Kolbe and de Melo-Martin (2023) raise important concerns about the limited usefulness of measures of moral distress. They propose that moral distress is best measured in terms of “illegitimate inst...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhisms and DeconstructionsFrancis X. Clooney, SJBuddhisms and Deconstructions. Edited by Jin Y. Park, with an afterword by Robert Magliola. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006. Pp. xxii + 290.Buddhisms and Deconstructions originated in a panel on "Buddhism, Deconstruction, and the Works of Robert Magliola" at the twenty-second annual convention [End Page 182] of the International Association for Philosophy and Literature. Half its essays began as conference (...) papers, while the rest (including several published elsewhere) were solicited for the volume. Implicit too are an awareness of other volumes—for example, Harold Coward's Derrida and Indian Philosophy (1990) and (with Toby Foshay) Derrida and Negative Theology (1992)—and the conviction that such volumes, although making a contribution, have not adequately sorted out what can usefully be said with respect to that tantalizingly elusive couple, deconstruction and Buddhism.The volume exemplifies many starting points and avenues for testing the Buddhism-deconstruction relationship, but all of it is clearly mapped. "Buddhism and Deconstruction" (section 1) illumines some basic issues underlying Buddhist-deconstructionist comparisons: "Naming the Unnameable: Dependent Co-arising and Différence" (Jin Y. Park) and "Nagarjuna and Deconstruction" (Ian Mabbett). "Buddhism Deconstructs" (section 2) explores how deconstruction can be analyzed from a Buddhist perspective, and includes "Derridean and Madhyamika Buddhist Theories of Deconstruction" (Zong-qi Cai) and "Indra's Postmodern Net" (David R. Loy). "Deconstructing Buddhism" (section 3), with essays on "Deconstructive and Foundationalist Tendencies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism" (Roger R. Jackson) and "Ji Zang's Sunyata-Speech: Derridean Denegation with Buddhist Negations" (Ellen Y. Zhang), looks in the other direction, still further deconstructing Buddhism. "Chan/Zen Buddhist Deconstruction" (section 4) furthers the critique with another pair of detailed analyses, "The Chan Deconstruction of Buddha Nature" (Youru Wang) and "Sudao: Repeating the Question in Chan Discourse" (Frank W. Stevenson). All these authors stick with cases in order to test the larger Buddhism and deconstruction hypothesis, showing, unsurprisingly, that similarities and differences make comparisons work out in different ways and for different conclusions. It matters which Buddhist tradition is brought into play, how one interprets some particular Buddhist thinker, and (because almost everyone here is thinking of "Derrida" and "deconstruction" at the same time) how someone with Buddhist learning ought to read which early or late essay by Derrida. Altogether, these eight essays illumine specific examples and contribute to the volume's larger topic, as we narrow down and define the Budhism-Deconstructionism conversation. Loy perhaps speaks for many of the authors here:From a Buddhist perspective, the post-structural realization that the meaning of a text cannot be totalized—that language/thought never attains a self-presence which escapes differences—is an important step towards the realization that there is no abiding-place for the mind anywhere within Indra's net. But the textual dissemination liberated by Derrida's deconstruction will not be satisfactory unless the dualist sense-of-self—not just its discourse—has been deconstructed.(p. 80)Or, as Ellen Zhang soberly puts it, [End Page 183]The play of sunyata/denegation implies a movement of thought that sees the surplus of thought, and understanding this surplus sometimes requires the un-thought. The moment of negativity is, therefore, also the moment of construction and creativity. Sunyata/denegation is not simply a nihilistic place of reducing meaning to non-meaning, reality to non-reality. On the contrary, it is the moment of emancipation of meanings, we find in the Chinese traditions from Zhuangzi to Buddhist philosophers and Chan masters. Meanwhile, the experiential dimensions in the process of transforming our thought and consciousness explored by Daoism and Buddhism also offer a possible critique of postmodern discourse.(p. 121)One could well imagine an entire volume made of just these essays with just such insights.But there is more. In "Deconstructing Life-Worlds" (section 5), two essays—"The Veil Rent in Twain: A Buddhist Reading of Robert Magliola's Deconstructive Chiasm" (Jane Augustine) and "Emmanuel, Robert" (Gad Horowitz)—remind us that the volume is indeed a still more complex three-way conversation, including also the writings and personality (evident by the vehicle of an Afterword) of Robert Magliola, a scholar of both Buddhism (which he teaches... (shrink)

