Apostoli and Brown have shown that the class of formulae valid with respect to the class of -ary relational frames is completely axiomatized by Kn: an n-place aggregative system which adjoins [RM], [RN], and a complete axiomatization of propositional logic, with [Kn]:□α1 ∧...∧□αn+1 → □2/ is the disjunction of all pairwise conjunctions αi∧αj )).Their proof exploits the chromatic indices of n-uncolourable hypergraphs, or n-traces. Here, we use the notion of the χ-product of a family of sets to formulate an alternative (...) definition of an n-trace, which in turn enables a new and simpler completeness proof. (shrink)

Background: Although convolutional neural networks (CNNs) achieve high diagnostic accuracy for detecting Alzheimer’s disease (AD) dementia based on magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans, they are not yet applied in clinical routine. One important reason for this is a lack of model comprehensibility. Recently developed visualization methods for deriving CNN relevance maps may help to fill this gap as they allow the visualization of key input image features that drive the decision of the model. We investigated whether models with higher accuracy (...) also rely more on discriminative brain regions predefined by prior knowledge. Methods: We trained a CNN for the detection of AD in N = 663 T1-weighted MRI scans of patients with dementia and amnestic mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and verified the accuracy of the models via cross-validation and in three independent samples including in total N = 1655 cases. We evaluated the association of relevance scores and hippocampus volume to validate the clinical utility of this approach. To improve model comprehensibility, we implemented an interactive visualization of 3D CNN relevance maps, thereby allowing intuitive model inspection. Results: Across the three independent datasets, group separation showed high accuracy for AD dementia versus controls (AUC ≥ 0.91) and moderate accuracy for amnestic MCI versus controls (AUC ≈ 0.74). Relevance maps indicated that hippocampal atrophy was considered the most informative factor for AD detection, with additional contributions from atrophy in other cortical and subcortical regions. Relevance scores within the hippocampus were highly correlated with hippocampal volumes (Pearson’s r ≈ −0.86, p < 0.001). Conclusion: The relevance maps highlighted atrophy in regions that we had hypothesized a priori. This strengthens the comprehensibility of the CNN models, which were trained in a purely data-driven manner based on the scans and diagnosis labels. The high hippocampus relevance scores as well as the high performance achieved in independent samples support the validity of the CNN models in the detection of AD-related MRI abnormalities. The presented data-driven and hypothesis-free CNN modeling approach might provide a useful tool to automatically derive discriminative features for complex diagnostic tasks where clear clinical criteria are still missing, for instance for the differential diagnosis between various types of dementia. (shrink)

Philosophers of sport seem to have lived happily with the idea that the knowledge in sporting skills is knowing how. In traditional epistemology, knowing how does not qualify to be knowledge proper since knowledge is a question of whether a belief is true and justified. Unless knowing how is a special case of knowing that, it is not knowledge. The argument for such an identification arises saying that a former expert in tennis has tennis know-how, although she cannot perform skillfully. (...) If we do not need ability to perform a skill and still have know-how, it seems reasonable to say that know-how is a type of knowing that. With such a move, skills are perhaps not identical to know-how. Are we then left with the idea that there isn’t any knowledge in sporting skills? If we stick with the idea that a fine forehand is indeed an able forehand, the question of what knowledge skills contain remains. This article aims to discuss and shed light on issues related between knowledge, knowing h... (shrink)

