The publication in 1807 of Georg Wilhelm Frederich Hegel's Phanomenologie des Geistes (translated alternately as "Phenomenology of Mind" or "Phenomenology of Spirit") marked the beginning of the modern era in philosophy. Hegel's remarkable insights formed the basis for what eventually became the Existentialist movement. Yet the Phenomenology remains one of the most difficult and forbidding works in the canon of philosophical literature.

A close reading of the final chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology, with special attention to dialectical method, to the relation of ch.s 6c on Objective Spirit and 7c on Revealed Religion to ch. 8 on Absolute Spirit, and to the relations of the absolute standpoint to time and to history.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 2 Seiten: 175-194.

In the contemporary world all kinds of culture, thought modes, philosophies and religions are complicatedly active. Social conditions of our contemporary world wear a nihilistic look which Nietzsche prophesied as a fact, 200 years after his time. In this nihilistic ambience, the whole world seems to be overrun by various crimes neglecting morality and ethics. In such a world we are urged to consider how morals and ethics can be realized. In this meaning the „bounds of ethics‟ are considered in (...) regard to the paradigms of different historical epochs as the framework and basis of life, culture and thinking. One of these paradigms, common to East and West, is the one based on being and nothingness: relative being, relative nothingness, absolute being, nihil, and absolute nothingness, which last-mentioned paradigm subsumes the other four. In essence, this paper will discuss how morality and ethics in the paradigm of absolute nothingness can finally act in oneness with religion and overcome nihilism in the contemporary world, even if it acts very slowly. (shrink)

Ordinary skepticism is based upon some form of certainty. One may be skeptical about the claims of religion because one accepts the certainties of science or some philosophical argument. One may be skeptical about a certain investment strategy because one believes in various proven economic principles. Absoluteskepticism, on the other hand, has no such certainty upon which to rely. Every standpoint, including absolute skepticism itself, is open to doubt. Thus absolute skepticism is not another philosophical position but (...) raises severe doubt about all philosophy and all knowledge. In this paper I will explore some of the implications of absolute skepticism and how Lao Zi and Jiddu Krishnamurti (1895-1986) may serve as possible representatives of absolute skepticism. (shrink)

This paper examines Wittgenstein's conception of absolute safety in the light of two potential problems exposed by Winch. These are that, firstly: even if someone's life has been virtuous so far, the contingency of its remaining so until death vitiates the claim that the virtuous person cannot be harmed; and secondly: when voiced from a first-person standpoint, the claim to be absolutely safe due to one's virtuousness appears hubristic and self-undermining. I argue that Wittgenstein's mystical conception of safety, (...) unlike some others, requires no claim about one's own virtue and hence can be construed as avoiding these problems. (shrink)

Nishida Kitarō1, the founder of the Kyoto school of philosophy, often stated that his philosophy of Absolute Nothingness, which had in part been inspired by Zen Buddhism, was not a kind of mysticism. In his last unfinished essay, Watakushi no ronri ni tsuite he complained that his logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity had not been understood by the academic world, and its meaning had been distorted. Nishida decided that the only way of clarifying his philosophical standpoint was to (...) redefine the concepts of 'mind' and 'logic' by showing the relation of the philosophy of Absolute Nothingness to the... (shrink)

This chapter discusses the issue of standpoint in sociological discourse as well as in the dynamics of social life. It begins with a discussion of the work of André Béteille, creative social theorist from India, about the plurality of standpoints in the sociological discourse of society as well as in social dynamics. Béteille has consistently been a champion of a plural approach in the study of society, but his discussion of plural standpoints raises further questions which call for further (...) collaborative search and reflections. For example, what is the nature of standpoint in these plurality of standpoints—is it partial or absolute? Do these different standpoints communicate among each other? Is it a responsibility for sociology to understand and contribute to communication among plural standpoints? The present author thinks the same as Béteille on these questions and discusses further the challenge of pluralization that emanates from Béteille’s reference to plurality of standpoints. The issue of the relationship between sociology and theology as between sociology and ideology is discussed. This is followed by a discussion of the issue of empirical and normative aspects of social reality, and the author argues that sociology needs to go beyond the dualism of the empirical and normative in order to understand the normative strivings and struggles at work in the very heart of social reality itself. (shrink)

According to its quietist readings, skepticism can be dissolved by demonstrating that the notion of ‘absolute objectivity’ is confused. The dissolution of this confusion is supposed to lead us to acquiesce in our finite and plain everyday life without being bothered anymore about the supposed need for objective knowledge. In contrast, I want to propose a transformative reading of skepticism according to which the philosophical practice of skepticism can be ‘epistemically transformative’. To this end, I will transpose L.A. Paul's (...) notion of ‘epistemically transformative experience’ from decision theory to the realm of philosophical practice and argue that the modern skeptical problem of an external standpoint can evoke transformative experiences that lead to a new, albeit non-propositional, insight into the finitude of the human condition. (shrink)

Moral relativism is deeply troubling for those who believe that, without a set of moral absolutes, democratic societies will devolve into tyranny or totalitarianism. Engaging directly with this claim, Carlo Invernizzi Accetti traces the roots of contemporary anti-relativist fears to the antimodern rhetoric of the Catholic Church, and then rescues a form of philosophical relativism for modern, pluralist societies, arguing that this standpoint provides the firmest foundation for an allegiance to democracy. In its dual analysis of the relationship between (...) religion and politics and the implications of philosophical relativism for democratic theory, this book makes a far-ranging contribution to contemporary debates over the revival of religion in politics and the conceptual grounds for a commitment to democracy. It conducts the first comprehensive genealogy of anti-relativist discourse and reclaims for English-speaking readers the overlooked work of political theorists such as Hans Kelsen and Norberto Bobbio, who had articulated the bond between philosophical relativism and democracy. By engaging with attempts to replace the religious foundation of democratic values with a neo-Kantian conception of reason, this book also offers a powerful case for relativism as the strongest basis for a civic ethos that integrates different perspectives into democratic politics. (shrink)

This paper means to demonstrate the theoretical-and- methodological potential of a particular pattern of thought about culture. Employing an end-means and absolute value plus concept of reality approach, the continuous model of culture aims to embrace from one holistic standpoint various concepts and debates of the modern human, social, and political sciences. The paper revisits the debates of fact versus value, nature versus culture, culture versus structure, agency versus structure, and economics versus politics and offers the concepts of (...) the rule of law, state capitalism, a dialectical model of progress, and interpretative qualitative research, as well as of cultural diffusion, autonomy, alienation, and individuality. This model distinguishes between the ideal-symbolical and the instrumental functions of culture, sees culture as being sewn from universal binaries, and provides a certain understanding of the cognitive function of a value judgment, with positivism so far vague about the topic. It, too, suggests an extra method for investigating culture : the comparative literature study of culture enables social science to view literature as its potential in-depth interviewee— a case for arguing for a certain conception of interdisciplinarity as well. In addition, it predicts that cultural particularism or individuality remains an essential factor of human existence. Analyzing the issue of Eurocentrism in social science, the model finds modernity ’s concept of reality to be involved in ” methodological ” intellectualistic reductionism, characterizing it since the empiricism/ rationalism origination. Systematically confusing the universal oppositions in a Eurocentric manner, intellectualism becomes a contributing factor in unfolding post- modernity. (shrink)

