The main thesis of this paper is that when we trust the results of scientific research, that trust is inevitably directed at least in part at collective bodies rather than at single researchers, and that accordingly, reasonable assessments of epistemic trustworthiness in science must attend to these collective bodies. In order to support this claim, I start by invoking the collaborative nature of most of today’s scientific research. I argue that the trustworthiness of a collaborative research group does not supervene (...) on the trustworthiness of its individual members and point out some specific problems for the assessment of epistemic trustworthiness that arise from the specific nature of today’s collaborative research. Next, I argue that the social diffusion of trustworthiness goes even further; we always also need an assessment of the trustworthiness of the respective research community as a whole. Communities, I claim, play an essential role in the epistemic quality management of science. To see why this role is indispensible, we have to appreciate the full complexity of determining what is desirable in a method of inquiry. The relevant features of a method include three different dimensions: the reliability of positive results, the reliability of negative results, and the method’s power. Every methodological choice involves a trade-off between these three dimensions. The right balance between them (the “distribution of inductive risks”, or DIR) depends on value judgments about the costs of false results and the benefits of correct ones. Conventional methodological standards of research communities impose constraints on admissible DIR and thereby harmonize the implicit value judgments. Trusting that the research community has set the limitations on DIR in a suitable way is thus always part of placing our trust in a scientific result. (shrink)

Epistemic trust is crucial for science. This article aims to identify the kinds of assumptions that are involved in epistemic trust as it is required for the successful operation of science as a collective epistemic enterprise. The relevant kind of reliance should involve working from the assumption that the epistemic endeavors of others are appropriately geared towards the truth, but the exact content of this assumption is more difficult to analyze than it might appear. The root of the problem is (...) that methodological decisions in science typically involve a complex trade-off between the reliability of positive results, the reliability of negative results, and the investigation's power. Which balance between these is the ‘correct’ one can only be determined in light of an evaluation of the consequences of all the different possible outcomes of the inquiry. What it means for the investigation to be ‘appropriately geared towards the truth’ thus depends on certain value judgments. I conclude that in the optimal case, trusting someone in her capacity as an information provider also involves a reliance on her having the right attitude towards the possible consequences of her epistemic work. 1 Introduction2 Epistemic Reliance within the Sciences3 Methodological Conventionalism4 Trust in Science5 Conclusions. (shrink)

What is the normative import of telling a genealogy of our present reason-giving practices? In this paper, I will focus on Michel Foucault’s materialist genealogies in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, which attend to the social and material settings in which we act and give and ask for reasons. A number of influential critics have interpreted them as a critical evaluation of our reason-giving practices. But understood in this way, Foucault’s genealogical project faces significant philosophical (...) problems. I will sketch a different account, arguing that telling a genealogy can have an uncanny effect: It can disrupt our familiarity with the everyday world by revealing to us the embodied norms that structure our everyday activities. Once we recognize that our situation is structured by normative demands, we cannot simply let ourselves be carried along by found norms. Genealogies call on us to take responsibility for these norms and to practically transform the space in which we act. (shrink)

Scientific research that requires space flight has always been subject to comparatively strong external control. Its agenda has often had to be adapted to vacillating political target specifications. Can space scientists appeal to one or the other form of the widely acknowledged principle of freedom of research in order to claim more autonomy? In this paper, the difficult question of autonomy within planned research is approached by examining three arguments that support the principle of freedom of research in differing ways. (...) Each argument has its particular strengths and limitations. Together they serve to demonstrate particular advantages of scientific autonomy, but in the case of space science, their force ultimately remains limited. However, as the arguments highlight the interrelations between scientific autonomy, the democratic process and the collective interest in scientific knowledge, they suggest that a coherent and sustained space science agenda might best be ensured by increasing the transparency of science policy decisions and involving the democratic public. (shrink)

When interests and preferences of researchers or their sponsors cause bias in experimental design, data interpretation or dissemination of research results, we normally think of it as an epistemic shortcoming. But as a result of the debate on science and values, the idea that all extra-scientific influences on research could be singled out and separated from pure science is now widely believed to be an illusion. I argue that nonetheless, there are cases in which research is rightfully regarded as epistemologically (...) deficient due to the influence of preferences on its outcomes. I present examples from biomedical research and offer an analysis in terms of social epistemology. (shrink)