Aufgrund der vielen Spuren in Kants Reflexionen und in der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten kann es als sicher gelten, daß Kant die Theory of Moral Sentiments von Adam Smith gut gekannt hat. Vor allem die Figur eines unparteiischen Zuschauers mußte ihn interessieren, da Smith, der zwar eine moral-sense- Theorie entwickelt hat, diesen Typus von Ethik in einem gewissen Sinne rationalisiert, dann nämlich, wenn er die unparteiischen Zuschauer durch die Applikation allgemeiner Moralregeln urteilen läßt. Die Abhandlung konzentriert sich auf das (...) moralische Selbstbewußtsein, also auf den Begriff des Gewissens, bei Smith und Kant. Sie zeichnet die Rolle des unparteiischen Zuschauers in Smith's Konzept des Gewissens nach, das dieser als einen inneren Gerichtshof versteht. Die Abhandlung wendet sich dann Kant zu und skizziert dessen Idee einer wirklich auf Vernunft gegründeten Moral, die zugleich die Idee einer wirklich autonomen Moral ist. Auf der Basis dieser Idee ist aber die Vorstellung vom Gewissen als innerem Gerichtshof unhaltbar. Es muß daher überraschen, daß Kant bedauerlicherweise an dieser herkömmlichen Vorstellung vom Gewissen festhält und daß er damit weit hinter das begriffliche Niveau seines Entwurfs einer autonomen Moral zurückfällt. Es ergibt sich daraus für jeden, der mit der Idee der Kantschen Ethik sympathisiert, die Aufgabe, ein richtiges Verständnis des Gewissens zu formulieren. Because of the many traces in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and in the notices which Kant left behind, we know for sure that Kant was well acquainted with Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments . Especially the concept of an impartial spectator must have interested Kant since Adam Smith, though developing a moral-sense-theory of morals, in a way rationalises this type of ethics when he comes to understand the impartial spectator as judging not by his moral sense, but by the application of general moral rules. The paper concentrates on moral self-consciousness, i.e. on the concept of conscience in Smith and in Kant. It outlines the role of the impartial spectator Smith's theory of conscience which he understands as an intrapersonal court of justice. Turning to Kant, a sketch is drawn of his idea how really to base morals on reason, thereby formulating the concept of morals that really deserves to be called autonomous. On the basis of the Kantian idea of morals, however, the conception of conscience as an intrapersonal court of justice is untenable. To every reader it must therefore be a surprise, and indeed a real pity, that Kant nevertheless sticks to this traditional idea of conscience, thus falling far back behind the conceptual level of his own theory of morals. So, it is up to every one who sympathizes with a Kantian style of moral theory, to spell out the right way of understanding conscience. (shrink)

Inquiry into the Origin of Humanity: An Annotated Translation of Tsung-mi's Yuan-jen lun with a Modern Commentary. Peter N. Gregory. A Kuroda Institute Book. University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu 1995, xv, 264 pp. Cloth $46.00, pbk $17.95.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ethics and Economies of Inquiry: Certeau, Theory, and the Art of PracticeTony Schirato (bio) and Jen Webb (bio)In this paper we will look at what Certeau, in The Practice of Everyday Life, calls “Theories of the Art of Practice.” Certeau is perhaps best known as a theorist of the ways in which everyday practices inhabit the institutions and sites of power and official culture, while not being in (...) any sense recuperable or explicable to these “proper places.” In “Theories of the Art of Practice” he concerns himself not with cultural practices themselves but, rather, with the specific relationship between theoretical discourse and the object of that discourse. In order to do this he takes as examples certain cultural theorists—most obviously Foucault and Bourdieu—whose work is strongly underpinned by an emphasis on the relation between discourse and practice. He offers a detailed consideration and critique of their theories of practice and the tactics those theorists use to escape the theory/practice dichotomy.In the first two paragraphs of “Theories of the Art of Practice,” Certeau identifies the two points which, taken together, constitute the broad narrative of this section of Practice. The first relates to the theoretical basis from which we can approach practice. “Everyday practices,” he writes:depend on a vast ensemble which is difficult to delimit but which we may provisionally designate as an ensemble of procedures. The latter are schemas of operations and of technical manipulations. On the basis of some recent and fundamental analyses (those of Foucault, Bourdieu, Vernant and Détienne, and others) it is possible, if not to define them, at least to clarify their functioning relative to discourse (or to “ideology,” as Foucault puts it), to the acquired (Bourdieu’s habitus), and to the form of time we call an occasion (the kairos discussed by Vernant and Détienne). These are different ways of locating a technicity of a certain type and at the same time situating the study of this technicity with respect to current trends in research.[43]An important issue here is Certeau’s critique of the extent to which each theorist applies a specific technicity (Foucault’s disciplinary procedures, Bourdieu’s habitus) in an attempt to delimit the field, to reduce the multiplicity of practice—or the theorizing of practice—to a singularity. As he points out in his essay on Nicholas of Cusa [“The Gaze” 6], such “ways of proceeding are subject to a common problematics,” because they inscribe a particular way of thinking and seeing and, in that process, risk excluding other ways of understanding. However, Cusa’s praxis: [End Page 86]does not presuppose a language proper to theory, an autonomous metalanguage that would provide a distinct linguistic space for speculation.... A task related to each singularity liberates, as it were, and develops... the “impulsion” which is integral to each and which is revealed to be infinite by the very impossibility of finding a hierarchical unity among singularities.[“The Gaze” 7]What Certeau looks for in the work of Bourdieu and Foucault is the moment, or the “impulsion,” which allows a theoretical engagement with practice. If practice can’t be called up, defined, or finally explicated, what can be done is to plot the relationships between power and its structures, logics, places, and discourse and the objects of power (practices) it seeks to identify and regulate. This allows us to identify both how power seeks to exclude the heterogeneity that is practice and the ways in which practice, despite these acts of exclusion and regulation, leaves its mark on official places (discourses, institutions, the objective structures of cultural fields). What Certeau does is to explore how others (Foucault and Bourdieu in particular, Vernant and Détienne) have explored this terrain.The second move Certeau makes is to contextualize those theories of practice, not so much as metadiscourses or generalized maps but as practices themselves, specific to a time and place and informed both by their theoretical antecedents and by the politics, logics, and discourses of the field(s) within which they operate. This allows Certeau to exemplify both how bodies of theory (as well as intellectual fields) come about and develop and... (shrink)