This book examines Hegel's presentation of the absolute as knowing and as spirit. McRae construes this absolute both metaphysically, as a self-sufficient existent, the conceptual articulation of which explains the essence and existence of reality, and as truth-oriented, as the conceptual integration of thought and being. He is not, however, aware of the distinction between these construals. He contends that Hegel fails to show that the theoretically inquisitive reader should accept the standpoint of the absolute, because (...) it is presented as self-explanatory in a way alien to what would serve as an explanation for the reader. But he also contends that Hegel's presentation should be accepted both as explaining reality for his time and culture, and as the basis for understanding our own. The reason to distinguish construals, I think, is that it is the absolute's metaphysical status which for McRae seems to make its articulation in purely systematic terms inaccessible to the reader, and it is the truth-oriented absolute which seems to ground his claim that the reader should seek to know it. (shrink)

In this article I deal with time as a notion of epistemological content associated though with the notion of a subjective consciousness co-constitutive of physical reality. In this phenomenologically grounded approach I attempt to establish a ‘metaphysical’ aspect of time, within a strictly pistemological context, in the sense of an underlying absolute subjectivity which is non-objectifiable within objective temporality and thus non-susceptible of any ontological designation. My arguments stem, on the one hand, from a version of quantum-mechanical theory in (...) view of its formal treatment of two different aspects of time within a quantum context. The discrete, partial-ordering properties and the dynamical-parameter properties reflected in the wave equations of motion. On the other hand, to strengthen my arguments for a transcendental factor of temporality, I attempt an interpretation of some relevant conclusions in the work of J. Eccles and of certain results of experimental research of S. Deahaene et al. and others. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant criticizes his predecessors, specifically Locke and Leibniz, in their one-sided reductions of representation to a single faculty. In his 1802 dialogue Bruno, Schelling develops this discussion into a criticism of Kant’s own one-sided idealism. Focusing on these developments makes clear the manner in which Schelling sees himself as advancing beyond both pre-Critical realisms and Kant’s transcendental idealism. He subsumes realism and Kantian idealism within his own absolute standpoint, providing a ground and (...) rationale for both types of philosophical system as independent approaches, and he asserts that the ultimate foundation and unity of these systems of philosophy is in the absolute which is beyond conceptual thought. (shrink)

A well-documented defense of the thesis that St. Augustine held the city of man, especially Rome, to contain many relative goods, however evil it was from the absolute standpoint of goodness consisting in the worship of the true God. O'Meara discusses in some detail many contemporary critics, e.g., Ernest Barker, who oppose this interpretation, and argues on the basis of historical circumstance and Augustine's own declarations in works other than the City of God.--R. C. N.

For Hegel, the philosophy of world history marks the culmination of the philosophy of right and introduces the philosophy of absolute spirit. As the juncture between time and eternity, it raises the critical question about his project. Either history is taken seriously and time condemns all achievements, whether political, aesthetic, religious or philosophical, to the finitude of contingency. Or the absolute standpoint, once attained, cuts the flow of time, cancelling the reality of its continuation.

Philosophical skepticism, according to numerous influential accounts of it, is bound up with our failure or inability to adopt an “absolute” standpoint. Similarly, many religions speak of an “absolute” that also is beyond human reach. With this similarity in mind, I will develop what I take to be a religious dimension of skepticism. First, I will discuss the connection that Stanley Cavell draws between his reading of skepticism and the notions of God and original sin. I will (...) then refer to William James’s description of the religious experience of conversion and apply it to the transformative aspect of skepticism. Finally, I will argue with respect to mysticism and negative theology that the transformative experiences one can find in both skepticism and religion can be interpreted as yielding an experiential understanding of the finitude of the human condition. (shrink)

With respect to "beginnings," Marxism-Leninism shares with Hegel the opinion that 1) man is a product of an historical process and hence has no fixed nature; 2) knowledge and its object are changeable, but there is an "absolute standpoint" created by change itself from which a view of the whole is obtainable. There is disagreement about the nature of the object known and hence also about the nature of the absolute standpoint. This study repeats the customary (...) objection that Hegel begins with thinking, whereas he ought to have begun with primitive human activity. Accordingly, Hegel ends with speculation whereas Marxism-Leninism issues in praxis. The best part of the study appears to be the discussion of the relation in Hegel between sensibility and thought, and therewith the relation between the beginning of the Logik and of the Phänomenologie.—H. C. (shrink)

Against the ‘great narrative’ of religion in the Middle-Ages, Modern Times are the times of differentiation. For religion that means that it becomes one sphere of culture, among others. On the other hand, religion sheds its light upon all the rest. The religious man “cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view” . To deal with religion today, means to deal with that paradox. The differentation coming up in modern times ends up in a kind of de-differentation (...) or fragmentation, so characteristic for our post-modern culture. Pushed to its extreme, this leads to two opposite reactions, both prominent on the contemporary religious scene, viz. a religion “à la carte” on the one hand, and fundamentalism on the other. In the process of differentiation, there always is the tendency of one sphere taking over the whole field. The great narratives of modernity were a first attempt to keep all the spheres at their proper place, but it was only a first and still naive attempt. The real problem turned out to be the status of reason and more specifically the status of metaphysics . In this article a concept of reason is defended – building upon Lyotard’s treatment of Kant’s faculty of judgement – in which reason is the instance of analysis and critique, opening up an interplay between all the spheres of culture, without founding them or bringing them together into one all-encompassing ‘whole’. Such a reason is, as Lyotard says, like an admiral, going between all the islands of the archipelago, without having an ‘absolute standpoint’ of its own, but always moving within its vast ‘milieu’, viz. the sea. Such a faculty of reason is eventually the only means to keep not only religion but also science at its proper place. (shrink)

This paper considers Fichte’s philosophy from the standpoint of the concept of nihilism: I contend that Fichte subordinates the emotional life to the moral imperative. After leaving Jena, Fichte would have tried to answer Jacobi’s objections, making the concept of life his central philosophical concern. This attempt at reconciling the primacy of the moral imperative and a relevant concept of life (in response to Jacobi) would allow us to understand Fichte’s philosophy in the Berlin period and, in particular, his (...) concept of the absolute. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes’ standpoint concerning the right for death seems to be coherent as well as justifiable. On one hand he points at the fear of death as the main source of law, but on the other hand he formulates minimum basic rules which safeguard man’s life. Though nobody is obliged to rescue someone else at the cost of their own life, but at the same time nobody has a right to kill anyone. Also nowadays the same rule can be (...) found in many legal systems: even if people are obliged to help others, they are not compelled to undertake heroic deeds or risk their lives. Thus Hobbes’ position can be given the name of ethical individualism, or even egoism in which no form of instrumentalism of human life is allowed. The value of any individual is absolute, which excludes the possibility to sacrifice their life for the sake of others. Hobbes does not share assumptions of utilitarianism and his solution might seem utopian from the perspective of the strategy of social actions, but from the perspective of values and rights of an individual it seems justifiable. (shrink)

