The objective of this study is twofold: to examine the patterns that govern social reporting with reference to an Islamic framework and to identify the moral legitimacy factors that influence them. We select 146 publicly listed Sharia‐compliant companies and classify the disclosures in their annual reports according to an Islamic framework that categorises items as either Required, Expected or Desired to indicate the degree of importance each item carries from an Islamic perspective. Based on this framework, we then analyse moral (...) legitimacy factors, specifically the type of Sharia screening body and the proportion of Muslims in the population, that may influence the prioritisation of the different categories of social reporting. We find that disclosures that fall into the Required category of our framework—especially those that relate to companies’ involvement in “haram” activities (activities not permissible in Islam)—are still few among the companies studied. Our research also reveals that both moral legitimacy factors under investigation influence the three categories of social reporting, although in different ways. This research contributes to the existing literature by empirically examining how organisations prioritise their disclosure of virtues and the moral legitimacy factors that influence that prioritisation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Artificial Virtues and the Equally Sensible Non-Knaves: A Response to Gauthier Annette C. Baier Gauthier's splendidly dialectical paper1 first sets out Hume's official Treatise account ofhow each personhas a self-interested motive to curb her natural but socially troublesome self-interest, by agreeing to the adoption ofthe artifices ofprivate property rights, transfer by consent, and promise (provided others are also agreeing to adopt them), andhow the sympathy-dependent moral sentiment approves of (...) such a redirection of"the interested passion." Enlightened self-interest gives us the natural obligation tojustice; the fact that it is morally approved turns it into a moral obligation. Self-hatred for any breaches of the moral obligation may come in to bolster the self-interested motivation, and this will be helped along by the extra artifices employed by educators and politicians. So far so good. But now enters the sensible knave, who queries the initial assumption that each will in fact gain more by strict conformity to the rules of the Humean social artifices than by occasional carefully calculated and undetected breaches of them. If the knave is right, then the Treatise story ofhow reasonable self-interested people can get themselves to conscientiously respect property rights (including rights ofbarter), and to keep promises, is in trouble. Only by an erroneous calculation of their interest could they end with the motivation which Hume attributes to them, and finds to be morally approvable.Gauthier argues that there are indications even in the Treatise that Hume is aware ofthe flawed nature ofhis official account, since he attributes "sophistry" to some attempted justifications of honest behaviour, and attributes "feigned acts" of impossible willing to some conscientious promise-keepers. Gauthier finds Hume to have, in the Treatise, a second, less official story ofwhat it takes to be motivated to be just—that it takes error, and letting oneself be taken in by feignings and sophistry. In the Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals this submerged account surfaces in the sensible knave's challenge and Hume's admission that his own answer will not be satisfactory to the knave. The charms of official Humeanjustice, Gauthierconcludes, are spurious, sincethe "anatomy" of the account of the rational motivation to be just is known to be unsound. "The sensible knave's message is thathuman society... lacks any moral foundation." Volume XVIII Number 2 429 ANNETTE C. BAIER This is a sombre tale. One of its unwelcome implications is that Hume himself, really believing that the knave is right, but unwilling tobe seen tohave the bad grace to "dehver a theory, however true which... leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious," is simply trying to "sink" the knave's truth in oblivion by creating a smoke-screen of insincere rhetoric about the greater delights of consciousness of integrity over the knave's satisfaction in his ill-gotten gains. So there really are two sombre tales—one, attributed to Hume, about justice, and one about Hume's dupUcity (or is it mere cynical frivolity?): Gauthier crafts both stories beautifully, directing our attention to bits ofHume's text injust the right order for his dramatic purposes. But is he giving us truth or fiction? I completely agree with Gauthier's version of Hume's official Treatise story, that the moral obligation to justice supervenes on the "natural obligation" for which Hume believes the natural motivation to be collectively redirected self- (or family) interest.2 1 agree that there are one or two passages, especially in the Treatise section, "Of the obUgation of promises," that seem to jar with this account, and which much somehow be explained. I agree that Hume believes that his reply to the knave is, from the knave's point ofview, unsatisfactory. Now for some disagreements. First, about Hume's reply to the knave.3From the viewpointofthevirtuous dues-payingmemberof"the party of humankind," Hume's is a perfectly satisfactory reply. It will be plain truth, for a person with the other Humean virtues (including equity, which is listed as a natural virtue),4 that justice will bring as great or greater good than would judicious injustice. Even if it would be "simply preposterous" to believe that the social order is dangerously threatened by any... (shrink)