This guest editorial opens with a brief overview of the transformations of medicine and mental health that can be observed since the second half of the twentieth century. New genetics and biotechnologies hold out the promise of overcoming presumed limitations in the field of mental health care, that is, the fact that diagnostic procedures in psychiatry and clinical psychology still largely rely on the narratives of patients and questionnaires, supposedly subjective assessments by physicians and psychologists. It is envisioned that innovative (...) genetic and proteomic tools, imaging technologies, and objective laboratory tests for blood biomarkers will enable better diagnosis and treatment of mental diseases. We argue that emerging biotechnologies do not revolutionize mental health, despite their promise to do so. Instead, we observe a pluralization of research and treatment approaches in the domain of mental health. The second part of this editorial discusses the contributions to this special issue on emerging biotechnologies and mental health and outlines how they address some of the gaps in social studies of psychiatry and mental health in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

A common complaint against the increasing privatization of research is that research that is conducted with the immediate purpose of producing applicable knowledge will not yield knowledge as valuable as that generated in more curiosity‐driven, academic settings. In this paper, I make this concern precise and reconstruct the rationale behind it. Subsequently, I examine the case of industry research on the giant magnetoresistance effect in the 1990s as a characteristic example of research undertaken under considerable pressure to produce applicable results. (...) The example permits one to arrive at a more optimistic assessment of the epistemic merits of private, application‐driven research. I attempt to specify the conditions that, in this case, advanced the production of interesting and reliable knowledge. (shrink)

This book is a festschrift for Torsten Hagerstrand. "Through your work on migration, innovation diffusion, and time-geography you have helped demonstrate that geography's most profound insights are to be gained from the study of process rather than form.".

To study how religiosity affects family business goals, we merge literatures on goal setting, temporal orientation, and family business to argue that family business goals can be distinguished into short-term and long-term orientations and propose that religiosity affects both orientations, but to varying degrees. Drawing on a sample of private U.S. family businesses and applying partial least squares structural equations modeling, we find tentative support that religiosity has a stronger positive effect on long-term goal orientation than on short-term goal orientation. (...) We discuss implications for theory development and future research involving religiosity and family business goals. (shrink)

In this paper on the integrative function of work the author challenges the popular claim that jobs are the main source of social integration. Rather it is argued that the claim that work entitles to recognition, participation, income and opens the way towards a meaningfullife should be treated as an ideal, established in the period of Enlightenment. >Social integration< is then defined as a normative concept concerning the capability to participate in the social systems and communities. In that view, social (...) integration implies more than the workplace has to offer. While gainful employment based on high standards of social security may further the cause of social integration, precarious jobs combined with harsh workfare regimes do endanger it. Concluding, a policy adhering to the capability approach towards social integration is proposed, measures intended to take pressure offthe welfare system include changes in the system of public education and the establishment of a basic income scheme. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungTrotz einer bereits vor der COVID-Krise erkennbar großen gesellschaftlichen Bedeutung und möglicher Potenziale der Digitalisierung für den organisierten Sport, liegen bislang nur wenige aussagekräftige Befunde darüber vor, welchen Stellenwert Sportvereine der Digitalisierungsthematik innerhalb der Vereinsarbeit beimessen. Vor diesem Hintergrund geht der Beitrag folgenden Fragen nach: (i) Welche Priorität messen Sportvereine dem Thema Digitalisierung bei? (ii) Welche vereinsspezifischen Faktoren beeinflussen die jeweilige Priorisierung des Themas Digitalisierung? Die Priorisierung der Digitalisierung wird dabei in Abhängigkeit von Vereinszielen, einstellungs- und organisationskulturbezogenen Faktoren sowie den (...) unterschiedlichen organisationalen Kapazitäten der Sportvereine modelliert. Für die Analyse konnte eine Stichprobe von n = 787 Sportvereinen generiert werden. Die Befunde zeigen, dass Digitalisierung für Vereine vor der COVID-Krise zwar ein wichtiges Thema, aber kein Thema von herausgehobener Priorität innerhalb der Vereinsarbeit darstellt. Die Ergebnisse des logistischen Regressionsmodells deuten darauf hin, dass die Unterschiede in der Priorisierung vor allem auf Differenzen in der Organisationskultur und der Organisationskapazität zurückzuführen sind. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Im Rahmen dieses Beitrages soll hinterfragt werden, inwieweit sich die Konzepte der Amerikanisierung und der Globalisierung eignen, um aktuelle Sportentwicklungen zu beschreiben. Nach der Präzisierung des Begriffs der Sportentwicklung vor dem Hintergrund aktueller entwicklungstheoretischer Diskussionen und der Theorie sozialen Wandels werden die Konzepte der Amerikanisierung und der Globalisierung auf der Basis des dargestellten begrifflichen Instrumentariums analysiert, und es werden zentrale Tendenzen der aktuellen Sportentwicklung beschrieben. Abschließend erfolgt die Diskussion der Reichweite der beiden Konzepte im Rahmen der Forschung zur Sportentwicklung, (...) und es werden Perspektiven der zukünftigen Forschung aufgezeigt. (shrink)

