discourse against various forms of emotivism and pragmatism by locating the ordinary import of moral ascriptions in their reference to persons rather than situations, Owen proceeds to generalize this requirement so that moral imperatives are regarded as making sense only if they issue from a personal source. "Making sense" admittedly does not mean that there is any logical contradiction involved in denying that a relation of persons is (...) presupposed by moral conduct and implied by moral discourse; negatively put, stoicism is the only consistent alternative to theism: but stoicism neglects evidence for the existence of God that it need not. Thus, while there is a "gap" between the premisses and the conclusion of the moral argument which can only be bridged by a "leap," this "leap" of faith is far from being blind. While most of this book amounts simply to an incisive and extremely well-ordered restatement of the Kantian moral argument for the existence of God, the author's use of the notion of person and pari passu community as integral features of the argument revise it sufficiently to give it a prima facie better based cognitive appeal than Kant's.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The title above identifies two issues in Charles Hartshorne's panentheistic understanding of God that, in my judgment, have not been sufficiently clarified. The purpose of this paper is to provide additional clarification, that the adequacy of this type of theism may be more carefully judged by its admirers and by its detractors from their respective perspectives. The first part will identify central elements of Hartshorne's reasoning about God's relation to the world. The second part examines how Hartshorne speaks of a (...) divine "transcendence" in a naturalistic metaphysics that is thoroughly empirical. The third part will examine the ways that God is related to the world's evil and whether God is in some way .. (shrink)

In the recent debate on future contingents and the nature of the future, authors such as G. A. Boyd, W. L. Craig, and E. Hess have made use of various logical notions, such as the Aristotelian relations of contradiction and contrariety, and the ‘open future square of opposition.’ My aim in this paper is not to enter into this philosophical debate itself, but rather to highlight, at a more abstract methodological level, the important role that Aristotelian diagrams can play (...) in organizing and clarifying the debate. After providing a brief survey of the specific ways in which Boyd and Hess make use of Aristotelian relations and diagrams in the debate on the nature of the future, I argue that the position of open theism is best represented by means of a hexagon of opposition. Next, I show that on the classical theist account, this hexagon of opposition ‘collapses’ into a single pair of contradictory statements. This collapse from a hexagon into a pair has several aspects, which can all be seen as different manifestations of a single underlying change. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mind and Purpose in Nature: A Reply to Donald A. CrosbyMikael Leidenhag (bio)One might say that there is a blurred line between panpsychism and emergentism. They are both committed to anti-reductionism and have often been construed as viable options to crude physicalism and Cartesian dualism. Yet, the panpsychist will find the bruteness of emergent properties concerning, in that they seem to emerge unpredictably and in defiance of any logical (...) explanation. In my book and article, I highlighted potential weaknesses in various forms of emergentism, including Donald Crosby’s way of using emergence theory to lay a metaphysical foundation for a Religion of Nature.1 In his most recent book Evolutionary Emergence of Purposive Goals and Values: A Naturalistic Teleology, Crosby responds to some of my criticisms.2 This short essay offers a reply to what I take to be the key issues in this important dialogue between panpsychism and emergentism.Before I proceed to respond to Crosby’s informative criticism, let me summarize some important commonalities between my own panpsychist view of consciousness and Crosby’s teleological emergentism.First, we both share a commitment to mental and teleological realism, in that our accounts take it as a fact that there is something to be explained. Mentality and teleological features of nature are not appearances to be explained (away) by some underlying, purely physical, level. In that regard, both Crosby and I take Daniel Dennett’s illusionist and eliminativist view of consciousness to be an insufficient metaphysical starting point. I agree with Crosby’s assessment in Evolutionary Emergence of Purposive Goals and Values that such an eliminative stance “provides no satisfying explanation for teleology or convincing interpretation of its critical role” in humans and non-human animals.3 [End Page 84]A second, important, common denominator is that our accounts reject what Crosby terms “mechanistic materialism” according to which, contra Dennett, there is something to be explained, but that consciousness/teleology (C/T) can be wholly accounted for in terms of physico-mechanical interactions, opening the door for wholescale causal determinism and denial of freedom in nature.4Third, albeit in significantly different ways, our accounts of C/T rely on something more fundamental to explain higher-level phenomena. I take mind/mindedness to be a fundamental and universal feature of existence, whereas Crosby suggests that novelty is a “pervasive trait of the temporal universe,” enabling the emergence of C/T through longer evolutionary trajectories.5Fourth, C/T can act as a pointer towards a Sacred dimension of reality. On Crosby’s Religion of Nature, the reality of C/T signifies the valuative dimensions of nature and a “sacredness that is not derivative from something else or from some other realm.”6 While I concede that there is no necessary connection between panpsychism and theism, I have previously made the argument that the former makes the latter significantly more reasonable.Given these commonalities, Crosby and I would occupy a rather similar spot on a hypothetical map of all the available positions in philosophy of mind.I outline these common denominators to make sure that the differences between our accounts are not exaggerated and that it hopefully makes it easier to follow my response to Crosby’s criticism below.I will, in particular, focus on three areas of contention: (1) That emergence theory does not entail a stronger notion of unpredictability/incomprehensibility, (2) that consciousness (and teleological norms) can arise naturally through the evolutionary process if given sufficient time; and (3) that emergence theory does not entail dualism.It should be emphasized that my arguments, and concerns about Crosby’s emergentism, are mostly based on philosophers that subscribe to some form of naturalism, materialism, or physicalism.Emergence Theory and UnpredictabilityIn my book Naturalizing God? and the article “Does Naturalism Make Room for Teleology?” I make the argument that the plausibility of emergentism is undercut by one of its core commitments; namely, that emergent properties, [End Page 85] while ontologically dependent on their material base, are unpredictable in relation to the subvenient base. That is, while consciousness depends on the brain structure, the coming into being of consciousness—our very ability to have thoughts, feelings, and perceptions... (shrink)

