We introduce the Vital Sign Ontology (VSO), an extension of the Ontology for General Medical Science (OGMS) that covers the consensus human vital signs: blood pressure, body temperature, respiratory rate, and pulse rate. VSO provides a controlled structured vocabulary for describing vital sign measurement data, the processes of measuring vital signs, and the anatomical entities participating in such measurements. VSO is implemented in OWL-DL and follows OBO Foundry guidelines and best practices. If properly developed and extended, we believe the VSO (...) will find applications for the EMR, clinical informatics, and medical device communities. (shrink)

Rather than regarding dreams as "things" or property, and grammatically treating them as nouns, the suggestion is to formulate a dream as an activity, label it "dreaming" and more specifically accept dreaming as interactional. For dreaming to be of importance, several psychological factors must be considered, including retention and selection, as well as external factors, such as to whom dreams are reported and their style of communication. Examples from anthropological writers on dreams are provided. It is noted that societal beliefs (...) about dreams tend to influence the amount and types of dreams that are communicated. (shrink)

The definitive principle of actualism is that the world is composed wholly of actual or factual entities, including concreta like a horse and abstracta like his neigh, and the sums and the sets thereof, all on the one plane of particular and definite existents. There are no substrata of potency or prime matter, no forces or virtues, no blur of indefiniteness or press of tendency; no superstructure of unexampled essences or disembodied possibilities or transcendental acts of Be-ing. Our actual entities, (...) I specify further, are all either simple qualia, or relations belonging to one of three primitive categories, or some compound of these. The relational categories which I think sufficient and necessary are the whole-part or "merological" relations, resemblances or "comparisons," and locative distances and directions, not necessarily the physical geometry of space-time, but at least some analogous modes of deployment. "Factualism" here is a rhyming synonym of "actualism" and does not connote the very dubious doctrine of the young Wittgenstein that the world is the sum of "facts" in the sense of Sachverhalten. Nor does "actualism" connote the doctrine, so popular in New York and environs, that things must be active, though quite likely most of them are. (shrink)

For horribilesque we need something better than Haupt's horribile aequor ; and Mr. E. L. B. Meurig Davies comes near the truth, I think, with his proposal horribilem niue. A noun in the ablative indicating cold to define horribilem is just what we require. That noun does not seem to me, however, likely to be niue. Read rather horribilem gelu; cf. Luc. 2. 570 ‘ Rheni gelidis … fugit ab undis’, Claud. Rapt. 3. 321 ‘non Rheni glacies, non me Rhipaea (...) tenebunt’, Paneg. 7. 6 ‘duratus gelu Rhenus’. (shrink)

Anthropological studies of folk cultures have been made not only on the content of their dreams but also on their interpretations. While there is a wide variance in the understanding of dreaming by cultures other than our own, there is a large set which might be called the classic dream interpretation of folk societies, which was first noted by Tylor in the nineteenth century. Its main tenet is that dreams are the experiences or travels of the soul, and that the (...) soul is distinct from the waking ego who recounts the dream. The dream is a narrative about real things, not something of a fantasy nature. This leads to a different epistemological basis of dreaming than the Western framework. This paper details the extent and nature of this interpretation, and explores the psychological and philosophical issues raised by it. (shrink)

This paper explores the effect of structurally enacted governance, such as board membership rules, versus process enacted governance, such as disclosure practices, on investor trust. Certain organizational factors are proposed due to their ability to inform trust propensity and transparency enactment. Regulatory oversight, organizational structure and investor salience are considered in light of their effect on relational and transactional approaches to a company’s investors.

An overview of major work on Augustine published between 1990 and 2000.

Reviews in allegory the approaches taken to the problem of agency by contemporary perspectives in psychology and broader intellectual tradition. The author argues that agency can only be rendered sensible or possible where there is freedom from traditional determinisms and where there is real moral content. It is argued that agency will only be possible when moral relativity is overcome. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

"Translated with an uncanny sense for the overall point of Augustine's doctrine. In short, a very good translation. The Introduction is admirably clear." --Paul Vincent Spade, Indiana University.

Empirical studies have suggested that language-capable robots have the persuasive power to shape the shared moral norms based on how they respond to human norm violations. This persuasive power presents cause for concern, but also the opportunity to persuade humans to cultivate their own moral development. We argue that a truly socially integrated and morally competent robot must be willing to communicate its objection to humans’ proposed violations of shared norms by using strategies such as blame-laden rebukes, even if doing (...) so may violate other standing norms, such as politeness. By drawing on Confucian ethics, we argue that a robot’s ability to employ blame-laden moral rebukes to respond to unethical human requests is crucial for cultivating a flourishing “moral ecology” of human–robot interaction. Such positive moral ecology allows human teammates to develop their own moral reflection skills and grow their own virtues. Furthermore, this ability can and should be considered as one criterion for assessing artificial moral agency. Finally, this paper discusses potential implications of the Confucian theories for designing socially integrated and morally competent robots. (shrink)

