Some individuals have a neurogenetic vulnerability to developing strong facilitation of ingestive movements by learned configurations of biosocial stimuli. Condemning food as addictive is mere polemic, ignoring the contextualised sensory control of the mastication of each mouthful. To beat obesity, the least fattening of widely recognised eating patterns need to be measured and supported.

This book begins well. Blank first gives, for the benefit of lay readers and those unfamiliar with the area of neuroscience, a brief but informative description of the structure and workings of the brain itself. He then goes on to offer an overview of the current state of brain intervention ranging from direct brain intervention (electroconvulsive therapy, electronic and magnetic stimulation, psychosurgery and neural implants), psychotropic drugs, the use of virtual reality, nootropics and neurogenetics. Blank offers a concise summary and (...) evaluation of each of these methods, outlining both potential benefits and risks. He makes the important point that most of these methods, however, do not present a cure, but rather are aimed at altering behaviour, raising the important question as the ethics of behavioural control for social convenience – particularly in relation to the vulnerable, such as the management of children with ADHD.Blank then offers a well-researched and balanced overview .. (shrink)

Climate change is the most difficult threat facing humanity this century and negotiations to reach international agreement have so far foundered on deep issues of justice. Providing provocative and imaginative answers to key questions of justice, informed by political insight and scientific understanding, this book offers a new way forward.

Emotions and personhood are important notions within the field of mental health care. How they are related is less evident. This book provides a framework for understanding the important and complex relationship between our emotional wellbeing and our sense of self, drawing on psychopathology, philosophy, and phenomenology.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Psychedelics are experiencing a renaissance in mental healthcare. In recent years, more and more early phase trials on psychedelic-assisted therapy have been conducted, with promising results overall. However, ethical analyses of this rediscovered form of treatment remain rare. The present paper contributes to the ethical inquiry of psychedelic-assisted therapy by analysing the ethical implications of its therapeutic mechanisms proposed by the relaxed beliefs under psychedelics (REBUS) hypothesis. In short, the REBUS hypothesis states that psychedelics make rigid beliefs revisable by increasing (...) the influence of bottom-up input. Put differently, patients become highly suggestible and sensitive to context during a psychedelic session, amplifying therapeutic influence and effects. Due to that, patients are more vulnerable in psychedelic-assisted therapy than in other therapeutic interventions; they lose control during a psychedelic session and become dependent on the therapeutic setting (including the therapist). This enhanced vulnerability is ethically relevant and has been exploited by some therapists in the past. Therefore, patients in current research settings and starting mainstream medical settings need to be well informed about psychedelics’ mechanisms and their implications to give valid informed consent to treatment. Furthermore, other security measures are warranted to protect patients from the vulnerability coming with psychedelic-assisted therapy. (shrink)

The responsibility gap, commonly described as a core challenge for the effective governance of, and trust in, AI and autonomous systems (AI/AS), is traditionally associated with a failure of the epistemic and/or the control condition of moral responsibility: the ability to know what we are doing and exercise competent control over this doing. Yet these two conditions are a red herring when it comes to understanding the responsibility challenges presented by AI/AS, since evidence from the cognitive sciences shows that individual (...) humans face very similar responsibility challenges with regard to these two conditions. While the problems of epistemic opacity and attenuated behaviour control are not unique to AI/AS technologies (though they can be exacerbated by them), we show that we can learn important lessons for AI/AS development and governance from how philosophers have recently revised the traditional concept of moral responsibility in response to these challenges to responsible human agency from the cognitive sciences. The resulting instrumentalist views of responsibility, which emphasize the forward-looking and flexible role of agency cultivation, hold considerable promise for integrating AI/AS into a healthy moral ecology. We note that there nevertheless is a gap in AI/AS responsibility that has yet to be extensively studied and addressed, one grounded in a relational asymmetry of vulnerability between human agents and sociotechnical systems like AI/AS. In the conclusion of this paper we note that attention to this vulnerability gap must inform and enable future attempts to construct trustworthy AI/AS systems and preserve the conditions for responsible human agency. (shrink)

This article explores how ethical agency, as ‘other-oriented’ caring, emerged from feelings of being ‘different’ in a cultural organization by drawing on feminist ethics of care. By analyzing interview material from an ethnographic study, we centralize the relationship between feelings of being ‘different,’ vulnerability and the development of sensibilities, practices and imaginaries of care. We elaborate on how vulnerability serves as a ground for caring with rather than for others, and illustrate how it allowed individuals to challenge both (...) organizational, normative diversity discourses and essentialization of differences. We contribute to the literature on critical diversity management by furthering problematizations of instrumental diversity management from the perspective of care, and to the organizational literature on feminist care ethics by empirically exploring how ethical agency emerges from tensions related to feeling ‘different.’ While previous studies have shown how marginalized individuals use their sense of ‘otherness’ to negotiate, conform to and resist organizational norms, practices and discourses, we provide further insights on how it also can drive concern and care for others, and thus serve as possible ground for ethical change initiatives within organizations. (shrink)