This article presupposes that God should, first and foremost, be understood as essentially loving. From this, this article constructively proposes divine power as kenotic love-power for the Other and shows how this is coherent with different forms of theism. Such love-power always promotes the well-being of the Self-Other in a mutually loving relationship without connotations of self-negation or self-humiliation often associated with kenosis. If love is primary, theists should seek relational theology where God and creation relate to each (...) other and affect each other. Panentheism is one example of relational theology, and so is open theism. Pantheism, on the other hand, is incoherent with the suggested notion of relational kenotic love-power. Several theologians argue that God necessarily loves the world and that God’s love is kenotic. However, kenosis is connected to ideas of self-negation and emptying of the self. From a feminist perspective, this is problematic. This article constructively puts forward an understanding of kenotic love-power that takes this feminist critique seriously and suggests that divine loving power should be understood not as self-limitation or self-abnegation but as self-realization through love and acceptance of that which is Other. It suggests a necessary Self-Other relationship because, without the Self, the Other cannot be. If that were so, there could not be a relationship at all. This model suits panentheists, process-panentheists, and open theists but not pantheists. (shrink)

Panentheism seems to be an attractive alternative to classical theism. It is not clear, though, what exactly panentheism asserts and how it relates to classical theism. By way of clarifying the thesis of panentheism, I argue that panentheism and classical theism differ only as regards the modal status of the world. According to panentheism, the world is an intrinsic property of God – necessarily there is a world – and according to classical theism the world is an extrinsic property of (...) God – it is only contingently true that there is a world. Therefore, as long as we do not have an argument showing that necessarily there is a world, panentheism is not an attractive alternative to classical theism. (shrink)

Biomedical ontologies define entities and relations in order to represent knowledge in the biomedical domain. In addition, many ontologies further represent supplementary knowledge by linking terms from an external controlled vocabulary to the entities defined within the ontology itself. In this paper we concentrate on the domain of medical imaging, for which controlled vocabularies are emerging, but no ontology currently exists. We analyzed computed tomography reports in order to determine to which entities terms used in such reports refer and which (...) relations are used with regard to the recently published Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Relation Ontology. Our analysis revealed that the majority of entities referred to in radiological reporting practice are anatomical entities and anatomical coordinates. Based on the Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Relation Ontology we provide a set of additional relations for the ontological structuring of image features such as shape, morphology, size and signal, frequently found in the reports. On the basis of these results we conclude that the construction of an imaging ontology may benefit greatly from already existing reference ontologies such as the Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA), which represent those entities to which radiological reports most frequently refer. (shrink)

