Most countries have been struggling with the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic imposing social isolation on their citizens. However, this measure carried risks for people's mental health. This study evaluated the psychological repercussions of objective isolation in 1,006 Italians during the first, especially strict, lockdown in spring 2020. Although varying for the regional spread-rate of the contagion, results showed that the longer the isolation and the less adequate the physical space where people were isolated, the worse the mental health. Offline (...) social contacts buffered the association between social isolation and mental health. However, when offline contacts were limited, online contacts seemed crucial in protecting mental health. The findings inform about the potential downsides of the massive social isolation imposed by COVID-19 spread, highlighting possible risk factors and resources to account for implementing such isolation measures. Specifically, besides some known factors such as physical space availability, the local contagion rate is critical in moderating the link between social isolation and mental health issues, supporting national policies implementing regional tiers of restriction severity. (shrink)

Cantor’s theory of cardinal numbers offers a way to generalize arithmetic from finite sets to infinite sets using the notion of one-to-one association between two sets. As is well known, all countable infinite sets have the same ‘size’ in this account, namely that of the cardinality of the natural numbers. However, throughout the history of reflections on infinity another powerful intuition has played a major role: if a collectionAis properly included in a collectionBthen the ‘size’ ofAshould be less than the (...) ‘size’ ofB(part–whole principle). This second intuition was not developed mathematically in a satisfactory way until quite recently. In this article I begin by reviewing the contributions of some thinkers who argued in favor of the assignment of different sizes to infinite collections of natural numbers (Thabit ibn Qurra, Grosseteste, Maignan, Bolzano). Then, I review some recent mathematical developments that generalize the part–whole principle to infinite sets in a coherent fashion (Katz, Benci, Di Nasso, Forti). Finally, I show how these new developments are important for a proper evaluation of a number of positions in philosophy of mathematics which argue either for the inevitability of the Cantorian notion of infinite number (Gödel) or for the rational nature of the Cantorian generalization as opposed to that, based on the part–whole principle, envisaged by Bolzano (Kitcher). (shrink)

Suppose you’re certain that a claim—say, ‘Frida is tall’—does not have a determinate truth value. What attitude should you take towards it? This is the question of the cognitive role of indeterminacy. This paper presents a puzzle for theories of cognitive role. Many of these theories vindicate a seemingly plausible principle: if you are fully certain that A, you are rationally required to be fully certain that A is determinate. Call this principle ‘Certainty’. We show that Certainty, in combination with (...) some minimal side premises, entails a very implausible claim: whenever you’re certain that it’s indeterminate whether A, it is rationally required that you reject A. This is a surprising result, which requires abandoning at least some intuitive views about indeterminacy and cognitive role. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Christian List (2014) has argued for the compatibilism of free will and determinism. Drawing on a distinction between physical possibility (used in defining determinism) and agential possibility (used in defining free will), List constructs a formal two-level model in which the two concepts are consistent. This paper's first contribution is to show that though List's model is formally consistent, philosophically it falls short of establishing a satisfactory compatibilist position. Ensuingly, an analysis of the shortcomings of the (...) model leads to the identification of a controversial epistemological assumption implicit in the statements of both compatibilist and incompatibilist positions. Arguing that this assumption is not currently satisfied, the paper's second contribution is to show that neither the compatibilist nor the incompatibilist position is presently well-founded. (shrink)

The present article aims at providing some clarification on the Horkheimer-Neurath 1937 debate, so as to make three main claims: (a) around 1937 (even though perhaps neither in the early 1930s, at the time of his review of Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia, nor after the Second World War, at the time of Adorno’s disenchanted statement, “the whole is the false”), Horkheimer belonged to the Hegelian-Marxist tradition stemming from Lukács’s History and Class Conscioussness (1923); (b) notwithstanding Neurath’s semantic and epistemological holism, (...) his fallibilism, his rejection of Wertfreiheit in the social sciences, his commitment to socialism, there is still a gulf between his position and Horkheimer’s, for Neurath did not accept the main methodological claim made by the latter, namely, the Lukács-inspired view that what “constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought” is the Hegelian “point of view of totality”; (c) highlighting the main differences between Neurath’s and Lukács’s versions of Marxism – one concerning the very idea of dialectic, and the other concerning the epistemic privilege of the proletariat – can throw some light on and help understand better the distinctive features of Lukács’s Hegelianization of Marxism. (shrink)