This paper defends a neorepublican account of civic virtue as consisting of stable traits of character, understood in broadly Aristotelian terms, that exhibit excellences associated with the role of citizen, and that contribute to the secure protection of freedom as non-domination. Such an account is important for the neorepublican project because neither laws nor social norms can yield reliable support for republican freedom without a parallel input from civic virtue. The paper emphasizes the need to distinguish civic (...) class='Hi'>virtue from desirable norms, which can operate in tandem. Against other neorepublican accounts of civic virtue, it argues that the primary function of such virtue is not to support the stability of republican regimes. Rather, it has a corrective function, and may in fact challenge institutions, laws, and informal norms if they allow for the exercise of arbitrary power. Finally, the paper argues that this account of civic virtue is better positioned than a stability-focused account to shed light on the relationship between civic virtue and the common good. (shrink)

Traditional approaches to animal ethics commonly emerge from one of two influential ethical theories: Regan’s deontology (The case for animal rights. University of California, Berkeley, 1983) and Singer’s preference utilitarianism (Animal liberation. Avon Books, New York, 1975). I argue that both of the theories are unsuccessful at providing adequate protection for animals because they are unable to satisfy the three conditions of a minimally decent theory of animal protection. While Singer’s theory is overly permissive, Regan’s theory is too restrictive. I (...) argue that a minimally decent animal ethic requires a framework that allows for context-dependent considerations of our complex human–animal relationship in a non-ideal world. A plausible theory which exemplifies this new ethic is virtue ethics. (shrink)

Jakob Ohlhorst’s Trust Responsibly develops a dual process, virtue-theoretic answer to a crucial challenge to hinge epistemology, the so-called “demarcation problem” of distinguishing epistemically good from epistemically bad hinges. The book is packed with insightful ideas about many epistemological issues, offering carefully crafted arguments for a picture of knowledge that merges in an extremely attractive way hinge epistemology, virtue epistemology, and dual process theory. In this contribution to the book symposium on Trust Responsibly, I focus on Ohlhorst’s characterisation (...) of cornerstone propositions, his take on epistemic alchemy, and the internalist credentials of his answer to the sceptical challenge, raising some worries about these aspects of his account. (shrink)

By analysing the two relevant psychological phenomena of "endurance" and "non-endurance," this essay aims to reveal the ethical implications of a Confucian approach, namely regarding non-endurance as an impulse of primary virtue. Based on this case study, the author then explores the significance of moral cultivation or psychological training in establishing moral personality and the complexities of such a process. Meanwhile, "love" in Confucian ethics means sympathy for the inferior rather than affection for the revered. Hopefully, this study may (...) deepen our understanding of virtue ethics. /// 通过对忍与不忍这两种相关的心理现象的分析，可揭示儒家把不忍人之心作 为首善之端加以强调的伦理学含义。以此为例，探讨修养功夫即心理训练对道德人 格形成的重要性及复杂性，进而可得出儒家伦理讲求的爱是对弱者的怜爱而非对崇 敬者的热爱。这项研究有助于深化我们对德性伦理的认识。. (shrink)

In his reflections on ethics, Descartes distances himself from the eudaimonistic tradition in moral philosophy by introducing a distinction between happiness and the highest good. While happiness, in Descartes’s view, consists in an inner state of complete harmony and satisfaction, the highest good instead consists in virtue, i.e. in ‘a firm and constant resolution' to always use our free will well or correctly. In Section 1 of this paper, I pursue the Cartesian distinction between happiness and the highest good (...) in some detail. In Section 2, I discuss the question of how the motivation to virtue should be accounted for within Descartes’s ethical framework. In Section 3, I turn to Descartes’s defence of the view that virtue, while fundamentally distinct from happiness, is nevertheless sufficient for obtaining it. In the final section of the paper , my concern is instead with a second and sometimes neglected distinction that Descartes makes between two different senses o.. (shrink)

