The fetal human possesses an active central nervous system from at least the eighth week of development. Until mid-gestation the most significant center of activity is the brainstem. By the end of the first trimester, it appears that the brainstem could be acting as a rudimentary modulator of sensory information and motor activity. What importance ought to be attached to such regulatory activity is uncertain. Some argue that it represents a level of integrated activity sufficient to bolster an argument (...) for conferring some measure of standing at this point. Our thinking about sentience is not advanced a great deal, as we as yet have no good way of talking about it at the brainstem level. As for the neocortex, available evidence indicates that it does not become a functional part of the neuraxis until at least mid-gestation. It is not until then that the thalamus – the major gateway for sensory input to the cerebrum – makes its first afferent contacts with the neocortex. Keywords: neuromaturation, fetal behavior, fetal brainstem CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

It is an undeniable empirical fact that a human fetus is a member of the species homo sapiens from the moment of conception. There is thus an important sense in which it is a human being in itself, and not simply part of a pregnant woman’s body, despite what defenders of abortion on demand might want us to think. It is also reasonable to suppose that all human beings, and thus human fetuses, are persons, with (...) all that entails, but this is a metaphysical presupposition as opposed to an empirical fact, and is thus contentious. It is argued, however, that this should be of little comfort to the defenders of abortion, because the mere fact that human fetuses have an inherent tendency to become persons is sufficient reason to confer a moral status upon them, which renders abortion morally problematic at best. (shrink)

This essay makes a case for the metaphysical status of the human fetus. I argue that personhood begins at conception as opposed to at some point in the post-conception continuum. However, there is a deep division over this matter. Defenders of the pro-life position grant that life begins at conception. In contrast, defenders of the pro-choice position deny that life begins at conception. Even if it were the case that life begins at conception, proponents of abortion claim that (...) a woman’s bodily autonomy should come first over protecting the fetus’s life. Contemporary discussions regarding this matter continue to lack a clear and adequate account of why we continue to face a stalemate in terms of settling the issue of the metaphysical status of the human fetus. In section I, I discuss what I call the less central issues that stand in the way when it comes to addressing the main question of the personhood of the human fetus. In section II, I discuss the personhood problem as it relates to the fetus. In section III, I sketch out a conception- grounded theory of fetal personhood. In section IV, I consider some objections. In section V, I discuss the origin problem as it relates to the fetus within the broader context of the challenge, we face in answering the question of the nature of life. Finally, in section VI, I conclude this paper by claiming that conception plays a decisive metaphysical role in the personhood status of the fetus. (shrink)

This essay explores some moral problems raised by experimentation involving the human fetus. In the first part of the essay three examples of fetal experimentation from the medical literature are described in some detail. Next, the ethical and legal arguments employed in the two major existing public policy-documents on fetal experimentation are analyzed. Finally, the author seeks to identify four fundamental presuppositions which underlie divergent normative positions on the problem of fetal experimentation.

Abortion is the most common and controversial issue in many parts of the world. Approximately 46 million abortions are performed worldwide every year. The world ratio is 26 induced abortions per 100 known pregnancies. Pakistan has an estimated abortion rate of 29 abortions per 1,000 women of reproductive age, despite the procedure being illegal except to save a woman’s life. 890,000 abortions are performed annually in Pakistan. Many government and non-government organizations are working on the issue of abortion. Muslim jurists (...) are unanimous in declaring that after the fetus is completely formed and has been given a soul, abortion is haram (forbidden). (shrink)

Research to improve the health of pregnant and fetal patients presents ethical challenges to clinical investigators, institutional review boards, funding agencies, and data safety and monitoring boards. The Common Rule sets out requirements that such research must satisfy but no ethical framework to guide their application. We provide such an ethical framework, based on the ethical concept of the fetus as a patient. We offer criteria for innovation and for Phase I and II and then for Phase III clinical (...) trials to improve the health of pregnant patients and of fetal patients and also criteria to responsibly manage the transition from investigation to clinical practice. Basing ethical criteria for research involving pregnant women on the ethical concept of the fetus as a patient insulates the proposed ethical framework and therefore research on pregnant women from the divisive and politicized concepts and discourses of personhood, fetal rights, and unborn child. (shrink)

The Standard View of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career, has no mental features at all. So the Standard View entails that no person was ever a fetus--contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It (...) is also mysterious what does ordinarily happen to a human fetus, if it does not come to be a person. Although an extremely complex variant of the Standard View may allow one to persist without psychological continuity before one becomes a person but not afterwards, a far simpler solution is to accept a radically non-psychological account of our identity. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 35, Issue 7, Page 672-679, September 2021.

Judge Christian Byk renders service to the Steering Committee on Bioethics of the Council of Europe (CDBI) by proposing a draft of the protocol destined to fill in a gap in international law on the status of the human embryo. This proposal, printed in a previous issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics deserves nevertheless to be questioned on important points. Is Christian Byk proposing to legalise research on human embryos not only in vitro but also in utero?