This book presents Hartshorne's philosophical theology briefly, simply, and vividly. Throughout the centuries some of the world's most brilliant philosophers and theologians have held and perpetuated six beliefs that give the word God a meaning untrue to its import in sacred writings or in active religious devotion: God is absolutely perfect and therefore unchangeable 2.omnipotenc 3.omniscienc 4.God's unsympathetic goodness, 5.immortality as a career after death, and 6.revelationble Charles Hartshorne deals with these six theological mistakes from the standpoint of his (...) process theology. Hartshorne says, "The book is unacademic in so far as I am capable of being that." Only a master like Hartshorne could present such sophisticated ideas so simply. This book offers an option for religious belief not heretofore available to lay people. (shrink)

This book considers whether there is a legitimate or even necessary place for the perspective of 'care' when addressing questions of universal justice. To this end, it examines two major frameworks of contemporary moral philosophy_Jürgen Habermas's model of discourse ethics and Jacques Derrida's deconstructive ethics of radical singularity_in which the contrasting standpoints of communicative reciprocation and care for the absolute otherness of the other are respectively prioritized.

Cahill addresses the ethics of sexuality, marriage, parenthood and family from a feminist Christian standpoint. She wants to reaffirm the traditional unity of sex, love and parenthood, not as an absolute norm, but a guiding framework. The book also develops the significance of New Testament models of community and of moral formation, to argue that the human values associated with sex and family should be embodied in a context of concern for society's poor and marginalized. Roman Catholicism receives (...) special but not exclusive attention. (shrink)

Hegel established the modern standpoint of the philosophy of religion by creating a "phenomenology" in which all modes of religious experience prior to his own philosophical religion were viewed as "finite." It is our task now to work out the logic of the "absolute religion". This excellent book is valuable spade-work for that task; but it is still only spade-work.--H. S. Harris, Glendon College, York University.

The following presents an excerpt from Nishitani Keiji’s “Prajña and Reason” (1979), which can be considered Nishitani’s last attempt to make his case for the importance of the “standpoint of śūnyatā (‘emptiness’)” in confrontation with the history of Western philosophy. The translator’s preface situates “Prajña and Reason” (1) in Nishitani’s oeuvre and (2) in the context of his broader reception of Western thought, before (3) outlining the place of the excerpt within the full study. The translation here excerpts section (...) six and a portion of the final section seven. Where the prior sections develop and motivate his unified interpretation of G. W. F. Hegel (from the Differenzschrift to the Encyclopedia), in this excerpt, Nishitani diagnoses a problem in the relationships between the domains of Absolute Spirit, specifically, philosophy and religion. As argued in the translator’s preface, the arch of this study points to the contributions that religion (and art) make in evincing “living activity,” a “Knowing” that, while perhaps “un-Scientific” and, in that way, a “not-Knowing,” is for all that “Truthful.”. (shrink)

Putnam has given a different twist to the ethical issues in his philosophical writing on ethics. In his book on ‘Ethics Without Ontology,’ he has given the different interpretation to the ethical issues. Putnam states that there is no ‘ontology’ in ethics. For him, there is nothing wrong with ethics, rather there is something wrong with metaphysics. The ethics cannot be justified from a non-ethical standpoint of view. In this way, Putnam challenges both inflationary ontological ethics and deflationary ontological (...) ethics and he bids goodbye to all varieties of ontologies. This idea of ethics goes against the possibility of Vedanta, Buddhism, Aristotelian metaphysics, Platonic forms, Islam, Kantian category, Levinas’s ‘being’, and Heidegger’s ontology. He replaced ‘ethical ontology’ with that of pragmatic pluralism: the recognition that we employ in our everyday lives different kinds of discourses, discourses subject to different standards and possessing different sorts of applications that all contribute to the description of reality. Putnam is right in many of his criticisms of metaphysical ethics, but it is not clear how he can avoid the idea of absolute values, which are transcendental as proposed by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein accepts both aspects of ethical life, i.e., transcendental and empirical. I shall try to show that we have every reason to accept Wittgenstein’s view that there is ontology in ethics. (shrink)

1.- Introduction: articulating Hayek’s evolutionary argument with his socialist calculation dispute I completely agree with Bruce Caldwell (Caldwell 1988b: 74-75; Caldwell 1988a) that it is precisely within the conceptual and theoretical framework of the debate on the possibility of socialist calculation that Hayek definitively breaks with the standard static equilibrium approach to the market economy and finds out that the central problem of economics is related to the complex question of social coordination. From the Hayekian standpoint, this problem cannot (...) be solved without articulating a genuine theory about the role and the use of knowledge in society.1 This forms the hard core of what I will call the Hayekian theoretical argument. But one can find a much different kind of argument in Hayek, i.e. an evolutionary argument. I will characterize this argument as the Hayekian empirical argument. Hayek first exposed the essential elements of this genuine argument systematically in Law, Legislation and Liberty (see especially Hayek 1973). But in Hayek’s last book (Hayek 1988), socialism is still analyzed from this evolutionary standpoint , and as such socialism is considered by Hayek to be the major problem not only of economic theory but also, more globally, of Western civilization itself. In that book, published the year before the Soviet Union collapsed, Hayek showed himself to be absolutely confident that economic analysis could prove that socialism was not only a social blunder and a political failure, but above all a formidable scientific error. My reading of Hayek’s work is that this evolutionary argument has to be linked to the first one, which is of a more theoretical nature as far as economics is concerned. Indeed, while the evolutionary argument puts forward a completely different conceptual framework tightening the theoretical argument, it first of all displaces the gist of Hayek’s claim against socialism.. (shrink)

