Este artigo examina a relação entre subjetividade e vontade à luz de alguns resultados parciais obtidos em nossa pesquisa sobre a filosofia de Henri Bergson, cujo carro-chefe é a noção de “duração”. Pensar a subjetividade a partir da duração significa admitir que a transição ininterrupta que vai do passado para o futuro passando pelo presente é a temporalidade atuando no nível mais simples de nossa relação com o mundo. Destacamos a subjetividade a partir da duração porque já na percepção estamos (...) evocando o passado para iluminar o presente e, assim, podemos compreender o “problema” da subjetividade a partir de uma ação na qual se observa uma diferença de funções: a diferença entre o presente que atua e o passado que já não atua. É precisamente esse caráter temporal da ação que leva os comentadores de Bergson a interpretarem de maneira original a gênese da subjetividade, o papel da memória na percepção e a conceberem novos sentidos para o conceito de “vontade”. Por conseguinte, a estrutura argumentativa que adotamos neste texto deverá mover-se em três níveis de análise que correspondem, respectivamente, a três aspectos da subjetividade humana (percepção, memória e vontade). Desse modo, pretendemos ressaltar a temporalidade viva como marca registrada do bergsonismo. (shrink)

This text proposes an interpretation of the work of Franklin Leopoldo e Silva based on the reading of some of his numerous published articles and books, without neglecting the classes and guidance received from the stage of Scientific Initiation to Postdoctoral studies. Precisely, by highlighting the importance of three thinkers widely studied by Professor Franklin – Berkeley, Bergson and William James –, we suggest that at the heart of this philosophical experience there would be a constant: empiricism. Whether in the (...) classical or radical version, the line we draw in this multiplicity reveals an openness to concrete empiricism. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with answering the following question: What is phenomenological realism? I have tried to accomplish this, in part, by looking at the history of phenomenological realism. However, it is not sufficient to look at the history of this movement if we are to understand what it is today. Thus, I have tried to present the reader with the attitude, methods, and the ontological and epistemological foundations of phenomenological realism, both in some of their early formulations and in (...) their later, more refined forms. While many phenomenological realists differ with regards to certain issues, I think that there exists much agreement concerning these basic aspects of the philosophy. I have tried to present these foundational aspects of phenomenological realism using the following outline. Chapter one concerns itself with phenomenological realism as a twentieth century philosophy. I mention the leading figures of this movement, both in the Munich and Goettingen Circles, and I use the works of Adolf Reinach and Dietrich von Hildebrand in order to demonstrate the attitude which is at the heart of this philosophy. I then proceed, in chapter two, to present the ways in which Plato's writings implicitly contain many of the notions which are vital to phenomenological realism. In chapter three I argue that the term ‘phenomenological realism’ does not accurately describe this philosophy and suggest that the term which Fritz Wenisch has proposed, ‘chreontic philosophy,’ more accurately describes this movement. I then present three examples of how the attitude and methods of chreontic philosophy have been used to uncover certain features of reality. Finally, I conclude with responses to three objections concerning insight and the existence of genuine essences. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é examinar a relação entre ser e perceber a partir da análise do princípio central da filosofia de George Berkeley - esse est percipi -, conforme é apresentado na obra A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge. Para desenvolver essa análise e seguindo o tratamento dado por Grayling à fundamentação desse princípio, pretendemos mostrar que os argumentos de Berkeley se dispõem em três níveis: o estritamente empírico ; o fenômenico ; e o metafísico que, em (...) última instânci, explica os dois anteriores. (shrink)

Este artigo examina algumas aproximações e distanciamentos de Merleau-Ponty em relação à filosofia de Bergson, tendo em vista que Merleau-Ponty parece dividido quanto ao seu parecer sobre a concepção bergsoniana do tempo. Essa oscilação entre crítica e elogio é certamente visível na Fenomenologia da percepção, na qual Merleau-Ponty reconhece que Bergson teria dissolvido a questão do dualismo ao afirmar que “o corpo e o espírito se comunicam pela mediação do tempo”. Entretanto, Merleau-Ponty vai denunciar outra espécie de dualismo bergsoniano, que (...) pretende reencontrar a unidade na multiplicidade por meio do conceito de “multiplicidade de fusão”. Nesse sentido, a metáfora bergsoniana da “bola de neve” procura caracterizar a essência do tempo enquanto duração. (shrink)