For many people subjected to systemic injustice, life under oppression involves participating in what philosophers have called “non-normative behavior,” or behavior that fails to comply with oppressive norms. Discussions of the value of such actions tend to emphasize the benefits they have for other people who are subjugated. I argue that while benefiting others is a noble goal, there are oppressed persons for whom such altruistic reasons do not apply. For all that, acting non-normatively may still be ethically worthwhile. I (...) highlight another source of value for non-normative behavior, stemming from one’s personal projects and relationships. Finally, I argue that having a disposition to engage in non-normative actions in the right way - a trait which I call rebelliousness - is a virtue under oppression, the right reasons for which include both altruistic and non-altruistic concerns. (shrink)

In light of the complexity of some important matters, the best epistemic strategy for laypersons is often to rely heavily on the judgments of subject matter experts. However, given the contentiousness of some issues and the existence of fake experts, determining who to trust from the lay perspective is no simple matter. One proposed approach is for laypersons to attend to displays of intellectual virtue as indicators of expertise. I argue that this strategy is likely to fail, as non-experts (...) often display apparent intellectual virtues while legitimate experts often display apparent intellectual vices. Then, I argue that this challenge is difficult to overcome, as experts who attempt to better exhibit apparent intellectual virtues would likely compromise their own reliability in the process. Finally, I discuss two conclusions—one more optimistic and one more pessimistic—that one might draw concerning the role of intellectual virtue in the identification of experts. (shrink)

William Kingdon Clifford famously argued that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." His ethics of belief can be construed as involving two distinct theses—a moral claim (that it is wrong to hold beliefs to which one is not entitled) and an epistemological claim (that entitlement is always a function of evidential support). Although I reject the (universality of the) epistemological claim, I argue that something deserving of the name "ethics of belief" can (...) nevertheless be preserved. However, in the second half of the paper I argue that Clifford's response to the problem of unethical belief is insufficiently attentive to the role played by self-deception in the formation of unethical beliefs. By contrasting the first-person perspective of a doxastic agent with the third-person perspective of an outside observer, I argue that unethical belief is a symptom of deficiencies of character: fix these, and belief will fix itself. I suggest that the moral intuitions implicit in our response to examples of unethical belief (like Clifford's famous example of the ship owner) can better be accounted for in terms of a non-evidentialist virtue ethics of belief-formation, and that such an account can survive the rejection of strong versions of doxastic voluntarism. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHow do different forms of education contribute to value preferences? Clearly, informal education through personal experiences that shape one’s sense of identity and frame cultural expectations and opportunities, non-formal education through religious traditions and formal state-mandated education all contribute to value preferences in culturally-specific ways. However, wisdom should allow people to coordinate culturally-specific education in ways that promote prosocial values. Our study considered the relative strength of four value-orientations from Schwartz’s Personal Values Questionnaire and of 15 core virtues among 189 (...) participants from Canada and South Korea; half were older and half younger adults. 101 were emerging adults and 88 were retired older adults. Multivariate regression analyses show that, although all three forms of education influenced value orientation in culture-specific ways in both Canada and South Korea, formal education was critical to cultivating the wisdom needed to coordinate and adjudicate between different values so as to live well. (shrink)

Several philosophers, known as situationists, have argued that evidence in social psychology threatens to undermine Aristotelian virtue ethics. An impressively large amount of empirical evidence suggests that most people do not consistently act virtuously and lack the ability to exercise rational control over their behavior. Since possessing moral virtues requires these features, situationists have argued that Aristotelianism does not accurately describe the character traits possessed by most people, and so the theory cannot lay claim to various theoretical advantages such (...) as explanatory power and egalitarian character education. In contrast to previous defenses which either downplay the relevance of psychological evidence or revise philosophical conceptions of virtue to fit the data, this paper appeals to previously neglected psychological evidence on self-efficacy and mental contrasting in combination with “non-idealized” interpretations of Aristotelian moral virtue to support the view that the available empirical evidence is compatible with widespread possession of virtuous character. These “non-idealized” interpretations of virtuous character allow for serious deviations from virtuous conduct, especially in the contexts described by the psychology experiments. Furthermore, decades of research on mental contrasting and self-efficacy suggest that subjects in the psychology experiments acted for reasons and possessed the ability to exercise rational control over their behavior. Hence, situationists are mistaken in thinking that, based on the empirical data, Aristotelianism is deprived of various theoretical advantages. (shrink)