The Derridean standpoint has made it challenging for philosophy to affirm a non-dualistic view of the world. If signification is a process where linguistic signs are always postponed or in deferment, then it is impossible to cultivate experiences without recurring to metaphysical thought. However, third generation Kyoto School thinker, Ueda Shizuteru, complicates this viewpoint. What Ueda describes as “exiting of language and exiting into language” is the dynamic movement of Zen experience that instantiates how language can be torn through (...) and resurrected. As a reversal of Derrida who prizes linguistic signs over experience, Ueda’s view of Zen seeks to set limits to language without denying its inherent existence by clarifying how humans live in a two-fold world of the metaphysical and non-metaphysical. In order to make the latter visible, however, Ueda speaks of how absolute silence operates as a negation of Being, that which brings forth the world of infinite nothing, accompanied by an infinite stillness and openness that is undisturbed by the utterance of words. And yet the implications of Derrida’s method of critique are something Zen must also confront. Since human experience cannot avoid the world of metaphysics by virtue of existing as signs inscribed in the historical context, Zen must ethically examine the repressiveness of its inherited linguistic structure in the return to the world of signs. In the attempt to dispel this particular tension between Derrida and Ueda, this article, as a concluding point, will close the gap between their view of language and freedom by demonstrating how the compassionate vow of the bodhisattva can interrupt the problems of exclusion and marginalization brought on by linguistic production. (shrink)

Context: The detection of objective reality, truth, and lies are still heated topics in epistemology. When discussing these topics, philosophers often resort to certain thought experiments, engaging an important concept that can be broadly identified as “the global observer.” It relates to Putnam’s God’s Eye, Davidson’s Omniscient Interpreter, and the ultimate observer in quantum physics, among others. Problem: The article explores the notion of the global observer as the guarantor of the determinability and configuration of events in the world. It (...) analyzes the consistency of the notion “global observer” from the standpoint of logic and philosophy, and discusses why application of this notion in some contexts poses challenges and appears to be paradoxical. Method: The paper uses conceptual methods of argumentation, such as logical and philosophical kinds of proof. Its key approach is the engagement of thought experiments. Results: The notion of a global observer is incoherent: “being global” and “being an observer” appear to be incompatible features. It is claimed that from the standpoint of global observation, there are no events occurring in the world. Furthermore, the indefiniteness of the world as a whole is asserted, which is related to the uninformedness of the global observer regarding the “true state of affairs.” “Global observation” turns out to be incompatible with the concept of the observer, blocking, as a result, the opportunity for a determinable configuration of events. It only makes sense to discuss local observations, which are limited to mutual observation or introspections, and not to assume the existence of some absolute truth, reality, or the state of affairs beyond the local observations. Constructivist content: The article emphasizes the role of the observer and observation. It opens up some problematic consequences of the core philosophical assumptions of globally observing existence. Referring to von Foerster’s and Luhmann’s idea that we can only speak reasonably about local observations, the paper argues that reality is neither external to nor independent of the observer. Implications: The paper could be productive for epistemic theories, theories of quantum physics, and theories of non-classical logic. (shrink)

Ovaj članak predstavlja tragove ranoga vedāntskog tumačenja Maitreyī-brāhmane, jednog od najpoznatijih dijelova Brhadāranyaka-upanišadi u Brahma-sūtrama, temeljnom tekstu filozofske škole vedānte. Predmet diskusije je egzegeza Maitreyī-brāhmane prema trima starodrevnim komentatorima Āśmarathyi, Audulomiu i Kāśakrtsni. Cilj je ovog rada pokazati kakve se metode tumačenja upanišadskih tekstova koriste u različitim vedāntskim školama. Također možemo vidjeti tehnike tumačenja preuzete iz pūrva-mīmāmse, škole tumačenja vedskih tekstova, koje su preoblikovane za tumačenje upanišadi. Članak također pokazuje kako filozofsko stajalište o odnosu sopstva i apsoluta služi egzegetskoj svrsi (...) pomirenja različitih upanišadskih učenja. Učenje BS i starodrevnih komentatora je bhedābhedavāda, istodobna različitost i nerazličitost sopstva i apsoluta. Śankara tumači sūtre kao da poučavaju monistički iluzionizam. On na dvije razine istine razlikuje niži brahman i najviši brahman. Na ovaj je način mogao pomiriti sva upanišadska učenja, bilo da naginjuteizmu ili monizmu. Važna je i hermeneutička rasprava Śankarina s bhedābhedavādinom Bhartrprapañcom o prirodi znanja i djelovanja, odnosno prvenstvu upanišadi koje se bave znanjem brahmana nad brāhmanama koje se bave obrednim djelovanjem.This article presents some traces of early vedāntic interpretations of Maitreyī-brāhmana, one of the most famous parts of Brhadāranyaka-upanishad, in the Brahma-sūtras, the fundamental work of the philosophical school vedānta. Topic under discussion conveys the exegesis of Maitreyī-brāhmana according to three ancient commentators, Āśmarathya, Audulomi and Kāśakrtsna. The purpose of this article is to show the methods of interpretation of upanishadic passages in different vedāntic schools. Also, we can see some techniques of interpretation taken from pūrva-mīmāmsa, the school of vedic interpretation, and adapted for upanishadic interpretation. The article shows how the main philosophical standpoint on the relation of the self and the absolute serves the exegetical purposes. So the standpoint of the BS and the ancient commentators is bhedābhedavāda, teaching of both the difference and non-difference between the self and the absolute, like sparks and fire. Śankara interprets the sūtras as teaching monistic illusionism. He also differentiates between the two levels of truth and accordingly the lower brahman and the highest brahman. In this way he was able to reconcile all upanishadic passages, whether they inclined to theism or monism. There is also an important hermeneutical discussion of Śankara with bhedābhedavādin Bhartrprapañca on the nature of knowledge and action and priority of the upanishads, part of sacred canon dealing with knowledge of brahman over the brāhmanas, which are dealing with ritual action. (shrink)

Gopal Sreenivasan, 201 West Duke Building, Box 90743, Durham NC USA 27708. Email: gopal.sreenivasan{at}duke.edu ' + u + '@ ' + d + ' '/ /- ->This paper reviews the epidemiological debate between the relative income hypothesis and the absolute income hypothesis. The dispute between these rival hypotheses has to do with whether an adequate account of the relationship between income and life expectancy requires the definition of ‘income’ to include any comparative element. I discuss the evidence offered for (...) the relative hypothesis, as well as two important criticisms that have been levelled against this evidence. I also offer some critical reflections on the debate from a philosophical standpoint concerned with the ethics of population health. Both hypotheses agree that a redistribution of income towards the worst off will improve their life expectancy. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In this paper I argue that one of the most important impulses that structure Hegel's account of religion is the need to show gratitude for the gift of creation. Beginning with the “Love“ fragment and 1805-6 Realphilosophie , I first explore what it means to see God's relationship to spirit as one of externalization or divestment ( Entäusserung ). Then, relying on the Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, I argue that Hegel takes Christianity to be the Consummate Religion (...) because it not only offers its own divestment to match God's, but actually takes itself to participate in God's own divestment. This leads to a discussion of revealed religion in the Phenomenology , which, in contrast to simpler forms of religion such as the worship of luminous being ( Lichtwesen ), is able to conceive of a divine generativity in which spirit actively participates. I conclude by identifying two political implications of the centrality of divestment in Hegel's account. First, it means that, since Hegel takes Christianity to be unique in its representation of divine divestment, he cannot be a simple pluralist on religious truth. Second, Hegel's emphasis on divestment in his various accounts of religion helps set up his critique of sovereignty from the standpoint of philosophy or absolute knowing. While religion still clings to a vision of humanity as sovereign over nature, its origin in gratitude for creation proves to be incompatible with this vision. (shrink)

