Foreign security and defense policy is an interdependent component of securitymanagement. According to the neo-classical definition of security management in thefield of external security-defense policy, it includes a series of practices, strategies andprinciples aimed at protecting assets, information and resources from various threatsand risks through the development of civil and military skills. From the perspective ofthe realist theory, the nature of the international structure is defined by its organizingprinciple, that is, the balance and distribution of power between states (...) and internationalinstitutions. Hence, the question arises as to what is the position and role of small statesin the international system in terms of security management, from where the main hypothesisof this paper derives, which highlights the need for appropriate management ofsecurity trends, both at the national level and in wider international context.Through the application of an inductive method of qualitative analysis of primaryand secondary sources, comparative presentation of combined data and identificationof causal influences, the role of the mechanisms that have the most potential to achievean optimal outcome in the positioning of small states with limited political influence anda low security share is highlighted. Thus, through the application of appropriate modelsfor the implementation of security management functions, small states create space forparticipation in security maneuvers. (shrink)

In his paper “The challenge of brain death for the sanctity of life ethic”, Peter Singer advocates two options for dealing with death criteria in a way that is compatible with efficient organ transplantation policy. He suggests that we should either redefine death as cortical death or go back to the old cardiopulmonary criterion and scrap the Dead Donor Rule. We welcome Singer’s line of argument but raise some concerns about the practicability of the two alternatives advocated by him. (...) We propose adding a third alternative that also – as the two previous alternatives – preserves and extends the possibility of organ transplantation without using anyone without their consent. Namely, we would like to draw readers’ attention to a proposal by Robert Veatch, formulated 42 years ago in his 1976 book “Death, dying, and the biological revolution” and developed further in his later publications. Veatch argues for a conscience clause for the definition of death that would permit people to pick from a reasonable range of definitional options. This autonomy-based option, we believe, is more likely to be practicable than the two options advocated by Singer. Furthermore, we present data from a study with Lithuanian participants that suggest that there is quite pronounced variation of preferences concerning death determination. (shrink)

The growing awareness that corporate and public policy forming processes are intensively utilitarian has provoked a variety of criticism. The procedural difficulties of utilitarianism are well known; less well known but potentially more devastating is a set of charges that utilitarian policy processes intrude upon important relationships and societal processes. This paper defends utilitarian methods against these charges.More specifically, two criticisms are singled out for examination. The first is the claim that utilitarian policy processes systematically discriminate against (...) the rights of non-human life and suppress any feelings of sympathy or obligation humans might have for animals or plants. The second is the argument that utilitarianism ultimately circumvents considerations of process which are essential for the development of individual and societal identity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Contrary to George Bishop's claim, collective deliberation and cue‐taking permit even poorly informed individuals to form opinions that can accurately reflect their values and interests in light of available information. Statistical aggregation of poll results can smooth out offsetting errors and uncertainties and reveal collective preferences that are real, stable, consistent, coherent, differentiated, and responsive to information: preferences that policy makers should pay attention to. Media polls tend to be more useful for this purpose than academic surveys that (...) encourage “don't know” responses and use information‐based filters that bias estimates of collective preferences against lower‐income citizens, minorities, and others who tend to be less well informed. Media polls frequently ask about specific policy issues relevant to policy makers. Even biased poll questions of certain kinds can provide useful information about collective policy preferences. (shrink)

Derk Pereboom disagrees with P.F. Strawson that abandoning the reactive attitudes associated with praise and blame would come at the price of exiting our personal relationships. According to Pereboom, we can contain or modify our attitudes in ways that preserve, and perhaps even enrich interpersonal relationships. In a recent article, Seth Shabo defends “the inseparability thesis” in order to undermine Pereboom’s containment policy. Drawing on David Goldman’s work on non-antagonistic responses to wrongdoing, we defend Pereboom from Shabo’s critique.

