Paracelsus was a transmutational alchemist: For most of his career, he believed that one metal could be turned into another. In an alchemical text, the De renovatione et restauratione, he explored the theoretical foundations of transmutation and hinted at recipes for bringing it about. He proposed that from plants, gems, metals, and minerals might be prepared a class of marvelous medicaments, which he called prima entia (first entities). Each primum ens had particular uses, but the entia were all supposed to (...) be able to revitalize the human body and cleanse it of disease. Certain entia could also transmute metals. The De renovatione et restauratione affirmed the metaphysical centrality, in goldmaking and medicine alike, not just of purification or alteration but of renewal and transformation. It expressed the author’s eschatological excitement at God’s works of wonder, whether within or above nature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 97 Unity and Reform: Selected Writings of Nicholas de Cusa. Edited by John P. Dolan. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962. Pp. viii -I- 260. $6.50.) This volume was designed to serve both the cause of historical instruction and the cause of "unity and reform" as it has been stimulated by the present ecumenical movement and Council. Professor Dolan's Introduction emphasizes the practical aspects (...) of the Bishop's career, especially his efforts to combat the disintegration of the Respublica Christiana of the fifteenth century. He explains the Bishop's achievements, both ecclesiastical and philosophical, in terms of the problems of his own time. However, the reader soon discovers in the narrative of the Introduction as well as in the selections from Cusanus's works that the current revival of interest in this theologian and philosopher is due to the important bearing which he has on the Catholic efforts toward reunion and reform today. Only Book III of Learned Ignorance is included; then follow in their entirety Concerning Wisdom, The Vision of God or the Icon, Concerning Concord in Religious Belief (De Pace Fidei); and to illustrate Nicholas of Cusa's interest in mathematics and physics, the volume concludes with a dialogue on experiments in weighing. Hrne~a~T W. Sca~NEm~tt Claremont, California La cosmologie de Giordano Bruno. By Paul-Henri Michel. (Paris: Editions Hermann, 1962. Pp. 341.) Malgr~ les excellents travaux d~j~ publi~s (ceux d'Emile Namer, d'Augusto Guzzo et d'autres ~minents sp~cialistes bruniens), Giordano Bruno demeure une figure historique la lois tr~s c~l~bre et bien myst~rieuse au demeurant. L'exceUent ouvrage de Paul-Henri Michel rendra ainsi les plus grands services aux historiens de la pens~e qui se penchent avec curiosit~ sur la d~concertante p~iode de transition qui s~pare les philosophes de la Renaissance de l'av~nement en Europe d'attitudes proprement modernes devant la r~alit~ ext~rieure et l'homme. S'appuyant sans cesse sur les textes originaux de Bruno lui-mdme, pourvu d'un index complet, le bel ouvrage du Pr. Michel ne d~cevru passes lecteurs ~xudits. Comme il se dolt, rauteur commence par faire le point sur l'homme Bruno, s'attachant faire la distinction qui s'impose entre l'histoire et la l~gende--car la k~gende s'est empar ~e de ce philosophe, consid~r~ volontiers comme un athfie materialiste total ayant voulu d~truire la religion catholique, attitude louse ou vilipendfie selon clue Bruno sera vu comme un h~r~tique pervers ou, au contraire, comme un glorieux martyr de la "librepens ~" rationaliste. On appr~.iera tout sp~cialement les pages (p. 10 et suivantes) darts lesquelles M. Michel s'efforce de faire toute la lumi~re ~, propos du proc~s ecd~iastique de Giordano Bruno--sur lequel toute la lumi~re souhaitable n'avait pas encore ~t~ faite. Mais la majeure paxtie du volume est consacr~e ~ un expos~ m~thodique du syst~me du monde, telle clue l'~tude minutieuse de tousles textes accessibles permet de le structurer. En dix chapitres, l'auteur passe minutieusement--mais toujours d'une mani~re remarquablement logique et claire--les grandes articulations autour desquelles tourne toute la cosmologie brunienne: Le monde comme objet de connaissance, Cosmogonic, Ens mobile, LAme du Monde, La mati~re et l'univers infini, Le systkme solaire, Les mondes innombrables, L'univers vivant, Temps et dternit~. Le grand nombre des citations ~tendues faisant de cette belie ~tude une sorte de fort commode anthologie m~thodique de la pens~e brunienne. 98 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY I1 est incontestable que nous autres contemporains sommes toujours endins 5. voir en Giordano Bruno un penseur franchement "moderne," et le fait est qu'il brave volontiers, prenant intrdpidement parti pour le syst~me de Copernic, la philosophie scolastique et la th~ologie scripturaire; son grandiose hymne mdtaphysique 5. l'infini de l'univers et 5. la r6partition innombrable des syst~mes plan~taires rend be1 et bien un son r~volutionnaire pour son temps. Ce n'est d'ailleurs pas pour rien que Bruno rut mis 5. l'index pour... (shrink)