First published in 1991, this book -- through the examination of ancient Greek literary, philosophical and legal texts -- analyses how the Athenian torture of slaves emerged from and reinforced the concept of truth as something hidden in the human body. It discusses the tradition of understanding truth as something that is generally concealed and the ideas of 'secret space' in both the female body and the Greek temple. This philosophy and practice is related to Greek views of the 'Other' (...) (women and outsiders) and considers the role of torture in distinguishing slave and free in ancient Athens. A wide range of perspectives -- from Plato to Sartre -- are employed to examine the subject. (shrink)

This chapter presents an essay by W. E. B. Du Bois on the strivings of the American Negro. He cites the double-consciousness of the Negro, the sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness—an American, a Negro two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength (...) alone keeps it from being torn asunder. He argues that the history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,—this longing to attain self—conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to present several immediate consequences of the introduction of a new constant called Lambda in order to represent the object ``nothing" or ``void" into a standard set theory. The use of Lambda will appear natural thanks to its role of condition of possibility of sets. On a conceptual level, the use of Lambda leads to a legitimation of the empty set and to a redefinition of the notion of set. It lets also clearly appear (...) the distinction between the empty set, the nothing and the ur-elements. On a technical level, we introduce the notion of pre-element and we suggest a formal definition of the nothing distinct of that of the null-class. Among other results, we get a relative resolution of the anomaly of the intersection of a family free of sets and the possibility of building the empty set from ``nothing". The theory is presented with equi-consistency results . On both conceptual and technical levels, the introduction of Lambda leads to a resolution of the Russell's puzzle of the null-class. (shrink)

Adolf Reinach was one of the leading figures of the Munich and Göttingen circles of phenomenology, and Husserl's first real co-worker. Although his writings are highly original and remarkably clear, Reinach's tragic death in the First World War prevented him from formulating a definitive statement of his phenomenology, leaving his name virtually unknown to all but a small circle. In his ground-breaking study, Judgment and Sachverhalt, DuBois shows how Reinach succeeds in developing a realist ontology and epistemology based on (...) rigorous argumentation and phenomenological elucidation. Drawing from numerous texts and the developments of Reinach's students and colleagues - Roman Ingarden, Alexander Pfänder and Dietrich von Hildebrand above all - DuBois presents, refines and defends Reinach's `phenomenological realism'. Confrontations of Reinach's theories of states of affairs, concepts and speech acts with the work of contemporary authors like Chisholm and Searle allow readers to evaluate Reinach's philosophy, not only in the light of the later developments of Husserl, but also in the light of certain Anglo-American developments. (shrink)