This article discusses Philip Pettit’s neo-republicanism in light of the criterion of self-sustenance: the requirement that a political theory be capable of serving as a self-sustaining public philosophy for a pluralist democracy. It argues that this criterion can only be satisfied by developing an adequate politics of virtue. Pettit’s theory is built around the notion of freedom as non-domination, and he does not say much about the virtues of citizens or the policies the state may employ to encourage their (...) development. In order to explain the motivation to comply with republican laws that promote non-domination, Pettit relies on the phenomenon of civility and the mechanism of the intangible hand. But to understand what underlies an adequate level of robust civility one needs to focus on the more basic phenomenon of personal virtue. Policies that aim to promote non-domination should take into account the need to cultivate virtue among citizens, as well as the full range of conditions that favor its exercise. (shrink)

Is traditional virtue epistemology a kind of idealised epistemology? Is that a bad thing? Some supporters of the virtue epistemology of liberatory virtues seem to answer these questions affirmatively. H. Battaly also argues that to avoid idealization virtue epistemologists should adopt a kind of normative contextualism according to which one and the same character trait is a virtue in some contexts, and a vice (or at least not a virtue) in other contexts. In this paper, (...) I defend traditional virtue epistemology against some, but not all, of these charges. I argue that the examples that motivate its critics are best explained by invoking particularism about actions rather than normative contextualism about character traits. I also show that a particularist virtue epistemology of inquiry provides an account of the difference that social circumstances and power relations make to epistemically virtuous (and vicious) conduct that is superior to those that can be offered by resorting to normative contextualism. (shrink)

This paper explores two pedagogical virtues (intellectual virtues of a teacher) that arise from the insight that non-epistemic situational factors can affect students’ epistemic judgments and behavior. First, a virtuous teacher must be sensitive enough to these factors in order to take advantage of how they boost student learning. However, while cultivating a situationally and epistemically favorable environment for learning sounds good, teachers should also not spoil their students by making them too dependent on these beneficial external factors. The virtuous (...) teacher must also realize that these are only scaffolds; while these do help students initially, they must be eventually removed to promote the students’ intellectual autonomy. This characterizes a second pedagogical virtue: the competence to facilitate the students’ growth so that they become more capable in future opportunities of knowledge acquisition. (shrink)

In his work on Wu wei, Edward Slingerland argues that the classical Chinese ideal is an inherently paradoxical concept that is first and foremost spiritual and political only secondarily. Through a close reading of the Dao de Jing, the first major classical text to substantially deploy and develop the concept, I argue that Wu wei isn’t inherently paradoxical and that this is seen precisely when it is viewed in terms of its political primacy. On my reading, the emergence of Wu (...) wei in the Daoist canon is an equilibrating moment of political mediation between the highly intentionalized sphere of human pursuits and the purposeless fluidity and boundless flux of the natural world. Wu wei here takes on a different aspect—mystery rather than paradox—when considered within a form of political collectivity in which the intentional and the innate, purposive and natural are constantly juxtaposed and contending with one another. (shrink)

Virtue theorizing, long in eclipse, has revived strongly in recent times. However, virtue-type approaches predominate in non-Western cultures and dominated Western thought before the modern period. So the revival can make one wonder whether modern epistemology and ethics do not represent a kind a medieval period relative to these other historical/sociological facts. Why did virtue ethics and epistemology go into eclipse in the West during the modern period? The emerging importance of the individual may represent a kind (...) of shock of modernity that left Western virtue approaches decimated in its wake. Both Cartesian epistemology and modern rights theory represent emergent individualism, but the revival of virtue approaches recently may indicate that the shock of modernity is starting to wear off. (shrink)

Is traditional virtue epistemology a kind of idealised epistemology? Is that a bad thing? Some supporters of the virtue epistemology of liberatory virtues seem to answer these questions affirmatively. H. Battaly also argues that to avoid idealization virtue epistemologists should adopt a kind of normative contextualism according to which one and the same character trait is a virtue in some contexts, and a vice (or at least not a virtue) in other contexts. In this paper, (...) I defend traditional virtue epistemology against some, but not all, of these charges. I argue that the examples that motivate its critics are best explained by invoking particularism about actions rather than normative contextualism about character traits. I also show that a particularist virtue epistemology of inquiry provides an account of the difference that social circumstances and power relations make to epistemically virtuous (and vicious) conduct that is superior to those that can be offered by resorting to normative contextualism. (shrink)