Der ontologische Gottesbeweis, den zuerst Anselm von Canterbury in seinem Proslogion entwickelt, setzt einen spezifischen Begriff von Sein als Fülle voraus, ohne den er unverständlich bleibt. Dieser Seinsbegriff entstammt dem antiken Platonismus. Erst Platon faßt den Begriff des Seins so, daß er in einem ontologischen Komparativ wahres oder vollkommenes Sein vom uneigentlichen Sein unterscheidet. Plotin entwickelt daraus einen Begriff vom Sein als absoluter Fülle, in dem die beiden Bedeutungen des vollkommenen und des notwendigen Seins, die, wie Henrich gezeigt hat, für (...) den ontologischen Gottesbeweis maßgeblich sind, auf konsistente Weise vereinigt sind. Bei Plotin ist dieses absolute Sein der sich selbst als Inbegriff der Ideen denkende Nous, von dem er das Absolute als Überseiendes unterscheidet. Boethius vermittelt Plotins Begriff des absoluten Seins an Anselm, und zwar als Begriff von Gott, d.h. so gefaßt, daß das vollkommene Sein zugleich das Absolute ist. Index dieses Seinsbegriffs ist der bei Plotin, Boethius und Anselm jeweils übereinstimmende Begriff der Ewigkeit als teillos vollendeter Einheit und Ganzheit. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION T& #39;an Ssu-t& #39;ung If H[hJ was an important philosopher and activist in modern China, who, though his life was exceedingly short,...

A recent approach to the problem of logical omniscience holds that belief is question-sensitive: what an agent believes depends on what question they try to answer (Pérez Carballo, 2016; Yalcin, 2018; Hoek, 2022). While the question-sensitive approach can avoid some logical omniscience problems, we argue that it suffers from nearby problems. First, these accounts all validate closure principles that are just as implausible as the ones it was designed to avoid. Second, question-sensitivity by itself isn’t suitable for explaining many kinds (...) of failures of logical omniscience. Recognizing the flaws of this approach, however, naturally leads to a more promising solution. Our account generalizes the question-sensitive approach by appealing to (1) the defeasible nature of dispositions toward action associated with belief and (2) the algorithms an agent uses to make decisions. On our view, then, believing that φ means being disposed to employ an algorithm which outputs acting on the information that φ in normal circumstances associated with φ. We argue that this account naturally generalizes the question-sensitive accounts while avoiding their faults. (shrink)

Das hier zu besprechende Buch 'Rhetorik für Plädoyer und forensischen Streit' von T. Lübbig kündigt einen Beitrag im Bereich ‚Rhetorik und Recht‘ an, und dabei insbesondere eine Untersuchung zur Rhetorik in der juristischen Praxis.