The following is the transcript of a lecture taken in shorthand by Hans-Georg Backhaus. The transcript was originally published as an appendix in Hans-Georg Backhaus, Dialektik der Wertform. Untersuchungen zur marxschen Ökonomiekritik, a complete translation of which is forthcoming in the Historical Materialism book series.

W. Norris Clarke's metaphysics of the universe as a journey rests on six major positions: the unrestricted dynamism of the mind, the primacy of the act of existence, the participation structure of reality, and the person, considered as both the starting point of philosophy and the source of the categories needed for a flexible contemporary metaphysics. Reflecting on his conscious life and the universe around him, the finite person mounts by a two-fold path to its Infinite source, who, though immutable (...) in His natural being, is mutable in the intentional being of His personal knowledge and love. The personal God is the efficient cause from whom the universe comes and the final cause to whom it returns.Less optimistic than Norris Clarke, John Caputo wonders about his metaphysics of the person. In a hermeneutical interpretation of the human face, the person through whom Being "sounds" discloses an ambiguous Being that both reveals and conceals itself. Far from grounding a casual ascent to God, hermeneutical phenomenology allows us no more than the right to interpret the world and its transcendent source through our own free decision.Although impressed by Norris Clarke's attempt to introduce mutability into God, Lewis Ford still finds Clarke's Thomistic God unacceptable. As a Whiteheadian, he proposes in place of Thomas' God, whose perfection consists in static unity, a God whose perfection consists in a never-ending process of unification. John Smith argues against the traditional dichotomy made between the ontological and cosmological arguments. Rather than opposed methods of proving God's existence, they should be taken as complementary journeys to the divine presence which discloses itself, although diversely, in the soul and in the world. There are parallels between Smith's historical study of two arguments and Clarke's two-fold path to God. Yet Smith is critical of Thomas' cosmological journey to God and does not share Clarke's confidence in its validity. Significant studies in their own right, the three essays as a group challenge Clarke's whole metaphysics of the universe as a journey. Meeting the challenge, Clarke clarifies and refines his own thought.An account of Clarke's philosophy by Gerald A. McCool, S.J. preceds this unified and stimulating philosophical discussion. (shrink)

Translated from the Danish by Walter Lowrie, David Swenson, and Alexander Dru The Danish philosopher Kierkegaard is one of the master thinkers of the modern age, a defining influence on existentialism and on twentieth-century theology, and this brilliantly tailored selection from his vast and varied writings--made by the great English poet W.H Auden--is a perfect introduction to his work. Auden's inspired and incisive response to a thinker who had done much to shape his own beliefs is a fundamental reading of (...) an author whose spirit remains as radical as ever more than 150 years after he wrote. (shrink)