By analysing the two relevant psychological phenomena of “endurance” and “non-endurance,” this essay aims to reveal the ethical implications of a Confucian approach, namely regarding non-endurance as an impulse of primary virtue. Based on this case study, the author then explores the significance of moral cultivation or psychological training in establishing moral personality and the complexities of such a process. Meanwhile, “love” in Confucian ethics means sympathy for the inferior rather than affection for the revered. Hopefully, this study may (...) deepen our understanding of virtue ethics. (shrink)

The antirealist argument from the underdetermination of theories by data relies on the premise that the empirical content of a theory is the only determinant of its belief-worthiness (premise NN). Several authors have claimed that the antirealist cannot endorse NN, on pain of internal inconsistency. I concede this point. Nevertheless, this refutation of the underdetermination argument fails because there are weaker substitutes for NN that will serve just as well as a premise to the argument. On the other hand, antirealists (...) have not made a convincing casefor NN (or its weaker substitutes) either. In particular, I criticize van Fraassen's recent claim that all ampliative rules in epistemology must be rejected on the grounds that they lead to incoherence. The status of the underdetermination argument remains unsettled. (shrink)

The claim has been made that when Aquinas speaks about the virtue of truth and its opposing vices in the Summa theologiae 2-2.109-113, he regards himself as speaking of the same virtue of truth as found in the Nicomachean Ethics 4.7. In this paper, I dispute this claim, showing how Aquinas’s account cannot be Aristotelian and, in particular, that the possibility of forfeiting the virtue of truth by one serious lie cannot be explained by habituation. I argue (...) instead that Aquinas’s account can be better understood by reference to the kind of embodied experience most commonly encountered in joint attention or second-person relatedness, an approach that may offer new ways to address broader moral questions regarding truth. (shrink)

This paper aims to reduce the confusion about what our proper attitudes toward reductionism should be. I will begin by saying briefly why reductive explanations are generally desirable. I will then spend the bulk of the paper laying out what I consider to be the best epistemic reasons for thinking that developing non-reductive accounts is also highly desirable. I aim to show that the best arguments for the desirability of reduction, and for the desirability of non-reduction, are rooted less in (...) any deep metaphysical principles, and more in the general nuts and bolts of information storage in cognitive agents. (shrink)

I examine all the occasions on which Aquinas uses a particular example, which goes back to Plato's Republic, to shed light on the controversial subject of the immutability of natural law. Aquinas usually transcribes it as depositum gladius non debet restitui furioso, although some variations also occur. We shall first look at the context in which Plato situates this idea, then go on to examine the occasions on which Aquinas draws on it: in the Summa, when discussing the question as (...) to whether the natural law is the same for everyone; in his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, when he explains in what sense natural law may change, and in what sense it remains the same; and finally, where he examines the virtues of gnome and epieikeia, also in the Summa. (shrink)

The question ?How should one live?? reflects the central concern in the ethics of Socrates. The answer to this question is not merely related to the concepts of obligation and duty, which constitute the major problems of modern moral philosophy, but it can also be considered from the prudential point of view. Therefore both the moral and non-moral realms contribute to a good life. Although there is little doubt concerning the existence of the non-moral realm in Confucianism, yet the relationship (...) between the moral and the non-moral realms has not been carefully examined. Obviously the nature of the existence of the non-moral realm can be clear only if the question whether the non-moral virtues can be defined in terms of, or reduced to, or overridden by moral virtues is resolved. This paper attempts to scrutinize the relationship mentioned so as to determine the status of prudence within the ethics of Confucianism. (shrink)

The question ‘How should one live?’ reflects the central concern in the ethics of Socrates. The answer to this question is not merely related to the concepts of obligation and duty, which constitute the major problems of modern moral philosophy, but it can also be considered from the prudential point of view. Therefore both the moral and non-moral realms contribute to a good life. Although there is little doubt concerning the existence of the non-moral realm in Confucianism, yet the relationship (...) between the moral and the non-moral realms has not been carefully examined. Obviously the nature of the existence of the non-moral realm can be clear only if the question whether the non-moral virtues can be defined in terms of, or reduced to, or overridden by moral virtues is resolved. This paper attempts to scrutinize the relationship mentioned so as to determine the status of prudence within the ethics of Confucianism. (shrink)