While Chinese societies often appear centralized and traditional, presumably impeding technology and innovation, these values may simply reflect the negative-leaning poles of Confucianism. This study proposes a Confucian work ethic dimension that stresses justified tradition. In combination with Western innovative cultures, this Chinese style might facilitate learning about knowledge and morality in an interaction seemingly unique to the Chinese science and technology sector. Specifically, contrary to the Western style that tolerates conflict to achieve harmony, Confucian work ethics -an Eastern way (...) -prefer to respect hierarchy to attain harmony. Samples from the multinational corporations in Shanghai and privately owned enterprises in Hsinchu of Taiwan represent two levels of Westernization. The findings reveal that the two types of cultures almost equally influence the facilitation of learning about morality, whereas the Western way more effectively teaches about professional knowledge and the Eastern way more effectively teaches general knowledge. In addition, though the samples from both locations enjoy positive advantages from their combined cultures, Shanghai appears more Westernized than Taiwan, and Taiwan benefits more from Confucian work ethics and a higher level of quality learning, particularly with regard to morality. This result may suggest the benefits of Confucius' ideas, if they are not used excessively to emphasize the negative aspects. (shrink)

Die Frage ›Warum ist überhaupt etwas und nicht vielmehr nichts?‹ gehört zu den ebenso traditionsreichen wie umstrittenen Problemen der Philosophie. Bereits mehrmals in die Mottenkiste der Philosophiegeschichte verbannt, erlebt sie doch zuverlässig ihre Renaissancen. Der vorliegende Band nimmt sich der ›Grundfrage‹ in einer ideengeschichtlichen Perspektive an. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass die systematisch keineswegs erst mit Leibniz auftauchende Frage in ihrer Geschichte von der Antike bis zur gegenwärtigen analytischen Philosophie nicht nur jeweils unterschiedliche Antworten provoziert hat, sondern vor allem auch (...) ganz verschieden gestellt worden ist: Formuliert Leibniz »Pourquoi il y a plus tôt quelque chose que rien?«, heißt es bei Schelling »Warum ist nicht nichts, warum ist überhaupt etwas?«, während Schopenhauer ihr eine existentielle Wendung gibt (»Lieber nichts als etwas«). Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit dem Nihilismus führt zu der Frage: »Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?«, während Arendt sie ins Politische wendet (»Warum ist überhaupt jemand und nicht niemand?«). Der Band wird durch einen Überblick über die vielschichtige Diskussion der ›letzten Warum-Frage‹ in der Tradition der Analytischen Philosophie sowie einen Antwortversuch aus Sicht der aktuellen Physik und Kosmologie abgerundet. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Background Recent publications reveal shortcomings in evidence review and summarization methods for patient decision aids. In the large-scale "Share to Care (S2C)" Shared Decision Making (SDM) project at the University Hospital Kiel, Germany, one of 4 SDM interventions was to develop up to 80 decision aids for patients. Best available evidence on the treatments' impact on patient-relevant outcomes was systematically appraised to feed this information into the decision aids. Aims of this paper were to (1) describe how PtDAs are developed (...) and how S2C evidence reviews for each PtDA are conducted, (2) appraise the quality of the best available evidence identified and (3) identify challenges associated with identified evidence. Methods The quality of the identified evidence was assessed based on GRADE quality criteria and categorized into high-, moderate-, low-, very low-quality evidence. Evidence appraisal was conducted across all outcomes assessed in an evidence review and for specific groups of outcomes, namely mortality, morbidity, quality of life, and treatment harms. Challenges in evidence interpretation and summarization resulting from the characteristics of decision aids and the type and quality of evidence are identified and discussed. Conclusions Evidence reviews in this project were carefully conducted and summarized. However, the evidence identified for our decision aids was indeed a "scattered landscape" and often poor quality. Facing a high prevalence of low-quality, non-directly comparative evidence for treatment alternatives doesn't mean it is not necessary to choose an evidence-based approach to inform patients. While there is an urgent need for high quality comparative trials, best available evidence nevertheless has to be appraised and transparently communicated to patients. (shrink)

In this article I argue that Jacques Derrida is correct in holding that the law is always an authorized force but that he is mistaken in suggesting that its ultimate font or origin (what he calls the ‘mystical foundation of authority’) is an originary or ‘foundationalional’ act of violence. I suggest that Derrida and, more recently, Jens Bartelson fall prey to a curious, one-sided narrow view of ‘foundationalism’ and contrast their overly ‘architecturalized’ image of the ‘foundation’ of authority with the (...) foundationalism of Thomas Hobbes which is, I shall argue, architectural only as and when appropriate. I also suggest that Hobbes helps us to see that the state, strictly speaking, does not ‘have’ or ‘exercise’ authority but that it is, rather, the font or source of the authority wielded by its (empirical) government. Key Words: Jens Bartelson • Jacques Derrida • Thomas Hobbes • justice • Immanuel Kant • law • Michel de Montaigne • Blaise Pascal • violence. (shrink)