In the present research we investigated gender-specific beliefs about emotional behaviour. In Study 1, 180 respondents rated the extent to which they agreed with different types of beliefs (prescriptive, descriptive, stereotypical, and contra-stereotypical) regarding the emotional behaviour of men and women. As anticipated, respondents agreed more with descriptive than with prescriptive beliefs, and more with stereotypical than with contra-stereotypical beliefs. However, respondents agreed more with stereotypical beliefs about the emotional behaviour of women than with those about men. These results were (...) replicated in Study 2 with a sample of 75 students and 80 nonstudents. In Study 3, a sample of 279 respondents rated the extent of agreement with the same items, this time with respect to then own emotional behaviour. A similar pattern of results was obtained, although agreement rates were higher than in Study 1 and 2. (shrink)

The handicap principle stipulates that signal reliability can be maintained if signals are costly to produce. Yet empirical biologists are typically unable to directly measure evolutionary costs, and instead appeal to expenditure as a sensible proxy. However the link between expenditure and cost is not always as straightforward as proponents of HP assume. We consider signaling interactions where whether the expenditure associated with signaling is converted into an evolutionary cost is in some sense dependent on the behavior of the intended (...) recipient of the signal. We illustrate this with a few empirical examples and demonstrate that on this alternative expenditure to cost mapping the traditional predictions of HP no longer hold. Instead of full information transfer, a partially informative communication system like those uncovered by Wagner :163–181, 2013) and Zollman et al. is possible. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the bioethical principle of justice and the bioethical key concept of vulnerability, in a queer feminist posthuman framework. I situate these contemplations, philosophical by nature, in the context of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), one the most vicious moral problems of our time. Further, I discuss how gender and sexual variance, vulnerability and justice manifest in AMR. I conclude by considering my queer feminist posthuman framework for vulnerability and justice in relation to the notion (...) of antibiotic vulnerabilities, suggesting a lacuna for further AMR research. (shrink)

International migration has a female face in the beginning of the twenty-first century; since at least 1990, a total of 49 percent of international migrants have been women (UN 2008).1 Many women relocate in pursuit of goals that they can’t realize in their countries of origin, and many women move on their own to developed countries as caregivers to the very old or the very young, as nurses to attend to the sick in hospitals, and as domestic workers.2 How should (...) we regard their decisions to do so? One way of thinking about such moves is to deplore the fact that women have to move in order to attain certain goals in their lives; it would be more desirable to live in a world that would not make such moves necessary... (shrink)

Smajdor argues that “recognition” is the solution to the “reifying attitude” that results from “the urge to protect ‘vulnerable’ people through exclusion from research”. Drawing on theories of reification, we argue that it is the concepts of autonomy and vulnerability themselves that have been reified, resulting in the impoverishment of approaches to autonomy at law and in research ethics. Overcoming such reification demands a deeper consideration of the grounds on which vulnerable individuals are owed recognition and thereby the forms (...) such recognition should take. Smajdor argues for a recognition that appeals to autonomy and that manifests in providing vulnerable individuals with the opportunity to assent. The problem is that this kind of recognition is dependent on a more fundamental kind. It is this second form of recognition that would need to do the heavy lifting for assent-based frameworks to avoid the same problems we find with consent. (shrink)

A specific clinical encounter in which the author was an ethics consultant, after a brief summary, provides the basis for a phenomenological delineation and explication of the key ingredients of such encounters. A brief historical reflection on the myths of Gyges and Aesculapius suggests that several of these ingredients are essential to clinical encounters and help constitute their specific moral aspects and challenges. Understood as an interpersonal relationship framed by critical issues of illness experiences, the clinical encounter makes prominent such (...) constitutive features as dialogue, trust, violence, and especially vulnerability and power. The role of the clinical ethicist is found to be often critical in these encounters, in particular because of the need to help patients and doctors identify, understand, and cope productively with fundamental moral phenomena. (shrink)

