Abstract“Conscientious provision” refers to situations in which clinicians wish to provide legal and professionally accepted treatments prohibited within their (usually Catholic) health care institutions. It mirrors “conscientious objection,” which refers to situations in which clinicians refuse to provide legal and professionally accepted treatments offered within their (usually secular) health care institutions. Conscientious provision is not protected by law, but conscientious objection is. In practice, this asymmetry privileges conservative religious or moral values (usually associated with objection) over secular moral values (usually (...) associated with provision). In this article, we first argue for a legal right to one kind of conscientious provision: referral for procedures prohibited at Catholic hospitals. We then argue that a premise in that argument—the principle of comparably trivial institutional burdens—justifies legal protections for some additional forms of conscientious provision that include, for example, writing prescriptions for contraception or medical abortions. However, this principle cannot justify legal protections for other forms of conscientious provision, for instance, the right to perform surgical abortions or gender-affirming hysterectomies at Catholic hospitals. (shrink)

In the article “Principled Conscientious Provision: Referral Symmetry and Its Implications for Protecting Secular Conscience,” Abram L. Brummett, Tanner Hafen, and Mark C. Navin reject what they call the “referral asymmetry” in U.S. conscientious objection law in medicine, which recognizes rights of conscientiously objecting physicians to withhold referrals for medical interventions but does not (yet) recognize rights of physicians to make referrals for medical interventions to which they are morally committed but to which their health care institutions are (...) morally opposed. This commentary concentrates on a second asymmetry, namely, the relationship of a health care provider's referral or nonreferral to the medical standard of care. The commentary argues that this second asymmetry seems to require action more appropriately recognized as civil disobedience than conscientious provision of referral. (shrink)

Some philosophers (such as Kant and Rawls) think it is only wrong to be cruel to cats because it will make one behave cruelly to humans. This explanation is unsatisfactory. Why? Because being cruel to your cat is a direct wrong to your cat regardless of the effects it has on other humans. Ascribing the wrongness of cruelty to the fact it will make one callous to other humans is to assess the character of the cruel person not the act (...) they are performing. Cruelty to your cat is wrong because it wrongs your cat directly. (shrink)

A set of qubit channels has a classical representation when it is isomorphic to the convex closure of a group of classical channels. From Crowder and Martin (Proceedings of Quantum Physics and Logic, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 2009), we know that up to isomorphism there are five such sets, each corresponding to either a subgroup of the alternating group on four letters, or a subgroup of the symmetric group on three letters. In this paper, we show that the (...) classical representation of a qubit channel also carries its information theoretic data—in particular, both the Holevo capacity and the scope of a unital qubit channel can be completely calculated from a systematically determined classical channel. (shrink)

Originally published in 1979. Adultery is a dominant feature in chivalric literature; it becomes a major concern in Shakespeare's last plays; and it forms the central plot of novels from Anna Karenina to Couples. Tony Tanner proposes that transgressions of the marriage contract take on a special significance in the "bourgeois novels" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. His interpretation begins with the general topic of adultery in literature and then zeroes in on three works—Rousseau's La Nouvelle Héloïse, Goethe's (...) Die Wahlverwandtschaften, and Flaubert's Madame Bovary. His interpretation encompasses the role of women, the structure of the family, social mores, and the history of sexuality. (shrink)

Recent work on Mary Shepherd has largely focused on her metaphysics, especially as a response to Berkeley and Hume. However, relatively little attention has thus far been paid to the epistemological aspects of Shepherd’s program. What little attention Shepherd’s epistemology has received has tended to cast her as providing an unsatisfactory response to the skeptical challenge issued by Hume. For example, Walter Ott and Jeremy Fantl have each suggested that Shepherd cannot avoid Hume’s inductive skepticism even if she is granted (...) her metaphysics. In this paper, I examine Shepherd’s epistemology and argue that her response to Hume is more successful than the current literature suggests. In particular, I argue that, if Shepherd is granted her metaphysics, she can answer Hume’s demand for a rational justification of ordinary inductive inferences via a deductively justified uniformity principle and an appeal to parsimony. (shrink)