Steven Landsburg argues that from a legal perspective, “most abortions should be unrestricted.” This conclusion, he claims, follows from combining insights from Judith Jarvis Thomson (1971) with a “careful Rawlsian analysis,” where “Rawlsianism is the industry-standard approach” for settling conflicts like those that arise in debates over abortion policy. If correct, then “the right approach to policy questions” implies that abortion access should remain relatively open. Here, I argue that Landsburg has drawn from Rawlsian tools the wrong conclusion (...) about abortion. I defend what he terms “naive Rawlsian”: the view that as a matter of justice, “many abortions . . . should be prohibited.” If correct, then “the industry-standard approach” for settling conflicts (as Landsburg calls it) should lead society to prohibit abortion in most cases. Proponents of abortion who wish to avoid this outcome, therefore, should abandon the “industry standard” approach to conflict resolution. (shrink)

Luck egalitarianism assigns a central role to personal responsibility in egalitarian justice. In the context of healthcare, luck egalitarianism is the view that the distribution of medical and healthcare resources—or common resources in general—should respond to the (im)prudence of individuals. Recently, Joar Björk, Gert Helgesson, and Niklas Juth have argued that it is impractical to use luck egalitarianism as a normative framework in healthcare because it has no reasonable way of dealing with the imprudent. In response to their argument, this (...) paper first suggests that the epistemic problems of applying luck egalitarianism to the healthcare context raised by Björk et al. can be circumvented by using the exemption system as a policy application of luck egalitarian healthcare justice. This paper then shows that an _ex ante_ policy, a tax system with refunds, can reasonably be adopted as a luck egalitarian institutional design of healthcare policy. We argue that the proposed conception of luck egalitarianism can deal with the problem of differential option luck. Finally, we show that the threshold problem for the definition of imprudence does not refute the proposed _ex ante_ policy. (shrink)

European integration has increased to encompass security-related policies. One such policy is defense industry policy, which traditionally has been a national concern rooted in defense and security policy. Efforts have been made since the 1990s to create a European defense industry market. However, there have been different ideas of how this goal should be achieved or which model for state—industry relations the market should rest on. Using Sweden to illustrate the development, this article argues that for the (...) Europeanization of defense industry policy, marketization has played a vital role. Building on official documents and interviews, the article analyzes the efforts to create a European defense industry market, marketization of Swedish defense industry policy, and the increased interaction between Swedish and European defense industry policy processes. The analysis also shows domestic challenges that the processes of Europeanization and marketization have brought about. (shrink)

Current planetary defense policy prioritizes a probability assessment of risk of Earth impact by an asteroid or a comet in the planning of detection and mitigation strategies and in setting the levels of urgency and budgeting to operationalize them. The result has been a focus on asteroids of Tunguska size, which could destroy a city or a region, since this is the most likely sort of object we would need to defend against. However a complete risk assessment would consider (...) not only the probability of an impact but also the magnitude of its consequences, which in the case of an object of Chicxulub size could be the end of civilization or even human extinction. This paper argues that a planetary defense policy based on a complete (or one could say genuine) risk assessment would justify expenditures much higher than at present. (shrink)

It is now generally recognized that Earth is at risk of a devastating collision with an asteroid or a comet. Impressive strides in our understanding of this threat have been made in recent decades, and various efforts to deal with it have been undertaken. However, the pace of government action hasn’t kept up with the advance of our knowledge. Despite the daunting dimensions of planetary defense, one intrepid NGO has stepped up to the plate: The B612 Foundation has embarked on (...) a half-billion-dollar project, called Sentinel, to map the estimated one million near-Earth objects that could wipe out a city or even end civilization. This article offers an explanation of how it came to be that private citizens have assumed what is arguably government’s primary mandate to "provide for the common defence." It then examines some of the practical – or, if you will, ethical – risks that may be attendant on such a shift of responsibility. Finally, a new policy emphasis is proposed. (shrink)

