_ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 165 - 181 Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘hinge propositions’—those propositions that stand fast for us and around which all empirical enquiry turns—remains controversial and elusive, and none of the recent attempts to make sense of it strike me as entirely satisfactory. The literature on this topic tends to divide into two camps: either a ‘quasi-epistemic’ reading is offered that seeks to downplay the radical nature of Wittgenstein’s proposal by assimilating his thought to more mainstream (...) epistemological views, or a non-epistemic, ‘quasi-pragmatic’ conception is adopted that goes too far in the opposite direction by, for example, equating ‘hinge propositions’ with a type of ‘animal’ certainty. Neither interpretative strategy, I will argue, is promising for the reason that ‘hinges’ are best not conceived as certainties at all. Rather, what Wittgenstein says in respect to them is that doubt is “logically” excluded, and where there can be no doubt, I contend, there is no such thing as knowledge or certainty either. (shrink)

This paper considers the advantages of incorporating Foucault's anti-essentialist theory of the body into feminist explanations of women's oppression. There are also problems in that Foucault neglects to examine the gendered character of the body and reproduces a sexism endemic in "gender neutral" social theory. The Foucauldian body is essentially passive resulting in a limited account of identity and agency. This conflicts with an aim of feminism: to rediscover and revalue the experiences of women.

Many countries tightly ration access to publicly funded fertility treatments such as in vitro fertilisation. One basis for excluding people from access to IVF is their body mass index. In this paper, I consider a number of potential justifications for such a policy, based on claims about effectiveness and cost-efficiency, and reject these as unsupported by available evidence. I consider an alternative justification: that those whose subfertility results from avoidable behaviours for which they are responsible are less deserving of treatment. (...) I ultimately stop short of endorsing or rejecting such a justification, though highlight some reasons for thinking it is unlikely to be practicable. (shrink)

My purpose in this essay is to suggest, via case study, that if Anglo-American philosophy is to become more inclusive of non-western traditions, the discipline requires far greater efforts at self-scrutiny. I begin with the premise that Confucian ethical treatments of manners afford unique and distinctive arguments from which moral philosophy might profit, then seek to show why receptivity to these arguments will be low. I examine how ordinary good manners have largely fallen out of philosophical moral discourse in the (...) west, looking specifically at three areas: conditions in the 18th and 19th centuries that depressed philosophical attention to manners; discourse conventions in contemporary philosophy that privilege modes of analysis not well fitted to close scrutiny of manners; and a philosophical culture that implicitly encourages indifference or even antipathy toward polite conduct. I argue that these three areas function in effect to render contemporary discourse inhospitable to greater inclusivity where Confucianism is concerned and thus, more broadly, that greater self-scrutiny regarding unexamined, parochial western commitments and practices is necessary for genuine inclusivity. (shrink)

There is an ongoing discussion concerning personal vs. impersonal considerations in professional care. In this article, three different positions within the ethics of closeness will be discussed. These are: (a) reserving the ethics of closeness for close experienced others, ‘including the experienced Other’, which is Nortvedt's position; (b) trying to bring the distant, non‐experienced others closer, ‘including the Third’; and (c) finally, an examination of whether a perspective of closeness may lead to the exclusion of various groups in need of (...) help, ‘including the Other at the expense of the Third’. These positions are discussed with a view to clarifying some of the challenges that the ethics of closeness faces when it maintains that greater ethical obligation is associated with personal than with impersonal relations, without discussing the terms on which the obligation is based. Key questions that arise for a nurse or other health professional are: If our primary moral responsibility is for those that are close to us, the experienced others, who is to be responsible for those that are outside the established health services, the non‐experienced others? Is it evident that favouring the experienced others is based on legitimate needs? Can a discussion on the legitimate basis of nursing be avoided in questions relating to closeness and priorities? This discussion touches the heart of our discipline. Is a one‐sided perspective of closeness, rejecting moral responsibility for those with whom we have no relationship, a defensible ethical position? (shrink)