Can we build endogenous expectations about the locus of occurrence of a target without being able to describe them? Participants performed cue–target detection tasks with different proportions of valid and invalid trials, without being informed of these proportions, and demonstrated typical endogenous effects. About half were subsequently able to correctly describe the cue–target relationships . However, even non-verbalizer participants showed endogenous orienting with peripheral cues , not depending solely on practice . Explicit instructions did not bring about dramatic advantages in (...) performance .With central symbolic cues, only verbalizers showed reliable endogenous effects . We concluded that endogenous orienting with peripheral cues can occur independently of participants developing explicit hypotheses about the cue–target relationships. (shrink)

In this article I describe and evaluate the debate that surrounds the proper interpretation of Tarski’s account of logical consequence given in his classic 1936 article ‘On the concept of logical consequence’. In the late 1980s Etchemendy argued that the familiar model theoretic account of logical consequence is not to be found in Tarski’s original article. Whereas the contemporary account of logical consequence is a variable‐domain conception – in that it calls for a reinterpretation of the domain of variation of (...) the quantifiers when evaluating logical consequence –, no such reinterpretation is found in Tarski’s original account, which was rather based on a ‘fixed‐domain’ conception. Etchemendy’s claims have sparked a debate on Tarski’s conception of logical consequence with important contributions by, among others, Bach, Bays, Corcoran, Gómez‐Torrente, Mancosu, Ray, Sagüillo, and Sher. (shrink)

Ever since the early decades of this century, there have emerged a number of competing schools of ecology that have attempted to weave the concepts underlying natural resource management and natural-historical traditions into a formal theoretical framework. It was widely believed that the discovery of the fundamental mechanisms underlying ecological phenomena would allow ecologists to articulate mathematically rigorous statements whose validity was not predicated on contingent factors. The formulation of such statements would elevate ecology to the standing of a rigorous (...) scientific discipline on a par with physics. However, there was no agreement as to the fundamental units of ecology. Systems ecologists sought to identify the fundamental organization that tied the physical and biological components of ecosystems into an irreducible unit: the ecosystem was their fundamental unit. Population ecologists sought, instead, to identify the biological mechanisms regulating the abundance and distribution of plant and animal species: to these ecologists, the individual organism was the fundamental unit of ecology, and the physical environment was nothing more than a stage upon which the play of individuals in perennial competition took place. As Joel Hagen has pointed out, the two schools were thus dividied by fundamentally different and irreconcilable assumptions about the nature of ecosystems.Notwithstanding these divisive efforts to elevate the image of ecology, the discipline remained in the shadows of American academia until the mid-1960s, when systems ecologists succeeded in projecting ecology onto the national scene. They did so by seeking closer involvement with practical problems: they argued before Congress that their approach to the theoretical problems of ecology was uniquely suited to the solution of the impending “environmental crisis.” With the establishment of the International Biological Program, they succeeded in attracting unprecedented levels of funding for systems ecology research. Theoretical population ecologists, on the other hand, found themselves consigned to the outer regions of this new institutional landscape. The systems ecologists' successful capture of the limelight and the purse brought the divisions between them and population ecologists into sharper relief — hence the hardening of the division of ecology observed by Hagen.45I have argued that the population biologist Richard Levins, prompted by these institutional developments, sought to challenge the social position of systems ecology, and to assert the intellectual priority of theoretical population ecology. He attempted to do so by articulating a nontrivial and rather carefully thought out classification of ecological models that led to the disqualification of systems analysis as a legitimate approach to the study of ecological phenomena. I have suggested that — ultimately —Levins's case against systems analysis in ecology rested on the view that an aspiration to realism and prediction was incompatible with an interest in theoretical issues, a concern that he equated with the search for generality. He sought to reinforce this argument by exploiting the fact that systems ecologists had staked their future on the provision of technical solutions to the problems of the “environmental crisis”: he associated systems ecologists' aspiration to realism and precision with a concern for practical issues, trading on the widely accepted view that practical imperatives are incompatible with the aims of scientific inquiry.46 These are plausible, but nonetheless questionable, claims which have now become an integral part of ecological knowledge. And finally, I hope to have shown how even the most abstract levels of scientific argument are shaped by political considerations, and how discussions of the conceptual development of modern ecology might benefit from a greater consideration of its historical and social dimensions.47. (shrink)

In the lively discussions on Galileo's laws of motion after the Pisan's death, we observe what might be called a new “Galilean affair.” That is, a trial brought against his new science of motion mainly by French and Italian Jesuits with the substantial adherence of M. Mersenne. This new trail was originated by Gassendi's presentation of Galileo's de motu not simply as a perfectly coherent doctrine, but also as a convincing argument in favor of the truth of Copernicanism.

