Книга рассчитана на тех, кто по своей специальности занимается социальной философией и в дальнейшем углубят свои знания в этом вопросе, а также для широкого круга читателей.

Collection of works on literature theory, translated into Mongolian language.

Upshot: The response starts with a clarification of certain points that commentators found insufficiently articulated and then goes on to discuss some of the suggested solutions, all of which are seen as welcome improvements to the original proposal. The need for establishing a research environment acknowledging and nurturing the non-trivial character of experience is emphasised.

Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem is well known in Mathematics/Logic/Philosophy circles. Gödel was able to find a way for any given P (UTM), (read as, “P of UTM” for “Program of Universal Truth Machine”), actually to write down a complicated polynomial that has a solution iff (=if and only if), G is true, where G stands for a Gödel-sentence. So, if G’s truth is a necessary condition for the truth of a given polynomial, then P (UTM) has to answer first that (...) G is true in order to secure the truth of the said polynomial. But, interestingly, P (UTM) could never answer that G was true. This necessarily implies that there is at least one truth a P (UTM), however large it may be, cannot speak out. Daya Krishna and Karl Potter’s controversy regarding the construal of India’s Philosophies dates back to the time of Potter’s publication of “Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies” (1963, Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall Inc.) In attacking many of India’s philosophies, Daya Krishna appears to have unwittingly touched a crucial point: how can there be the knowledge of a ‘non-cognitive’ mokṣa? [‘mokṣa’ is the final state of existence of an individual away from Social Contract]—See this author’s Indian Social Contract and its Dissolution (2008) mokṣa does not permit the knowledge of one’s own self in the ordinary way with threefold distinction, i.e., subject–knowledge-object or knower–knowledge–known. But what is important is to demonstrate whether such ‘knowledge’ of non-cognitive mokṣa state can be logically shown, in a language, to be possible to attain, and that there is no contradiction involved in such demonstration, because, no one can possibly express the ‘experience-itself’ in language. Hence, if such ‘knowledge’ can be shown to be logically not impossible in language, then, not only Daya Krishna’s arguments against ‘non-cognitive mokṣa’ get refuted but also it would show the possibility of achieving ‘completeness’ in its truest sense, as opposed to Gödel’s ‘Incompleteness’. In such circumstances, man would himself become a Universal Truth Machine. This is because the final state of mokṣa is construed as the state of complete knowledge in Advaita. This possibility of ‘completeness’ is set in this paper in the backdrop of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s Advaitic (Non-dualistic) claim involved in the mahāvākyas (extra-ordinary propositions). (Mahāvākyas that Śaṅkara refers to are basically taken from different Upaniṣads. For example, “Aham Brahmāsmi” is from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, and “Tattvamasi” is from Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Śrī Śaṅkarācārya has written extensively. His main works include his Commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, on major Upaniṣads, and on ŚrīmadBhagavadGītā, called Bhāṣyas of them, respectively. Almost all these works are available in English translation published by Advaita Ashrama, 5 Dehi Entally Road, Calcutta, 700014.) On the other hand, the ‘Incompleteness’ of Gödel is due to the intervening G-sentence, which has an adverse self-referential element. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in its mathematical form with an elaborate introduction by R.W. Braithwaite can be found in Meltzer (Kurt Gödel: on formally undecidable propositions of principia mathematica and related systems. Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962). The present author believes first that semantic content cannot be substituted by any amount of arithmoquining, (Arithmoquining or arithmatization means, as Braithwaite says,—“Gödel’s novel metamathematical method is that of attaching numbers to the signs, to the series of signs (formulae) and to the series of series of signs (“proof-schemata”) which occur in his formal system…Gödel invented what might be called co-ordinate metamathematics…”) Meltzer (1962 p. 7). In Antone (2006) it is said “The problem is that he (Gödel) tries to replace an abstract version of the number (which can exist) with the concept of a real number version of that abstract notion. We can state the abstraction of what the number needs to be, [the arithmoquining of a number cannot be a proof-pair and an arithmoquine] but that is a concept that cannot be turned into a specific number, because by definition no such number can exist.”.), especially so where first-hand personal experience is called for. Therefore, what ultimately rules is the semanticity as in a first-hand experience. Similar points are voiced, albeit implicitly, in Antone (Who understands Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, 2006). (“…it is so important to understand that Gödel’s theorem only is true with respect to formal systems—which is the exact opposite of the analogous UTM (Antone (2006) webpage 2. And galatomic says in the same discussion chain that “saying” that it ((is)) only true for formal systems is more significant… We only know the world through “formal” categories of understanding… If the world as it is in itself has no incompleteness problem, which I am sure is true, it does not mean much, because that is not the world of time and space that we experience. So it is more significant that formal systems are incomplete than the inexperiencable ‘World in Itself’ has no such problem.—galatomic”) Antone (2006) webpage 2. Nevertheless galatomic certainly, but unwittingly succeeds in highlighting the possibility of experiencing the ‘completeness’ Second, even if any formal system including the system of Advaita of Śaṅkara is to be subsumed or interpreted under Gödel’s theorem, or Tarski’s semantic unprovability theses, the ultimate appeal would lie to the point of human involvement in realizing completeness since any formal system is ‘Incomplete’ always by its very nature as ‘objectual’, and fails to comprehend the ‘subject’ within its fold. (shrink)