Introduction: Over the past twenty-five years the sporting body has been studied in a myriad of ways including via a range of feminist frameworks (Hall 1996; Lowe 1998; Markula 2003; George 2005; Hargreaves 2007) and gender-sensitive lenses (e.g. McKay 1994; Aoki 1996; Woodward 2008). Despite this developing corpus, studies of sport only rarely engage in depth with the ‘flesh’ of the lived sporting and exercizing body (Wainwright and Turner 2003; Allen-Collinson 2009) at least from a phenomenological angle, and in relation (...) to female embodiment. It seems that a more corporeally-grounded, phenomenological perspective on women’s sporting embodiment would be a welcome addition to extant studies. In this chapter I suggest that employing a feminist phenomenological framework can provide a powerful lens through which to explore the subjective, richly-textured, lived-body experiences of sport and exercise. Phenomenology of course offers only one of a multiplicity of avenues to investigate the body in sport, and this chapter provides just a small glimpse of its possibilities. To-date studies of sporting experience employing a phenomenological theoretical framework remain surprisingly under-developed (Kerry and Armour 2000), as do those using its ethnomethodological offspring (Coates 1999; Burke et al. 2008). Further, as Fisher (2000) notes, the significance of the interaction between phenomenology and feminism has only relatively recently begun to be explored. It seems timely, therefore, to address this intriguing, potentially productive, but sometimes uneasy nexus, focusing upon female running embodiment in this case. (shrink)

In “IRBs and the Protection-Inclusion Dilemma: Finding a Balance,” Dr. Phoebe Friesen and her collaborators (2023) provide a compelling framework that helps Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) think...

This paper attempts to philosophically articulate empirical evidence on the positive effects of illness within the wider context of a discussion of the positive aspects of vulnerability. The conventional understanding holds that to be vulnerable is to be open to harms and wrongs; it is to be fragile, defenseless, and of compromised autonomy. In this paper, we challenge the assumption that vulnerability consists of nothing but powerlessness and dependence on others. This paper attempts to: (1) outline the theoretical (...) conceptualisation of the positive aspects of coping with illness, while simultaneously showing how these findings provide empirical support for some classical philosophical ideas; (2) influence a change in the manners in which the ill are usually perceived (as weak, dependent, robbed of a good life) and (3) point to the importance of modernising the prevalent biomedical conception of illness with the subjective dimension of health. Biomedical understanding of illness focuses on the vulnerable experience of the sufferer, suggesting the importance of philosophical additions. (shrink)

The concept of vulnerability has been renewed in meaning and importance over recent decades. Scholars such as Judith Butler, Martha Fineman and Pamela Sue Anderson have endeavored to redeem vulnerability from its traditional signification as a negative individual condition, and to reveal the positive meaning of vulnerability as a transformative call for solidarity, equality and love. In this paper we examine the newly constructed positive understanding of vulnerability, and argue that the current way of pursuing this (...) positive understanding affirms a merely functional positivity. In the recent accounts, vulnerability is still a status to avoid, yet functions positively as a corrective force to the environment that produces vulnerability. We will try to find an essential way of designating the positivity of vulnerability by revisiting the philosophical discussion on vulnerability in Emmanuel Levinas. We will argue that Levinas’s notion of vulnerability is positive in a sense which goes beyond the purely functional; it is seen as essential for his definition of humanity. Yet compared to the contemporary discussion, Levinas’s notion of vulnerability lacks a direct social political meaning. We will tentatively explore how the essential positivity drawn from Levinas can provide a new way to construct the political significance of vulnerability. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that gendered abuse is only defined as such within certain institutional configurations and norms (and the language in which the norms are expressed). Consequently, the absence or deficiency of a particular structure for identifying or naming abuse _is_ itself a kind of abuse, both deeply personal in its effects, but institutional in its nature. I call this phenomenon “discursive cornering.” To build this argument, I draw from work on the concept of consent by two feminist (...) political thinkers: nonfiction writer Melissa Febos and television creator Michaela Coel. I examine Febos’ essay “Thank You for Taking Care of Yourself” on the politics of what she terms “empty consent,” a descriptor she uses to detail how patriarchal structures can pressure women into reluctantly agreeing to their own oppression. I analyze Coel’s critically acclaimed HBO series “I May Destroy You” to show that what constitutes rape, sexual assault, and abuse is always defined within particular legal structures, which are themselves embedded in diverse political climates. I show that understandings of abuse must acknowledge the structures that define abuse, and we must remember that those structures can also themselves be abusive. Otherwise, we are unable to understand how survivors’ agency works without implicitly minimizing harm. (shrink)