A philosophical consideration of political affairs has the disadvantage of being incapable, in and of itself, of implying any specific practical action or policy. It would, then, seem useless except for the accompanying reflection that specific policy undertaken without any attention to principles, is mindless; and mindless action can have no expectation either of practical effect or of intellectual defense. No doubt the relation of principles to action is complex indeed; but at least it can be said that (...) practical principles without reference to possible action are vacuous, and action which can not be clarified by principle is aimless commotion. Principled action offers us then the best that can be hoped for. That, however, is the work not of philosophy but of statesmanship, a faculty which is as theoretically clear as it need be but also skilled by experience in reading the existing political scene. Accordingly my present remarks aim only at some principles involved in the understanding of war, focusing on those which seem conspicuously absent in contemporary discussion, and not at defending any specific judgments about the current war. Examples of incoherent principles will be drawn from present discussions; but any other war might have served equally well. No judgment about the present war can be derived from these remarks on principles; and if most of the false principles are quoted from the antiwar side, it is only because that side has been more vocal. (shrink)

If one of the lessons of the ubiquitous and highly problematic ticking bomb scenario is that torture may be justified under certain narrowly specified situations, why would we not want it made available as a weapon in the government’s anti-terrorist activities? This is not a new question. It has been hotly debated, and a number of arguments have been made against the idea of formulating the torture policy on the basis of the ticking-bomb hypothetical. The question that this Essay (...) addresses is related but narrower: if one starts from the proposition that the ticking bomb scenario demonstrates that a government official facing prosecution for torture may have available the necessity defense, what implications, if any, should the government be able to draw from the existence of the defense as it formulates its torture policy? This Essay discusses, and rejects, one common answer to this question—that the nature of the necessity defense is such that it can generate no forward-looking prescriptions. This Essay then advances a new argument on the basis of the nature and function of the necessity defense as not only spelling out morally permissible instances of harm infliction but also effecting a division of power between the state and citizens. (shrink)

The gun control debate is more complex than most disputants acknowledge. We are not tasked with answering a single question: should we have gun control? There are three distinct policy questions confronting us: who should we permit to have which guns, and how should we regulate the acquisition, storage, and carrying of guns people may legitimately own? To answer these questions we must decide whether (and which) people have a right to bear arms, what kind of right they have, (...) and how stringent it is. We must also evaluate divergent empirical claims about (a) the role of guns in causing harm, and (b) the degree to which private ownership of guns can protect innocent civilians from attacks by criminals, either in their homes or in public. This book sorts through the conceptual, moral, and empirical claims to fairly assess arguments for and against serious gun control. I argue that the US needs far more gun control than we currently have in most jurisdictions. (shrink)

The debate concerning prostitution is centered around two main views: the liberal view and the radical feminist view. The typical liberal view is associated with decriminalization and normalization of prostitution; radical feminism stands in favor of prohibition or abolition. Here, I argue that neither of the views is right. My argument does not depend on the plausible (or actual) side effects of prohibition, abolition, or normalization; rather, I am concerned with the ideals involved. I will concede to liberals their claim (...) that prostitution is not harmful in itself. Yet, I will argue that prostitution cannot be thought of as “just another job”. Even if prostitution is not harmful in itself, it can do much harm. I will argue that a policy of vigilance is the most adequate one to adopt with regard of prostitution, given the risk of harm associated with prostitution. A policy of vigilance tries to discriminate between those who take a certain course of action willingly and those who do not. It puts no restraints on those who exercise their genuine will, but protects those who are openly or subtly coerced. (shrink)

Many guidelines and commentators endorse the view that clinical research is ethically acceptable only when it has social value, in the sense of collecting data which might be used to improve health. A version of this social value requirement is included in the Declaration of Helsinki and the Nuremberg Code, and is codified in many national research regulations. At the same time, there have been no systematic analyses of why social value is an ethical requirement for clinical research. Recognizing this (...) gap in the literature, recent articles by Alan Wertheimer and David Resnik argue that the extant justifications for the social value requirement are unpersuasive. Both authors conclude, contrary to almost all current guidelines and regulations, that it can be acceptable across a broad range of cases to conduct clinical research which is known prospectively to have no social value. The present article assesses this conclusion by critically evaluating the ethical and policy considerations relevant to the claim that clinical research must have social value. This analysis supports the standard view that social value is an ethical requirement for the vast majority of clinical research studies and should be mandated by applicable guidelines and policies. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper, three objections to the precautionary principle are outlined: the principle requires some account of how to balance risks of significant harms; the principle focuses on action and ignores the costs of inaction; and the principle threatens epistemic anarchy. I argue that these objections may overlook two distinctive features of precautionary thought: a suspicion of the value of “full scientific certainty”; and a desire to distinguish environmental doings from allowings. In Section 2, I argue (...) that any simple distinction between environmental doings and allowings is untenable. However, I argue that the appeal of such a distinction can be captured within a relational account of environmental equity. In Section 3 I show how the proposed account of environmental justice can generate a justification for distinctively “precautionary” policy-making. (shrink)