In various debates about science, appeal is made to the freedom of scientific research. A rationale in favor of this freedom is rarely offered. In this paper, two major arguments are reconstructed that promise to lend support to a principle of scientific freedom. According to the epistemological argument, freedom of research is required in order to organize the collective cognitive effort we call science efficiently. According to the political argument, scientific knowledge needs to be generated in ways that are independent (...) of the major political powers because of the important role it plays for the citizens and their capacity to form well-informed political preferences. Both arguments are examined critically in order to identify their strengths and limitations. I argue that the scientific freedom established by both rests on a number of critical preconditions, and that the arguments’ force must be weighed against competing societal interests and values in each case of their application. Appeal to a principle of scientific freedom should therefore never mark the end, but rather the beginning of a public debate about the ends and means of science. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDieser Beitrag analysiert, basierend auf Essers (2009) vierdimensionalem Integrationskonzept, das Ausmaß der sozialen Integration von einheimischen und immigrierten Mitgliedern im Vereinssport (n = 780; MAlter = 20.62; 38.2 % weiblich; 38.5 % mit Migrationshintergrund). Dabei interessierte der Einfluss soziodemografischer, sportbezogener sowie soziokultureller Merkmale. Mitglieder der ersten Migrationsgeneration waren entlang dreier Integrationsdimensionen weniger stark integriert als einheimische und immigrierte Mitglieder der zweiten bzw. dritten Generation. Multiple Regressionsanalysen verdeutlichten, dass einige Merkmale signifikant mit den Integrationsdimensionen zusammenhängen (Mitgliedschaftsdauer, elterliche Sportvereinsaktivität, Wertorientierung, bikulturelle Integrationseinstellung) (...) und somit relevanter für die soziale Integration sind als andere (Identität, Nationalität). (shrink)

In order to select an area of ignorance and make it the target of inquiry, one first has to be aware of one’s own lack of knowledge in this particular area. In this paper, I explore this connection between ignorance and the aims of research. I emphasize the importance of distinguishing between all the things we don’t know—our total ignorance—and the totality of what we know we don’t know—our conscious ignorance. I argue that while our total ignorance may be conceptualized (...) as a set of true propositions that are unknown to us, our conscious ignorance is best understood as a set of questions. This enables us to identify the preconditions that have to be satisfied in order for a question to be an element of our conscious ignorance. The analysis reveals that conscious ignorance is a complex ability that can often require quite an amount of knowledge and competence. Items of conscious ignorance can, of course, differ in many important respects. To stress one of these differences, I introduce the notion of deep ignorance to signify cases in which we not only fail to know the correct answer to a given question, but cannot even name any plausible candidate answers. I argue that items of deep ignorance should be expected to possess particular attractiveness as targets of research (provided they are not entirely intractable). Finally, I suggest that in light of my analysis, some of the strategies of ignorance-mongers that have engaged agnotologists’ interests over the past years can be understood as attempts to undermine not only knowledge, but also conscious ignorance at the same time—or, in cases where that is not possible, to at least counteract the impression that the ignorance in question is deep. (shrink)