The debates on the scientificity of social sciences in general, and sociology in particular, are recurring. From the original methodenstreitat the end the 19th Century to the contemporary controversy on the legitimacy of “regional epistemologies”, a same set of interrogations reappears. Are social sciences really scientific? And if so, are they sciences like other sciences? How should we conceive “research programs” Lakatos (1978) or “research traditions” for Laudan (1977) able to produce advancement of knowledge in the field of social and (...) human phenomena? Is the progress of knowledge in social sciences similar to the one generally observed in natural sciences? Is it possible to evaluate the relative merits of each one of these research programs? -/- These debates are important vectors of social and intellectual polarization. The historical divide between the positivist and the hermeneutics poles precedes the structure of the contemporary debate around the epistemic space of social sciences, It is not only a question of renewing the opposition between a monist view of sciences (e.g. McIntyre, 1996) and a dualistic one (e.g. Geertz, 1973) or even a trialist view of sciences (e.g. Lepenies, 1985). It is also a question of asserting dichotomies transformed into framework (including when it is a question of exceeding them): nature-culture, nomothetic-idiographic, models-narrative, structure-history, cause-reason, explanation-comprehension. -/- In this short introduction, we provide, in section 2, a first overview of this epistemological debate in social science. Section 3 proposes a different standpoint on the same questions, by introducing both ontological and methodological aspects in this basic epistemological debate. Namely, following (Hollis, 1994) oppositions of the explanation - understanding, causes - meaning, etc., types discussed in the firsts ection are comparatively examined together with oppositions of the structure - action, holism - individualism types. This allows us to discus show multi-agent design, by integrating various dimensions and standpoints in the same framework (Phan, Amblard, 2007, Chapters 1, 5, 14) can help us to shift these boundaries, and to bypass these oppositions. As model building and ontology design are at the core of this process (Phan, Amblard, 2007, Chapter 12), Section4 discusses various issues of the art of modelling, starting both from economists’ and sociologists’ current standpoints. (shrink)

Contribution à l'histoire culturelle des conceptions et des mentalités. Entre Paracelse et Montaigne, un panorama, à travers les oeuvres marquantes, de la logique et de la pratique de la faculté imaginative durant cette époque fertile en recommencements. [SDM].

La nouvelle sociologie des sciences réunit un ensemble d'études consacrées aux programmes de recherche dits " fort " et " constructiviste ". Ces programmes, véritables orthodoxies en sociologie des sciences, ont en commun de se focaliser sur le processus de la recherche et d'en donner une représentation singulière : " relativiste " pour le premier, " contingentiste " pour le second. Là où les ouvrages existants consacrés à ces programmes prennent essentiellement le parti de la description, il revendique celui de (...) l'analyse critique. Il propose une réflexion d'ensemble sur les limites de ces approches sociologiques et sur la représentation des sciences qui s'y rapportent : limites de la conception générale de l'explication sociologique et de ses applications, du caractère inédit de ses thèses et principes généraux, de la transposition de données et démarches venues de disciplines voisines, etc. L'ouvrage vient à la suite de l'affaire Sokal au cours de laquelle les représentants de la " nouvelle sociologie des sciences " ont été ouvertement pris à parti par une partie de la communauté scientifique. Il n'invite pas à l'abandon de l'analyse sociologique du processus de recherche mais à une redéfinition des modalités de cette analyse. (shrink)

Early childhood is characterized by many cognitive developmentalists as a period of considerable change with respect to representational format. Dienes & Perner present a potentially viable theory for the stages involved in the increasingly explicit representation of knowledge. However, in our view they fail to map their multi-level system of explicitness onto cognitive developmental changes that occur in the first years of life. Specifically, we question the theory's heuristic value when applied to the development of early mind reading and categorization. (...) We conclude that the authors fail to present evidence that dispels the view that knowledge change in these areas is dichotomous. (shrink)

Tomasello et al. have presented a position that is grounded in a conservative perspective of cultural learning, as well as in a rich interpretation of recent findings in early social cognition. Although I applaud their theoretical framework, I argue that data from studies of human infants are not necessarily consistent with the developmental picture that they describe.

Carey proposes a theory of conceptual development that specifies innate conceptual representations that get learning started. Those representations are the output of innate domain-specific input analyzers. I contend that innate core cognition about agency is itself a gradual construction and that the role of Quinian bootstrapping needs elaboration to account for the development of intuitive theories of psychology.

The Freedmen's Bureau is a government of men that arose in the South. Lasting legally, from 1865 to 1872, but in a sense from 1861 to 1876, it sought to settle the Negro problems in the United States of America. This chapter presents an essay by W. E. B. Du Bois that examines the Freedmen's Bureau—the occasion of its rise, the character of its work, and its final success and failure—not only as a part of American history, but as one (...) of the most singular and interesting of the attempts made by a great nation to grapple with vast problems of race and social condition. (shrink)