"In this paper I shall attempt to sketch a defense of the plain man's view that the job of the judge, qua judge is to apply the law." What seems to have lead to the other view is the pervasive role of policy and principle in the justification of judicial decisions. This is no argument, however, for the existence of discretion: "For while it must be admitted that judges are entitled to appeal to certain general policies and principles, this (...) by no means implies that they are entitled to exercise discretionary judgment in the formulation of such standards." With Dworkin, distinguishes weak and strong discretion: the former means merely final or controversial; the latter implying that judges are at some point free to reach decisions not controlled by authoritative standards. Agrees with Dworkin that non-rule standards are part of law. "Both Dworkin and I are in agreement that law is a system of entitlements, although, as we shall see, we differ as to what is their basis." "At any rate, we share the view that a litigant before a court of law is not in the position of one begging a favor from a potential benefactor, but rather in that of one demanding a particular decision as a matter of right, as something to which the law entitles him. Such a demand has two aspects: a claim that a right exists which the law recognizes; a claim that this right takes precedence over any competing legal rights or obligations involved. Let us refer to these two sorts of claims respectively as ones involving decisions as to recognition, and weight.:" Argues that we cannot distinguish between legal moral principles and non-legal moral principles without a rule of recognition. The same is true for the problem of establishing weight between various principles - here we have to consider how well a principle coheres with the institutional practice of a legal system. "[I]t is the distinctive feature of the institutionalized role of the judiciary, in contrast to the legislative, that it may not directly base decisions on substantive considerations of the value of competing social policies." "The theoretical possibility of the law being indeterminate with regard to what it requires...does not imply any correspondign indeterminacy with regard to what is required of the judge.". (shrink)

Philosophers from Plato and Augustine to Heidegger, Nozick, and Baudrillard have warned us of the dangers of living on too heavy a diet of illusion and make-believe. But contemporary cultural life provides broader, more attractive opportunities to do so than have existed at any other point in history. The gentle forms of self-deceit that such experiences require of us, and that so many have regarded as ethically unwholesome or psychologically self-destructive, can in fact serve as vital means to political reconciliation, (...) cultural enrichment, and even (a kind of) utopia. -/- The first half of the book provides a highly schematic definition of simulated experience and compares it with some claims about the nature of simulation made by other philosophers about what it is for one thing to be a simulation of another. The author then provides a critical survey of the views of some major authors about the value of certain specific types of simulated experience, mainly in order to point out the many puzzling inconsistencies and ambiguities that their thoughts upon the topic often exhibit. In the second half of the book, the author defends an account of the positive social value of simulated experience and compares his own position to the ideas of a number of utopian political thinkers, as well as to Plato's famous doctrine of the "noble lie." He then makes some tentative practical suggestions about how a proper appreciation of the value of simulated experience might influence public policy decisions about such matters as the justification of taxation, paternalistic "choice management," and governmental transparency. (shrink)

Defense of Scientific Hypothesis: From Reproducibility Crisis to Big Data sets out to explain and defend the scientific hypothesis. Alger's mission is to counteract the misinformation and misunderstanding about the hypothesis that even seasoned scientists have concerning its nature and place in modern science. Most biological scientists receive little or no formal training in scientific thinking. Further, the hypothesis is under attack by critics who claim that it is irrelevant to science. In order to appreciate and evaluate scientific controversies like (...) global climate change, vaccine safety, etc., the public first needs to understand the hypothesis. Defense of Scientific Hypothesis begins by describing and analyzing the scientific hypothesis in depth and examining its relationships to various kinds of science. Alger then guides readers through a review of the hypothesis in the context of the Reproducibility Crisis and presents survey data on how scientists perceive and employ hypotheses. He assesses cognitive factors that influence our ability to use the hypothesis and makes practical and policy recommendations for teaching and learning about it. Finally, Alger considers two possible futures of the hypothesis in science as the Big Data revolution looms: in one scenario, the hypothesis is displaced by the Big Data Mindset that forgoes understanding in favor of correlation and prediction. In the other, robotic science incorporates the hypotheses into mechanized laboratories guided by artificial intelligence. But in his illuminating epilogue, Alger envisions a third way, the Centaur Scientist, a symbiotic relationship between human scientists and computers. (shrink)