This paper begins with a discussion of the translations of the term “ontology” in Chinese language, and argues that its translation as “bentilun”(in Chinese PinYinorthography) can be supported by ample evidence from the history of doctrine and the tradition of Chinese culture. Therefore, It is necessary to keep this translation on condition that one distinguish strictly “ontology” as a branch of philosophy from “bentilun” as a special morphology of philosophical theory. Examining the history of metaphysics, this thesis draws a clear (...) line of demarcation between “traditional ontology” and “modern ontology”, and reveals themain characteristics of traditional ontology. It holds that although the reformation of Marx’s Philosophy was realized through criticizing traditional ontology, his Philosophy did not abolish the concept of ontology as a branch of the discipline. The ontology of Marx’s philosophy is a theory that considers natural being, social being and human being as a unity. This theory emphasizes understanding the meaning of being from the perspective of a pattern. The main idea of ontology of Marx’s philosophy is that of a practical outlook and practical model of thinking. First, the concept of ontology and its translations would be reviewed. As regards itsderivation, we could find that Ontologie in German and in French both came from the word of Ontologia in Latin, which originated from the Greek. In the literal meaning of Greek,this word means the “logos” of “on”. In Greek, “on” corresponds to “being” in English. As to its signification, according to Heidegger, “on” has a twofold meaning that can signify both “being in general” and “the ground of being”. The former is close to essence while the latter to origin. From the angle ofhistory, Goclenius was the first one who used the term “Ontologia” in philosophy in 17th century. Since then this word was used and developed by subsequent philosophers. Although this term appeared in 17th century, yet its correlative questions had been studied from ancient Greece. The sticking point here is to pay attention to the demarcation between subject and theory. As a branch subject or as a universal noun, “Ontology” is counted in the historical tradition of western philosophy. Here all the problems discussed are public, but the concrete solutions and viewpoints are different. The former corresponds to the level of subject and the latter to the level of theory. These two levels must not be confused or substituted from one and other. That is, different ideas, schools and opinions could bebrought under the same problem. So it could be said that traditional ontology and modern ontology are two branches. Of course these two branches are very different in dealing with the problem of Ontology. This difference could be illustrated as following: (1) What to be→beings→substance —traditional ontology; (2) How to be→the mode of being→relation—modern ontology. Obviously both begin with the problem of being and end with Ontology, while their approaches are very different. The essential characteristic of traditional ontology is to seek the eternal substance, pursue the transcendent nature, establish the base of knowledge, and take the absolute truth as the ultimate telos. Traditional ontology ended with the critique of modern philosophy, Marxmade the crucial critique of traditional ontology in his remarks on Hegel’s philosophy. His critique of Hegel’s speculative method is actually the critique of traditional ontology although Marx himself never used the term of ontology explicitly in his new philosophy. Being in Marx’s philosophy is the real world of real beings. Concretely speaking, it is sensible world, objective world or human world that is integrated on the base of human praxis. The keystones here are natural being, social being and human being. There are some important similarities between Marx’s ontological approach and Heidegger’s ontology, that is, to understand the meaning of being through the mode and relation of being. In any case, the standpoint and thinking mode of praxis characterize the ontology of Marx’s philosophy. (shrink)

To be open-minded is to be willing to revise or entertain doubts about one’s beliefs. Commonly regarded as an intellectual virtue, and often too as a moral virtue, open-mindedness is a trait that is generally desirable for a person to have. However, in the major theistic traditions, absolute commitment to one’s religious beliefs is regarded as virtuous or ideal. But one cannot be completely resolved about an issue and at the same time be open to revising one’s beliefs about (...) it. It appears, then, that religious devotion is inconsistent with open-mindedness. The more religiously devout a person is, the more firmly she will hold to her convictions. And the stronger her belief commitments, the less open-minded she will be regarding these beliefs. So there appears to be a paradox here, where from the standpoint of religious devotion, it is virtuous to display an intellectual vice, namely closed-mindedness. I discuss this problem and explore some potential routes of escape from the paradox. (shrink)

This article explores the possibility of a phenomenological method in the field of philosophy of science. It reconstructs the idea of scienticity, which is significant both for philosophy as a science and for philosophy's relationship to nonphilosophical sciences. The concepts of intentionality, eidetic objectness, and absolute evidence are discussed as conditions for the possibility of philosophy as a rigorous science. The concepts of constituting, objectivation, and regional ontology are examined in the context of the possibility of founding of sciences (...) with a dogmatic standpoint in philosophy. It is suggested that the phenomenological program of philosophy of science remains current, though it also continues a tradition of thinking about science that stretches back to Plato. Phenomenological philosophy of science is a clarification of the meaning of scienticity, the very principles of a scientific relationship to the world. (shrink)

In The Crane's Walk, Jeremy Barris seeks to show that we can conceive and live with a pluralism of standpoints with conflicting standards for truth--with the truth of each being entirely unaffected by the truth of the others. He argues that Plato's work expresses this kind of pluralism, and that this pluralism is important in its own right, whether or not we agree about what Plato's standpoint is.The longest tradition of Plato scholarship identifies crucial faults in Plato's theory of (...) Ideas. Barris argues that Plato deliberately displayed those faults, because he wanted to demonstrate that basic kinds of error or illogic have dimensions that are crucial to the establishing of truth. These dimensions legitimate a paradoxical coordination of logically incompatible conceptions of truth. Connecting this idea with emerging currents of Plato scholarship, he emphasizes, in addition to the dialogues' arguments, the importance of their nonargumentative features, including drama, myths, fictions, anecdotes, and humor. These unanalyzed nonargumentative features function rigorously, as a lever with which to examine the enterprise of rational argument itself, without presupposing its standards or illegitimately assimilating any position to the standards of another.Today, communities are torn apart by conflicts within and between a host of different pluralist and absolutist commitments. The possibility developed in this book-a coordination of absolute and relative truth that allows an understanding of some relativist and some absolutist positions as being fully legitimate and as capable of existing in a relation to their opposites-may contribute to perspectives for resolving these conflicts. (shrink)

Would a just society or government absolutely refrain from shaming or humiliating any of its members? "No," says this essay. It describes morally acceptable uses of shame, stigma and disgust as tools of social control in a decent (just) society. These uses involve criminal law, tort law, and informal social norms. The standard of moral acceptability proposed for determining the line is a version of perfectionistic prioritarian consequenstialism. From this standpoint, criticism is developed against Martha Nussbaum's view that to (...) respect the dignity of each person, society absolutely must refrain from certain ways of shaming and humiliating its members and rendering them objects of communal disgust. (shrink)