In this article, identity politics is understood as a form of politics stressing collective but malleable group identities as the basis of political action. This notion of identity politics also allows thinking of identity as intersectional. The focus of this article, and a problem related to identity politics, is that when discussed in the context of the neoliberal order, identity politics has a tendency to become harnessed by the ethos of vulnerability. Some implications of the ‘vulnerabilizisation’ are considered in (...) the field of education, which is a field currently thoroughly affected by neoliberalism. Therefore, it is also important to look closer at the relationship between identity politics and the ethos of vulnerability. In addition, we re-consider poststructuralist thinking as a theoretical and political approach to see what it can offer in terms of re-thinking identity politics and in analyzing the ethos of vulnerability. When categories of vulnerability keep expanding into various psycho-emotional vulnerabilities defining subjects that can be known and spoken about, it is crucial to ask whether we regard these changes as educationally and politically progressive. The article discusses some problematic policies in educational environments and the phenomenon of trigger warnings. (shrink)

In “Lifelines” Steven Rose constructs a case against neurogenetic determinism based on experimental data from biology and in favor of a significant degree of self determination. Two philosophical errors in the case favoring neurogenetic determinism are illustrated by Rose: category mistakes and an excessively narrow view of causality restricted to the linear form.

Are the emotions relevant for the theory of value and normativity? Is there a set of morally correct arrangements of emotions? Current debates are often structured as though there were only two theoretical options to approach these questions, a sentimentalist theory of some sort, which emphasizes the role of emotions in forming ethical behaviour and practical thought, and intellectualist rationalism, which denies that emotions can help at all in generating normativity and contributing to moral value, hence also denying that they (...) may have any role to play in moral agency and moral thinking. In what follows, I will offer a Kantian account of ‘practical reason’ as the seat of moral agency, which recognizes a diversified and complex relation between reason and sensibility. (shrink)

This paper draws upon a research study of accountants and HR specialists. The study eschewed hypothetical scenarios and focused upon those situations and scenarios that the interviewees defined as causing them ethical concerns. There are two distinct but related issues arising from the paper. The first is that the singular categorisations of moral reasoning attributed to individuals when faced with hypothetical scenarios by many who write on the issue of moral reasoning, did not correspond to the fluidity in moral choices (...) faced by the interviewees as they experienced their unfolding moral dilemmas. The second issue relates to the unwillingness of the interviewees to give voice to their concerns, not only externally, but also within their employing organisations. The tensions within the two cases featured were held in check only by the diminution of the autonomy of the two principal actors. As a consequence, the exercise of moral agency was denied. (shrink)

Elijah foretold evil for Ahab in the name of the Lord. ‘I will bring evil upon you; I will utterly sweep you away, and will cut off from Ahab every male, bond or free in Israel’ … but when he heard those words, he rent his clothes, and put sackcloth upon his flesh, and fasted and lay in the sackcloth, and went about dejectedly. And the word of the Lord came to Elijah saying ‘Have you seen how Ahab has humbled (...) himself before me? Because he has humbled himself before me, I will not bring the evil in his days, but in his son's days I will bring evil upon his house.’. (shrink)

In this paper we propose an ‘undisciplinary’ meeting between Elinor Ostrom and Judith Butler, with the intent to broaden the theory of the commons by discussing it as a relational politics. We use Butler’s theory of power to problematize existing visions of commons, shifting from Ostrom’s ‘bounded rationality’ to Butler’s concepts of ‘bounded selves’ and mutual vulnerability. To be bounded – as opposed to autonomous being – implies being an (ambiguous) effect of socio-power relations and norms that are often (...) beyond control. Thus, to be a collective of bounded selves implies being mutually vulnerable in power relations which are enabling, albeit injurious. A politics of commoning is not a mere technical management of resources (in space) but a struggle to perform common livable relations (in time). We argue that the multiple exposures which produce us are also the conditions of possibility for more just and equalitarian ‘re-commoning’ of democracies around the world. (shrink)

This article addresses the conditions that are necessary for non-Indigenous people to learn from Indigenous people, more specifically from women and feminists. As non-Indigenous scholars, we first explore the challenges of epistemic dialogue through the example of Traditional Ecological Knowledge. From there, through the concept of mastery, we examine the social and ontological conditions under which settler subjectivities develop. As demonstrated by Julietta Singh and Val Plumwood, the logic of mastery—which has legitimated the oppression and exploitation of Indigenous peoples—has been (...) reproduced in academia, leaving almost no room for Indigenous knowledge and epistemes. In the same vein, Sámi scholar Rauna Kuokkanen reclaims and suggests the logic of the gift as a means to render academia more hospitable to Indigenous peoples and epistemes. In our view, reclaim as a concept-practice is a promising way to disrupt colonial, racist, and sexist power relations. Thus, we in turn propose to reclaim vulnerability as defined by Judith Butler in order to deconstruct masterful settler subjectivities and reconstruct relational ones instead. As theorized by Erinn Gilson, we propose epistemic vulnerability to imagine the conditions of our learning from Indigenous peoples and philosophies. (shrink)