A question of recent interest in epistemology and philosophy of mind is how belief and credence relate to each other. A number of philosophers argue for a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On the belief-first view, what it is to have a credence just is to have a particular kind of belief, that is, a belief whose content involves probabilities or epistemic modals. Here, I argue against the belief-first view: specifically, I argue that it cannot account (...) for agents who have credences in propositions they barely comprehend. I conclude that, however credences differ from beliefs, they do not differ in virtue of adding additional content to the believed proposition. (shrink)

Many evidentialists are impermissivists. But there’s no in-principle reason for this. In this paper, I examine and motivate permissivist evidentialism. Not only are permissivism and evidentialism compatible but there are unique benefits that arise for this combination of views. In particular, permissivist evidentialism respects the importance of evidence while capturing its limitations and provides a plausible and attractive explanation of the relationship between the epistemic and non-epistemic. Permissivist evidentialism is thus an attractive option in logical space that hasn’t received enough (...) attention. (shrink)

The literature on faith has largely focused on the relationship between faith and belief, specifically the question: does faith entail belief? At the same time, it’s also widely held that faith involves a desire or pro-attitude, but more attention has been paid to the specifics of faith’s doxastic component than to faith’s affective component. This paper focuses on the relationship between faith and desire. I’ll argue that faith is weakly positive: while faith may not always involve a flat-out desire, faith (...) necessarily involves a positive desire-like attitude. (shrink)

Credences are similar to levels of confidence, represented as a value on the [0,1] interval. This chapter sheds light on questions about credence, including its relationship to full belief, with an eye toward the empirical relevance of credence. First, I’ll provide a brief epistemological history of credence and lay out some of the main theories of the nature of credence. Then, I’ll provide an overview of the main views on how credences relate to full beliefs. Finally, I’ll turn to the (...) empirical, and suggest some ways that cognitive science does and could answer questions about credence, such as what credences one has, how credences relate to beliefs, and the extent to which we can control our credences. (shrink)

Pascal’s wager is unique among theistic arguments. It does not aim to establish that God exists but instead concludes that you ought to believe in, or wager on, God. In this chapter, I provide an overview of Pascal’s wager and discuss different approaches to the wager. Then, I consider how to motivate a wager for Christianity in particular. I also address common Christian objections to the wager. Finally, I cover the practical importance of Pascal’s wager for both Christians and non-Christians.

This paper examines whether atheists, who believe that God does not exist, can have faith. Of course, atheists have certain kinds of faith: faith in their friends, faith in certain ideals, and faith in themselves. However, the question we’ll examine is whether atheists can have theistic faith: faith that God exists. Philosophers tend to fall on one of two extremes on this question: some, like Dan Howard-Snyder (2019) and Imran Aijaz (2023), say unequivocally no; others, like Robert Whitaker (2019) and (...) Sam Lebens (2023), say unequivocally yes. Here, I take a middle position: I argue that atheists can have action-focused theistic faith (faith in how they act) but not attitude-focused theistic faith (faith in what attitudes they have). (shrink)