The main aim of this work is to indirectly display, through an analysis of the concepts of world, God, and human freedom, the shift from a harmonious concept of nature to another chaotic, darker, and pre-rational. It is important to relate this transformation, which takes place around 1807, to the change in Schelling’s ideas about the relationship between God and the world to weaken a previous Spinozist monistic standpoint. These changes in turn affect Schelling’s view of the concept of (...) unity. He now modifies the notions of immanence and pantheism in favour of a dualistic doctrine of particular and finite existence that we could relate to Kierkegaard and later existentialists. Finally, we introduce Schelling’s theory of love. Love is a mode of union through free will and personal choice that neutralizes the totalizing metaphysics of identity associated to the systematic construction of idealism from Spinoza to Hegel, and that Schelling criticizes, in his middle and late philosophy, as a resource to a self-transparent and overdetermining Absolute. (shrink)

I. RATNAKIRTI. HIS PHILOSOPHICAL CONGENERS AND ADVERSARIES Ratnakirti flourished early in the 11th century A.D. at the University of Vi kramasila, a member of the Yogacara-Vijnanavada school oflate Buddhist philosophy. Thakur characterizes Ratnakirti's writing as "more concise and logical though not so poetical" 1 as that of his guru, Jfianasrimitra, two of 2 whose dicta are focal points of the present work. From a translogical or absolute point of view, Ratnakirti endorses a form of 3 solipsistic idealism. The Sarhtdndntaradu$alJa, (...) his proof of solipsism written from the standpoint ofthe highest truth, concludes that an exter nal nonmental continuum is impossible. In ultimate reality the cognizing sub ject, its act of awareness, and the cognized object coalesce - all are fabrications superposed on what is really an indivisible evanescent now. 4 As Ratnakirti's predecessors have put it: There is neither an 'I' nor a 'he' nor a 'you' nor even an 'it'; neither the thing, nor the not-thing; neither a law nor a system; neither the terms nor the relations. But there are only the cognitive events of colourless sensations which have forms but no names. They are caught for a moment in a stream and then rush to naught. Even the stream is a fiction. That sensum of the moment, the purest particular, that advaya, the indivisible unit of cognition, that is the sole reality, the rest are all fictions, stirred up by time-honoured 5 convention of language which is itself a grand fiction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 29.2 (2005) 379-393 [Access article in PDF] Love, Self-Deception, and the Moral "Must" Randy Ramal Claremont Graduate University I One significant impact that conceptual relativism has had on current discussions in moral philosophy is the denial of intelligibility to discourses that affirm moral absolutism. The denial is typically based on two allied arguments. The first argument entails that the justification of absolute moral laws and (...) values presupposes the existence of an Archimedean standpoint, but since such viewpoint is unintelligible, a "view from nowhere" as it has been called, then affirming moral absolutism could only be the result of a confused temptation for metaphysical universality and objectivity. The second argument states that since all moral values and concepts are the products of particular cultural-linguistic contexts, it would not make sense to speak of absolute values that have application in other cultural-linguistic contexts.I sympathize with the critical spirit in which this dual argument is made. The unintelligibility of a neutral standpoint and the obvious contextuality of all moral discourses render meaningless any attempt to affirm metaphysically-based moral absolutes. But what this argument fails to acknowledge is that the ordinary language of moral absoluteness is not only infinitely distant from the metaphysical claims to Olympian grounds but also internally related to the absolute moral judgments and principles it invokes. Furthermore, it is doubtful that one could speak at all of moral discourse as needing metaphysical justification. It would not make sense to speak of moral discourse as either needing or not needing metaphysical backing because both notions ignore the ordinary contexts of moral discourse, where the issue of philosophical justification does not arise. The point here is not simply to reject the [End Page 379] metaphysical need for justifying moral discourse but to question the intelligibility of the attempt itself.1In what follows I argue that the ordinary claims to moral absoluteness, be it to give moral advice, to justify personal beliefs and actions, or to judge and criticize the conduct of other people, are perfectly intelligible practices that embody ordinary moral judgments and values. I elucidate the intelligibility of these moral claims by discussing Leo Tolstoy's "The Death of Ivan Ilych," Proust's Remembrance of Things Past, and Ann Beattie's "Learning to Fall." These works, I argue, portray an ethical notion of "need" that expresses natural, and intelligible, affirmations of moral necessity. The context of this affirmation concerns the ethical call to end all self-deception about one's love life.Traditionally, the relationship between love and self-deception has been interpreted to suggest that people often deceive themselves about love in order to fulfill a deep need in them to give meaning to their lives. This interpretation is often invoked to explain, on the one hand, why people who are in love might claim otherwise and, on the other hand, why those who are not in love at all convince themselves of the opposite. Although this interpretation is not philosophical in nature and does not necessarily entail the denial of all discourses of moral necessity, the idea that self-deception fulfils a deep need in people is often invoked as a philosophical explanation of the notion of "need." One example of such philosophical explanation is Martha Nussbaum's Love's Knowledge, where she endorses the traditional interpretation of the relation between love and self-deception through a discussion, among other works, of the above mentioned works by Proust and Beattie.There is no doubt that self-deception, whether in regards to one's love life or other aspects of it, could sometimes arise as a result of a need in people to give their existence some meaningful stability. But this interpretation cannot apply to all cases of love and self deception because the radical plurality of our notions of love prevents such explanatory reductionism. The insistence on this type of reductionism, it seems to me, rests on a common tendency among moral philosophers, Nussbaum included, to read into literature personal ethical views that are not intended by it. The task of the moral philosopher... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:GROUNDING THE HUMAN CONVERSATION Introduction ANTHONY M. MATTEO Elizabethtown Oollege Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania SINCE THE APPEARENCE of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 1 the so called "rationality debate " has been conducted at a high pitch in Anglo-American philosophy. Concurrently, this debate has occupied some of the luminaries of Continental philosophy: Gadamer, Habermas, Feyerabend, and Derrida. Now that the Sturm und Drang associated with it has to some (...) extent subsided, we would like to offer a partial analysis and critique. of the insights that this controversy has proffered. In this essay our fundamental thesis is twofold: I) At the heart of the rationality debate is a longing to deconstruct narrow and restrictive methodologies.for acquiring knowledge, thereby creating the possibility for a free and open " human conversation," unfettered by the dogmatisms of the past; ~) The " deconstructive " phase of the deba.te now requires an essentially "constructive " complement: further conditions necessary to ground a free and open " human conversation " need to be specified. In this latter ta.sk we will suggest that the work of the contemporary analytic philosopher, A. C. Grayling, and that of the fa:ther of Transcendental Thomism, Joseph Marecha.I, can be particularly helpful. I ncommensurability The most radical claim to emerge from the recent rationality debate is that of" incommensura.bility ": namely, two or more awropriations of reality can be so utterly diverse that we can1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 285 ANTHONY M. MATTEO not adjudicate between them as to their respective truth or falsity. Take at face value, for example, Paul Feyerabend's proclamation: that the views of scientists, and especially their views on basic matters, are often as different from each other as are the ideologies that underlie different cultures. Even worse: there exist scientific theories which are mutually incommensurable though they apparently deal " with the same subject matter." 2 Underlying :this claim is the belief that there is no a prori limit to the number of independent ways in which the stuff of reality can be conceived. Furthermore, since there is no atemporal or ahistorical standpoint beyond the fray of contending worldviews, no one view can legitimately demand absolute cognitive priority on the grounds that it more faithfully captures the " essence " of things than any other possible alternative. In effect, then, " reality is entirely reconceivable.... Our experience of the accidents of objects has no more direct claim to being veridical than our judgments about the nature of things." 3 Even a partial list of the factors contributing to the genesis of the notion of radical incommensurability would be impressive : the rise of historical consciousness and its assertion of the historically conditioned nature of all world views, the emphasis in the sociology of knowledge on the socially constructed nature of all visions of reality, the contention in the philosophy of science that.all scientific observation and appraisal is ineluctably theory-laden, a:s well as the Marxist critique of theoretical positions as intellectual supports for vested class interests. Without gainsaying the significance of these and other possible factors in the evolution of the notion of incommensurability, we would argue that a proper gra:sp of its apparent plausi2 Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (London : NLB, 1975), p. 274. a Victor Preller, Di·vine Science And The Science Of God (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 69. GROUNDING THE HUMAN CONVERSATION ~87 bility and consequent appeal can best be attained if we unearth its foundation in ·a relativist reading of Kant's Copernican Revolution in philosophy. Kant's connection with this notion turns on a particular development of his basic distinction between " our " mode of conceiving reality and reality-initself (Ding-an-Sich). In Kant's view, we can only know the appearance of reality as filtered through our conceptual scheme; thus, the thing-in-itself-reality in its pure nature or aseity-is opaque and impenetrable. For Kant, however, there was only one conceptual scheme: namely, the scheme structured by the presuppositions of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics. Kant believed that one of his great contributions to our theoretical life was to demonstrate that this scheme was coterminous with the powers of human conceptualization as such... (shrink)