All else being equal, can granting the objective purport of moral experience support a presumption in favor of some form of moral objectivism? Don Loeb (2007) has argued that even if we grant that moral experience appears to present us with a realm of objective moral fact—something he denies we have reason to do in the first place—the objective purport of moral experience cannot by itself provide even prima facie support for moral objectivism. In this paper, I contend against Loeb (...) that granting the objective purport of ordinary moral experience is sufficient to support a defeasible presumption in favor of moral objectivism, and this by constituting non-explanatory, comparative confirmation that incrementally raises the prima facie likelihood that moral facts exist. More specifically, I appeal to a modest confirmation principle shared by Likelihoodists and Bayesieans - namely, the Weak Law of Likelihood - in an effort to show that (i) at a minimum, moral experience establishes a middling scrutable probability for a sufficient but not necessary condition of moral objectivism being true, and that (ii) this moderate probability in turn constitutes evidence that makes it prima facie more probable than not that some form of moral objectivism is true. (shrink)

Massive amounts of data are collected and stored on a routine basis in virtually all domains of human activities. Such data are potentially useful to biomedicine. Yet, access to data for research purposes is hindered by the fact that different kinds of individual-patient data reside in disparate, unlinked silos. We propose that data cooperatives can promote much needed data aggregation and consequently accelerate research and its clinical translation. Data cooperatives enable direct control over personal data, as well as more democratic (...) governance of data pools. This model can realize a specific kind of data economy whereby citizens and communities are empowered to steer data use according to their motivations, preferences, and concerns. Policy makers can promote this model by recognizing citizens’ rights to access and to obtain a copy of their own data, and by funding distributed data infrastructures piloting new data aggregation models. (shrink)

This paper attempts to demonstrate Max Scheler’s anticipation of and continued relevance to a burgeoning trend of essence-based accounts of modality, chief among them being Kit Fine’s landmark 1994 “Essence and Modality.” I argue that Scheler’s account of the material a priori not only anticipates the picture of essence-based modality suggested by Fine, but moreover offers resources with the potential to resolve key challenges for the Finean program. In particular, Fine’s account runs into problems in explaining how formal logical necessities (...) are to be grounded in essences, challenges that put pressure on the essentialist to adopt a non-propositional account of the nature of logical principles. I argue that one such account can be found in Scheler’s notion of the material a priori, according to which all necessary propositional truth is grounded in a realm of experientially given yet a priori "phenomenological facts." After showing the general rapprochement between Scheler’s and Fine’s accounts of regional modality, I then turn to address Scheler’s attempt to ground formal logical principles in essences. On Scheler’s picture, propositions expressing formal logical truths are true in virtue of the domain of essences in two senses: In terms of what Scheler calls objective necessity, they are true insofar as they coincide with the essential facts and interconnections shared by all possible regions of being; In terms of what he calls subjective necessity, they are true in virtue of these same essential facts and interconnections insofar as they have become “functionalized” into law-like patterns of cognition. (shrink)

Rationality (or something similar) is usually given as the relevant difference between all humans and animals; the reason humans do but animals do not deserve moral consideration. But according to the Argument from Marginal Cases not all humans are rational, yet if such (marginal) humans are morally considerable despite lacking rationality it would be arbitrary to deny animals with similar capacities a similar level of moral consideration. The slippery slope objection has it that although marginal humans are not strictly speaking (...) morally considerable, we should give them moral consideration because if we do not we will slide down a slippery slope where we end up by not giving normal humans due consideration. I argue that this objection fails to show that marginal humans have the kind of direct moral status proponents of the slippery slope argument have in mind. (shrink)

Referred to as “a foundational concept” of bioethics, personhood has long figured prominently in discussions of entities’ moral status and attendant rights and duties (Farah and Heberlein 2007, 39)...

An easy, jargon-free introduction to Stoic philosophy and its relevance to modern life. Topics include: the three pillars of Stoic philosophy (logic, physics, and ethics), the Stoic ideal of living in accordance with nature, and the question of whether belief in God is necessary for practicing Stoicism.