Pro-life and pro-choice advocates battle for rational dominance in abortion debates. Yet, public polling (and general legal opinion) demonstrates the public’s preference for the middle ground: that abortions are acceptable in certain circumstances and during early pregnancy. Implicit in this, are two contradictory intuitions: (1) that we were all early fetuses, and (2) abortion kills no one. To hold these positions together, Harman and Räsänen have argued for the Actual Future Principle (AFP) which distinguishes between fetuses that will develop into (...) persons and those that will never develop into persons. However intellectually ingenious their solutions are, they fail to account for a third intuition: that the death of a wanted fetus – e.g. through termination or miscarriage – is of moral significance. Not only is this practically important, but it is also supported by public opinion. The authors of this paper argue that relational ontology can modify the AFP to better account for all three intuitions. Furthermore, it further emphasizes the pivotal role of the pregnant person who relates to their own fetus in either personal or impersonal ways. Addressing the fundamental challenges of relational ontology, the authors defend the position that human personal identity is ultimately relational. (shrink)

During the 70s and 80s ethical debate concerning the fetus became intensive. The great advances made in medical technology and research and improvements in prenatal diagnosis as well as in embryological research have led us to believe that the fetus is an individual with recognised claims to protection. In Sweden the aborted fetus has previously been considered merely as a risk-disposal problem, equivalent to dangerous and infected material and there have been no specific guidelines for the treatment (...) of the fetus after abortion. In July 1990 treatment of aborted fetuses was changed with the general guidelines from the National Board of Health and Welfare. The present paper sets out the main contents of the guidelines and discusses the gradually changing views concerning the status of the human fetus in Sweden, as well as the public debate which has been a contributing factor to these changes. (shrink)

Who has more rights-the mother or the fetus? Interdisciplinary in scope and character, this latest volume of Humana's classic series, Biomedical Ethics Reviews, focuses on the complex moral and legal problems involving human fetal life. Each article in Bioethics and the Fetus provides an up-to-date review of the literature and advances bioethical discussion in its field. The authors have avoided much of the technical jargon of philosophy and medicine in order to speak directly to a broad and (...) general readership. Topics include: • maternal-fetal conflict • the disposition of aborted fetuses • frozen embryos • creating children to save sibling's lives • fetal tissue transplantation • moral implications of fetal brain integration • the embryo as patient • prenatal diagnosis. Probing deeply into these thorny issues, Bioethics and the Fetus offers thought-provoking reading-and paves the ground for new insight-for a host of healthcare and other professionals, as well as concerned laypersons. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to stimulate academic debate on embryo and fetal research from the perspective of the drafting of a protocol to the European Convention on Biomedicine. The Steering Committee on Bioethics of the Council of Europe was mandated to draw up such a protocol and for this purpose organised an important symposium on reproductive technologies and embryo research, in Strasbourg from the 16th to the 18th of December 1996.

I reviewed Pope Francis’s Address as one acutely aware of the extremely murky psycho-political cloud surrounding womb-determinism in the United States, and coming to it without any religion-based predisposition on the issue.I made note that Pope Francis’s main point is not proscriptive. He gives a low profile to any dogmatic definition of the sanctity of life. His tone is humane, not doctrinal.The Pope proposes that the fetus, like the child who follows, is basically a messenger, communicating from the womb (...) and creating the universe that will define the mother, the family, and the wider community. This point is not moral—he calls it “pre-religious”—but semiotic, concerned with the nature and structure of how we... (shrink)

          First an outline of the argument Assume that I once was a fetus. Who will deny this —surely a fetus was what I once was? Yet, though it is hard to deny, much of this paper will be work to bolster up this portion of the argument. For now assume this. But now if the right-to-life (understood as the right not to be deprived of life by human (...) decision unless one has deserved such deprivation through a crime that one has been.. (shrink)

Human–nonhuman chimeras have been the focus of ethical controversies for more than a decade, yet some related issues remain unaddressed. For example, little has been said about the relationship between the origin of transferred cells and the morally relevant capacities to which they may give rise. Consider, for example, a developing mouse fetus that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a human and another that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a dolphin. If both chimeras (...) acquire morally relevant capacities as a result of transplantation, and if those capacities are indistinguishable, should the difference in cell origin matter to how we classify these creatures? I argue that if morally relevant capacities are easy to detect, cell origin is irrelevant to how the chimera ought to be treated. However, if such capacities are hard to detect, cell origin should play a role in considerations about how to treat the chimera. (shrink)

Bypassing the question of when "human" life begins, the author seeks to determine the moral status of the fetus directly by means of a rational theory of rights. He argues that all agents with an operative rational and moral capacity are entitled to full equal rights, while the rights of those lacking these capacities are conferred by rational, moral agents. After reviewing the general considerations that would lead rational agents to confer rights, the author concludes that these agents (...) would probably not choose to restrict their liberty of abortion by conferring substantial rights on the fetus. (shrink)