Available in English for the first time, this much-anticipated translation of Enrique Dussel's _Ethics of Liberation_ marks a milestone in ethical discourse. Dussel is one of the world's foremost philosophers. This treatise, originally published in 1998, is his masterwork and a cornerstone of the philosophy of liberation, which he helped to found and develop. Throughout his career, Dussel has sought to open a space for articulating new possibilities for humanity out of, and in light of, the suffering, dignity, and creative (...) drive of those who have been excluded from Western Modernity and neoliberal rationalism. Grounded in engagement with the oppressed, his thinking has figured prominently in philosophy, political theory, and liberation movements around the world. In _Ethics of Liberation_, Dussel provides a comprehensive world history of ethics, demonstrating that our most fundamental moral and ethical traditions did not emerge in ancient Greece and develop through modern European and North American thought. The obscured and ignored origins of Modernity lie outside the Western tradition. _Ethics of Liberation_ is a monumental rethinking of the history, origins, and aims of ethics. It is a critical reorientation of ethical theory. (shrink)

Philosophers have recently expressed interest in the question as to whether there is a right to sex, a right whose justification is motivated by the existence of sexually excluded people—people who suffer from involuntary long-term sexual deprivation (owing, say, to a chronic medical condition). This paper, after offering preliminary remarks about what a right to sex and its objects might be and who might have this right, surveys seven justifications for the right: linkage arguments, need, well-being, a minimally decent life, (...) sexual activity being a basic good, injustice, and relationships. The paper argues that a right to sex does not likely exist because none of the justifications is convincing. The paper then argues that despite the lack of justification, and because sexual exclusion is a problem worthy of attention, people’s sexual needs can be addressed through the lens of goals instead of rights. This not only takes sexual exclusion seriously enough, it also avoids the crucial problems associated with rights-talk, especially that of sexual coercion. (shrink)

Causal exclusion arguments are taken to threaten the autonomy of the special sciences, and the causal efficacy of mental properties. A recent line of response to these arguments has appealed to “independently plausible” and “well grounded” theories of causation to rebut key premises. In this paper I consider two papers which proceed in this vein and show that they share a common feature: they both require causes to be proportional to their effects. I argue that this feature is a bug, (...) and one that generalises: any attempt to rescue the autonomy of the special sciences, or the efficacy of the mental, from exclusion worries had better not look to proportionality for help. (shrink)

There is an ongoing discussion concerning personal vs. impersonal considerations in professional care. In this article, three different positions within the ethics of closeness will be discussed. These are: (a) reserving the ethics of closeness for close experienced others, ‘including the experienced Other’, which is Nortvedt's position; (b) trying to bring the distant, non‐experienced others closer, ‘including the Third’; and (c) finally, an examination of whether a perspective of closeness may lead to the exclusion of various groups in need of (...) help, ‘including the Other at the expense of the Third’. These positions are discussed with a view to clarifying some of the challenges that the ethics of closeness faces when it maintains that greater ethical obligation is associated with personal than with impersonal relations, without discussing the terms on which the obligation is based. Key questions that arise for a nurse or other health professional are: If our primary moral responsibility is for those that are close to us, the experienced others, who is to be responsible for those that are outside the established health services, the non‐experienced others? Is it evident that favouring the experienced others is based on legitimate needs? Can a discussion on the legitimate basis of nursing be avoided in questions relating to closeness and priorities? This discussion touches the heart of our discipline. Is a one‐sided perspective of closeness, rejecting moral responsibility for those with whom we have no relationship, a defensible ethical position? (shrink)

In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory (...) of causation such as Woodward's (2003) and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction. (shrink)

Some non-reductionists claim that so-called ‘exclusion arguments’ against their position rely on a notion of causal sufficiency that is particularly problematic. I argue that such concerns about the role of causal sufficiency in exclusion arguments are relatively superficial since exclusionists can address them by reformulating exclusion arguments in terms of physical sufficiency. The resulting exclusion arguments still face familiar problems, but these are not related to the choice between causal sufficiency and physical sufficiency. The upshot is that objections to the (...) notion of causal sufficiency can be answered in a straightforward fashion and that such objections therefore do not pose a serious threat to exclusion arguments. (shrink)