The structure of Aristotelian virtue ethics has been misunderstood. Conventional wisdom has it that Aristotle, as indeed all of the major philosophers of ancient Greece, believed that the virtues are reciprocally entailing (RV): a person can have one of the virtues of character if and only if she has them all. But this is false. Instead, Aristotle distinguishes between a set of basic and a set of nonbasic virtues, and claims that only the basic virtues are reciprocally entailing. Furthermore, (...) he believes that, given at least a moderate amount of external goods, the basic virtues are both necessary and sufficient for happiness. The nonbasic virtues are, then, separable from the basic virtues, and unnecessary for happiness, on Aristotle’s view. This insulates Aristotelian virtue ethics from the charge that it demands unreasonable knowledge and resources of agent aiming for happiness. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the possibility of what I call “non-doxastic theistic prayer”, namely prayer that proceeds without full belief in God – or in the kind of God who could be the recipient of such prayer. After developing a working definition of prayer, I proceed to discuss a few prominent forms of prayer and explore the ways in which such prayer might legitimately be performed non-doxastically. I conclude by examining the possibility that some forms of what I call (...) “prayerful pretense” may be more epistemically and morally virtuous than their fully doxastic counterparts. (shrink)

A body of work in ethics and epistemology has advanced a collectivist view of virtues. Collectivism holds that some social groups can be subjects in themselves which can possess attributes such as agency or responsibility. Collectivism about virtues holds that virtues are among those attributes. By focusing on two different accounts, I argue that the collectivist virtue project has limited prospects. On one such interpretation of institutional virtues, virtue-like features of the social collective are explained by particular group-oriented (...) features of individual role-bearers that are elicited by institutional structures or goals. On another account of groups as moral agents unbound by formal institutional constraints, to the extent that group characteristics meet the collectivist requirement, they fail to stand up as virtues in the substantive sense of a character trait. These two positions’ respective drawbacks and insights support a non-collectivist conclusion: Where there is a substantive virtue of some social group, it consists only in certain group-specific attitudes and motives of individuals qua members of that group. I end by outlining some risks in adopting collectivism about virtues as an explanatory or normative doctrine, and suggesting that we can abandon it without embracing an equally undesirable individualism in virtue theory. (shrink)

The paper describes a form a non-Socratic dialogue which aims at exposing oneself to the normative critique of interlocutors with different commitments. It further argues that such exposure is the only way in which one can achieve critical distance from one's own commitments. It goes on to explore the epistemic and political virtues of this form of dialogue.

This article takes its bearings from Martha Nussbaum’s “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach.” There, Nussbaum proposes an analytic framework that is intended to allow those who disagree about the virtues, in particular due to cultural differences, to engage in fruitful dialogue with one another. To explore what such an approach might look like in practice, this article considers the case study of friendship. It critiques Aristotle’s account of that virtue and provides an alternative based on contemporary understandings. By placing (...) these two accounts into conversation, the analysis demonstrates the promise of cross-cultural and cross-historical dialogue about the virtues. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction The Confrontation of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and Moral Relativism Foot's Challenge MacIntyre's Tradition ‐ Based Defense of the Virtues Nussbaum's Non ‐ Relative Virtues The Ethical Naturalism of Foot and Hursthouse References.

This book offers a defence of Wrightean epistemic entitlement, one of the most prominent approaches to hinge epistemology. It also systematically explores the connections between virtue epistemology and hinge epistemology. -/- According to hinge epistemology, any human belief set is built within and upon a framework of pre-evidential propositions – hinges – that cannot be justified. Epistemic entitlement argues that we are entitled to trust our hinges. But there remains a problem. Entitlement is inherently unconstrained and arbitrary: We can (...) be entitled to any hinge proposition under the right circumstances. In this book, the author argues that we need a non-arbitrariness clause that protects entitlement from defeat. This clause, he argues, is to require epistemic virtue. Virtuous cognitive dispositions provide the non-arbitrariness clause that protects entitlement from defeat. The epistemic character of the agent who holds a particular set of hinges tells us something about the hinges’ epistemic status. Conversely, epistemic virtues are cognitive dispositions and capacities that rely on hinge propositions – without trusting in some hinges, we would be unable to exercise our virtues. -/- Trust Responsibly will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on epistemology, Wittgenstein, and virtues. (shrink)