How subject and object relate is perceived differently. This has been identified and discussed by philosophers. Hegel built on Plato’s notion that true reality only exists in ideas and is, therefore, objectively true. Hegel argued that the world we encounter is the objectification of the divine mind. Empiricists argue that material things can be engaged through the senses and are, therefore, real. But how do we know that spiritual things are real since they cannot be engaged through the senses? Feuerbach (...) reacted against the Enlightenment thoughts of his time by postulating that god is not real since it is a projection of human qualities. Feuerbach inverted Hegel’s theory by stating that the divine is an abstraction and reification of human thought. With this theory, Feuerbach stated that religion is human-made and redundant. Feuerbach’s theory of the non-existence of god was created during the 19th century and corresponds with post-theism. De Botton also denies the existence of god, but declared that religion has many valuable functions for society. Feuerbach, from a philosophical and De Botton, from a sociological perspective, both deny the existence of god, but differ on the role religion play in society. Feuerbach’s theories proves to have relevance to current studies of religion.Contribution: This contribution investigates the position of Ludwig Feuerbach and tries to indicate the influence his ideas had on current post-theistic theories, such as that by Allan de Botton. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to clarify the conceptions of epistemic deism and probabilistic theism and to demonstrate that the two doctrines do not finally collapse into one. I would like also to point some reasons for the acceptance of a certain version of probabilistic theism which I will call in the last part of the article “open probabilistic theism”. Open probabilistic theism is not a version of the view called “open theism”. The reasons for the (...) openness of open probabilistic theism are quite different from the reasons supporting open theism. (shrink)

Open theism denies that God has definite exhaustive foreknowledge, and affirms that God takes certain risks when creating the universe. Critics of open theism often complain that the risks are too high. Perhaps there is something morally wrong with God taking a risk in creating a universe with an open future. Open theists have tried to respond by clarifying how much risk is involved in God creating an open universe, though we argue that it (...) remains unclear how much risk is actually involved. We claim that open theists need to start developing theories about how God manages risks in order to bring about His purposes for the universe. In this article, we will take a philosophical and biological perspective on risk management that adds plausibility to open theism. We will consider how God can use different risk‐management, surveillance, and redundancy systems in the natural world in order to accomplish His goals. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to facilitate ongoing dialogue between open and non-open theists. First, I try to make precise what open theism is by distinguishing the core commitments of the position from other secondary and optional commitments. The result is a characterization of ‘generic open theism’, the minimal set of commitments that any open theist, qua open theist, must affirm. Second, within the framework of generic open theism, I distinguish three (...) important variants and discuss challenges distinctive to each. The significance of this approach is that it helps avoid conflating arguments bearing on specific versions of open theism with arguments pertaining to open theism simpliciter. (shrink)

Compares and contrasts Open Theism with Theological Determinism, Molinism, and Process Theism.

Richard Swinburne is one of the best-known names in the international philosophical scene. His apologetic project is considered one of the largest and most impactful and profound of the last century. The interview conducted here explores many biographical and theoretical issues (Omniscience, Eternity, God’s existence, Free will, Analogy, Relational ontology and Powers ontology, Soul-Body relation, Trinity, Evil) and it aims to trace a broad (albeit necessarily partial) path through his numerous works. The interview took place in 2016, in Oxford, (...) at Swinburne’s home. Today, Swinburne’s thought is discussed in monographs and doctoral theses, witnessing to an influence that will undoubtedly be lasting. (shrink)

Galleries, libraries, archives and museums are striving to retain audience attention to issues related to cultural heritage, by implementing various novel opportunities for audience engagement through technological means online. Although born-digital assets for cultural heritage may have inundated the Internet in some areas, most of the time they are stored in “digital warehouses,” and the questions of the digital ecosystem’s sustainability, meaningful public participation and creative reuse of data still remain. Emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, are used to bring (...) born-digital archives to light, aiming to enhance the public’s engagement and participation. At the core of this debate lies both the openness of data and issues of privacy. How open to the public should born-digital archives be? Should everything be open and available online, and what does it take to achieve balance between openness and privacy, especially through AI initiatives? The study is qualitative and builds on the rationale of grounded theory. The role of AI development is critically investigated in relation to opening up born-digital archives online, by considering privacy and ethics issues. Grounded in the context of the author’s PhD research, the paper proposes a human-centred approach to AI development for democratising its development towards fairness and social inclusion, contrary to the stereotypical cliché of blackboxing, allowing space for the plurality of born-digital archives to flourish. (shrink)