Human embryonic moral status in the embryo debate in the Indian religious school of thoughts is a challenging issue. The paper tries to figure out whether ontological status implies moral status of embryo. Consciousness is an important determinant of animation of human embryo. In this paper an attempt had been made to understand the concept of man and soul in the Hindu philosophical thought. In the process we would also make a critical review of embryology in the Hindu (...) philosophical thought. The study would adopt a conceptual elucidation of morality. The paper made an elaborative study of Puruṣa as found in the Saṃkhya Philosophy and the study of consciousness and animation would try to resolve the related question, when does life begin to have that value? Embryo-protectionist regards embryos as a potential person. The Gita says the human person is individual self-called āttmā, whose nature is of pure consciousness, Brahman/Puruṣa. Consciousness constitutes the essentiality of individual Self. Human embryo developments are elaborately studied in the Yajñavalkya Smṛti, Garbha Upaniṣad, and Suśruta Saṃhitā. The self that remain latent in the embryo gets impetus with the association of consciousness until then it cannot be a human personality. In Hinduism sanctity of life gets combined with autonomy and self-determination. The sanctity of life applies both to the fetus as well as to the overall welfare of the society. The embryo being in an interim stage and the soul not being destroyed upon body annihilation, it may be claimed that since destruction or annihilation of the physical form does not destroy the soul, beneficial embryo research should thus not be abhorrent. The Hindu ethics as examined here precludes the consideration of the situation at hand, and causing the least harm and work according to one’s dharma. (shrink)

Human embryonic stem cell research can bring about major biomedical breakthroughs and thus contribute enormously to human welfare, yet it raises serious moral problems because it involves using human embryos for experiment. The “moral status of the human embryo” remains the core of such debates. Three different positions regarding the moral status of the human embryo can be categorised: the “all” position, the “none” position, and the “gradualist” position.The author proposes that the “gradualist” position is (...) more plausible than the other two positions. Confucius’s moral principle of jen, which proposes a unique theory of “love of gradation”, and the principle of yi, which advocates “due treatment for persons”, are then explored. The author then argues that our moral obligations to do good to other living organisms, persons, and our families are different.Putting together the “gradualist” position on the human embryo, and Confucius’s theories of “love of gradation” and “due treatment for persons”, the author concludes that the early embryo has less ethical significance than the later fetus and adult human. The moral obligation we have toward persons is clearer and stronger than that which we have toward human embryos. Embryo research is justifiable if it brings enormous welfare to human persons that cannot be otherwise achieved. The “love of gradation” requires us, however, to extend love and respect towards other entities according to their different status. We should therefore be very cautious in using human embryos for research, acknowledging the gradualist nature of their moral status. (shrink)

In her paper, Robinson asserts that if one is convinced by the arguments assigning personhood according to a threshold criterion, one should also be open to the potential for a secondary personhood threshold, satisfied when one is pregnant, which confers temporary enhanced moral status. Rather than grounding such a claim on a fetus’s possession, or lack thereof, of personhood, Robinson argues that the pregnant person’s status as a ‘unique being’ is enough to satisfy the requirements of such an additional (...) personhood classification. 1 She justifies her claim via three arguments: (1) that the pregnant person is, in fact, more than a singular individual; (2) that pregnant people play a critical role in the human race’s continuation and (3) that the significant harms and burdens to which pregnant people have been exposed to historically and contemporary requires counterbalancing with enhanced protections. Unfortunately, despite Robinson’s best efforts, she does not... (shrink)

In a footnote to the first edition of Political Liberalism, John Rawls introduced an example of how public reason could deal with controversial issues. He intended this example to show that his system of political liberalism could deal with such problems by considering only political values, without the introduction of comprehensive moral doctrines. Unfortunately, Rawls chose “the troubled question of abortion” as the issue that would illustrate this. In the case of abortion, Rawls argued, “the equality of women as equal (...) citizens” overrides both “the ordered reproduction of political society over time” and also “the due respect for human life.” It seems fair to say that this was not the best choice of example and also that Rawls did not argue for his example particularly well: a whole subset of the Rawlsian literature concerns this question alone. (shrink)