Existing predominant approaches within virtue ethics (VE) assume humans as the typical agent and virtues as dispositions that pertain primarily to human–human interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the main accounts in the more specific area of environmental virtue ethics (EVE) tend to support weak anthropocentric positions, in which virtues are understood as excellent dispositions of human agents. In addition, however, several EVE authors have also considered virtues that benefit non-human beings and entities (e.g., environmental or ecological virtues). The latter correspond (...) to excellent character dispositions that would extend moral consideration and care for the benefit of non-human beings, entities, or entire ecosystems. In this direction, a few authors have argued that EVE could be considered non-anthropocentric insofar as it could: (a) promote non-human ends, well-being, and the flourishing of non-human beings and entities; (b) involve significant relations to non-humans. Drawing from different traditions, including ecofeminism and care ethics, we argue for a broader notion of self and a decentered notion of virtues. The broader notion of selfhood corresponds to the “ecological self”, one that can be enacted by both human and non-human beings, is embedded in a network of relations, and recognizes the more-than-human world as fundamental and yet indispensable otherness. We suggest that this broader notion of agency allows for an expansive understanding of virtues that includes a-moral functional ecological virtues, which can be exercised not only by humans but also by certain non-human beings. This alternative understanding of selfhood and ecological virtues within EVE could have several theoretical and practical implications, some of which may enable different types of agencies and transform collective action. (shrink)

Environmental virtue ethics faces the problem of motivation: there is a gap between knowledge and action. This paper first analyzes the roots of this problem and discusses possible solutions that require the use of imagination and information technology. Then it reformulates the problem of motivation and the question concerning environmental virtue by using the notion of skill. It sketches the contours of a non-Romantic and non-Stoic virtue ethics that attempts to move beyond dualist assumptions concerning the relations (...) between humans, nature, and technology. In this way, the paper shows how environmental philosophy can benefit from a dialogue with philosophy of technology. (shrink)

Critics of virtue ethics have argued that its focus on character rather than action, as well as its rejection of universal rules of right action renders virtue ethics unable to shed much light on the question of what ought and ought not to be done in specific situations. According to them, this explains why so few attempts have been made to apply virtue theory to specific moral questions. In this paper I aim to go some way towards (...) developing a version of virtue theory that satisfies four constraints that applied ethics places upon moral theory, namely that it should: (1) present standards of right action; (2) show a sensitivity to the complexity of moral life in multicultural and pluralistic societies; (3) accept the principle of universalisability as a necessary property of an ethical theory, and (4) provide a non-egoistic justification and explanation of universal rules and principles. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.21(2) 2002: 133-143. (shrink)

Aesthetic non-naturalism is the view that there are objective aesthetic truths that hold in virtue of sui generis facts. This view is seldom explicitly endorsed in philosophical aesthetics. I argue that many aestheticians should treat it as the view to beat, since (a) their commitments favour aesthetic realism, (b) non-naturalistic forms of aesthetic realism are particularly promising and (c) non-naturalists have reasonable answers to four important objections.

Sono prese in esame – attraverso le opere pubblicate, ma anche attraverso le lezioni e le riflessioni – tre questioni centrali nell’etica di Kant: lo spessore teorico, e le modificazioni, dei concetti di virtù e di felicità, nonché le maniere con cui Kant tentò di armonizzarli, nell’idea di sommo bene. La filosofia morale di Kant è presentata non come un sistema compiuto una volta per tutte, bensì come un ragionare in lotta con il proprio oggetto. L’autrice mostra – presentando una (...) ricostruzione sorprendente delle vicende dell’etica di Kant nel decennio successivo alla Critica della ragion pratica– come Kant si trovò costretto, per difficoltà teoriche, a mutare la propria dottrina su tutti e tre i temi, collocandoli, di volta in volta, entro una nuova struttura globale. L’evoluzione del concetto di felicità è riconosciuta dalla Kantforschung; l’analisi dei mutamenti del concetto di dovere etico e dell’idea di sommo bene costituisce un contributo originale dell’autrice. L’excursus sulla nascita del concetto di eudemonismo mostra come il termine – contrariamente a quanto si sostiene correntemente – non sia stato coniato da Kant.L’interpretazione del libro di Kant su La religione contrasta con le tendenze di gran lunga dominanti negli studi kantiani. -/- The concepts of virtue and happiness, and the ways Kant tried to combine them in the idea of the highest good, are examined with regard not only to Kant’s published works, but also to his lectures and reflections. The story of the changes in Kant’s ethic – particularly about the reality of the highest good and God’s existence – and the excursus on the birth of the concept of eudemonism give an original contribution to Kantforschung. (shrink)