Twelve essays in literary theory, philosophy, and religion--about atheism, freedom, and "the Jesus thought experiment"--connect, but don't conclude. A recurring theme is the "nothing" at the heart of the deep atheism of George Eliot, Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde, Rudyard Kipling, and Thomas Hardy, who approach "nothing" with a directness lacking in their English-speaking philosophical contemporaries. How does being in the world--Thomas Nagel's "what-it's-likeness"--and how do values--Alasdair MacIntyre's justice and misericordia--fare in the face of the mindless "It" that Hardy finds at (...) the heart of things? A pivotal essay compares the theism of Paul Ricoeur and the atheism of Daniel Dennett--the subtitle is a response to the latter's latest book. Writing and Freedom defends (a strong version of) free will as necessarily interpersonal: my freedom is nothing but my acceptance of yours. This is how Milton, Rossetti, and Dickinson treat their readers, and how scientists and philosophers ideally treat each other. The book's open-ended essays model freedom so understood. Moreover, both "nothing" and "freedom" are fundamental to biblical and religious narratives (Mark and Newman). God, being "out of all relation" with the finite, cannot be known from the text of the world. Yet as "nothing," God may be said to grant unconditional autonomy to his creatures, and therefore to be present in his absence. It is round "nothing," therefore, that atheists and theists endlessly circulate. But that is what the deep atheism of European thinkers--Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan, and Zizek--say we all do anyway, however excitedly we pretend to ourselves that we don't. (shrink)

Precision medicine relies on data and biospecimens from participants who willingly offer their personal information on the promise that this act will ultimately result in knowledge that will improv...

One can readily conceive of worlds of horrendous, gratuitous suffering. Moreover, such worlds seem possible. For classical theists, however, God, amongst other things, is perfectly good. So, the question arises: for classical theists are such evil worlds possible? Many classical theists have said no. This is the modal problem of evil. Herein, I discuss a related problem: the problem of evil worlds for Lewisian theism. Lewisian theism is the conjunction of Lewis’s modal realism and classical theism, and (...) a leading Lewisian theist, Almeida, thinks that Lewisian theists should admit the existence of on-balance evil worlds. I do not. Herein, I present a dilemma for Almeida: either give up God’s sovereignty and the reductionist account of modality or make God blameworthy for evil. (shrink)

Since the time of the Enlightenment in Western Europe, discussions of faith and reason have often pitted the believer against the skeptic, the theist against the atheist, and the person of one faith against the person of no professed faith. But the relation of reason to faith has been a matter of debate among believers as well. There are those who hold that religious faith can be proven or supported by rational argument. Others say that to try to give reasons (...) and arguments does violence to religious faith, or opens it to misunderstanding and doubt, or trivializes it. Responses to the Enlightenment: An Exchange on Foundations, Faith, and Community is a dialogue between Hendrik Hart and William Sweet, two philosophers who identify themselves as Christians, and who seek to respond to the challenges of the Enlightenment and its legacy. The authors approach the relation of faith to reason, however, in very different ways: Hart from the perspective of the Calvinian tradition and postmodern philosophy, Sweet from the Catholic tradition and analytic philosophy. Among the topics discussed are the nature of religious faith and of reason, liberalism and orthodoxy in religion, the relation of religious experience and rationality, and building community in a religiously and culturally pluralistic world. This exchange presents two distinctive perspectives to some of the major challenges of the reason to religious belief, but seeks to find common ground between them. (shrink)

Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone brings together these great truth-seeking disciplines, and seeks to understand the ways in which they challenge and inform each other. Key topics and their areas of focus include: - Foundational Issues - why should anyone care about the science-and-religion debate? How do scientific claims relate to the truth? Is evolution compatible with design? - Faith and Rationality - can faith ever be rational? Are theism and atheism totally opposed? Is God hidden or does God (...) simply not exist? - Faith and Science - what provides a better explanation for the origin of the universe-science or religion? Faith and physics: can they be reconciled? Does contemporary neuroscience debunk religious belief? Creationism and evolutionary biology - what constitutes science and what constitutes pseudo-science? - Practical Implications - is fundamentalism just a problem for religious people? What are the ethical implications of the science-and-religion debate? Do logic and religion mix? This book is designed to be used in conjunction with the free 'Philosophy, Science and Religion' MOOC (massive open online course) created by the University of Edinburgh, and hosted by the Coursera platform (www.coursera.org). This book is also highly recommended for anyone looking for a concise overview of this fascinating discipline. (shrink)