In my book, The Rights of Others, I developed a discourse-theoretic approach to questions of political membership in liberal democracies, which include practices of citizenship, as well as of immigration, refuge and asylum. This article revisits five issues in response to various criticisms. How can we justify democratic exclusions? Is there a `right to membership' and how can it be reconciled with the different practices of various constitutional democracies? Is there a distinction between normatively acceptable and normatively problematic restrictions on (...) political membership? Does the concept of `democratic iterations' describe normative or empirical processes? How plausible is the binarism of the national and the global? I argue that democratic exclusions can be justified by not discriminating against would-be citizens and immigrants on the basis of ascriptive criteria. Ascriptive characteristics, like one's sex and skin colour, are not the product of one's voluntary doings. Democratic iterations are empirical processes which can be judged in the light of normative criteria deriving from discourse theory. Furthermore, while the binarism of national and global is problematical, alternative configurations of political membership at the present are not more defensible. (shrink)

The non-reductive physicalist would like to believe that mental properties are not identical to physical properties; that there are complete causal explanations of all events in terms of physical properties; and that there are sometimes explanations of events in terms of mental properties. However, some have argued that these claims cannot all be true, since they are collectively inconsistent with a principle of causal exclusion. In this paper I argue that the best formulation of the interventionist theory of causation entails (...) the falsity of the exclusion principle. However, I argue that it does so at the cost of revealing a weakness in the interventionist theory itself. (shrink)

Jaegwon Kim’s (2005) most recent formulation of the so-called Supervenience Argument against Non-Reductive Physicalism is discussed. The two stages of Kim’s argument can be seen as instances of, what I will call, the Generalized Exclusion Argument.

A critical review essay, this work explains the methodological, material, and ideological reasons for why "diversity" initiatives in philosophy face an up-hill battle.

Este artículo resume el “Relevamiento y análisis sobre la aplicación del Código de Faltas en la Ciudad de Córdoba”59; investigación exploratoria realizada en la ciudad de Córdoba, entre cuyos principales objetivos se formuló el analizar cómo se aplican las figuras de Merodeo (Art. 98), Negativa u omisión de identificarse (Art. 79) y Posesión injustificada de llaves alteradas o ganzúas (Art. 97), del Código de Faltas de la Provincia de Córdoba, desde la perspectiva de jóvenes varones de entre 18 y 25 (...) años, residentes en barrios de diferentes niveles de ingresos. (shrink)

Does rational bargaining yield a social contract that is efficient and so inclusive? A core allocation, that is, an allocation that gives each coalition at least as much as it can get on its own, is efficient. However, some coalitional games lack a core allocation, so rationality does not require one in those games. Does rationality therefore permit exclusion from the social contract? I replace realization of a core allocation with another type of equilibrium achievable in every coalitional game. Fully (...) rational agents coordinate the pursuit of incentives so that equilibria of this type are efficient. They adopt a social contract that is efficient and inclusive. (shrink)

One of the great challenges in word learning is that words are typically uttered in a context with many potential referents. Children's tendency to associate novel words with novel referents, which is taken to reflect a mutual exclusivity (ME) bias, forms a useful disambiguation mechanism. We study semantic learning in pragmatic agents—combining the Rational Speech Act model with gradient‐based learning—and explore the conditions under which such agents show an ME bias. This approach provides a framework for investigating a pragmatic account (...) of the ME bias in humans but also for building artificial agents that display an ME bias. A series of analyses demonstrates striking parallels between our model and human word learning regarding several aspects relevant to the ME bias phenomenon: online inference, long‐term learning, and developmental effects. By testing different implementations, we find that two components, pragmatic online inference and incremental collection of evidence for one‐to‐one correspondences between words and referents, play an important role in modeling the developmental trajectory of the ME bias. Finally, we outline an extension of our model to a deep neural network architecture that can process more naturalistic visual and linguistic input. Until now, in contrast to children, deep neural networks have needed indirect access to (supposed to be novel) test inputs during training to display an ME bias. Our model is the first one to do so without using this manipulation. (shrink)

in their book American Philosophy: From Wounded Knee to the Present, contemporary philosophers Erin McKenna and Scott Pratt identify "living in a context of difference" as the central philosophical issue in the history of the United States. They credit W. E. B. Du Bois with having identified racial difference as one particular version of this general issue: "Du Bois once declared that the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line—the problem of the coexistence of differences (...) that figure in our existence as members of communities". For McKenna and Pratt, this continues to be the central philosophical problem in the United States, and perhaps globally, today: "From the... (shrink)