In the past decade UNESCO has pursued a leadership role in the articulation of general principles for bioethics, as well as an extensive campaign to promulgate these principles globally.1 Since UNESCO's General Conference adopted the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights in 2005, UNESCO's Bioethics Section has worked with member states to develop a "bioethics infrastructure." UNESCO also provides an "Ethics Teacher Training Course" to member states and disseminates a "core curriculum," primarily targeting medical students. The core curriculum orients (...) itself by the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights and aims to articulate a set of "bioethical principles" that provide a "common global . (shrink)

In the summer of 2015 the governor of Wisconsin signed an omnibus budget bill that, among other things, removed tenure from state statute—forcing the Board of Regents to rewrite it into board policy documents—and attempted to undermine aspects of shared governance that had been part of life at the university since the founding of the system in the early 1970s. Two years later, the Wisconsin Assembly passed a bill that directed the university to "strive to remain neutral on the public (...) policy controversies of the day". These actions and others like them in Wisconsin are part of a wider trend for states, particularly in those dominated by conservative legislatures and governors, to... (shrink)

FRÉDÉRICK ARMSTRONG | : It is common to see vulnerability as either “ontological” or broadly “circumstantial.” Both views capture something morally important about vulnerability. However, there is a puzzle: how can the same concept refer to a necessary ontological fact and to a contingent circumstance? I address two solutions to this puzzle. First, I argue that Mackenzie et al.’s taxonomy of vulnerability is not a real solution. Second, I address Martin et al.’s dispositional account of vulnerability. (...) For them, vulnerability is both an intrinsic property and a disposition. This supposedly solves the puzzle: vulnerability can be intrinsic and yet be manifest in only some circumstances—such is the nature of dispositions. However, I argue that if vulnerability is indeed a disposition, it is better conceived as an extrinsic disposition. Thus, vulnerability cannot be both intrinsic and dispositional; Martin et al. fail to resolve the puzzle. This, however, is no reason to fret. Indeed, an amended dispositional account of vulnerability, in which it is conceived as an extrinsic disposition, is metaphysically consistent and it satisfies our moral intuitions about human vulnerability, and more. Given these advantages, I argue the solution to this dilemma is to abandon the ontological conception of vulnerability. | : La vulnérabilité est souvent présentée comme une propriété « ontologique » ou comme une propriété « circonstancielle ». Ces deux conceptions saisissent des aspects moralement significatifs de la vulnérabilité. Il y a cependant un puzzle : comment peut-elle être, en même temps, un fait ontologique nécessaire et une donnée circonstancielle contingente? J’explore deux solutions. Premièrement, je montre que la taxonomie de Mackenzie et al. n’est pas une solution. Ensuite, je présente l’approche dispositionnelle de Martin et al.. Selon elles, la vulnérabilité est une propriété intrinsèque et dispositionnelle. Cela résoudrait le puzzle : la vulnérabilité peut être intrinsèque et n’être manifeste qu’en des circonstances particulières – telle est la nature des dispositions. Or, la vulnérabilité, si on la conçoit comme une disposition, est mieux conçue comme extrinsèque. La vulnérabilité ne peut pas être dispositionnelle et intrinsèque, donc Martin et al. échouent. Il n’y a toutefois pas là lieu de s’inquiéter. Une version amendée de l’approche dispositionnelle, où la vulnérabilité est conçue comme une disposition extrinsèque, est métaphysiquement cohérente, compatible avec l’ensemble de nos intuitions morales sur la vulnérabilité humaine et plus encore. Étant données ces avantages, la solution au puzzle est d’abandonner la conception ontologique de la vulnérabilité. (shrink)

This paper is part of a special section devoted to an interdisciplinary exploration of vulnerability, assessing the theoretical elaborations of the concept, its uses, its political significance, and methodological issues in studying it. By foregrounding feminist and phenomenological philosophical methods that center on lived experience, the paper elaborates a multidimensional theoretical framework for understanding vulnerability as a complex experience and concept. It advances a pluralist understanding of vulnerability, seeking to connect dimensions of the concept that may be (...) fragmented and focusing on its relational nature. Such a non-dualist approach entails that the political and ethical conclusions that can be drawn about vulnerability are complex and thus require critical analysis, especially of how vulnerability becomes a matter of political rhetoric, rather than straightforward prescription. Finally, in light of its complexity and ambiguity, adequate and socially just theorizing about and application of the concept of vulnerability requires more thoroughgoing interdisciplinary collaboration. (shrink)