This essay examines the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods in conceptions of the good human life through an exploration of the thought of Confucius and Mencius. Both Confucius and Mencius lived in quite similar worlds, but their conceptualizations of the world differed from each another. This difference led them to hold different views on the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods. On the one hand, Confucius highlighted the self-sufficiency of virtue, (...) but he acknowledged and appreciated the intrinsic and instrumental value of non-moral goods. On the other hand, while Mencius underscored the role of virtue as the best means to the best ends, he tried to depreciate the value of non-moral goods. As a consequence, even though their conceptions of the good life were essentially predicated on virtue, they parted company concerning the status of non-moral goods in human life. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has been dogged by the objection that it lacks the ability to provide adequate action-guidance, that it is agent-centered rather act-centered. Virtue ethics has also been faulted for devolving into moral cultural relativism. Rosalind Hursthouse has presented an action-based, naturalistic theory of virtue ethics intended to defuse these charges. Despite its merits, I argue that Hurthouse’s theory fails to successfully solve the problems associated with action guidance and relativism precisely because her attempt to provide a (...) non-cultural basis for virtue ethics undermines the possibility of using virtue ethics to derive useful action-guidance. The action-guiding power of virtue is derived from culture; seeking to avoid the cultural grounding of virtue merely brings one back to the problem of how virtue ethics can provide action-guidance. (shrink)

Virtue ethics is on the move both in Anglo-American philosophy and in the rest of the world. This volume uniquely emphasizes non-Western varieties of virtue ethics at the same time that it includes work in the many different fields or areas of philosophy where virtue ethics has recently spread its wings. Just as significantly, several chapters make comparisons between virtue ethics and other ways of approaching ethics or political philosophy or show how virtue ethics can (...) be applied to "real world" problems. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 3, Page 416-436, March 2022. Drawing on Bernard Williams's Truth and Truthfulness and Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Justice, this article presents an epistemic argument for democracy on the basis of its ability to incentivize more people to display the virtues of truth required for the social production and aggregation of knowledge. In particular, the article compares democracy respectively with autocracy and epistocracy, showing that it is likely to be, within the context of a modern (...) pluralistic society, an epistemically superior regime in the sense that it creates more favourable conditions for the pooling of epistemic resources. The article concludes with a multi-dimensional framework of democratic legitimacy, where democracy's epistemic value is directly tied with both the safeguard against elite domination and the development of citizens' ethical and intellectual capabilities. In this regard, the article also helps to bridge the gap between epistemic and non-epistemic approaches in democratic theory and unite what might be called the wisdom, power, and virtue of the multitude. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This manuscript develops the concept of organizational virtue orientation (OVO) and examines differences between family and non-family firms on the six organizational virtue dimensions of Integrity, Empathy, Warmth, Courage, Conscientiousness, and Zeal. Using content analysis of shareholder letters fromS&P 500companies, our analyses find that there are significant differences between family and non-family firms in their espoused OVO, with family firms generally being higher. Specifically, family firms were significantly higher on the dimensions of Empathy, Warmth, and Zeal, but lower (...) on Courage. Based on these findings we further develop the OVO concept through the discussion of implications and areas for future research. (shrink)

This paper seeks to establish whether the categories of MacIntyrean virtue ethics as applied to business organizations are meaningful in a non-western business context. It does so by building on research reported in Moore : 363–387, 2012) in which the application of virtue ethics to business organizations was investigated empirically in the UK, based on a conceptual framework drawn from MacIntyre’s work. Comparing these results with an equivalent study in Sri Lanka, the paper finds that the categories are (...) meaningful but that there are both similarities to and considerable differences in the content of these categories from the UK study. The paper draws on aspects of institutional theory to explore and explain these findings. Overall, there is supportive evidence that the categories of MacIntyrean virtue ethics are generalizable, and so can be used to characterize problems of organizational virtue and vice around the world, while providing evidence that there may be polities which are more conducive to the ‘practice-like conduct of production’ : 77–91, 2008). (shrink)