De Vries and Müller-Salo begin with an interpretation of my view on the need for adequate secular reasons in supporting coercion in politics—specifically, in law-making and establishing public policies. Most laws and public policies are coercive. A public policy, for instance, may be established by a governmental or quasi-governmental institution such as a public university, and it may be enforced using sanctions that include fines and possible imprisonment. Even temporary policies established by agencies of government as opposed to legislative (...) bodies may have the authority to impose serious penalties for non-compliance. Müller-Salo and De Vries consider various problems my approach raises and conclude by offering a principle weaker than my principle of secular rationale but aimed at making a similar contribution to formulating an ethics of citizenship—a set of standards applicable both to individual citizens and to government officials. (shrink)

I develop and argue for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of non-doxastic attitudes that I call policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. My defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argument and an indirect linguistic argument, an inference to (...) the best explanation of some strange ways we use certain conditionals. The main thought throughout is that attitudes we reason with, like belief, are very different from attitudes we don't reason with, in a way that constrains the former but not the latter. Finally, I investigate some consequences of policy externalism, including that it secures the possibility of genuine conditional apologies. (shrink)

A large and impressive literature has arisen over the past fifteen years concerning the emergence, transfer, and sustenance of political norms in international life. The presumption of this literature has been, for the most part, that the winds of normative change blow in a progressive direction, toward greater or more stringent normative control of individual or state behavior. Constructivist accounts detail a spiral of mutual normative reinforcement as actors and institutions discover the advantages of normative self- and other evaluation. There (...) is also now much interesting research focused on the question of how to predict the emergence of future norms.I focus, however, on a different issue here: the death of norms that had once seemed well internalized and institutionalized. The issue arises in relation to one of the most dramatic features in the defense policy of the United States since 2001: the crumbling of highly restrictive normative regimes prohibiting interrogatory torture and assassination as part of the “global war on terror.” My aim here is to sketch what I take to be the central features of cases in which even norms that are clearly defined and apparently well internalized in a democracy nonetheless lose their grip on policy. The ultimate lesson, however, is an unappealing irony: While democracies surely do better than authoritarian regimes in adopting and internalizing certain kinds of constraints, in part because of a greater sensitivity to public mobilization around normative questions, that same sensitivity makes the long-term survival of these norms precarious. In particular, I suggest that force-constraining norms are most effectively internalized by coherent and relatively insulated professional cadres who see themselves as needing to act consistently over time. But in a democracy the values and arguments of those cadres are susceptible to being undermined by a combination of public panic and the invocation by policymakers of a public interest that can override the claims both of law and pragmatic restraint. Democracy, hence, can be at the same time both fertile and toxic: fertile as a source of humanitarian values and institutions, but toxic to the very institutions it cultivates.The model I will describe may be of predictive use in helping us to see the special vulnerability of normative orders in democracies. But my hope is that it is also constructive in showing us how states and institutions committed to maintaining a certain normative order, especially democratic states, might best try to entrench those norms. While my argument is conceptual and philosophical, it draws on this recent history. I also add two qualifications to this article's title. First, I am not addressingallnorms, but specific norms concerning the state use of force in national security policy. I therefore do not make claims about the generalizability of the conflict I describe to other norms, for example, norms of racial, sexual, or religious orthodoxy or hierarchy, or norms of reciprocal interaction. Second, reports of a norm's death are frequently exaggerated, since norms can be latent, then resurrected. Arguably, the anti-torture norm was resuscitated by President Obama in 2009 when, as one of his first official acts as chief executive, he moved to prohibit cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of detainees. I write here about the path of decay, whether or not that path is unidirectional, and why previously salient norms no longer seem to govern policy choice among political decision-makers. (shrink)