Proponents of the argument from regress maintain that the existence of Instrumental Value is sufficient to establish the existence of Intrinsic Value. It is argued that the chain of instrumentally valuable things has to end somewhere. Namely with intrinsic value. In this paper, I shall argue something a little more modest than this. I do not want to argue that the regress argument proves that there is intrinsic value but rather that it proves that the idea of intrinsic value is (...) a necessary part of our thinking about moral value. (shrink)

The topic of cruelty features regularly in discussions concerning animals’ moral status. Further, condemnation of cruelty to animals is virtually unanimous. As Regan points out, ‘[i]t would be difficult to find anyone who is in favour of cruelty.’ What is to count as cruelty is therefore important. My aim here is to gain a clearer understanding of one aspect of our moral landscape: cruelty to animals. I will start by analyzing the concept of cruelty in section II. In section III (...) I will examine some implications of this analysis. I will present two arguments for why we should reassess whether modern farming practices are cruel. First, farming practices have changed and our understanding of the concept of cruelty needs to change with them. Second, our application of the concept of cruelty is inconsistent: we would consider many routine practices involving farm animals to be cruel if they involved pets. This inconsistency presents a dilemma: either extending farming practices to pets would not be cruel, or continuing our current farming practices is cruel. In section IV I consider some objections. (shrink)

Michael Tanner; IX*—Sentimentality, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 77, Issue 1, 1 June 1977, Pages 127–148, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.

It is commonly thought that neo-Hobbesian contractarianism cannot yield direct moral standing for marginal humans and animals. However, it has been argued that marginal humans and animals can have a form of direct moral standing under neo-Hobbesian contractarianism: secondary moral standing. I will argue that, even if such standing is direct, this account is unsatisfactory because it is counterintuitive and fragile.

If we are going to treat other species so very differently from our own — killing, eating and experimenting on pigs and sheep, for example, but never human beings — then it seems we need to come up with some morally relevant difference between us and them that justifies this difference in treatment. Otherwise it appears we are guilty of bigotry (in just the same way that someone who discriminates on the basis of race or sex is guilty of bigotry). (...) But what is this morally relevant difference? Julia Tanner's article examines, and rejects, some of the most popular answers to this question. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper I will examine two responses to the argument from marginal cases; the argument from kinds and the similarity argument. I will argue that these arguments are insufficient to show that all humans have moral status but no animals do. This does not prove that animals have moral status but it does shift the burden of proof onto those who want to maintain that all humans are morally considerable, but no animals are.

Mark Rowlands argues that, contrary to the dominant view, a Rawlsian theory of justice can legitimately be applied to animals. One of the implications of doing so, Rowlands argues, is an end to animal experimentation. I will argue, contrary to Rowlands, that under a Rawlsian theory there may be some circumstances where it is justifiable to use animals as experimental test subjects (where the individual animals are benefited by the experiments).

Counters the long-standing, solemn interpretation of Plato’s dialogues with one centered on the philosophical and pedagogical significance of Socrates as a comic figure. Plato was described as a boor and it was said that he never laughed out loud. Yet his dialogues abound with puns, jokes, and humor. Sonja Madeleine Tanner argues that in Plato’s dialogues Socrates plays a comical hero who draws heavily from the tradition of comedy in ancient Greece, but also reforms laughter to be applicable to (...) all persons and truly shaming to none. Socrates introduces a form of self-reflective laughter that encourages, rather than stifles, philosophical inquiry. Laughter in the dialogues—both explicit and implied—suggests a view of human nature as incongruous with ourselves, simultaneously falling short of, and superseding, our own capacities. What emerges is a picture of human nature that bears a striking resemblance to Socrates’ own, laughable depiction, one inspired by Dionysus, but one that remains ultimately intractable. The book analyzes specific instances of laughter and the comical from the Apology, Laches, Charmides, Cratylus, Euthydemus, and the Symposium to support this, and to further elucidate the philosophical consequences of recognizing Plato’s laughter. Sonja Madeleine Tanner is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, and the author of In Praise of Plato’s Poetic Imagination. (shrink)

In Part I of his paper Cooper gives indisputable evidence regarding Plato's use of the man-made image as a step to the apprehension of a Form under discussion, whether that image be in fact a diagram or a model, or simply a verbal picture, such as his imaginative account of Justice within a community, which we find used to provide us with in Republic 443 c 4 ff. However, Cooper goes on to assure us that the divided-line figure offers us (...) only three types of object: ‘We have three kinds of objects which differ from one another in clearness and esteem, firstly, the Forms, secondly, the objects of ordinary sense-perception, and thirdly, images, shadows and reflections.’ Now the admitted fact that, as he notes, Republic 10 gives the same three orders of reality, does not entirely absolve Cooper from all the implications of Plato's decision to divide his line into four parts rather than three; for it is made quite clear in 509 b 6–10 that the Form of the Good, is the source of being as well as of knowledge, so the Line must also classify both. (shrink)

Michael Tanner's readable introduction to Nietzsche's life and work examines the numerous ambiguities inherent in his writings. It also explodes the many misconceptions fostered in the hundred years since Nietzsche wrote, prophetically: 'Do not, above all, confound me with what I amnot!'.