In Umberto Eco's semiotics, the encyclopedia is a multidimensional space of semiosis. It is a complex system of shared knowledge that governs the production and interpretation of signs inside communicative contexts. Every semiotic act involves the elements that form the encyclopedia. By means of several examples and comparisons with different semiotic theories, my paper aims to show how semiosis is governed by semantic categorizations, pragmatic rules, and narrative frames that the encyclopedia articulates and makes operative for interpreters and producers of (...) signs. (shrink)

The late Emanuele Severino (1929–2020) was an Italian philosopher whose work on Aeschylus has not yet been made available in English. In Il giogo: alle origini della ragione: Eschilo (The Yoke: At the Origins of Reason: Aeschylus, 1989), Severino seeks to demonstrate that Aeschylus belongs amongst the founders of philosophy, i.e., that Aeschylus was the first to set down some of philosophy’s most fundamental principles, including that ontological becoming produces unbearable suffering and that the only remedy to suffering is knowledge (...) of the truth. Thus, by introducing readers to Severino’s interpretation, and by translating various passages of his work, this article aims to enlarge Severino’s readership and spread his argument for the philosophical stature of Aeschylus. (shrink)

We review several of de Finetti’s fundamental contributions where these have played and continue to play an important role in the development of imprecise probability research. Also, we discuss de Finetti’s few, but mostly critical remarks about the prospects for a theory of imprecise probabilities, given the limited development of imprecise probability theory as that was known to him.

In the lively discussions on Galileo's laws of motion after the Pisan's death, we observe what might be called a new “Galilean affair.” That is, a trial brought against his new science of motion mainly by French and Italian Jesuits with the substantial adherence of M. Mersenne. This new trail was originated by Gassendi's presentation of Galileo's de motu not simply as a perfectly coherent doctrine, but also as a convincing argument in favor of the truth of Copernicanism.

In this study some typical aspects of human behavior are reconsidered in a new evolutionary perspective. Firstly, a theoretical paradigm is introduced, according to which animals show a natural propensity to maintain behavior far beyond the time when the triggering motivation has been removed;, these drifting conducts are defined as Vestigial Drifting Drives or. Such a paradigm is then applied to those human attitudes that once conferred an adaptive advantage on our species but have now become dysfunctional within the framework (...) of the current ecological crisis. In this context, human beings are considered the repository of VDDs that may play out as evolutionary threats. This thesis is supported by many examples and references that, hopefully, could stimulate scientific debate and further research in evolutionary anthropology, psychology, and related disciplines. (shrink)

The two theories of pancreatic enzyme secretion, those of exocytosis and transmembrane flow, are described. Data thought to support the theory of transmembrane flow of single molecules from pancreatic acinar cells are first reviewed, and the conditions which could allow these data to be explained by the theory of exocytosis of enzyme quanta, i.e. secretory granules, are then discussed.The evidence suggesting short‐term modulation of the composition of pancreatic juice is also considered, and its possible explanations at the organ and cellular (...) level are discussed, in the light of suggested theories on enzyme secretion pathways. (shrink)

This paper aims to foster an interdisciplinary dialogue between Ricoeur’s phenomenological- hermeneutical thought and human geography, in particular with respect to the issue of landscape interpretation. The connection draws on the idea that landscapes and lived spaces can be read as texts, not unfamiliar to human geography and semiotics from 1980s onward. In the first part of the paper I will briefly expound some theories of landscape which make use of the metaphors “landscape as cultural image” and “landscape as text” (...) in human and cultural geography. Then, I will discuss the main contribution of Ricoeur to the issue of space. The philosopher already envisioned a possible application of his “threefold mimesis” of Time and Narrative to architectural spaces. In the conclusion, I will propose to rejuvenate the geographical metaphor of “landscape as text” by introducing a possible application of the Ricoeurian notion of “meaningful action as text” to landscape. (shrink)

This paper is the first of a series of three articles that present the syntactic proof of the PA-completeness of the modal system G, by introducing suitable proof-theoretic objects, which also have an independent interest. We start from the syntactic PA-completeness of modal system GL-LIN, previously obtained in [7], [8], and so we assume to be working on modal sequents S which are GL-LIN-theorems. If S is not a G-theorem we define here a notion of syntactic metric d(S, G): we (...) calculate a canonical characteristic fomula H of S (char(S)) so that ⊢G ∼ H → (∼S) and ⊢GL-LIN ∼ H, and the complexity σ of ∼ H gives the distance d(S, G) of S from G. Then, in order to produce the whole completeness proof as an induction on this d(S, G), we introduce the tree-interpretation of a modal sequent Q into PA, that sends the letters of Q into PA-formulas describing the properties of a GL-LIN-proof P of Q: It is also a d(*, G)-metric linked interpretation, since it will be applied to a proof-tree T of ∼ H with H = char(S) and σ(∼ H) = d(S, G). (shrink)