Derek Parfit has offered numerous arguments in an attempt to establish that identity is not what matters. Jens Johannson has recently argued that Parfit's various arguments for the claim that identity is not what matters fail to establish what Parfit takes such arguments to establish. Johannson contends that this is due in part to the invalidity of one of Parfit's key arguments, and the fact that Parfit ignores a position that is compatible with the conclusions of his successful arguments and (...) the claim that identity is in fact what matters, namely, that I survive fission as either one of the fission products or the other, but it is indeterminate which one I survive as. I aim to establish here that both of Johannson's assertions are problematic. As a corollary of this task, I hope to shed some light on the relationship between indeterminacy and fission-based arguments for the claim that identity is not what matters. (shrink)

Hsieh Liang-tso was one of the leading direct disciples of Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I, the two brothers who were the early leaders of the Confucian revival known as Neo-Confucianism in Northern Sung China. Hsieh was thus among the first to recognize and follow the insights of the Ch'eng brothers as definitive of the authentic Confucian tradition, a recognition that became the conviction of the majority of later Confucian scholars and practitioners. The present book is a focused analysis of the (...) core value of Confucian thought, namely jen, through an investigation of Hsieh Liang-tso's analysis of the Analects of Confucius. Selover argues that Hsieh's handling of key issues in interpreting and applying the Confucian Analects, his experiential reasoning and his deference to scriptural classics and earlier tradition, bear important similarities to the practice of theology in Western religious traditions. The volume also contains a translation of Hsieh's commentary on the Analects, as well as a foreword by the renowned scholar of Confucianism, Tu Wei-ming. (shrink)

This book presents a focused analysis of the core value of Confucian thought, namely the jen, through an investigation of Hsieh Liang-tso's analysis of the Analects of Confucius. Selover argues that Hsieh's handling of key issues in interpreting and applying the Confucian Analects, his experiental reasoning as well as his deference to scriptural classics and earlier tradition, bear important similarities to the practice of theology in Western religious traditions. The volume also contains a translation of Hsieh's commentary on the Analects, (...) and a foreword by the renowned scholar of Confucianism, Tu Wei-ming. (shrink)

A first step towards an ‘ethnography of Nazi law’ is the exclusion of traditional views on this topic: first Radbruch’s qualification of the Nazi made after 1945 as an Unrechtsstaat, a t...

Theories of literature, poetics, and criticism; with reference to Nepali.

Study of Dīdhitiprakāśikā of Gadhādharabhaṭṭācārya, 17th/18th cent., commentary on Pramāṇyavāda, portion of Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa, dealing with the concept of authenticity of proofs).

One of the greatest merits of Costica Bradatan's book is that it explores a cluster of topics that represent the untold, the unuttered, almost the unutterable in contemporary philosophy: death, dying, sacrifice and self-sacrifice. Ours is a culture of 'happy endings' and, in this respect, most philosophers of today are the spokespersons of their time. Bradatan is a dissenter. His book approaches death head-on. Indeed, what makes this project fascinating is the fact that, while the book purports to be about (...) 'dying for an idea,' it in fact sings praise to life. Death, in Bradatan's view, is something that brings new meaning to life, a renewed intensity to the act of living. Simon Critchley, New School for Social Research, New York, USA. (shrink)

The global coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has caused significant uncertainty for students and teachers. During this time, teacher and student creative beliefs and affect play a supportive role in adaptively managing stress, finding joy, and bouncing back from inevitable setbacks with resilience. Developing an adaptive orientation to creativity is a critically important step in helping teachers deal with the challenges and stress of reaching their students through distance learning, especially the most marginalized. This study aims to understand how teacher (...) creativity linked to well-being in the face of COVID-19-related school shutdowns and how teachers planned to adapt creatively to distance learning through the guidance of a summer creative teaching training institute. Results from this sequential mixed method study demonstrated important relationships. Creative self-efficacy in teaching related to teacher buoyancy in the face of setbacks. Creative growth mindset related to teachers’ general positive affect in teaching. Lowered creative anxiety related to reduced effects of secondary traumatic stress and general negative affect in teaching. Environmental support and encouragement for creativity in schools may be foundational for teacher well-being by enhancing teachers’ dispositional joy, general positive affect, and reducing general negative affect. Results suggested additional stress and loss of creativity for most teachers due to the COVID-19 pandemic alongside substantial capacity for creative adaptations with the support of training for creativity in teaching and learning. (shrink)