For a century Nietzsche has been among the most controversial of modern writers. Since his death in 1900 he has been appropriated as an icon by an astonishingly diverse spectrum of people, whose interpretation of his philosophy have been equally varied. This introduction to his life and work examines the numerous ambiguities in his writings, traces his development, and explodes many misconceptions.

This article makes the following three programmatic points. First, an understanding of divine transcendence, prominent in Christian theology's apophatic strain, developed in tandem, both historically and logically, with ideas about creation that eventuated in a creation ex nihilo viewpoint. Such an account of divine transcendence, second, fosters an account of creation that typically mixes both natural and personalistic images and categories. The loss of such an account of transcendence since the early modern period, I suggest thirdly and in conclusion, is (...) therefore responsible in great part for the dualistic, mutually exclusive alternation between a deistic, interventionist God and pantheism so common in modern Christian thought. (shrink)

Der Hallenser Theologe Klaus Tanner verortet die Theologie programmatisch im Kontext der Kulturwissenschaften. Christliche Theologie hat ein eigenstandiges Fundament in den Texten eines Grundbuches unserer Kultur: in der Bibel und ihrer breiten Rezeptions- und Wirkungsgeschichte. Die Wirkmachtigkeit christlichen Gedankengutes dokumentiert sich dabei immer auch als seine Transformation durch andere kulturelle Wirkgrossen. Exemplarisch zeigen das die in diesem interdisziplinaren Band versammelten Beitrage anhand des Liebesbegriffs. Das Spektrum der Untersuchungen reicht von exegetischen und theologiegeschichtlichen Darstellungen christlicher Liebestheologien uber Analysen zu nicht-christlichen (...) Leitvorstellungen von Liebe bis hin zu Beitragen institutioneller und diskursiver Einsatze des Liebesbegriffs. Auf diese Weise spannen die Autoren einen eindrucksvollen Bogen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. (shrink)

This is a companion paper to my preceding one on Harriot's experimentations in the field of the sign-rule of multiplication in algebra. Cardano had earlier attacked the conventional rule in a chapter of his De Aliza regula liber, published in 1570 as an appendix to the second edition of his Ars magna. He returned to the subject in a brief tract, published nearly a century later in his collected works as Sermo de plus et minus. Only Cardano's valid contention that (...) the standard ‘proof’ of the accustomed sign-rule was faulty made impact, in the Euclidean background to which the ‘proof’ belonged. His cause was to preserve the purity of the Euclidean tradition. It overshadows the true aim in the De Aliza chapter, but the Sermo reveals it plainly as far from retrograde: he wished to retain all the new techniques of algebra that brought in not only ‘minus’ quantities but also their square roots, and to escape the ‘impossible’ status of these last. This the rebel sign-rule did for him by making every root of a ‘minus’ just another ‘minus’. (shrink)

Determination of cell fate in the developing eye of Drosophila depends on a precise sequence of cellular interactions which generate the stereotypic array of ommatidia. In the eye imaginal disc, an initially unpatterned epithelial sheath of cells, the first step in this process may be the specification of R8 photoreceptor cells at regular intervals. Genes such as Notch and scabrous, known to be involved in bristle development, alos participate in this process, suggesting that the specification of ommatidial founder cells and (...) the formation of sensory organs in the adult epidermis may involve a similar mechanism, that of lateral inhibition. The subsequent steps of ommatidial assembly, following R8 assignment, involve a different mechanism: Undetermined cells read their position based on the contacts they make with neighbors that have already begun to differentiate. The development of the R7 photoreceptor cell, one of the eight photoreceptor cells in the ommatidium, is best understood. An important role seems to be played by sevenless, a receptor tyrosine kinase on the surface of the R7 precursor. It transmits the positional information– most likely encoded by the boss protein on the neighboring R8 cell membrane – into the cell via its tyrosine kinase, which activates a signal transduction cascade. Constitutive activation of the sevenless kinase by overexpression of an N‐terminally truncated form results in the diversion of other ommatidial cells into the R7 pathway suggesting that activation of the sevenless signalling pathway is sufficient to specify R7 development. Genetic dissection of this pathway should therefore identify components of a signalling cascade activated by a tyrosine kinase. (shrink)