This article analyses strategies of perception of Europe that fit into a triple structure. The traditional division into philosophical, cultural, and political Europe is intersected with more fundamental European perceptions determined by different ways of thinking. In this article, these ways are referred to as the closed, the open and the hollow ones. Thus, three different conceptions of Europe arise: the closed Europe characterized by essentialism, ethnocentrism, and monologic consciousness; the open Europe based on the standpoint that protection of (...) one’s own identity and maturity depend on a dialogic relationship with representatives of other identities; and the hollow Europe that makes absolute the imperative of moral self-criticism, as well as identity’s deconstruction and its relativism. The discussion of all three strategies of perception of Europe is followed by the analysis of how they were received in Lithuania. The conclusion highlights the necessity to further research the relationship between all three conceptions of European identity. (shrink)

Author: Czerniak Stanisław Title: CAN WE RIGHTLY SPEAK ABOUT “KAZIMIERZ HOFFMAN’S PHILOSOPHY”? (SOME REMARKS CONCERNING THE PUBLICATION POZNAWANIE KAZIMIERZA HOFFMANA) (Filozofia Kazimierza Hoffmana? Refleksje na marginesie książki Poznawanie Kazimierza Hoffmana) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.15, number: 2011/4, pages: 1038-1046 Keywords: KAZIMIERZ HOFFMAN, IDEA OF DIVINE, EXISTENCE, POETRY Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The article shows the philosophical background of Kazimierz Hoffman’s poetry. The author points to Hoffman’s idea of the Divine, (...) which creates all possible objects in the world and incessantly sustains their existence, treating it as the crucial point of his philosophical stance. Another question is devoted to a possible relationship between Hoffman’s philosophical views and the traditions of the philosophy of life and phenomenology. Worth examining are also some similarities between Hoffman’s concept of donation and the ethical standpoint of E. Lévinas. In conclusion to those considerations one could claim that in Hoffman’s poetry we experience an interesting kind of mysticism uniting the contemplation of the absolute order with the aesthetic, perfectionist attempts to write the “ideal poem” and to connect the metaphysical insight with the experimental form. In the article the author quotes extensively the most important hermeneutic conclusions contained in the book Poznawanie Kazimierza Hoffmana (“The Understanding of Kazimierz Hoffman”). (shrink)

FOR THE PURPOSES of this paper, I will interpret the word "culture" to refer, at its most basic level, to the fundamental categories in terms of which the peoples of that culture spontaneously express their most basic presuppositions. These fundamental categories, or basic presuppositions, designate the specific ways of conceiving reality which are expressed by the sense of the categories themselves. From the standpoint adopted here, they are not to be regarded as impositions of something called "the mind": neither (...) in the form of Kantian a priori categories, nor in the form of Collingwoodian "absolute" presuppositions. They do not form internally coherent "tables" of categories or "constellations" of absolute presuppositions. They constitute contingent ways of trying to understand the complexities of reality, and they are, themselves, a function of that reality of which they constitute a variety of interpretations. And the significant point to underline is that it is precisely when certain fundamental categories of this sort show themselves increasingly, and with increasing urgency, to be mutually incompatible that the stage is set for the necessary emergence of a new orientation in the history of human thinking--an orientation which constitutes an overcoming of the strongly felt incompatibility between whatever fundamental presuppositions are in question. (shrink)

Nishida Kitaro's reformulation of the major issues of Western philosophy from a Zen standpoint of "absolute nothingness" and "absolutely contradictory self-identity" represents the boldest speculative enterprise of modern Japan, continued today by his successors in the "Kyoto School" of philosophy. This English translation of Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness evokes the movement and flavor of the original, clarifies its obscurities, and eliminates the repetitions. It sheds new light on the philosopher's career, revealing a long struggle with such thinkers (...) as Cohen, Natorp, Husserl, Fichte, and Bergson, that ended with Nishida's break from the basic ontological assumptions of the West. Throughout labyrinthine arguments, Nishida never loses sight of his theme: the irreducibility and unobjectifiability of the act of self-consciousness which constitutes the self. Extensive annotation is provided for the first time in any edition of Nishida's work. Historians of Japanese philosophy and culture, and all those interested in the interaction of Eastern and Western thought-forms, now have a document which highlights many of the cultural, psychological, and intellectual dynamics that have shaped Japanese intellectual life in one of its most fascinating and ambitious manifestations. (shrink)