Appealing to reason rather than religious belief, this book is the most comprehensive case against the choice of abortion yet published. _The Ethics of Abortion_ critically evaluates all the major grounds for denying fetal personhood, including the views of those who defend not only abortion but also infanticide. It also provides several justifications for the conclusion that all human beings, including those in utero, should be respected as persons. This book also critiques the view that abortion is not wrong (...) even if the human fetus is a person. _The Ethics of Abortion_ examines hard cases for those who are prolife, such as abortion in cases of rape or in order to save the mother’s life, as well as hard cases for defenders of abortion, such as sex selection abortion and the rationale for being “personally opposed” but publically supportive of abortion. It concludes with a discussion of whether artificial wombs might end the abortion debate. Answering the arguments of defenders of abortion, this book provides reasoned justification for the view that all intentional abortions are morally wrong and that doctors and nurses who object to abortion should not be forced to act against their consciences. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of news stories were reported worldwide involving brain-dead pregnant women. Debates over providing life support to braindead pregnant women and delivery of their children have been around for some decades. Maintaining a woman’s life solely for fetal viability has become a major controversial social issue. Opposing opinions exist where one side supports the woman and her child should be left to die in dignity and the other side claims to protect the unborn child’s right to (...) live. Each group has strong beliefs. This paper addresses main aspects when considering the continuation of somatic support to the brain-dead pregnant woman for the purpose of fetus delivery including; human death, dignity of the woman, rights of the fetus, proportionality of acts, and the woman’s donor status, and independence of mother and fetus. Then, the authors present several diverse opinions and positions concerning the legitimacy of life support for brain-dead women based on them and critically evaluate them. We show that each and every claim can be ethically refuted. This paper also approaches to those claims from three different points of views, which are that of the brain-dead woman, her fetus and her family. We believe that the brain-dead woman’s wish and dignity, the child’s predicted wellbeing after birth, and the family’s beliefs and welfare should all be counted equally when making the final decision. In conclusion, we argue that the decision can be ethically justified only when the interests of all parties are appropriately taken into consideration and protected. (shrink)

Are fetuses, at any stage of their development, capable of feeling pain? In his paper, ‘Locating the Beginnings of Pain’, Stuart Derbyshire argues that they are not. We argue that he reaches this conclusion by way of conceptual confusion, a misreading of the available scientific data and the inclusion of irrelevant data. Despite his assertion to the contrary, the work of most scientists in the area supports the conclusion that fetuses can feel pain. At the outset we examine the concept (...) of pain and distinguish it from the allied concept of nociception, with which it is sometimes confused. With the relevant conceptual framework in place, we elucidate the problem of determining when, in its development, a human becomes capable of feeling pain. We then examine the available data showing how, on balance, it tends more to support than undermine the claim that fetuses of around 28 to 30 weeks' gestation are capable of feeling pain. (shrink)

In my articles ‘The Substance View: A Critique’ and ‘The Substance View: A Critique,’ I raise objections to the substance view, a theory of intrinsic value and moral standing defended by a number of contemporary moral philosophers, including Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, Christopher Tollefsen, and Francis Beckwith. In part one of my critique of the substance view, I raise reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral (...) standing as the standard adult human being, among other human beings. In part two, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of that conclusion. Here, in part three, I raise objections to Henrik Friberg-Fernros's attempt to rebut some of the aforementioned objections. (shrink)

The medical model of childbearing assumes that a pregnancy always has the potential to turn into a risky procedure. In order to advocate humanized birth in high risk pregnancy, an important step involves the enlightenment of the professional’s preconceptions on humanized birth in such a situation. The goal of this paper is to identify the professionals’ perception of the potential obstacles and facilitating factors for the implementation of humanized care in high risk pregnancies. Twenty-one midwives, obstetricians, and health administrator professionals (...) from the clinical and academic fields were interviewed in nine different sites in Japan from June through August 2008. The interviews were audio taped, and transcribed with the participants’ consent. Data was subsequently analyzed using content analysis qualitative methods. Professionals concurred with the concept that humanized birth is a changing and promising process, and can often bring normality to the midst of a high obstetric risk situation. No practice guidelines can be theoretically defined for humanized birth in a high risk pregnancy, as there is no conflict between humanized birth and medical intervention in such a situation. Barriers encountered in providing humanized birth in a high risk pregnancy include factors such as: the pressure of being responsible for the safety of the mother and the fetus, lack of the women’s active involvement in the decision making process and the heavy burden of responsibility on the physician’s shoulders, potential legal issues, and finally, the lack of midwifery authority in providing care at high risk pregnancy. The factors that facilitate humanized birth in a high risk include: the sharing of decision making and other various responsibilities between the physicians and the women; being caring; stress management, and the fact that the evolution of a better relationship and communication between the health professional and the patient will lead to a stress-free environment for both. Humanized birth in a high risk pregnancy is something that goes beyond just curing women of their illnesses. It can be considered as a token of caring, and continued support, which positively consolidates the doctor-patient relationship. As yet, it has not been described as a practiced guideline, due to its ever-changing complexities. (shrink)