This paper advocates for making epistemic interests a central object of philosophical analysis in epistemology and philosophy of science. It is argued that the importance of epistemic interests derives from their fundamental importance for the notion of objectivity. Epistemic interests are defined as individuated by a set of objectives, each of which represents a dimension of the search for truth. Among these dimensions, specificity, sensitivity, and productivity are discussed in detail. It is argued that the relevance of productivity is often (...) overlooked in debates about the ends and means of science. A definition of the objectivity of inquiry is proposed that takes the notion of epistemic interest as its starting point. (shrink)

Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) [Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic. Psychological Review, 109 (1), 75–90] found evidence for the use of the recognition heuristic. For example, if an individual recognizes only one of two cities, they tend to infer that the recognized city has a larger population. A prediction that follows is that of the less‐is‐more effect: Recognizing fewer cities leads, under certain conditions, to more accurate inferences than recognizing more cities. We extend the recognition heuristic to group decision‐making (...) by developing majority and lexicographic models of how recognition information is used by groups. We formally show when the less‐is‐more effect is predicted in groups and we present a study where three‐member groups performed the population comparison task. Several aspects of our data indicate that members who can use the recognition heuristic are, not in all but in most cases, more influential in the group decision process than members who cannot use the heuristic. We also observed the less‐is‐more effect and found that models assuming that members who can use the recognition heuristic are more influential better predict when the effect occurs. (shrink)

This paper discusses how to deal with research that threatens to cause harm to society—in particular, whether and in what cases bans and moratoria are appropriate. First, it asks what normative resources philosophy of science may draw on to answer such questions. In an effort to presuppose only resources acknowledgeable across different comprehensive worldviews, it is claimed that the aim of credibility provides a good basis for normative reflection. A close analysis reveals an inner tension inherent in the pursuit of (...) credibility, referred to as the paradox of credibility: Although the aim of credibility involves the goal of being trusted, the immediate pursuit of the goal of being trusted as much as possible can run counter to and undermine the pursuit of credibility. From this inner tension, considerations are derived on what it means to uncompromisingly strive for trustworthiness. When applied to the problem of harmful research, it becomes apparent that it is important to distinguish between different types of cases. Some cases allow science to prevent harm while relinquishing credibility in the associated research area. In contrast, other cases demand preserving subject-specific scientific credibility in order to manage potential harm. (shrink)

Power is often taken to be a central concept in social and political thought that can contribute to the explanation of many different social phenomena. This article argues that in order to play this role, a general theory of power is required to identify a stable causal capacity, one that does not depend on idiosyncratic social conditions and can thus exert its characteristic influence in a wide range of cases. It considers three promising strategies for such a theory, which ground (...) power in (1) the ability to use force, (2) access to resources, or (3) collective acceptance. It shows that these strategies fail to identify a stable causal capacity. The lack of an adequate general theory of power suggests that the concept lacks the necessary unity to play the broad explanatory role it is often accorded. (shrink)