This essay proposes a design perspective on argumentation, intended as complementary to empirical and critical scholarship. In any substantive domain, design can provide insights that differ from those provided by scientific or humanistic perspectives. For argumentation, the key advantage of a design perspective is the recognition that humanity’s natural capacity for reason and reasonableness can be extended through inventions that improve on unaided human intellect. Historically, these inventions have fallen into three broad classes: logical systems, scientific methods, and disputation frameworks. (...) Behind each such invention is a specifiable “design hypothesis”: an idea about how to decrease error or how to increase the quality of outcomes from reasoning. As problems in contemporary argumentation practice become more complex, design thinking rises in relevance and importance. A design research agenda in argumentation would focus on theorizing design innovations and on evaluating design hypotheses. (shrink)

Venn diagrams, which are widely used in introductory logic courses, provide a convenient and illuminating way of presenting the various theories concerning the nature of law. When combined with the Aristotelian square of opposition, these diagrams show not only how the theories are related to one another, logically, which is essential to understanding them, but also which theories are compossible. One surprising result of this approach is that it shows the substantive compatibility of the theories of law set forth by (...) H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin, who are usually pitted against one another. I show, through quotation and visual representation, that there is no essential disagreement between these jurisprudential stalwarts concerning the relation of law and morality. (shrink)

Much of the excitement about virtual reality and its potential for things like entertainment, art, education, and activism is its ability to generate experiences that are powerfully immersive. However, discussions of VR tend to invoke the notion of immersive experience without subjecting it to closer scrutiny; and discussions often take it for granted that immersive experience is a single unified phenomenon. Against this, we argue that there are four distinct types or aspects of immersive experience that should be distinguished: representational (...) immersion, which corresponds roughly to what is sometimes called “psychological presence”; participatory immersion, which is related to the interactive aspects of VR experience; affective immersion, which has to do with the subject’s emotional relation to the experience; and narrative immersion, which captures the phenomenon of being caught up in the flow of events experienced. We argue that this four-way distinction helps us understand the powerfully immersive character of VR, while also recognizing its continuity with the immersion we experience with media such as novels, films, and music. We also argue that the account of immersion we offer here lets us better understand the connection between VR and empathy, charting a middle course between extreme enthusiasts who view VR as the ultimate “empathy machine” and extreme skeptics who argue that this attitude is misguided. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that theistic belief is permissive belief. This is not a universal claim about persons or normative domains, but the claim that, for many common bodies of evidence, epistemic rationality is permissive about whether God exists. Marks of a permissive belief are rational disagreement over time, rational disagreement over persons, and powerful evidence on both sides. I argue that theistic belief fits all these criteria. I also show how considerations from divine hiddenness support permissivism about theism. (...) Then, I show how these considerations support intrapersonal permissivism about theistic belief, using Peter Van Inwagen’s (1994) Quam Dialecta as a case study. Finally, I reply to objections. (shrink)

This paper compares two ‘relativist’ theories about deliciousness: truth-relativism, and Kit Fine’s non-factualism about a subject-matter. Contemporary truth-relativism is presented as a linguistic thesis; its metaphysical underpinning is often neglected. I distinguish three views about the obtaining of worldly states of affairs concerning deliciousness, and argue that none yields a satisfactory version of truth-relativism. Finean non-factualism about deliciousness is not subject to the problems with truth-relativism. I conclude that Finean non-factualism is the better relativist theory. As I explain, non-facualism about (...) deliciousness is happily combined with an invariantist semantics for the word “delicious”. On this approach, relativism is a matter for a metaphysical theory, not a linguistic one. (shrink)

Savulescu argues that it may be ethically acceptable for governments to require citizens be vaccinated against COVID-19. He also recommends that governments consider providing monetary or in-kind incentives to citizens to increase vaccination rates. In this response, we argue against mandatory vaccination and vaccine incentivisation, and instead suggest that targeted public health messaging and a greater responsiveness to the concerns of vaccine-hesitant individuals would be the best strategy to address low vaccination rates.

I argue that the three drugs example makes trouble for the role Smith gives to being fully rational in his solution to the moral problem, given his understanding of what it takes to be fully rational. I conclude by suggesting he might have drawn on a different understanding of what it takes to be fully rational.