Ordinairement les manuels de biologie débutent par une exposition des caractéristiques qui distinguent la nature organique de la nature anorganique. En définissant et en limitant aussi exactement que possible son sujet, la biologie, le biologue ne fait pas autre chose que le mathématicien. La présente étude nous montre les obstacles presque insurmontables auxquels se heurtent le biologue et le mathématicien. A les bien considérer, les anciennes distinctions entre l'organisme d'une part et la matière non-organisée ou un système statique matériel, comme (...) la machine, d'autre part, se basant sur la nutrition, la respiration, les échanges vitaux et le mouvement ne tiennent plus debout. L'auteur allègue les expériences récentes de W. M. Stanley (Rockefeller Institute à Princeton) d'où il appert qu'il peut y avoir aussi génération dans les substances qui se secrètent sous la forme de cristaux (cristaux vivants), et s'en rapporte aux fameuses expériences de Driesch sur la régénération. Il y rattache les conceptions de Jordan (Utrecht) -- rapports entre les enchaînements des causes "d'après leur caractère amboceptor"; "le dessein des causes". Les vitalistes portent surtout leur attention sur "la totalité", les mécanistes sur "les parties". Le naturaliste qui se propose uniquement la recherche des causes physico-chimiques des phénomènes physico-chimiques serait parfaitement en droit de se contenter d'une conception mécaniste de la nature. Mais cette conception mécaniste ne suffirait pas à celui qui, comme l'auteur, aspire à comprendre l'organisme dans son ensemble. (shrink)

F. H. Bradley did not write extensively or systematically on the philosophy of religion, and much of what he did write has the character of either tentative speculation or the pre-emptive rebuttal of potential misinterpretations that might threaten his general philosophical position. ‘I admit that on this subject I never had much to say’ he warns. But such a remark should not discourage us from considering his views on this topic, since the disclaimer is typically Bradleian, and more reflective of (...) his high standards for what is required in order to claim to have something to say about some matter than of any genuine lack of opinion. On closer inspection we find that he has, scattered throughout his work, a great many important things to say about this subject. (shrink)

While a number of classical pragmatists crafted their philosophies in conjunction with a careful study of Hegel's works, others saw their philosophies emerge in antagonism with proponents of Hegel. In this paper, we offer an instance of the latter case. Namely, we show that the impetus for Charles S. Peirce's early articulation and avowal of realism (the claim that some generals are real) was William Torrey Harris's claim that the formal laws of logic lacked universal validity. According to Harris, the (...) leading representative of Hegelism in the United States, the universal validity of the laws of logic rested on a nominalistic metaphysics that a Hegelian-realism showed to be false. In response to this charge, we articulate how Peirce's attempt to prove the universal validity of the laws of logic resulted in avowing a realism that differed from both nominalism and Harris's Hegelian-realism. (shrink)

Principled discussions of civil rights became inherently less likely as a direct result of the observation by Earl Warren, in Brown v. Board of Education, that, respecting freedmen, “Education of Negroes was almost non-existent, and practically all of the race were illiterate,” and in proportion as that observation increasingly became the foundation of common opinion on the subject. Warren's observation was not true in any meaningful or non-trivial sense. Nevertheless, it served to perpetuate the myth of a backward people needing (...) help to catch up instead of the truth of a people being held back. That is the perspective – the disadvantaged group perspective – that ultimately infected all discussion of civil rights, even after the designation of so-called “disadvantaged groups” had been extended beyond American blacks. To define civil rights, we may well begin with what all mankind would likely recognize. Thus the dictionary definition of “civil rights” stands: “the rights that belong to all individuals in a nation or community touching property, marriage, and the like.” In that definition the term “rights” may be further expanded to mean “legitimate claims,” following the definition of right as law – as “a claim or title or interest in anything whatever that is enforceable by law.” This definition applies with minimal distinction of regimes intruding and, therefore, without the host of recent complications in the United States that create the impression that civil rights have something to do with pluralism. Previously, the generic definition was thought to exhaust the meaning of the term in the United States. (shrink)

W. E. B. Du Bois was one of the most profound and influential African-American intellectuals of the twentieth century. This volume addresses the complexities of Du Bois' legacy, showing how his work gets to the heart of today's theorizing about the color line.