Mill advocated an unqualified defense of the liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, which he understood to include not just the freedom to hold but also to express any opinion or sentiment. Yet considerable dispute persists about the nature of Mill’s argument for freedom of expression and whether his premises can support so strong a conclusion. Two prominent interpretations of Mill that threaten to undermine his uncompromising defense of free speech are considered and refuted. A better interpretation can (...) be founded on Mill’s claim that the liberties of conscience are inseparable in practice. This claim can be defended with modern psychological insight about the nature of cognitive bias, and epistemological insight about why justification of creedal beliefs requires the universal toleration of opinion, insights which are largely anticipated by Mill. This argument is especially vital because it highlights the divide between classical liberalism and progressivism that has become a flashpoint in the current political debate over free speech. (shrink)

Some say that public policy can be made without the benefit of theory--that it emerges, instead, through trial-and-error. Others see genuine philosophical issues in public affairs but try to resolve them through fanciful examples. Both, argues Robert E. Goodin, are wrong. Goodin--a political scientist who is also an associate editor of Ethics--shows that empirical and ethical theory can and should guide policy. To be useful, however, these philosophical discussions of public affairs must draw upon actual policy experiences (...) rather than contrived cases. Further, they must reflect the broader social consequences of policies rather than just the dilemmas of personal conscience. Effectively integrating the literatures of social science, policy science, and philosophy, Goodin provides a theoretically sophisticated yet empirically well-grounded analysis of public policies, the principles underlying them, the institutions shaping them, and the excuses offered for their failures. This analysis is enhanced by the author's discussion of such specific cases as the disposal of nuclear wastes and the priority accorded national defense--cases that illustrate Goodin's theoretical and methodological framework for approaching policy issues. (shrink)

This paper critically discusses Amartya Sen’s case for broadening the basket of wellbeing indicators in development policy beyond income and consumption expenditure. I first argue that, contrary to what Sen has suggested, the theoretical and practical motivations that he gives for this do not form a mutually complementary set. In the second, policy-focused, part of the paper I present problems Sen’s approach to measurement raises in the context of a case study from rural South Africa. I conclude by (...) suggesting that development indicators should be regarded as narrower – in particular, that we should give privileged attention to women’s incomes – rather than broader. Keywords: development policy; well-being proxies; welfare; Amartya Sen Word count: 11,315.. (shrink)

The malicious acts of terrorism in New York and Washington emphasized the need for states to combat terrorism. Likewise, Israel has suffered various terrorist attacks since its establishment. There are distinctive features in contemporary terrorism which call for a new assessment of its nature and the status of terrorists in domestic and international law. In October 2000, a violent conflict erupted between organizations operating within the territory of the Palestinian Authority--an entity that is not a state but is a sovereign (...) authority--and the State of Israel. This is a new type of armed conflict, one different from that treated in the international law of armed conflicts. No clear view exists as to the rules which should be applied in such a situation. This is one of the questions that shall be raised in this article. As a result of the violence against Israel, Israel initiated a policy which the media has called 'Israel's elimination policy', but which I believe may be more appropriately described as 'preventive action' taken by Israel within the framework of a military policy aimed at neutralizing terrorist organizations by targeting the perpetrators or their commanders. In this article I shall examine whether this policy is legitimate as a matter of law and morality. (shrink)