In this paper I will explore a phenomenology of the menstrual cycle, focusing on the cycle’s rhythm as a form of lived temporality. Drawing on the work of Henri Lefebvre and Thomas Fuchs I will outline a key connection between embodiment and rhythmic temporality more generally, before applying this analysis to the rhythm of the menstrual cycle specifically. I will consider the phenomenology of the experience of cycling through the phases of pre-ovulation, ovulation, pre-menstruation and menstruation as a pattern, or (...) specifically an embodied rhythm that constitutes a form of lived temporality. I will consider a way that the subject may potentially be alienated from this rhythm as a result of a dominant cultural narrative of “linear time”. I will argue further that this dissonance between the menstrual body and the contemporary world tends to be compounded by a lack of “menstrual literacy” in education and culture. (shrink)

This special issue includes a series of interviews with the past women presidents of the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia (PESA), including Felicity Haynes, Nesta Devine, Tina Besley, and Liz Jackson. This article sets the stage for reading the interviews, though an extended dialogue between the two authors of this project. In what follows, the authors reflect on insights gleaned from the interviews, and the past and future of women leadership in philosophy of education. Using a dialogical format, (...) it highlights different experiences and similar challenges across generations, questions what has changed versus what has stayed the same over decades, and elaborates on the value of the interviews for readers coming from different academic generations and subject positions. It reflects on the state of the field and its future directions from the perspectives of two women philosophers working and thinking across generations. (shrink)

Este artigo busca dimensionar um conjunto de políticas públicas nacionais para a juventude desenvolvidas e implementadas durante os anos 2000 no Brasil. Neste âmbito, propõe discutir a variedade dos conceitos de juventude, principalmente relacionados ao limite cronológico e a algumas ideias relacionadas, entre as quais, ocupação do tempo, pobreza e risco social associados ao indivíduo considerado jovem pela Sociologia. O objetivo principal é levantar e resumir dados importantes sobre algumas políticas nacionais para a juventude, refletindo sobre a escola, principalmente a (...) instituição pública, como espaço para a diminuição da vulnerabilidade social, propondo reflexões sobre o papel do administrador escolar e do orientador educacional na viabilização do acesso a direitos para a população jovem. (shrink)

Modern society has long been a spectacle. As defined by Guy Debord, a spectacle is not a collection of images but rather a social relationship mediated by images in a consumer economy. Whereas the spectacle offers the illusion of consumer choice, behind each manifestation is to be found the same alienation. Such aimless, persistent consumption does not lead to personal fulfillment but to drudgery. Breaking free of the spectacle is facilitated by an awareness of the symbiotic relationship between ideology and (...) revolution. As such, it is useful to those who are exhausted and disillusioned by rampant consumerism to examine how variants of the terms ideology and revolution were employed by Debord in The Society of the Spectacle, and to use that understanding as a basis for individual and collective liberation. To that end, this study examined variants of the terms ideology and revolution at the sentence level of usage. The results provide a comprehensive comparison of the themes and sentiments of those variants. Revolutionary freedom from the spectacle can only be achieved by overcoming the consumerist ideology embedded at the core of the capitalist regime of power. (shrink)

Scientists and engineers who extensively use the term “nanomachine” are not always aware of the philosophical implications of this term. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the concept of nanomachine through a distinction between three major paradigms of machine. After a brief presentation of two well-known paradigms - Cartesian mechanistic machines and Von Neumann’s complex and uncontrolled machines – we will argue that Drexler’s model was mainly Cartesian. But what about the model of his critics? We propose a (...) third model - Gilbert Simondon’s notion of concrete machines – which seems more appropriate to understand nanomachines than the notion of “soft machines”. Finally we review a few strategies currently used to design nanomachines, in an effort to determine which paradigm they belong to. (shrink)