Kaplan claims that (1) ‘I am here now’, though analytic, is not a necessary truth. But this sentence is not a proposition, in a sense of proposition in which some, but not all, sentences are propositions. Since it is not a proposition, it is not true, and consequently not analytic. It is in fact a fragment of a proposition, the same fragment as ‘he was there then’ in (2) ‘CJFW said in Oxford on 23 September 1991 that he was there (...) then’. Sentences containing indexicals in general owe their sense to the corresponding fragments of sentences containing ‘quasi‐indexicals’(‘then’, for example, is the quasi‐indexical to ‘now’ as indexical). Someone uttering (1) assertively will thereby make a proposition like (2) true. (2) entails (3) ‘CJFW said in Oxford on 23 September 1993 that CJFW was in Oxford on 23 September 1991′. So by uttering (1) in the appropriate circumstances I made it true that I had asserted the proposition (4) ‘CJFW was in Oxford on 23 September 1991′. What is analytic and necessarily true is the proposition ‘If (3) then (4)’. (shrink)

Mr. Alan Ker in C.Q., N.S. vii , 151–8, proposes to alter the text of Claudian in numerous places where the tradition appears to me to be blameless, in some cases substituting for readings which seem characteristic and admirable others which seem less so. Claudian is an elegant poet, whose mastery of language many regard as comparable with that of the Silver Age poets, and Mr. Ker's dismissal of him as ‘a simple writer, with a small and unambitious vocabulary’ does (...) less than justice to his powers. I would suggest, in particular, the following points for consideration. (shrink)

The form of this paper, which has more than one purpose, needs a word of explanation and perhaps of excuse. I had had it in mind to bring together and discuss a number of passages of Plautus in which gratus or gratia occurred. Then I came across an interesting paper by Professor L. R. Palmer in Hommages à Max Miedermann , Bruxelles, 1956, pp. 258–69, entitled ‘The Concept of Social Obligation in Indo-European: A Study in Structural Semantics’. There Palmer dealt, (...) among other things, with gratus and related words; he seemed to me, however, to treat the Latin evidence, the greater part of it from Plautus, in a way which I felt to be mistaken. In addition it seemed that a preconceived theory, derived from a special interpretation of the Mycenean tablets, was being read into Roman thought and institutions against the evidence. I have therefore taken the opportunity to discuss the passages of Plautus in which I was first interested within a general examination of Palmer's treatment of the Latin evidence for his theory. (shrink)

This special issue is dedicated to reassessing the relationship between phenomenology and explanation. The editors’ introduction serves to provide a brief historical analysis of the sources and the reasons for thinking that phenomenology neither is nor ought to be explanatory before moving on to challenge this commonplace assumption by reference to Husserl, and by pointing out that there are various developments within the field of explanation that merit a re-examination of this topic. The introduction highlights the importance of explanation as (...) a topic vis a vis the naturalization of phenomenology and provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue. (shrink)

Ordinary skepticism is based upon some form of certainty. One may be skeptical about the claims of religion because one accepts the certainties of science or some philosophical argument. One may be skeptical about a certain investment strategy because one believes in various proven economic principles. Absoluteskepticism, on the other hand, has no such certainty upon which to rely. Every standpoint, including absolute skepticism itself, is open to doubt. Thus absolute skepticism is not another philosophical position but raises severe doubt (...) about all philosophy and all knowledge. In this paper I will explore some of the implications of absolute skepticism and how Lao Zi and Jiddu Krishnamurti (1895-1986) may serve as possible representatives of absolute skepticism. (shrink)

This article is a response to an essay written by an academic in English Literature, Professor John Sutherland. Through close textual analysis,Sutherland purports to resolve a well-known literary question: whether the sexual encounter outlined in the Victorian novel Tess of the d'Urbervilles should be classified as rape or seduction. The present article rejects his conclusion on the matter. An(equally) close analysis of the fictional text in question and of Sutherland's gloss, demonstrates the partiality of his critique, both in literary-critical and (...) critical-legal terms. In addition, examination of the conceptual and historico-legal context regarding the notions of rape and seduction on both sides of the Atlantic highlights parallels between Sutherland's own partiality and that of the law. In short, the apparent objectivity of the textual analysis and subsequent critique undertaken by Sutherland is revealed as a continuation of legal and patriarchal prejudices defining rape and seduction. The use of close textual analysis as the key critical device promotes the apparent probity of his findings. Locating them in an essay collection designed for mass lay public consumption completes the circle – from partisan scholarship to `informed' popular prejudice. (shrink)

Research in education and cognitive development suggests that explaining plays a key role in learning and generalization: When learners provide explanations—even to themselves—they learn more effectively and generalize more readily to novel situations. This paper proposes and tests a subsumptive constraints account of this effect. Motivated by philosophical theories of explanation, this account predicts that explaining guides learners to interpret what they are learning in terms of unifying patterns or regularities, which promotes the discovery of broad generalizations. Three experiments provide (...) evidence for the subsumptive constraints account: prompting participants to explain while learning artificial categories promotes the induction of a broad generalization underlying category membership, relative to describing items (Exp. 1), thinking aloud (Exp. 2), or free study (Exp. 3). Although explaining facilitates discovery, Experiment 1 finds that description is more beneficial for learning item details. Experiment 2 additionally suggests that explaining anomalous observations may play a special role in belief revision. The findings provide insight into explanation’s role in discovery and generalization. (shrink)

In their article, Pavarani and colleagues offer a vision of evolutionary bioethics that focuses on innovation and empirical research as a means to enrich the field of bioethics. Empirical bi...