The development of new technologies that enable autonomous weapon systems poses a challenge to policymakers and technologists trying to balance military requirements with international obligations and ethical norms. Some have called for new international agreements to restrict or ban lethal autonomous weapon systems. Given the tactical and strategic value of the technologies and the proliferation of threats, the military continues to explore the development of new autonomous technologies to execute national security missions. The rapid global diffusion and dual-use nature of (...) autonomous systems necessitate a proactive approach and a shared understanding of the technical realities, threats, military relevance, and strategic implications of these technologies from these communities. Ultimately, developing AI-enabled defense systems that adhere to global norms and relevant treaty obligations, leverage emerging technologies, and provide operational advantages is possible. The development of a workable and realistic regulatory framework governing the use of lethal autonomous weapons and the artificial intelligence that underpins autonomy will be best supported through a coordinated effort of the regulatory community, technologists, and military to create requirements that reflect the global proliferation and rapidly evolving threat of autonomous weapon systems. This essay seeks to demonstrate that: (1) the lack of coherent dialogue between the technical and policy communities can create security, ethical, and legal dilemmas; and (2) bridging the military, technical, and policy communities can lead to technology with constraints that balance the needs of military, technical, and policy communities. It uses case studies to show why mechanisms are needed to enable early and continuous engagement across the technical, policymaking, and operational communities. The essay then uses twelve interviews with AI and autonomy experts, which provide insight into what the technical and policymaking communities consider fundamental to the progression of responsible autonomous development. It also recommends practical steps for connecting the relevant stakeholders. The goal is to provide the Department of Defense with concrete steps for building organizational structures or processes that create incentives for engagement across communities. (shrink)

This is an attempt to rehabilitate W. K. Clifford’s long-rejected position that “it is [morally] wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence.” I supplement Clifford’s own argument with two others. They are all valid. I argue for the truth of their premises. The premises in the arguments I use to supplement Clifford’s own are that we cannot believe purely at will; that we must choose among Cliffordianism, some other rule, and doxastic amoralism; that all other (...) rules are self-subverting in that they can be used effectively at most once; and that a policy of doxastic amoralism has worse results overall than adherence to Cliffordianism. The upshot is that Cliffordianism is an irreducible analogue of rule utilitarianism. I look at some objections to Cliffordianism. I argue that none has merit. I point out that Cliffordianism provides something of a justification for legal freedom of conscience. (shrink)

Several writers have recently developed proposals calling for a public policy that would allow a number of individuals to commit suicide if they so choose. Suicide, it is argued, is a fundamental matter of personal liberty and as such only very minimal restrictions should be placed on it. In this essay I offer a critique of these views and the public policies they entail. The result is a defense of the general outlines of current professional and legal policies which (...) permit intervention, even coercive intervention, with suicidal persons in almost every case. (shrink)

This book presents 12 essays that focus on the analysis of the problems prompted by cyber operations. It clarifies and discusses the ethical and regulatory problems raised by the deployment of cyber capabilities by a state’s army to inflict disruption or damage to an adversary’s targets in or through cyberspace. Written by world-leading philosophers, ethicists, policy-makers, and law and military experts, the essays cover such topics as the conceptual novelty of COs and the ethical problems that this engenders; the (...) applicability of existing conceptual and regulatory frameworks to COs deployed in case of conflicts; the definition of deterrence strategies involving COs; and the analysis of models to foster cooperation in managing cyber crises. Each essay is an invited contribution or a revised version of a paper originally presented at the workshop on Ethics and Policies for Cyber Warfare, organized by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in collaboration with the University of Oxford. The volume endorses a multi-disciplinary approach, as such it offers a comprehensive overview of the ethical, legal, and policy problems posed by COs and of the different approaches and methods that can be used to solve them. It will appeal to a wide readership, including ethicists, philosophers, military experts, strategy planners, and law- and policy-makers. (shrink)

Liberal societies typically prefer relatives and spouses of their members over other prospective immigrants seeking admission. Giving this preferential treatment to only certain categories of relationships requires justification. In this paper, I provide a defense of a category-based system for “unification admissions,” non-members seeking admission for the purpose of living in the same society with members on a stable basis, that is compatible with liberalism and, in particular, does not violate the requirement of liberal neutrality. This defense does not commit (...) liberal theorists to the traditional state sovereignty view on immigration, according to which societies have wide latitude to exclude immigrants as they see fit, and shows that, contra Ferracioli, societies are not required to treat relatives, spouses, friends, and creative partners of their members on a par in matters of immigration policy. (shrink)