Presents a history of physics from the dawn of science to the present through coverage of one hundred scientific breakthroughs in the discipline, including force and inertia, hidden heat, the Doppler effect, cloud chambers, and string theory.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Plotinus and the Parmenz'des B. DARRELL JACKSON IN 1928 E. R. DODDSARGUED that the first two hypotheses of Plato's Parmenides are the primary source of Plotinus' doctrines of the One and of Nous. I Dodds' main evidence was a list of parallels between the Parmenides and the Enneads? He argued further that the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Parmenides as positive metaphysics was neo-Pythagorean in origin. Several Plotinus scholars (...) have accepted and extended Dodds' view of the importance of the Parmenides for Plotinus. This group includes ]~mile Br6hier, ~ A. H. Armstrong, 4 Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, 5 and Paul Henry. n But Dodds' position is by no means universally accepted. Elmer O'Brien has recently argued that the Plotinian One was derived ultimately from Philo and mediated to Plotinus through Albinus and Numenius. 7 He says that Dodds' case, though good, is not convincing. It. A. Wolfson has been the great advocate of the Philonic origin of Plotinus' views. According to Wolfson, the doctrines attributed by Plotinus to Plato are not Plato's but mainly Philo's. 8 Others see Plotinus in varying degrees of dependence upon Plato. Philip Merlan holds that Plotinus is more in debt to the immediate successors of Plato and to Aristotle's interpretation of Plato than to the Platonic writings themselves. 9 C. J. de Vogel sees Plotinus as dependent upon Plato for a hierarchy of being which was accepted and elaborated by various middle Platonists and Gnostics. 1~According to de Vogel, the Parmenides wus not importan% in this hierarchy tradition, n In this article I shall re-examine Dodds' position. I believe the case for Plotinus' dependence upon the Parmenides can be strengthened. I shall try to do this by examining the systematic relation of Plotinus' thought to the Parmenides. Dodds x"The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One'," The Classical Quarterly, XXII (1928), 129-142. 2Ibid., 132 f. *In the introductions to Enneads V.3 (esp. pp. 43 f., 46 f.), V.5 (pp. 87 ft.), VI.4-5 (pp. 161163,165-168),and VI.7 (pp. 49, 60) in his Bud~ edition and translation of the Enneads (Paris, 1931-38). 4The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Cambridge, at the University Press: 1940), pp. 14-28. In his article "Plotinos", Vol. 21, pt. 1 of Paulys Real-Encyclopgdie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, 1951, cols. 552-554. eIntroduction to the second edition of Stephen MacKenna's translation of the Ennead.~ (New York: Pantheon Books Inc., n. d.), pp. xli-xliv. Elmer O'Brien (ed. and trans.), The Essential Plotinus (New York: Mentor, 1964),p. 15. 8"Albinus and Plotinus on Divine Attributes," Harvard Theological Review, XXXXV (1952), 115. 9From Platonism to Neoplatonism (2n ed. rev.; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960). 10"On the Neoplatonic Character of Platonism and the Platonic Character of Neoplatonism," Mind, LXIII (1953), 43-64. 11Ibid., 58. [3]5] 316 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY considered only parallel terminology. I shall in addition look at parallel argumentation and conclusions. Furthermore, since Dodds accounts only for Plotinus' first two hypostases, I shall consider the relation of the third hypostasis (soul) to the Parmenides. My primary interest is not the source of Plotinus' interpretation of the Parmenides but the way he carries that interpretation out. TM The former issue has often been focal in the literature on this subject. ~8It is certain thay many of the ideas used by Plotinus were already in circulation. But it is equally certain that in his combination of these ideas of a hierarchy, of transcendence, etc., Plotinus is original. I shall argue that this originality of combination is largely determined by an interpretation of the Parmenides. I should add that I am not concerned with whether Plotinus' interpretation is correct. ~4 In the following pages I shall attempt to show three things: (1) how Plotinus explicitly interprets the Parmenides, (2) to what extent he draws upon the language of the Parmenides, and (3) to what extent Plotinus' system may be understood by its relation to the Parmenides. I. Plotinus' Interpretation of the Parmenides The obvious place to begin an analysis of Plotinus' relation to the Parmenides is Enneads V... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dostoevsky, Girard, LevinasApocalyptic Frenzy and Eschatological Ethics in Dostoevsky's DevilsJ. A. Jackson (bio)In his interview with René Girard, Benoît Chantre connects the mimetic theory of René Girard with the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, observing, "It is in the confrontation with otherness that the individual acquires self-consciousness. The self has no meaning except in the relationship, even when the relationship takes the form of a duel. Can we not (...) say, following Levinas, that only experience of war can allow us to think about reconciliation?" Girard concurs and expands: "According to what you have said, Levinas saw the duel, like love, as an escape from totality that we absolutely need. However, it is in this sense that it explodes totality…. By affirming that the duel is already the relationship to the Other, it shows that the relationship sits at the heart of violent reciprocity."1 How fitting that a discussion regarding the thought of Girard and Levinas should center at some point on the duel, an act of violence, of course, and yet an event also pregnant with ethical implications, as rivals must respond face-to-face. Perhaps we should not be so surprised that our two thinkers should fashion the duel as both a temptation to murder and the command "Thou shalt [End Page 227] not murder"; both men have a deep love and sense of indebtedness to the Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky, a man in whose works the duel—both literal and relational—often plays a crucial narrative, and penitential, role.As the conversation between Chantre and Girard reveals, the pairing of Girard and Levinas seems wholly natural and still much underappreciated.2 Dostoevsky seems to be a natural interlocutor, as one cannot help but feel Dostoevsky's hyperbolic excessiveness coursing through the works of both Girard and Levinas. To read Dostoevsky now, thanks to Girard, one cannot help but be dazzled by Dostoevsky's genius regarding mimetic desire and modern man's underground psychology, the very foundations for Girard's notion of the Apocalyptic. To read Levinas means having the notion of infinite responsibility illumined by Dostoevsky's beautiful religious meditations, where previously one may have only seen Dostoevsky's relishing the idea of the impossible, a mixture of monastic asceticism, Karamozovan passion, and Dostoevsky's own romantic proclivities.3 In this essay, I wish to pursue a reading of Dostoevsky's Devils with Girard's thoughts on apocalypticism and mimetic frenzy—with its inherent focus on the human "political" community—on one side. This is, in turn, partnered with Levinas's sense of the eschatological as an anarchic response to history and politics, with ethics being prior to both politics and history. Most importantly, however, I want to offer my own reading of Dostoevsky and investigate his own position inside of this exchange. To this end, alongside Levinas's idea of eschatology, especially as spelled out in Totality and Infinity, and Girard's often understated, yet very-much-present notion of positive mimesis (love), I also investigate Dostoevsky's notion of kenosis, a key idea in Dostoevsky's anthropology, psychology, and theology.René Girard has always maintained that he did not invent his mimetic theory—that he simply needed only to listen to what great authors like Cervantes, Dante, Shakespeare, Proust, and, especially, Dostoevsky had to say about desire. Indeed, Dostoevsky maintains a central position in Girard's first book, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, and is his only subject matter in Resurrection from the Underground. The connection between Girard and Dostoevsky became even more profound for Girard: "When I wrote the last chapter of my first book, I had a vague idea of what I would do, but as the chapter took form I realized I was undergoing my own version of the experience I was describing. I was particularly attracted to the Christian elements, for example, Stepan Verkhovensky's final journeys and turn to the Gospel before his death. So I began to read the Gospels and the rest of the bible. And I turned into a Christian."4 One can find in much of Girard's meditations on Dostoevsky the seeds of so many [End Page 228] of his... (shrink)