Central to Raimon Panikkar’s work is the acclaimed Cosmotheandric epigram, according to which reality has three interrelated and irreducible dimensions, the human, the cosmos, and the divine. The paper examines this thesis and examines related concepts, such as ‘sacred secularity’ in Panikkar’s thinking. The overall pluralistic thesis allows for dialogue, communication and conversations across cultures. Panikkar considers that a new mythos may be emerging that places value on actions in this world and on temporality. Related to the above is Ken (...) Wilber’s ‘Integral Theory’ that underscores the stages of development of consciousness and worldviews, especially with regard to spirituality. Different perspectives on the divine and atheism are said to arise at each level of development. Wilber’s principal thesis is that religions and spiritualities have continuing and future potentials as ‘conveyor-belts’ of human development in three movements of the Spirit : art, religion and science. A brief discussion will follow on ‘participative spirituality’ and Nondual Śaiva Tantra, and their relation to contemporary atheism. The paper argues that rich space and forum for dialogue are opened between the discourses explored here with global a/theism. (shrink)

In reply to certain cosmological arguments for theism, critics regularly argue that the causal principle ex nihilo nihil fit may be false. Various theistic counter-replies to this challenge have emerged. One type of strategy is to double down on ex nihilo nihil fit. Another, very different strategy of counter-reply is to grant for the sake of argument that the principle is false, while maintaining that sound cosmological arguments can be formulated even with this concession in place. Notably, one can employ (...) a weaker opening premise formulated in modal terms, proceeding for instance from the proposition that for any contingent object coming into existence it is at least possible that it have a cause. My aim here is to try out a related strategy for weakening the relevant opening premise. Granting that it is possible for a contingent object to come into existence out of nothing without a cause, I proceed from the extremely modest claim that the obtaining of exceptionless longstanding contingent regularities demands an explanation. As such, the contingent regularity that empirically accessible macro-level contingent objects do not pop into existence causelessly demands explanation. And as it turns out, that explanation will have to be in terms of an object or objects possessed of at least some of the traditional divine attributes. (shrink)

Following the global financial crisis, banks have become more regulated to advance ethical sales cultures throughout the sector. Based on case studies of three retail banks, we find that they construct the ‘appropriate advisor’ in different ways. Inspired by Bakhtin’s work on ethics, we propose a vocabulary of relational ethics centered on the ‘answerable self.’ We argue that this vocabulary is apt for studying and discussing how organizations advance ethical sales cultures in ways that instead of encouraging value congruence (...) and alignment allow for ethical openness. In such cultures, employees—as moral agents—are morally questioning, critically self-reflexive, and answerable for their own actions toward others in their social relationships. Our paper makes three theoretical contributions, namely, problematizing the idea of cultural alignment and value congruence, demonstrating that identity regulation can both comprise and support the ‘answerable self,’ and advancing our understanding of the interdependence of ethical openness and ethical closure in fostering ethical sales cultures. (shrink)

This editorial critically engages with the understanding of openness by attending to how notions of presence and absence come bundled together as part of efforts to make open. This is particularly evident in contemporary discourse around data production, dissemination, and use. We highlight how the preoccupations with making data present can be usefully analyzed and understood by tracing the related concerns around what is missing, unavailable, or invisible, which unvaryingly but often implicitly accompany debates about data and openness.

This article introduces a model of levels of analysis applied to statements found in philosophical, scientific, and religious discourses in order to facilitate a more accurate description of the relation between science and religion. The empirical levels prove to be the most crucial for the relation between science and religion, because they include statements that are important parts of both scientific and religious discourse, whereas statements from metaphysical levels are only important in terms of religion and are neutral in relation (...) to particular scientific theories. In particular, the rejection of certain ontological assumptions behind special divine action logically entails the rejection of the literal meaning of empirical statements describing special open expression of supernatural factors in nature. Such a rejection also entails an essential revision of many religious systems of beliefs, including traditional Christian theism. (shrink)

The debate within the Christian academic community over open theism, or "openism", has been quite intense of late. Progress in this debate depends upon our examining how openism and its rivals fare when applied to particular Christian doctrines, beliefs, and practices. I hope to further the debate by raising a question regarding the Incarnation: ’Was Jesus Christ free in a morally significant way?’ After arguing that the two principal alternatives to openism (Thomism and Molinism) can offer internally plausible answers (...) to this question, I examine responses available to the open theist. None of these responses, I argue, seems particularly appealing. (shrink)