In recent years, a variety of philosophers have argued that the fundamental bearers of representational properties like truth are concrete particulars produced by cognitive agents—representational vehicles (“RVs”), as I will call them. This view apparently conflicts with other judgments that are part of our common sense understanding of truth. For instance, it is plausible that there are truths about the Milky Way that have and never will never be articulated by anyone. Whatever these truths are, it looks like they cannot (...) be RVs, because an RV is articulated just in case it exists. In this paper, I argue that it is consistent to hold that the fundamental truth-bearers are representational vehicles, while also acknowledging the existence of unarticulated truths. I argue that truth is a property that derivatively holds of kinds of RVs, that these provide the basis for our judgments that there are unarticulated truths, and I defend the view against putative counter-examples. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Kollektive Emotionen stellen für Marketing-Events mit sportlichen Inhalten einen zentralen Erfolgsfaktor dar, wenn es darum geht, potentiellen Kunden Produkte möglichst erlebnisorientiert zu vermitteln. In der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Eventmarketing-Forschung wird bislang weitgehend vernachlässigt, unter welchen Bedingungen es zur Entstehung kollektiver Emotionen kommt. Der Beitrag nähert sich dem Phänomen aus systemtheoretischer Perspektive, indem zunächst die Operationsformen emotionaler Kommunikation beleuchtet werden. Unter Bezugnahme auf emotionale Kommunikationsprozesse wird anschließend die Entstehung kollektiver Emotionen diskutiert. Dabei wird verdeutlicht, wie die Eventteilnehmer ihre eigenen emotionalen Zustände bei (...) anderen als ebenfalls gegeben voraussetzen und wie der als Gemeinschaft identifizierten Gruppe eine ähnlich „gefühlte“ Wirklichkeit unterstellt wird. Im Rahmen der Fallstudie „Red Bull District Ride“ werden die theoretischen Überlegungen einer empirischen Analyse unterzogen. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Der vorliegende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwieweit die Identifikation von Fans mit einem Sportteam bzw. -club die Einstellung und Kaufabsicht gegenüber Produkten von Clubsponsoren beeinflusst. Zur Analyse dieses Zusammenhangs wird zunächst ein Wirkungsmodell entwickelt, welches die Beziehung zwischen Fan, Sportclub und Sponsor abzubilden vermag. Die Prüfung der abgeleiteten Hypothesen erfolgt anhand einer empirischen Studie mit einem Proficlub der ersten Fußball-Bundesliga und einem seiner Sponsoren in der Saison 2007/08. Über eine Online-Befragung wurde eine Stichprobe von N = 1.594 generiert. (...) Die empirischen Befunde zeigen, dass die Fanidentität zwar die Einstellung gegenüber dem Clubsponsor positiv beeinflusst, ein direkter Einfluss auf die Kaufabsicht bestätigt sich dagegen nicht. Allerdings kann ein indirekter Effekt der Fanidentität via Einstellung gegenüber dem Sponsor auf die Kaufabsicht aufgezeigt werden. Damit weisen die Befunde darauf hin, dass der Einfluss der Fanidentität im Hinblick auf die Sportsponsoringwirkung nicht unterschätzt werden sollte. (shrink)

In recent years, the philosophy of Ludwig Boltzmann has become a point of interest within the field of history of philosophy of science. Attention has centred around Boltzmann’s philosophical considerations connected to his defense of atomism in physics. In analysing these considerations, several scholars have attributed a pragmatist stance to Boltzmann. In this paper, I want to argue that, whatever pragmatist traits may be found in Boltzmann’s diverse writings, his defense of atomism in physics can not be analysed this way. (...) In other words, I wish to show that he did not defend atomism as “preferable for its practical virtues”, as has been alleged.1 On the contrary, Boltzmann considered the atomist picture to be indispensable — more precisely, an indispensable prerequisite for making the application of continuous differential equations an understandable enterprise. (shrink)

This article gives a brief introduction to the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Treatment (MacCAT-T) and critically examines its theoretical presuppositions. On the basis of empirical, methodological and ethical critique it is emphasised that the cognitive bias that underlies the MacCAT-T assessment needs to be modified. On the one hand it has to be admitted that the operationalisation of competence in terms of value-free categories, e.g. rational decision abilities, guarantees objectivity to a great extent; but on the other hand it bears severe (...) problems. Firstly, the cognitive focus is in itself a normative convention in the process of anthropological value-attribution. Secondly, it misses the complexity of the decision process in real life. It is therefore suggested that values, emotions and other biographic and context specific aspects should be considered when interpreting the cognitive standards according to the MacArthur model. To fill the gap between cognitive and non-cognitive approaches the phenomenological theory of personal constructs is briefly introduced. In conclusion some main demands for further research to develop a multi-step model of competence assessment are outlined. (shrink)