Respect for patient autonomy is a central principle of medical ethics. However, there are important unresolved questions about the characteristics of an autonomous decision, and whether some autonomous preferences should be subject to more scrutiny than others. In this paper, we consider whether _inappropriately adaptive preferences_—preferences that are based on and that may perpetuate social injustice—should be categorised as autonomous in a way that gives them normative authority. Some philosophers have argued that inappropriately adaptive preferences do not have normative authority, (...) because they are only a reflection of a person’s social context and not of their true self. Under this view, medical professionals who refuse to carry out actions which are based on inappropriately adaptive preferences are not in fact violating their patient’s autonomy. However, we argue that it is very difficult to articulate a systematic and principled distinction between normal autonomous preferences and inappropriately adaptive preferences, especially if this distinction needs to be useful for clinicians in real-life situations. This makes it difficult to argue that inappropriately adaptive preferences are straightforwardly non-autonomous. Given this problem, we argue that there are significant theoretical issues with contemporary understandings of autonomy in bioethics. We discuss what this might mean for the practice of medicine and for medical ethics education. (shrink)

We introduce two new belief revision axioms: partial monotonicity and consequence correctness. We show that partial monotonicity is consistent with but independent of the full set of axioms for a Gärdenfors belief revision sytem. In contrast to the Gärdenfors inconsistency results for certain monotonicity principles, we use partial monotonicity to inform a consistent formalization of the Ramsey test within a belief revision system extended by a conditional operator. We take this to be a technical dissolution of the well-known Gärdenfors dilemma.In (...) addition, we present the consequential correctness axiom as a new measure of minimal revision in terms of the deductive core of a proposition whose support we wish to excise. We survey several syntactic and semantic belief revision systems and evaluate them according to both the Gärdenfors axioms and our new axioms. Furthermore, our algebraic characterization of semantic revision systems provides a useful technical device for analysis and comparison, which we illustrate with several new proofs. (shrink)

Bajo la inspiración de la performance Lips of Thomas de Marina Abramovic, se examinan en este trabajo las fisuras y las paradojas que plantea un posible circuito interpersonal del dolor, en el que se distinguen al menos cuatro momentos: experiencia álgica, expresión doliente, reconocimiento y comportamiento de ayuda. Nos detenemos especialmente en el caso de una experiencia álgica a la que no corresponde sorprendentemente una expresión, y también en el caso de una expresión doliente que ha de superar múltiples dificultades (...) para su reconocimiento. Mientras que el dolor agudo parece el verdadero actor que se despliega y manifiesta en la escena sin abrir apenas espacio a una modulación personal, el dolor crónico puede llegar a exigir una cuidadosa puesta en escena para alcanzar paradójicamente el reconocimiento de su mera realidad. Las múltiples fisuras y paradojas en la experiencia, expresión y reconocimiento del dolor pueden deberse, en definitiva, no a una disfunción casual de un circuito funcional y operante, sino al carácter disruptivo, destructivo o aberrante de una experiencia álgica que se manifiesta en último término como experiencia del mal. (shrink)

La propuesta sobre el objetivo supremo del ser humano ofrecida por Avempache —filósofo y comentador aristotélico—, consiste en la unión absoluta de ambos: el intelecto-alma del sujeto y el intelecto agente, éste caracterizado por ser uno, separado, eterno, además de que contiene en sí las formas espirituales universales de todas las cosas. Por esta razón la inmaterialidad del alma así como su inmortalidad están garantizadas, debido a la absoluta espiritualidad del intelecto. Es por la corrupción dada en las sociedades y (...) prácticas políticas que el objetivo final es alcanzado mediante la mejor manera de vivir, la cual consiste en soledad y reflexión; sólo de esta manera se adquiere la más alta perfección. Después de comprender la relevancia que Avempache asigna al intelecto agente, Alberto Magno negó la posibilidad de la unión con el intelecto mencionado, debido a la abolición de toda pluralidad así como la disolución de toda individualidad. (shrink)

En Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard defiende la conclusión de que el imperativo categórico rige la acción humana porque es el único principio que permite alcanzar la unidad psíquica plena, la cual, según Korsgaard, es un prerrequisito esencial para la acción efectiva. Para los agentes humanos, alcanzar esa unidad -que consiste en hacer coherentes distintos impulsos hacia la acción- es una actividad constante, denominada "autoconstitución". De acuerdo con Korsgaard, ésta es la fuente originaria de la normatividad y (...) de las identidades prácticas e incluso de la identidad personal. Después de exponer las ideas centrales del libro, presento dos objeciones: primero, critico la equiparación del imperativo categórico con la autoconstitución exitosa, pues no toda falla de auto-constitución es una falla moral. Segundo, argumento que la tesis de que la identidad personal es producto de la autoconstitución es problemática y que, al defenderla, Korsgaard confunde identidad práctica con identidad personal. In Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard argues that the categorical imperative rules human action because it is the sole principle that allows us to reach the complete psychic unity that, Korsgaard thinks, is an essential prerequisite for effective action. Reaching this unity -which consists in making cohere diverging impulses for action- is for human agents a constant activity called "self-constitution." According to Korsgaard, this activity is the source of normativity, of human practical identities and even of personal identity. After explaining the main ideas of the book, I present two objections. First, I criticize the linkage of the categorical imperative to successful self-constitution, for not every failure of the latter counts as a moral failure. Second, I argue that the thesis that personal identity is a product of self-constitution is problematic and that it betrays a confusion between practical identity and personal identity. (shrink)

Brasil tiene una larga historia de problemas ambientales, pero la filosofía parece ir atrás de otras disciplinas que activamente consideran esta historia. Sin embargo, existe una tradición intelectual suficientemente rica para permitir el surgimiento de una filosofía ambiental genuina. Basados sobre una detallada panorámica de las discusiones pertenecientes a la reflexión ambiental y al activismo en Brasil, este trabajo revela tres campos de tensión en su historiaambiental reciente –desarrollismo militar versus activismo ambiental militante, realismo antropocéntrico versus utopía ecocéntrica, desarrollo sostenible (...) versus sostenibilidad dura–todo lo cual presupone posiciones filosóficas y representa tres correspondientes "culpables intelectuales" que deben abordarse. Entre las tendencias emergentes de la filosofía ambiental, pueden destacarse dos avenidas de pensamiento que prometen dispersar estos "culpables": pluralismo etnocultural y responsabilidad ambiental global. (shrink)

Background: Moral sensitivity is the first step towards ethical decision-making. This sensitivity should form a basic attitude in healthcare team members, particularly nurses, toward providing effective and ethical care. This is highlighted in intensive care units (ICUs) where close attention should be paid to patient rights and moral or ethical decision-making. Objective: The present study aimed at determining and comparing the effect of written simulation and computer simulation of a virtual patient on the development of moral sensitivity of ICU nurses. (...) Research design: Randomized controlled trial with one control arm and two experimental arms. Participants and content: This study involved 204 ICU nurses working in hospitals affiliated to Tehran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran, from 2019 to 2021 using a random allocation method. The participants were allocated to three groups comprising virtual patient computer simulation, written simulation, and the no simulation control group. After training based on a Patient Rights Charter, five scenarios, with themes reflecting the clauses of the Patient’s Rights Charter, were written as a computer program and text for the computer simulation and written simulation groups, respectively. Finally, nurses' moral sensitivity was assessed using the Lützén moral sensitivity questionnaire as pre- and post-tests (immediately and 2 months after the intervention). Ethical considerations: Ethical permission was obtained for the study. All the participants signed the informed consent before the study onset. Results: The study results showed a significant difference in moral sensitivity among the three groups before the intervention ( p = 0.003). Immediately after the intervention compared to pre-intervention, the three groups showed no significant differences in this regard ( p = 0.056), however a significant difference among the three groups was found 2 months post-intervention ( p < 0.001). (shrink)