In “Evictionism and Libertarianism,” published in this journal, Walter Block defends the view that, although the fetus is a human being with all the rights to its body, it may nonetheless be evicted from the woman’s body as a trespasser, provided the pregnancy is unwanted. We argue that this view is untenable: the statement that the unwanted fetus is a trespasser does not follow from the premises that the fetus uninvitedly resides in the woman’s body and (...) that the woman is a full self-owner. For this statement to follow, one more statement would have to be true; namely, the woman would have to hold her self-ownership rights specifically against the fetus, and for this to be the case, the fetus would have to have a correlative duty to the woman to abstain from interfering with her body. This statement, however, is false. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:PHARAOH'S.MAGICIANS: THE ETHICS AND EFFICA:CY OF HUMAN FETAiL TISSUE TRANSPLANTS ROBERT BARRY, O.P. Program for the Study of Religion University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana DARREL KESLER Department of Animal Sciences University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. IN RECENT YEARS increasing attention ha;s been given to v:rurious types of scientific riese,arch involving the human fetus. In the 1970s, :a tremendous amount of concern was expres1 sed IJ.'egiaroing the fetus,a;.s (...) a rSU!bject of e~erimenrtation. In this debate, the announced " research impeiiat:i:ve " was pos,ed against other moral imperativ;es.1 Following much soctiet :JaJl drebarte, protootlive meiaisumeis 1 WeIDe il!dopited 1by oompireihensive regiutatiions in 1975 estaiblishiing protections foT a number of research sUibjects. These regulrutions protect the fetus from non-beneficiail experimentation. that iworuild pose more than minima;l risk rto the fetus. Current debates in science and ethics now swirl arlOiund a new topic regarding human '.fetal life: the fetus as a sourrce of tissue for triansplaintation into other persons ais run e~erimental thempy. It is an issue that is rapidly moving torward the same Jevel of" research imperative" as did the earlier debate on the 1 See Paul Ramsey, The Ethics of Fetal Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975): "Today one often hears statements like' Fetal Research must be done,' or 'It would be immoral not to do this research'" (P. xv). The validity of such opinions and utterances entirely depends on a netbenefits ethics, and the validity of that moral universe has been called increasingly into question in recent years. 575 576 ROBERT BARRY, O.P. AND DARREL KESLER ~etus as subject. Recently,,a new level of intensity was added to this deharte rby the imposition of an indefinite moratorium on federal support for research on transplantrution experiments inv;olving human.fetirul tissue and other!humans. 1Thls " :indefinite moratorium " w1as a result of a process that 1 began with research p110posaJs considered rby the National In- 'stituites of Health (NIH) in October 1987. In Marich 1988 a momtorium wa;g plaioed on the r:eseareh, and an 1advisory panel was summoned to consider the ethical issues involved. This panel presented 1a cveoommendation for the procedures. However, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Ruman Se1wfoes (HHS), Dr. Louis Sullivan, decided against the research proposal on etmcal grounds. His decision w:as with the 'concU'l'Tenoe of the Assistant Secretary :£m.· Health of HHS, Dr. James Mason, who has Tespons~bility for the NIH. Secretary SulliV1an's decision was oommumcarted to the Acting Director of the NIH, Dr. William Raub, in Nov,ember 1989. A :firestorm of criticism erupted from,rudv;ocates of this research, including the Council of Judicial and Ethical Affairs of tihe American Medical Association, which 5.n June 1989 called for an end to the:ban.2 In this article, we wish to question both the science and the ethics of the rproposed fotal tissue transplantation therapy. We!Will 1support the £edeml funding moratorium and surggest new pmtections for the fetuses (whether po,ssibly living or de2 " Medical Applications of Fetal Tissue Transplantation", JAMA, Vol. 263, No. 4, January 26, 1990, 'PP· 565-570. There has been a.great deal of public debate, not only in the U.S. but also in Europe over whether human embryo research should be supported with public funds. Many Catholic countries in Europe have prohibited such research, while a number of other nations have allowed it. Dickson, D., "Europe Split on Embyro Research", Science, Vol. 242, November 21, 1988, pp. 1117-1118. The most interesting controversy is in West Germany where there is a strong movement to prohibit it because many there believe such an experimentation requires judgments that there are certain forms of human life that do not deserve to survive. Ibid., p. 1117. Many Germans regard these sorts of judgments as too close to those made by Nazis, and there is strong sentiment to prohibit such research altogether. Ibid. HUMAN FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTS 577 oea:sed) of elective a.bortfons. We will also describe new reseaooh directions in t~apy.for the diseases in which it is claimed that fetal... (shrink)

Feticide, the practice of terminating the life of an otherwise viable fetus in utero, has become an increasingly common practice in obstetric centres around the globe, a concomitant of antenatal screening technologies. This paper examines this expanding practice in light of the concept of human dignity. Although it is assumed from the outset that even viable human fetuses are not persons and as such do not enjoy full membership in the moral community, it is argued that the (...) fact that these are nevertheless human fetuses affords them prima facie moral status. Thus even those who accept a liberal position with regard to therapeutic abortion, should be concerned about these more recent developments. Indeed, how we treat viable human fetuses has implications for our prospective treatment of other human non-persons and could undermine the common human dignity we all share. (shrink)