This paper aims to give an insight into developments that contributed to the significance of the work of Jakob von Uexküll and stresses the importance of his occupation in Hamburg. A biographical survey pays tribute to the implication of the historical pretext and context. A scientific survey describes findings and ideas of Uexküll that proved important for the development of biology and the cognitive sciences. In addition, this paper sets out to reject the common notion that Uexküll’s concepts were ideas (...) of a purely theoretical and philosophical character. It confirms that in fact the central aims of his work were to sustain the empirical method in biology and to give biology a sound epistemological basis. Some examples show how historical and theoretical developments converged at Uexküll’s Institut für Umweltforschung in Hamburg and ignited a productive research activity. (shrink)

The essay deals with the Protestant approach towards the issue of wealth. While biblical statements tend to take a very critical stance towards riches and the rich, the protestant tradition and classical and contemporary imagery take a more favorable approach. For that reason, a closer look seems necessary. Three steps are taken. First of all, the concept of ›wealth‹ bears closer scrutiny. Secondly, the classical Protestant doctrine on wealth is given a short survey. Finally, the role of wealth in a (...) Protestant concept of the good life is discussed. As a result, prosperity and capital are distinguished from wealth: While economic prosperity and capital may well be used as means in a Christian concept of the good life, wealth - understood as intentional use of prosperity as means towards social distinction or as overwhelming economic power - should not be one of its ends. Rather, Christians should advocate the spread of a basic prosperity and capital to everyone. (shrink)

The notion of ecological rationality implies that the accuracy of a decision strategy depends on features of the information environment in which it is tested. We demonstrate that the performance of a group may be strongly affected by the decision strategies used by its individual members and specify how this effect is moderated by environmental features. Specifically, in a set of simulation studies, we systematically compared four decision strategies used by the individual group members: two linear, compensatory decision strategies and (...) two simple, noncompensatory heuristics. Individual decisions were aggregated by using a majority rule. To assess the ecological rationality of the strategies, we varied (a) the distribution of cue validities, (b) the quantity, and (c) the quality of shared information. Group performance strongly depended on the distribution of cue validities. When validities were linearly distributed, groups using a compensatory strategy achieved the highest accuracy. Conversely, when cue validities followed a J-shaped distribution, groups using a simple lexicographic heuristic performed best. While these effects were robust across different quantities of shared information, the quality of shared information exerted stronger effects on group performance. Consequences for prescriptive theories on group decision making are discussed. (shrink)

This chapter provides an analysis of the long process of introducing an electronic identity for online authentication in Germany. This process is described as a multi-facet innovation, involving actors from different policy fields shifting over time. The eID process started in the late ‘90s in the context of eGovernment and eCommerce with the legislation on e-signatures, which were supposed to allow for online authentication of citizens. When after 5 years it was recognized that this was not the case, a new (...) digital ID card, which had meanwhile been announced, was chosen as token for the eID. This process was dominated by the concerns for visual inspection and border control, including the storage of digital fingerprints. Under the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior (BMI) and technical guidance of the Federal Agency for Information Security (BSI), technical specifications have to a large extent been adopted from the electronic passport, which had been smoothly introduced 2 years before. However, in the legislative process some concern regarding digital fingerprints on the eID card was raised and led to an opt-in solution. In 2009, a bill on the new ID card was passed which regulates the eID function for online authentication as well. This is characterized as a radical innovation by introducing a double-sided, mutual authentication of the citizen and the service provider and implementing the principle of proportionality regarding the access of service providers to data on the chip. At the time of writing, field tests are conducted. Roll-out of the new eID card is to start in November 2010. Therefore no figures about adoption can be provided here. (shrink)

This paper offers an explanation of how philosophy of science in the second half of the 20th century came to be so conspicuously silent on the problem of how to explain the applicability of mathematics. It examines the idea of the early logicists that the analyticity of mathematics accounts for its applicability, and how this idea was transformed during Carnap's efforts to establish a consistent and substantial philosophy of mathematics within the larger framework of Logical Empiricism. I argue that at (...) the end point of this development, philosophical discussion of the applicability problem was terminated although important aspects of the logicists' original response to the applicability problem had had to be sacrificed along the way. (shrink)