This paper draws on the economics of ethical compliance model to examine the association between ethical reasoning, perceived risk of detection, perceived levels of penalties and Chinese auditors'' ethical behavior in an audit conflict situation. Using 53 Chinese auditors from Shenzen as subjects, and a survey questionnaire, this study found that there is a significant negative association between ethical reasoning and the likelihood of unethical behavior and that this negative association is weaker for auditors who perceive higher risks of detection.

As John Rawls makes clear in A Theory of Justice, there is a popular and influential strand of political thought for which brute luck – that is, being lucky in the so-called “lottery of life” – ought to have no place in a theory of distributive justice. Yet the debate about luck, desert, and fairness in contemporary political philosophy has recently been rekindled by a handful of philosophers who claim that desert should play a bigger role in theories of distributive (...) justice. In the present paper, we present the results of our attempts to fill in some of the missing empirical details of this debate. Our findings provide some preliminary evidence that, contrary to what most contemporary political philosophers have assumed, people are not as worried by natural luck as previously thought. Instead, people’s worries seem to be focused exclusively on inequalities generated by social luck. (shrink)

This article calls into question the simplistic identification of modern technology with quantitative efficiency in order to develop three main themes. First, I establish that technology, broadly construed, is the use of knowledge and resources to meet specific human needs. Accordingly, dominant technical practice that favors efficiency and numerical criteria and discriminates against other technologies should more appropriately be called “technology of technology.” Second, I delineate how dominant practice in engineering is an exemplar of technology of technology, when it becomes (...) socially ambitious while remaining technically provincial and bears upon our personal and institutional life. Third, I illustrate what I call the “subjugated technical practice,” which exists under the rule of the dominant technical practice. Recognizing the importance of subjugated technical practices to engineering, I propose the concept of “critical technology of technology,” which is intended to advance technological alternatives and make critique an essential part of our technological world. (shrink)

Democratic societies are rife with talk of trust in institutions such as governments, banks, news agencies, medical practitioners, nuclear power plants, weather forecasters and social network sites. These institutions are anonymous in the sense that citizens tend to know very little about them. Philosophers have argued that trust in the absence of sufficient evidence may fit a child who trusts its parents but is inappropriate for the vigilant citizens of a democratic society. In this article, I defend the appropriateness of (...) trusting anonymous institutions against its critics. To this end, I develop two principles of appropriateness that apply to a wide range of trusting attitudes. First, the principle of epistemic duties according to which the truster should not be culpably ignorant about the trustee, where, what constitutes culpable ignorance will depend on the relationship of trust. Second, the principle of appropriate normative expectations according to which a truster should have normative expectations that fit the relationship with the trustee and the valued outcome at stake in the trust relation. I then show that it is often appropriate to trust anonymous institutions. In fact, the evidential requirements on trust are sometimes so low as to allow citizens to trust institutions which they know literally nothing about. (shrink)

Als im Jahr 1992 die Frage aufgeworfen wurde, ob der französische Philosoph Jacques Derrida den Ehrendoktortitel der University of Cambridge verliehen bekommen sollte, lehnte ein Teil der Jury-Mitglieder die Vergabe ab. Man könne nicht, so hieß es damals, einen Denker würdigen, der in seinen Schriften vormalig Gedankenspiele inszeniere und »überall seine eigenen Urteile wieder umstößt«. Die zuletzt zitierten Worte wurden so nicht geäußert, da sie aus dem dritten Jahrhundert von dem griechischen Philosophen Porphyrius stammten und gegen den 〉theoretischen Gründungsvater〈 des (...) Christentums, Paulus, gerichtet waren. Porphyrius war in seiner Kritik an Paulus nicht weniger kleinlich als die oben erwähnten Jurymitglieder. Es sei die Inkohärenz eines Denkens, das er bei Paulus kritisiere und das »jeder Bildung entbehre«. Denn »beinahe wie ein Schwert wetzt er [Paulus] seine Zunge und zerstückelt ohne Schonung die Glieder des Gesetzes, er, der an vielen Stellen den Gehorsam gegen das Gesetz eingeschärft und das Leben nach demselben für lobenswert erklärt hat.«. (shrink)