Appealing to reason rather than religious belief, this book is the most comprehensive case against the choice of abortion yet published. This updated edition of The Ethics of Abortion critically evaluates all the major grounds for denying fetal personhood, including the views of those who defend not only abortion but also post-birth abortion. It also provides several (non-theological) justifications for the conclusion that all human beings, including those in utero, should be respected as persons. This book also critiques the (...) view that abortion is not wrong even if the human fetus is a person. The Ethics of Abortion examines hard cases for those who are prolife, such as abortion in cases of rape or in order to save the mother's life, as well as hard cases for defenders of abortion, such as sex selection abortion and the rationale for being "personally opposed" but publically supportive of abortion. It concludes with a discussion of whether artificial wombs might end the abortion debate. Answering the arguments of defenders of abortion, this book provides reasoned justification for the view that all intentional abortions are ethically wrong and that doctors and nurses who object to abortion should not be forced to act against their consciences. Updates and Revisions to the Second Edition include: --A response to Alberto Giubilini's and Francesca Minerva's now famous 2012 article, "After-Birth Abortion" in the Journal of Medical Ethics--Responses to new defenses of Judith Jarvis Thomson's violinist argument--The addition of a new chapter on gradualist views of fetal moral worth, including Jeff McMahan's Time-Relative Interest Account--The addition of a new chapter on the conscience protection for health care workers who are opposed to abortion--Responses to many critiques of the first edition, including those made by Donald Marquis, David DeGrazia, and William E. May. (shrink)

Many believe that moral value is—at least to some extent—dependent on the developmental states necessary for supporting rational activity. My paper rejects this view, but does not aim simply to register objections to it. Rather, my essay aims to answer the following question: if a human being’s developmental state and occurrent capacities do not bequeath moral standing, what does? The question is intended to prompt careful consideration of what makes human beings objects of moral value, dignity, or goodness. (...) Not only do I think we can answer this question, I think we can show that nascent human life possesses goodness of precisely this sort. I appeal to Aquinas’s metaethics to establish the conclusion that the goodness of a human being—even if that being is an embryo or fetus—resides at the substratum of her existence. If she possesses goodness, it is because human existence is good. (shrink)

What Babies Know outlines a compelling case for why infancy research is fundamental for conceptualizing what it is to be human. There is another period in human development that is relatively inaccessible, yet is more important. In order to truly understand the nature of core knowledge, perception, and cognition, we must start not with the infant, but with the fetus.

ABSTRACT In this paper we attempt to sharpen and to provide an answer to the question of when human beings first become conscious. Since it is relatively uncontentious that a capacity for raw sensation precedes and underpins all more sophisticated mental capacities, our question is tantamount to asking when human beings first have experiences with sensational content. Two interconnected features of our argument are crucial. First, we argue that experiences with sensational content are supervenient on facts about electrical (...) activity in the cerebral cortex which can be ascertained through EEG readings. Second, we isolate from other notions of a‘functioning brain’that which is required to underpin the view that a cortex is functioning in a way which could give rise to rudimentary conscious experiences. We investigate the development in the human fetus of the anatomical and chemical pathways which underpin (immature) cortical activity and the growth and maturation of the electrical circuitry specifically associated with sensational content in adult experience. We conclude (tentatively) that a fetus becomes conscious at about 30 to 35 weeks after conception; an answer based on a careful analysis of EEG readings at various stages of cortical development. Finally, we survey the possible ethical ramifications of our answer. (shrink)

Since the birth of the first test-tube baby, Louise Brown, in 1977, we have seen truly remarkable advances in biotechnology. We can now screen the fetus for Down Syndrome, Spina Bifida, and a wide range of genetic disorders. We can rearrange genes in DNA chains and redirect the evolution of species. We can record an individual's genetic fingerprint. And we can potentially insert genes into human DNA that will produce physical warning signs of cancer, allowing early detection. In (...) fact, biotechnology has progressed to such a point that virtually any kind of genetic manipulation, if not already possible, is just around the corner. But these breakthroughs also raise serious ethical and moral dilemmas that we are only now beginning to confront. In Wonderwoman and Superman, noted medical ethicist John Harris offers the first thorough analysis of the moral dilemmas created by the revolution in molecular biology. Covering a wide array of recent innovations, Harris discusses, for example, the moral decisions involved and the consequences of creating egg and embryo banks. Who should be allowed to use such resources? Should recipients be screened? Should such banks be open for public or private use? And does it cheapen life to make embryos available for sale? In another chapter, Harris examines the question of conceiving children chiefly for organ donation, focusing on the recent case of a woman who wanted to have a second child to provide a bone marrow donor for her first child sick with leukemia (she intended to abort the fetus if its bone marrow did not genetically match that of her living child). In this case, the medical staff had to decide whether they should perform in-vitro fertilization, knowing that the mother did not satisfy the clinic's criteria (there was no father), and also knowing the potential for abortion. Discussing the ethics of the mother's choice and the clinic's choice, Harris asks whether it is morally correct to create a child as an organ donor, whether the future child would suffer, whether it is worth any suffering to be born, and who has the right to weigh the various factors (both moral and physiological) involved in making these decisions. Delving into a multitude of issues such as when life begins, when suffering is needless, and whether we should play God, Wonderwoman and Superman provides not only a thought-provoking inquiry into the potential and actual ethical dilemmas created by the many advances in biotechnology, but challenges us to learn to choose responsibly and to face the moral implications of the choices that confront us. (shrink)