Ibn Rushd presents different methods of reasoning. Each method differs in terms of its construction, level of assent, and the cognitive state it ultimately produces. Despite these technical variations, notable authors suggest that they are all equally valid and sound. I analyse this claim, and argue that although demonstrative and dialectical arguments are both valid and sound, there is a theoretical discrepancy between the two. Subsequently, I explore how underscoring this issue would motivate a non-classical/many-valued logic and a plurality of (...) truth in being able to make sense of the theoretical discrepancy. (shrink)

The paper tries to introduce the substantial terms used by the traditionalist authors. In its first part a short characteristic of the French counter-revolutionary thought is given. The second, substantial part of the paper offers an interpretation of the basic concepts used by the traditionalists, such as "revolution", "society", "humans", "reason", "power" and "constitution".

다산 역학의 성립과 정수, 그리고 그 경학적.사상사적의의를 논구한 저술.

ch. 1. Prodialektichennai︠a︡. Mai︠a︡k Ėngelʹsa ; Navstrechu dialektike ; Dialekticheskiĭ gumanizm -- ch. 2. Filosoficheskai︠a︡. Filosofskai︠a︡ Atlantida Drevneĭ Gret︠s︡ii ; Filosofski o filosofskom ; Absoli︠u︡tnyĭ svet absoli︠u︡tnoĭ istiny -- ch. 3. Zagorizontnai︠a︡. Na kremnistom puti v Chelovekii︠u︡ ; Zavetnoe okno ; Vysokie Svetlye Dorogi Vselennoĭ.

Die verbreitete Meinung, boses Tun erfordere eine bose Absicht, ist nach Ingolf U. Dalferth eine fragwurdige Ubervereinfachung. Der Primat des Bosen liegt nicht im Wollen, sondern in der Erfahrung des Bosen, im Widerfahrnis des Ublen. Was zahlt, ist das Leiden der Betroffenen. Aber auch dieser Ansatz kann zu abwegigen Ubervereinfachungen fuhren, wenn Leiden mit Bosem gleichgesetzt wird. An diesem Punkt beginnen die Uberlegungen der Studie. Fur Dalferth ist die entscheidende Frage, ob Leiden in jedem Fall als Boses verstanden werden muss. (...) Seine Antwort ist theologisch und ethisch differenziert und veranschaulicht in praziser Sprache die zu Grunde liegenden aktuellen Lebensphanomene an vielen gut verstandlichen Beispielen. Am Ende des Bandes werden Deutungs- und Bewaltigungsstrategien von Leiden und Bosem diskutiert, die den unverzichtbaren Beitrag von christlichem Glauben und Religion zum Umgang mit Leiden und Bosem aufzeigen und auch fur Nichtchristen verstehbar machen. Die Studie ist wahrend des Aufenthalts von Dalferth am Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin entstanden und in ihrer lebenspraktischen Ausrichtung ein hoch zu schatzender Gewinn fur alle Leserinnen und Leser. (shrink)

In this paper, the relations between science and technology, intervention and representation, the natural and the artificial are analysed on the background of the formation of modern science in the sixteenth century. Due to the fact that technique has been essential for modern science from its early beginning, modern science is characterised by a hybridisation of knowledge and intervention. The manipulation of nature in order to measure its properties has steadily increased until artificial things have been produced, such as laser (...) beams, chemical compounds, elementary particles. Furthermore, the structural bracing of natural science, technological development, and industrial exploitation of nature go also back to the foundation of modern science. In order to strengthen the debate on technoscience against this background, the specific characteristics of technoscientific objects have to be clarified as have the specific characteristics of the social organisation of technoscience and its performance. (shrink)

1-pu. Ŭmak kwa yŏsŏng -- 1. Wae widaehan ŭmakka nŭn modu namsŏng in'ga? -- 2. Ŭmakchŏk kabujangje -- 3. Ch'angjak hwaltong esŏŭi yŏsŏng sooe -- 4. Yŏsŏng ŭmakka ŭi sŏng yŏkhal -- 5. Ŭmak kyoyuk esŏŭi sŏng ch'abyŏl -- 6. Widaehan yŏsŏng ŭmakka ŭi t'ansaeng ŭl wihayŏ -- 2-pu. Ŭmak sok ŭi yŏsŏng -- 1. Ŭmak chakp'um esŏŭi namsŏng kwa yŏsŏng -- 2. Ŭmak esŏ kulchŏl toen yŏsŏng imiji -- 3. Ŭmak sok ŭi yŏngung kwa ch'angnyŏ ŭi yŏkhal -- 4. (...) Tongsŏngae wa ŭmakchŏk tamnon-- 5. Kŭrŏt'amyŏn p'eminijŭm ŭmak ŭn kanŭng han'ga? (shrink)