Scientific realists and antirealists believe that a successful scientific theory is true and merely empirically adequate, respectively. In contrast, epistemic reciprocalists believe that realists’ positive theories are true, and that antirealists’ positive theories are merely empirically adequate, treating their target agents as their target agents treat other epistemic agents. Antirealists cannot convince reciprocalists that their positive theories are true, no matter how confident they might be that they are true. In addition, reciprocalists criticize antirealists’ positive theories exactly in the way (...) that antirealists criticize their epistemic colleagues’ theories. Reciprocalism is a better epistemic policy than realism and antirealism in the epistemic battleground in which we strive to be epistemically safe vis-à-vis our epistemic colleagues’ theories and strive to convince our epistemic colleagues that our theories are true. (shrink)

In a recent response to our paper on developing a philosophical framework to guide the design and delivery of a just health service, Sarela raises several objections. We feel that although Sarela makes points which are worthy of discussion, his critique does not undermine either the need for, or the worth of, our proposed model. First, the law does not negate the need for ethics in determining just healthcare policy. Reliance on legal processes can drive inappropriate focus on ensuring (...) policies avoid judicial review, as opposed to ensuring they are truly just; the law affords protection against unjust policies but does not put a commitment to avoiding them at the heart of policy-making. We defend the need for Scanlonian supplementation by emphasising the practical value of adding a step based on reasonable rejection, particularly in ensuring that the views of vulnerable stakeholders are robustly considered. We discuss the similarities and differences between the work of Daniels and Sen in considering the relationship between health and opportunity, concluding that Sen’s capability approach is both valuable and compatible with our proposed model. Finally, the practical use of our model requires consideration of what constitutes a reasonable person. Our model is explicitly intended to help develop a healthcare system which is just to all its users. With this in mind, we suggest that those involved in decision-making should meet Scanlon’s definition of reasonable: they should be motivated to justify their actions to, and seek agreement with, others. (shrink)

Lightweight rowing – the most commonly used term for the weight category in rowing’s often bifurcated categorisation system – is under credible threat of being eliminated at virtually all levels of rowing in Canada and the U.S. The health concerns associated with weight loss reflect the most problematic aspects of lightweight rowing, where the acceptable limits of harm that one must tolerated in sport is brought into question. Also, such category protection seems arguably unnecessary, especially for lightweights who are nearly (...) as competitive as their openweight counterparts. This prompts reflection on the purpose and policies behind these categories. The justification for weight categories is scant or has simply been assumed as legitimate within the status quo. In the absence of any constructive debate on the topic, I will attempt to articulate the neglected rationale for why lightweight rowing ought to exist despite its apparent problems. In doing so, suggestions for further rules and policy improvements to lightweight rowing will be identified. (shrink)

Since World War I, the United States has pursued the defense of Western civilization as a critical element of its own national interest. In his provocative reconsideration of that goal, Robert Strausz-Hupe asks whether the American people can still agree upon and adopt foreign policies consistently devoted to that end. He specifically examines popular and paradoxical attitudes that often undermine Washington's ability to defend American and Western interests, attitudes towards society and the state, politics and government, instruments of foreign (...) class='Hi'>policy and the people who wield them. As the backdrop for his analysis, Strausz-Hupe employs the wisdom of Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, reiterating Tocqueville's finding that the driving force of American life is its passion for equality and democracy. To this insight, Strausz-Hupe adds another: When one realizes that domestic politics is the driving force behind foreign policy, one understands why "the foreign policy of the United States cannot be other than the defense of democracy everywhere." Unlike some analysts, however, Strausz-Hupe believes that this proposition states only the problem for American statesmen not the answer. The answer, Strausz-Hupe concludes, lies in a universal federation of democratic states. In an appreciative foreword that examines the evolution of Strausz-Hupe thought, Walter A. McDougall demonstrates that this idealistic vision of a democratic world-state has been the unifying thread in Strausz-Hupe's intellectual career, not the calculating Realpolitik so often attributed to him. Democracy and American Foreign Policy will be of central importance to international relations specialists, policymakers, political scientists, and students of political philosophy. Its chapters include "Tocqueville and Nationalism"; "Tocqueville and Marx"; "The Hypocrisies of Egalitarianism"; "Foreign Policy and Interest Groups"; and "Isolationism and the New World Order.". (shrink)