In Crowder’s reformulation of Berlin’s argument, not only does value pluralism provide support for liberalism, it actually suggests a version of liberalism that promotes the public use of personal autonomy. For Crowder, personal autonomy is a necessary element given value pluralism as it allows the individual to choose between a plurality of incommensurable options. In order to advance personal autonomy, Crowder advocates a robust account of freedom of exit coupled with a form of autonomy-facilitating education. To this effect Crowder posits (...) that it is acceptable to intervene in the lives of non-liberals in order to promote individual autonomy as a public ideal. However, I argue that despite the positive implications that a pro-autonomy account of liberalism may have for both the individual and the state, it will limit range of acceptable values within the liberal state and thus undermine certain aspects of value pluralism. (shrink)

In this brief note I claim that, contrary to what Esfeld argues in his paper in this same volume, Kim's position with respect to the problem of causal exclusion does indeed commit him to the causal heterogeneity of realized properties.

In this article, we frame men’s club football as an “extremely gendered” organization to explain the underrepresentation of women leaders within the industry. By analyzing women’s leadership work over a 30-year period, we find that women’s inclusion has been confined to a limited number of occupational areas. These areas are removed, in terms of influence and proximity, from the male players and the playing of football. These findings reveal a gendered substructure within club football that maintains masculine dominance in core (...) football leadership roles and relegates women to a position of peripheral inclusion in leadership roles. Through a discourse analysis of gender pay gap reports, we show that men’s football clubs legitimize women’s peripheral inclusion by naturalizing male dominance at the organizational core. These findings are significant because they demonstrate that men’s football clubs, as masculinity-conferring organizations, have excluded women from core roles to maintain their masculine character while superficially accepting women into roles that do not challenge the association of football with hegemonic masculinity. Therefore, organizational change may be possible only if women are granted greater access to core organizational roles. Here, we offer a new theoretical framework for “extremely gendered” organizations that can be applied to other sporting and male-dominated contexts to analyze women’s access to core leadership roles. (shrink)

The Causal Exclusion Problem is raised in many domains, including in the metaphysics of macroscopic objects. If there is a complete explanation of macroscopic effects in terms of the microscopic entities that compose macroscopic objects, then the efficacy of the macroscopic will be threatened with exclusion. I argue that we can avoid the problem if we accept that macroscopic objects are ontically vague. Then, it is indeterminate which collection of microscopic entities compose them, and so information about microscopic entities is (...) insufficient to provide a complete explanation of certain properties of macroscopic objects. After outlining this solution, I consider several objections. (shrink)

We give a derivation of exclusion principles for the elementary particles of the standard model, using simple mathematical principles arising from a set theory of identical particles. We apply the theory of permutation group actions, stating some theorems which are proven elsewhere, and interpreting the results as a heuristic derivation of Pauli's Exclusion Principle (PEP) which dictates the formation of elements in the periodic table and the stability of matter, and also a derivation of quark confinement. We arrive at these (...) properties by using a symmetry property of collections of the particles themselves as compared for example to the symmetry property of their wave function under interchange of two particles. (shrink)

This commentary offers a coherent reading of the papers presented in the special issue ‘Exclusion, Engagement, and Empathy: Reflections on Public Participation in Medicine and Technology’. Focusing on intellectual self-trust it adds a further perspective on the harmful epistemic consequences of social exclusion for individual agents in healthcare contexts. In addition to some clarifications regarding the concepts of ‘intellectual self-trust’ and ‘social exclusion’ the commentary also examines in what ways empathy, engagement and participatory sense-making could help to avoid threats to (...) intellectual self-trust that arise form being excluded from participation in communicative practices in the context of healthcare. (shrink)