A precursor to the hard problem of consciousness confronts nihilism. Like physicalism, nihilism collides with the first-personal fact of what perception and action are like. Unless this problem is solved, nature’s inclusion of conscious experience will remain, as Chalmers warns the physicalist, an “unanswered question” and, as Jacobi chides the nihilist, “completely inexplicable". One advantage of Kant’s Copernican turn is to dismiss the question that imposes this hard problem. We need not ask how nature is accompanied by the first-person (...) class='Hi'>standpoint because “I think” is an apperceptive form of thinking that must be able to accompany any cognition of nature. Kant’s formal conception of apperception worries Fichte in his Nova Methodo lectures. This conception arguably cannot exhaust the ground of experience, for it does not show why we posit objects “at all". For Fichte, it is our agency that first opens a world of objects, viz., as subjects, means, ends, and obstacles. In what follows, I argue that, for Fichte, the I poses no hard problem because it collides exclusively with nihilistic views like Spinozism, which are refuted by a properly transcendental idealist conception of apperception, according to which the first-person standpoint is the absolute ground of our experience of nature. If transcendental idealism refutes nihilism, nature is no more explicable than that there is something it is like for me to perceive and act. In Section 1, I show why Kantian apperception is necessary for possible experience. In Section 2, I reconstruct Fichte’s argument that a modified conception of apperception refutes guises of nihilism, thereby solving the hard problem of consciousness. In Section 3, I suggest that transcendental idealism undermines Chalmers’ proposed solution to and Dennett’s dismissal of this problem. (shrink)

The first reactions to the encyclical Fides et Ratio ranged from cautiously positive to critical disapproval. Many observers pointed to the ambiguity which they perceive in the encyclical, probably due to the several hands which participated in its writing process. This ambiguity functions as a starting point to develop two different keys to read the text, resulting in divergent interpretations and evaluations. Inspired by the opening clause of the encyclical the first key can be represented by the image of a (...) beautiful swan, which takes off for a flight towards the ultimate horizon of truth. This key starts from the perception that the encyclical is biased by an dismissal of the modern emancipation of reason and by a subordination of all rationality to faith . Only when reason complies with the presumptions of revelation, and thus limits its autonomy, can it enter the realm of absolute. But, following the lines of this key of interpretation, precisely this results in clipping one of the wings of the swan, preventing it from taking off. By his refusal to take seriously the modern redefinition of rationality and his reintroduction of a massive, static, and propositional concept of revelation, the pope makes a thoroughly provocative and fruitful meeting of Christian faith and contemporary reason impossible. And it is only by such an engaging encounter that theology can regain its plausibility in our modern times. The other interpretative key is represented by the image of a dove coming down from heaven, seeking for a place on earth to settle down. This key takes as its primary starting point the theological status of the genre of the encyclical, and consequently links up with fragments of the text which can seem more open. First of all, an encyclical is a magisterial document. This means that from the beginning it must be situated within a faith perspective, written from standpoint of a particular tradition. Only then one can understand that in the text - internal to the discourse - truth is immediately related to revelation. Secondly, this key points to the understanding of revelation as mystery, and in this regard to the sacramental or eucharistic concept of truth: the truth of faith becomes present to us, but cannot ever be pinpointed ontologically by us. The knowledge of faith never diffuses the mystery of revelation. Therefore, faith as faith can never be founded in reason. Taking into account these two starting points, the encyclical addresses reason only in relation to faith: reason from itself does not lead to faith, but faith needs rational, philosophical knowledge for its own understanding. Following this line of thought implies that the principles of philosophy as ‘praeparation fidei’ and as ‘ancilla theologiae’ have to be reconsidered. Moreover this perspective results in a more open reading of many other passages . Both readings imply a selective reading of the text. The more observatorial reading, according to the key of the swan, interprets the whole text from its more antimodern closed passages. The intra-theological reading with the key of the dove reinterprets many of the seemingly closed passages but nevertheless is confronted by fragments which hardly fit its reading. Neither key neutralizes the ambiguity, but confronts it. The perspective of the dove could be the more theologically successful way in doing this. However, even here a theological assimilation of a profound analysis of the contemporary philosophical situation would have enriched the encyclical extensively. For theology as ‘fides quaerens intellectum’, relevant today, must relate to the contextual critical consciousness as expressed in contemporary modern philosophy.The first reactions to the encyclical Fides et Ratio ranged from cautiously positive to critical disapproval. Many observers pointed to the ambiguity which they perceive in the encyclical, probably due to the several hands which participated in its writing process. This ambiguity functions as a starting point to develop two different keys to read the text, resulting in divergent interpretations and evaluations. Inspired by the opening clause of the encyclical the first key can be represented by the image of a beautiful swan, which takes off for a flight towards the ultimate horizon of truth. This key starts from the perception that the encyclical is biased by an dismissal of the modern emancipation of reason and by a subordination of all rationality to faith . Only when reason complies with the presumptions of revelation, and thus limits its autonomy, can it enter the realm of absolute. But, following the lines of this key of interpretation, precisely this results in clipping one of the wings of the swan, preventing it from taking off. By his refusal to take seriously the modern redefinition of rationality and his reintroduction of a massive, static, and propositional concept of revelation, the pope makes a thoroughly provocative and fruitful meeting of Christian faith and contemporary reason impossible. And it is only by such an engaging encounter that theology can regain its plausibility in our modern times. The other interpretative key is represented by the image of a dove coming down from heaven, seeking for a place on earth to settle down. This key takes as its primary starting point the theological status of the genre of the encyclical, and consequently links up with fragments of the text which can seem more open. First of all, an encyclical is a magisterial document. This means that from the beginning it must be situated within a faith perspective, written from standpoint of a particular tradition. Only then one can understand that in the text - internal to the discourse - truth is immediately related to revelation. Secondly, this key points to the understanding of revelation as mystery, and in this regard to the sacramental or eucharistic concept of truth: the truth of faith becomes present to us, but cannot ever be pinpointed ontologically by us. The knowledge of faith never diffuses the mystery of revelation. Therefore, faith as faith can never be founded in reason. Taking into account these two starting points, the encyclical addresses reason only in relation to faith: reason from itself does not lead to faith, but faith needs rational, philosophical knowledge for its own understanding. Following this line of thought implies that the principles of philosophy as ‘praeparation fidei’ and as ‘ancilla theologiae’ have to be reconsidered. Moreover this perspective results in a more open reading of many other passages . Both readings imply a selective reading of the text. The more observatorial reading, according to the key of the swan, interprets the whole text from its more antimodern closed passages. The intra-theological reading with the key of the dove reinterprets many of the seemingly closed passages but nevertheless is confronted by fragments which hardly fit its reading. Neither key neutralizes the ambiguity, but confronts it. The perspective of the dove could be the more theologically successful way in doing this. However, even here a theological assimilation of a profound analysis of the contemporary philosophical situation would have enriched the encyclical extensively. For theology as ‘fides quaerens intellectum’, relevant today, must relate to the contextual critical consciousness as expressed in contemporary modern philosophy. (shrink)