Even for persons who hold to the ethical acceptance of abortion practices in general, questions of detail often arise. If you assume the distinction between the physical human organism alone and the person that is associated with that organism, then you must face the question of whether it is permissible to abort a fetus if the corresponding person has come into being. We take the position that the abortion of a fetus that has achieved this level of (...) development should be declared unethical except in special circumstances. Our purpose here is to identify the point in the development of the fetus that serves as the marker for this level. (shrink)

Following on the heels of his critically acclaimed God of Abraham, Lenn E. Goodman here focuses on rights, their grounding in the deserts of beings, and the dignity of persons. In an incisive contemporary dialogue between reason and revelation, Goodman argues for ethical standards and public policies that respect human rights and support the preservation of all beings: animals, plants, econiches, species, habitats, and the monuments of nature and culture. Immersed in the Jewish and philosophical sources, Goodmans argument ranges (...) from the fetus in the womb to the modern nation state, from the problems of pornography and tobacco advertising to the rights of parents and children, individuals and communities, the powerful and powerless--the most ancient and the most immediate problems of human life and moral responsibility. Guided by the probing argumentation that Goodman lays out with distinctive, often poetic clarity, the reader will emerge enlightened and prepared to respond with intelligence and commitment to the sobering moral challenges of the coming century. This is a book for anyone concerned with law, ethics, and the human prospect. (shrink)

In phenomenology, theories of empathy are intimately connected with the question of how it is possible to have insight into the mind of the other person. In this article, the author wants to show why it is self-evident for us that the other person is having experiences. In order to do so, it is not enough to discuss the phenomenon of empathy with a starting point in the already constituted adult person; instead the article presents a genetic approach to (...) class='Hi'>human development. The author thus contrasts Edith Stein’s discussion of Einfühlung (empathy), which takes its starting point in the experience of the grown-up, with Max Scheler’s discussion of Einsfühlung (feeling of oneness), where the relation between mother and infant is taken as one example. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the world of the infant is read as one way of developing Scheler’s theory of intersubjectivity and of Einsfühlung. This genetic approach is developed further into a phenomenological analysis of the experience of the fetus and of birth. The author argues that the analysis of the fetus highlights the distinction between knowing that another person is having experiences, and knowing the specific content of the other person’s experiences. The fetus does not experience different persons, but has a pre-subjective experience of life that includes what is later experienced as belonging to “another.” Later in life, the experience of empathy, as an experience of a specific content, can be developed from this experience. In this way empathy and Einsfühlung can be understood as complementary rather than as competing phenomena. (shrink)

Mother and Fetus: Rights in Conflict A. INTRODUCTION After fertilization of the female egg (ovum) with male sperm the resulting zygote may implant ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Human Reproduction: Dominion and LimitsRichard A. McCormick S.J. (bio)The general struggle throughout Christian history has been to seek the proper balance between dominion and limits, intervention and nonintervention, givenness, and creativity. This struggle has worked itself out in six areas that touch human life. In this essay, I will revisit the Catholic tradition’s treatment of these in terms of dominion and limits to see whether we can (...) discern developmental patterns that might suggest an approach to issues pertaining to the sources of life (reproductive ethics) as we move into the next century.1. Abortion. The history of the treatment of abortion in the Catholic tradition is the history of an evaluation. This evaluation was somewhat muddied by [End Page 387] unclarity and inconsistency in the use of terms. Thus, some theologians distinguished three types of abortion: prevention of conception, abortion of an inanimate fetus, and abortion of an animated fetus. Others regarded all interventions into the life-giving process as homicides. Still others argued that termination of a nonanimated fetus was justified to save the life of the mother. And still others said such termination was anticipated homicide or the misuse of semen conceptum.Such unclarities and qualifications eventually vanished and produced an evaluation of fetal life that yielded to very few competing interests, what John Noonan (1970) referred to as “an almost absolute value.” There was some dominion or control, but the limits became increasingly clear and powerful.2. Individual and corporate self-defense. Augustine disallowed lethal individual or personal self-defense, but established the first elementary rules for war. Aquinas allowed both. Vitoria, Suarez, and others refined the criteria justifying war (jus ad bellum) and listed them as three: recovery of property, resistance to aggression, and vindication of injuries (injustices). Pius XII narrowed these to a single reason: national self-defense. The Challenge of Peace (NCCB 1983) moves away from the licitness of nuclear war and nuclear deterrence even for self-defense. Once again, the limits to the dominion over life in war grow stronger and more powerful even as the weapons of such dominion grow more powerful.3. Capital punishment. Over the centuries, Christian thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas, permitted the use of capital punishment. Three justifications were proposed to found this right of the state: retribution, deterrence, and reform. In the past decades, however, these justifications have been seriously questioned. Both the American and Philippine bishops’ conferences have rejected all use of capital punishment. Most recently John Paul II (1995, n. 56, p. 709) adduces defense of society as the only possible justification for it and sees such cases as “very rare if not practically non-existent.”4. The preservation of life. The theme of a balance between dominion and limits is perhaps nowhere clearer than in the Catholic approach to life preservation. Catholic tradition does not accept our culture’s rejection of death. Rather it asserts that the facts that we are pilgrims, that Christ has overcome death and lives, and that we also will live with him yield a general value judgment on the meaning and value of life as we now live it: Life is a basic good but not an absolute one. It is basic because, as the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (1980, p. 511) worded it, it is the “necessary source and condition of every human activity and of all society.” It is not absolute because there are higher goods for which life can be sacrificed—e.g., the glory of God, salvation of souls, service of one’s brethren, and the like. Thus in John (15:13): “There is no greater love than this: to lay down one’s life for one’s friends. John Paul II (1995, n. 47, p. 706) briefly summarizes this in Evangelium Vitae: “The life of the body in its earthly state is not an absolute good for the believer.” This value [End Page 388] judgment has immediate relevance for care of the ill and dying: Not all means must be used to preserve life.Thus the Catholic tradition has moved between two extremes: medico-moral optimism or vitalism (which preserves life with all means, at any cost... (shrink)