In this article, I approach some phenomena seen predominantly on social-media sites that are grouped together as cancel culture with guidance from two major themes in Plato’s thought. In the first section, I argue that shame can play a constructive and valuable role in a person’s improvement, just as we see Socrates throughout Plato’s dialogues use shame to help his interlocutors improve. This insight can help us understand the value of shaming people online for, among other things, their morally reprehensible (...) views. In the second section, I argue that it is required for the proper functioning of democratic institutions that some views be excluded from the public sphere, which follows some Platonic ideas from the Laws. In neither case do I argue that this approach is good in an unqualified sense or even ultima facie good. However, I maintain that these important insights from Plato’s dialogues illuminate crucial aspects of how we should think about cancel culture. (shrink)

Supporters of open borders sometimes argue that the state has no pro tanto right to restrict immigration, because such a right would also entail a right to exclude existing citizens for whatever reasons justify excluding immigrants. These arguments can be defeated by suggesting that people have a right to stay put. I present a new form of the exclusion argument against closed borders which escapes this “right to stay put” reply. I do this by describing a kind of exclusion that (...) has not been discussed in depth, which I call “territorial exclusion.” Territorial exclusion is the process according to which the group that wishes to exclude current citizens secedes from the territory in which those citizens reside. I argue that the wrongness of territorial exclusion explains why there is no pro tanto right for a state to exclude immigrants, because otherwise there would be a pro tanto right for the state to kick people out by seceding from the territory they inhabit. Because kicking people out like this is typically wrong, borders cannot be closed. (shrink)

Causal overdetermination, the existence of more than one sufficient cause for an effect, is standardly regarded as unacceptable among philosophers of mental causation. Philosophers of mind, both proponents of causal exclusion arguments and defenders of non-reductive physicalism, seem generally displeased with the idea of mental causes merely overdetermining their already physically determined effects. However, as I point out below, overdetermination is widespread in the broadly physical domain. Many of these cases are due to what I call the preservation of causal (...) sufficiency. We need therefore to be precise about what unacceptable overdetermination amounts to in order to evaluate the prospects for a non-reductive account of mental causation. I argue that in order to have a good understanding of unacceptable overdetermination we should appeal to the notion of a minimal sufficient cause. In brief, a sufficient cause is minimal if it is sufficient to bring about the effect, but not more than sufficient. One way a cause could be more than sufficient for an effect is if its existence necessitates the existence of another (simultaneous) cause that is also sufficient for the same effect. In the second half of the paper I use this revised understanding of unacceptable causal overdetermination to show that the validity of the causal exclusion argument depends on strong readings of the principle of the causal self-sufficiency of physics. These strong readings can reasonably be questioned by a believer in non-reductive accounts of mental causation. This puts the burden of argument back on the causal exclusionist. (shrink)

In a morally non-ideal legal system, how can law bind its subjects? How can the fact of a norm’s legality make it the case that practical reason is bound by that norm? Moreover, in such circumstances, what is the extent and character of law’s bindingness? I defend here an answer to these questions. I present a non-ideal theory of legality’s ability to produce binding reasons for action. It is not a descriptive account of law and its claims, it is a (...) normative theory of legal reasoning for particular social circumstances. The approach is, somewhat like Raz’s influential account, instrumental in character. Yet, it denies that the morally binding legal norms are, in whole or part, exclusionary reasons for the responsible subject. Law’s instrumentality must be given an alternative characterization. (shrink)

Karen Bennett has recently articulated and defended a “compatibilist” solution to the causal exclusion problem. Bennett’s solution works by rejecting the exclusion principle on the grounds that even though physical realizers are distinct from the mental states or properties that they realize, they necessarily co-occur such that they fail to satisfy standard accounts of causal over-determination. This is the case, Bennett argues, because the causal background conditions for core realizers being sufficient causes of their effects are identical to the “surround” (...) conditions with which the core realizers are metaphysically sufficient the states or properties that they realize. Here we demonstrate that the background conditions for the causal sufficiency of core realizers for their effects are not identical to the core realizer’s surrounds, nor do backgrounds necessitate such surround conditions. If compatibilist solutions to exclusion can be defended, a different argument will be needed. (shrink)