This article is both a comment on Neyland’s ‘On organizing algorithms’ and a supplementary note to our ‘The concept of algorithm as an interpretative key of modern rationality’. In the first part we discuss the concepts of algorithm and recursive function from a different perspective from that of our previous article. Our cultural reference for these concepts is once again computability theory. We give additional arguments in support of the idea that a culture informed by an algorithmic logic has promoted (...) modern rationality both in science and in society. We stress again the importance of distinguishing between algorithms applied to quantifiable entities such as space, time and value and those applied to ontological entities such as human actions. In the second case, the algorithm is applied outside its domain of definition and leads to social disaggregation. (shrink)

[ES] El artículo es una introducción a un nuevo enfoque para la filosofía de las matemáticas, conocido con el nombre de «la filosofía de la práctica matemática». El nuevo enfoque encontró su expresión en la colección La Filosofía de la Práctica Matemática editada por el autor. El artículo sitúa la «filosofía de la práctica matemática» dentro del contexto de otras tradiciones en la filosofía de las matemáticas y traza las similitudes y diferencias con estas tradiciones. [EN] The article is an (...) introduction to a new approach to the philosophy of mathematics that goes under the name of «the philosophy of mathematical practice». The new approach found its expression in the collection The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice edited by the author. The article situates the «philosophy of mathematical practice» within the context of other traditions in the philosophy of mathematics and outlines the similarities and differences with those traditions. (shrink)

If “no ought from is,” how can bioethics be empirical? Despite the widespread recognition that we can integrate empirical and normative, Hume's Law is still often claimed to pose logical limitations to empirical bioethics. Is Hume's Law a valid argument against empirical bioethics? I argue that we have reasons to answer no. First, I outline and reject two unverified assumptions: that Hume’ s Law, the fact‐value distinction, and the naturalistic fallacy are roughly the same thing, and that Hume's Law is (...) an undisputed meta‐ethical principle which dictates how to formulate normative statements. I then show how the interpretation of Hume's Law as establishing a logical gulf between facts and morality—rather than as clarifying the logical rules of normative argumentation—is dependent upon a non‐cognitivist interpretation of the Is‐Ought problem. I argue that the version of Hume's Law that stems from ethical non‐cognitivism is what is problematic for empirical bioethics. However, other interpretations are possible. We have two reasons to reject the thesis that Hume's Law is an argument against empirical bioethics. First, conflating meta‐ethics and applied ethics is problematic. Second, a non‐cognitivist interpretation of Hume's Law is likely to constitute an argument not only against empirical bioethics, but against all bioethics that claims to be situated within ethical cognitivism, be it empirical or philosophical. Lastly, I present two meta‐ethical postulates shared by empirical and philosophical bioethics. I call them: (1) the “bridge” postulate and (2) the “ethical cognitivism” postulate. (shrink)

We will discuss a mathematical proof found in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, a constructive version of Euler’s proof of the infinity of prime numbers. Although it does not amount to much, this proof allows us to see that Wittgenstein had at least some mathematical skills. At the very last, the proof shows that Wittgenstein was concerned with mathematical practice and it also gives further evidence in support of the claim that, after all, he held a constructivist stance, at least during the transitional (...) period of his thought (1929-33). (shrink)

The paper aims to describe the stakes of a Nietzschean influence on Deleuze's reflections on the transcendental and conversely to highlight the Deleuzian operation of politicising Nietzsche by ‘minorising’ him. In order to further understand such a complex relationship of becoming between Deleuze and Nietzsche, the first objective of the paper is to focus on active and reactive forces, which seem to be the core of this very relation. Thus, the paper suggests that micropolitics has its conditions of possibility in (...) the Nietzschean corpus and, in particular, in the symptomatology of decadence, resentment and nihilism. In this sense, now the title of the paper reveals its meaning: the whole Deleuzian operation could be summarised as the passage from the criticism and questioning of an image of Nietzsche ‘forbidden to minors’, typical of the interpretations of the first half of the twentieth century, to a becoming-minor of these very same Nietzschean concepts. It is precisely through such a becoming-minor that Nietzsche's diagnosis and concepts are translated in a political and emancipatory key, in order to give power to minorities. (shrink)