I want to put forward a certain view of the logical foundation of religious belief. It is, in a sentence, the view that religious belief is constituted by the concept of god. This view will be discussed under three headings. First, I shall explain as clearly as I can what I mean by it. Secondly, I shall indicate what seem to me to be interesting parallels, both with regard to universes of discourse in general and to religious belief in particular, (...) between my idea of a constitutive concept and Wittgenstein's ideas of a fundamental proposition and a religious ‘picture’. Thirdly, I shall try to substantiate the view I take of the logical foundation of religious belief by rebutting three conceivable objections to it: namely, that it rests on an illegitimate craving for generality, that it is at variance with common usage, and that it consigns religious belief to an intellectual ghetto. (shrink)

Notre époque, traversée de courants mystiques, manifeste un intérêt tout particulier pour les idées du neo-platonicien Plotin. Pour le platonicien l'univers participe à l'idée. Platon considérait les choses comme le reflet de l'idée, ce que Plotin se refusait à admettre. La diversité dont la vie fait preuve atteste son inépuisable richesse, et si les choses dans leur état particulier sont imparfaites et défectueuses, c'est que chaque chose représente sa particularité d'une façon imparfaite. Le dualisme platonicien se retrouve chez Plotin; à (...) côté du monde de l'erreur et de l'apparence il situe celui de la vérité et de la réalité. Mais l'ordre des deux mondes étant différent, nécessairement les catégories qui y règnent diffèrent. Contrairement au monde du temps et de l'espace, où tout est désaccord et combat, l'accord et l'harmonie règnent dans le monde de l'idée. D'après Platon l'idée de l'être implique l'idée du repos. Pour Plotin le mouvement et le repos ne sont pas incompatibles. Il y a encore un point de divergence entre les deux philosophes. Tandis que Platon conçoit le bien comme idée, Plotin le superpose au monde des idées et l'en sépare. A l'oppossé du maître il n'était pas dualiste mais moniste. La conception platonicienne du bien est purement éthique, c.a.d. humaine, la conception de Plotin est plus cosmique. L'univers lui apparaît comme une trinité: le monde sensoriel, le monde idéal et l'unité suprême, et il leur découvre une base commune. Tout en admettant l'imperfection du monde, Plotin nie qu'il soit mauvais et méprisable. Il se tourne contre les Gnostiques chrétiens qui prêchent le mépris du monde, et s'oppose vigoureusement aux doctrines qui font des jouissances sensuelles l'unique but de la vie. L'exercice de la vertu n'est autre chose que le moyen de s'unir à Dieu. Pour Plotin la vertu n'est donc pas une fin en elle-même, mais elle est subordonnée à un but qui la dépasse. (shrink)

Libertarians such as J.R. Lucas have abandoned traditional Christian doctrines because they cannot reconcile them with the freedom of the will. Traditional Christian thinkers such as Augustine have repudiated libertarianism because they cannot reconcile it with the dogmas of the Faith. In Free Will and the Christian Faith, W.S. Anglin demonstrates that free will and traditional Christianity are ineed compatible. He examines, and solves, puzzles about the relationships between free will and omnipotence, omniscience, and God's goodness, using the idea of (...) free will to answer the question of why God allows evil, and presenting arguments that link free will to eternal life and to the nature of revelation. Topics covered include the meaning of life, the soul and Lesbegue measure, and strategies for discerning the voice of God. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Ahead of Print. Asperó and Schindler have completely solved the Axiom [math] vs. [math] problem. They have proved that if [math] holds then Axiom [math] holds, with no additional assumptions. The key question now concerns the relationship between [math] and Axiom [math]. This is because the foundational issues raised by the problem of Axiom [math] vs. [math] arguably persist in the problem of Axiom [math] vs. [math]. The first of our two main theorems is that Axiom (...) [math] is equivalent to Axiom [math], and as a corollary we show that Axiom [math] fails in all the known models of [math]. This suggests that [math] actually refutes Axiom [math]. Our second main theorem is that the [math] Conjecture holds assuming [math]. This is the strongest partial result known on this conjecture which is one of the central open problems of [math]-theory and [math]-logic. These results identify a fundamental asymmetry between the Continuum Hypothesis and any axiom which is both [math]-expressible and which implies [math], on the basis of generic absoluteness for the simplest of the nontrivial sentences of Third-Order Number Theory. These are the [math]-sentences with no parameters. Such sentences are those which simply assert the existence of a set [math] for which some property involving only quantification over [math] holds. (shrink)