The dramatic events of the crisis have reignited debates on the independence of central banks and the scope of their mandates. In this article, I contribute to the normative understanding of these developments by discussing John Rawls’s position in debates of the 1950s and 1960s on the independence of the US Federal Reserve. Rawls’s account of the central bank in his property-owning democracy, Democratic Central Banking (DCB), assigns authority over monetary policy directly to the government and prioritizes low unemployment over (...) price stability. I contrast DCB with Central Bank Independence (CBI), which requires that the central bank is independent of the government and pursues low inflation. I evaluate DCB by asking whether justice as fairness requires democratic control of the central bank and argue that it does not. Instead, so I argue, the choice between DCB and CBI should be justified in terms of the difference principle. By reflecting on central banking in a property-owning democracy, I cast new light on the Rawlsian realistic utopia of a just capitalist society, while also investigating democratic objections to today’s independent central banks. (shrink)

Hugh of Saint-Victor's De Sacramentis is usually regarded as an early summa of theology. As such it has been regarded as not totally satisfying, lacking a clearness of its conceptual system when compared with the work of e.g. Peter the Lombard. What may make up for this lack of system and even confer coherence, be it on a different level, is Hugh's pedagogical view of creation and salvation history, as it shows most clearly in his tropological digressions. In his exposition (...) of the history of salvation as it unfolds since the very beginning, Hugh incorporates the process by which the monk can not only follow the story of the macrocosm, but at the same time can read his self into being, allowing recognition of ambivalence from the start, and thus presenting a multi-demensional view of being human. In the same way as, on the cosmic level, any pre-lapsarian state of innocence exhibits a flaw from the very beginning, so the life of man is in a permanent state of ambiguity. This ambiguity is the framework for man as a moral being. Only within the possibility of choice can man be just or happy, without choice justus and beatus have no real significance. Matters are shown to be even more complicated when, in the story of Eve Hugh draws attention to her doubtful interpretation of God's command, as a factor which precedes her choice. In this way, De Sacramentis is not only a doctrina in our sense of the content of Christian dogma, but it offers the monk a point to which he can attach and conform his intentio: by bringing his intentio in form with the story about creation and fall and reparation, the reader can in fact effect the necessary reparatio, consisting of knowledge of truth and love of virtue. (shrink)

In the 2005 Kitzmiller v Dover Area School Board case, a federal district court ruled that Intelligent Design creationism was not science, but a disguised religious view and that teaching it in public schools is unconstitutional. But creationists contend that it is illegitimate to distinguish science and religion, citing philosophers Quinn and especially Laudan, who had criticized a similar ruling in the 1981 McLean v. Arkansas creation-science case on the grounds that no necessary and sufficient demarcation criterion was possible and (...) that demarcation was a dead pseudo-problem. This article discusses problems with those conclusions and their application to the quite different reasoning between these two cases. Laudan focused too narrowly on the problem of demarcation as Popper defined it. Distinguishing science from religion was and remains an important conceptual issue with significant practical import, and philosophers who say there is no difference have lost touch with reality in a profound and perverse way. The Kitzmiller case did not rely on a strict demarcation criterion, but appealed only to a “ballpark” demarcation that identifies methodological naturalism as a “ground rule” of science. MN is shown to be a distinguishing feature of science both in explicit statements from scientific organizations and in actual practice. There is good reason to think that MN is shared as a tacit assumption among philosophers who emphasize other demarcation criteria and even by Laudan himself. (shrink)

_Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_ attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. Psychological studies indicate not just that we are bad at detecting our own "ego-threatening" thoughts; they also suggest that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts. However, self-reflection presupposes an ability to know one’s own thoughts. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? While admitting the psychological data, this book argues that we are infallible in a limited range of self-discerning judgments—that in some (...) cases, these judgments are self-fulfilling or self-verifying. Even so, infallibility does not imply indubitability, and the author does not wish to provide a "foundation" for empirical knowledge. The point is rather to explain how self-reflection as a rational activity is possible. The book will be of interest to scholars working on the issue of self-reflection across a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. (shrink)