Those who favor and those who oppose the interruption of pregnancy with anencephalic fetuses answer the question ‘what is the right to life?’ differently. Those in favor argue that life exists only when it is ‘viable’; that is to say, when cerebral activities occur or may occur. Those who oppose it argue that it is not possible to describe ‘life’ as residing in a particular quality, since life ‘exists from conception’. In fact, in both cases, the noun ‘life’ is being (...) defined by a particular quality, either as ‘viable’ or as ‘existing from the time of conception’. Also, simply saying that ‘there is life’ cannot count as a neutral answer since those who utter such a sentence employ an unspecified criterion to establish if there is life or not. There are two possible ways to investigate this controversial matter: either we look for a definition of ‘life’ which is neutral and objective and does not reside in a particular quality or we try to establish whether or not the search for a neutral point of view can lead to a satisfactory answer. In this article we explore the argument against the interruption of pregnancy – as defined above – in order to show 1) the impossibility of establishing a neutral point of view regarding knowledge; 2) the existence of a psychological motivation which justifies the longing for an absolute criterion for the evaluation of human actions. This psychological motivation is analyzed from a Nietzschean perspective. (shrink)

In addressing bioethical issues at the beginning of human life, such as abortion, in vitro fertilization, and embryonic stem cell research, one primary concern regards establishing when a developing human embryo or fetus can be considered a person. Thomas Aquinas argues that an embryo or fetus is not a human person until its body is informed by a rational soul. Aquinas's explicit account of human embryogenesis has been generally rejected by contemporary scholars due to (...) its dependence upon medieval biological data, which has been far surpassed by current scientific research. A number of scholars, however, have attempted to combine Aquinas's basic metaphysical account of human nature with current embryological data to develop a contemporary Thomistic account of a human person's beginning. In this article, I discuss two recent interpretations in which it is argued that a human person does not begin to exist until a fetus has developed a functioning cerebral cortex. (shrink)

Pregnancy and motherhood bring enormous change to one’s life. As a student of philosophy, I have struggled to find a place for myself, as a new mother, in academic life. Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness examines human consciousness -- it places human experience as the starting point of philosophical inquiry. This approaches the sort of place I think human experience should rest in philosophy. If I am to claim that motherhood is academically significant, surely, this examination must (...) begin with an examination of human experience. This paper tries to root my experience of pregnancy as something that I think is academically interesting. It was through writing this paper that I found myself hopeful that my becoming a mother was not the end of my academic career, but rather presents an interesting and important new path in my philosophical journey. (shrink)

This article presents an overview ofregulations, guidelines and societal debates ineight member states of the EC about a)embryonic and fetal tissue transplantation(EFTT), and b) the use of human embryonic stemcells (hES cells) for research into celltherapy, including `therapeutic' cloning. Thereappears to be a broad acceptance of EFTT inthese countries. In most countries guidance hasbeen developed. There is a `strong' consensusabout some of the central conditions for `goodclinical practice' regarding EFTT.International differences concern, amongstothers, some of the informed consent issuesinvolved, and (...) the questions whether anintermediary organisation is necessary, whetherthe methods of abortion may be influenced bythe possible use of EFT, and whether EFTTshould only be used for the experimentaltreatment of rare disorders. The potential useof hES cells for research into cell therapy hasgiven a new impetus to the debate about (human)embryo research. The therapeutic prospects withregard to the retrieval and research use of hEScells appear to function as a catalyst for theintroduction of less restrictive regulationsconcerning research with spare embryos, atleast in some European countries. It remains tobe seen whether the prospect of treatingpatients suffering from serious disorders withtransplants produced by therapeutic cloningwill decrease the societal and moral resistanceto allowing the generation of embryos for`instrumental' use. (shrink)