The purpose of this research is to investigate the masculinity politics of the ex-gay movement, a loose-knit network of religious, scientific, and political organizations that advocates change for homosexuals. Guided by Risman's gender structure theory, the authors analyze the individual, interactional, and institutional dimensions of gender in ex-gay discourses. The authors employ critical discourse analysis of representative ex-gay texts to deconstruct the movement's gender ideology and to discuss the social implications of its masculinity politics. They argue that gender is one (...) of the ex-gay movement's most potent social movement resources, enabling it to consolidate power by enlisting new populations and to globalize by adapting to cultural contexts beyond the United States. The authors conclude that the ex-gay movement is an antigay countermovement and an antifeminist Christian Right men's movement. (shrink)

How Journalists Engage: A theory of trustbuilding, identity, and care explores the ways journalists of different identities enact trusting relationships with their audiences according to divergent sets of principles. Drawing from case studies, community work, surveys, interviews and focus groups, this book documents the now-established "built environment" powered with engagement journalism that represents the first major paradigm shift of the press' core values in more than a century. A proliferation of media-trust programs, grants, foundations, companies, collaborations, networks, and money demands (...) that journalists take on four new roles-Relationship Builder, Content Collaborator, Community Conversation Facilitator, and Professional Network Builder-and be fluent in eight skillsets: radical transparency, power dynamic accounting, mediation, reciprocity, media literacies, community offline work, needs/assets/solution analyses, and collaborative production. These are in addition to the normative skills related to being a watchdog and storyteller. The author posits that this trust-building theory manifesting demands journalism be enacted with an "identity-aware care" through "listening and learning." This identity-aware ethic of care-a theory that comes from developmental psychology and nurtured in gender and women's studies-prioritizes communities over the propping up of problematic institutions that news media have traditionally protected in the name of objectivity. Instead, this theory asks journalists to acknowledge and incorporate their own identities-especially the privileges, biases, and marginalization attached to them-and those of their communities, resulting in a more intentional moral voice focused on justice and equity so that all news participants can feel cared for within information-exchange about public affairs. (shrink)

The Affective Turn in writing studies, the author argues, has actually gone through two phases, or three, if one counts the expressionist work on "finding one's true voice" that he dubs Phase Zero. Phase One runs from Alice Glarden Brand through Sue McLeod, and contains mostly empirical studies of affect in the classroom; Phase Two begins with Lynn Worsham's "Going Postal" and contains mostly theoretical studies of viral ecologies of affect. This book offers a signal contribution to Phase Two, re-theorising (...) affective ecologies as "somatic exchanges" and exploring their operation--and how to enhance their operation--in the writer-reader relationship, the classroom, and writing programmes. (shrink)

Wherever you turn your eyes the world can shine like transfiguration. You don’t have to bring a thing to it except a little willingness to see. Only, who could have the courage to see it?—Marilynne RobinsonMarilynne Robinson, Gilead (London: Virago Press, 2004), p. 280.Preamble: Going the Bloody Hard WayThe writings of Pamela Sue Anderson and Gillian Howie have been, and continue to be, important in helping to shape the development of my own philosophical vision. Yet my commitment to (a (...) fairly traditional) theism marks a point of departure between my work and theirs. Given their quite reasonable disinclination to persist with traditional theism, especially its concept of divine transcendence,Not only does an uncritical approach to the theistic conception of divine transcendence serve to sacralise hierarchical relationship between men and women, such that the latter is subordinate to the former, it also, as Anderson reminds us, sustains epistemic and practical norms that quietly yet pot. (shrink)

This chapter starts by restating the causal-hallucinatory argument against naive realism. This argument depends on the possibility of “philosophers' hallucinations.” It draws attention to the role of what the chapter refers to as the nonarbitrariness of philosophers' hallucinations in supporting this argument. The chapter then discusses three attempts to refute the argument. Two of them, those associated with John McDowell and with Michael Martin, are explicitly forms of disjunctivism. The third, exemplified by Mark Johnston, has, the chapter claims, disjunctivist features. (...) None of these responses to the argument is plausible. (shrink)

It could be argued that tort law is failing, and arguably an example of this failure is the recent public liability and insurance (‘PL&I’) crisis. A number of solutions have been proposed, but ultimately the chosen solution should address whatever we take to be the cause of this failure. On one account, the PL&I crisis is a result of an unwarranted expansion of the scope of tort law. Proponents of this position sometimes argue that the duty of care owed by (...) defendants to plaintiffs has expanded beyond reasonable levels, such that parties who were not really responsible for another’s misfortune are successfully sued, while those who really were to blame get away without taking any responsibility. However people should take responsibility for their actions, and the only likely consequence of allowing them to shirk it is that they and others will be less likely to exercise due care in the future, since the deterrents of liability and of no compensation for accidentally self-imposed losses will not be there. Others also argue that this expansion is not warranted because it is inappropriately fueled by ‘deep pocket’ considerations rather than by considerations of fault. They argue that the presence of liability insurance sways the judiciary to award damages against defendants since they know that insurers, and not the defendant personally, will pay for it in the end anyway. But although it may seem that no real person has to bear these burdens when they are imposed onto insurers, in reality all of society bears them collectively when insurers are forced to hike their premiums to cover these increasing damages payments. In any case, it seems unfair to force insurers to cover these costs simply because they can afford to do so. If such an expansion is indeed the cause of the PL&I crisis, then a contraction of the scope of tort liability, and a pious return to the fault principle, might remedy the situation. However it could also be argued that inadequate deterrence is the cause of this crisis. On this account the problem would lie not with the tort system’s continued unwarranted expansion, but in the fact that defendants really have been too careless. If prospective injurers were appropriately deterred from engaging in unnecessarily risky activities, then fewer accidents would ever occur in the first place, and this would reduce the need for litigation at its very source. If we take this to be the cause of tort law’s failure then our solution should aim to improve deterrence. Glen Robinson has argued that improved deterrence could be achieved if plaintiffs were allowed to sue defendants for wrongful exposure to ongoing risks of future harm, even in the absence of currently materialized losses. He argues that at least in toxic injury type cases the tortious creation of risk [should be seen as] an appropriate basis of liability, with damages being assessed according to the value of the risk, as an alternative to forcing risk victims to abide the outcome of the event and seek damages only if and when harm materializes. In a sense, Robinson wishes to treat newly-acquired wrongful risks as de-facto wrongful losses, and these are what would be compensated in liability for risk creation (‘LFRC’) cases. Robinson argues that if the extent of damages were fixed to the extent of risk exposure, all detected unreasonable risk creators would be forced to bear the costs of their activities, rather than only those who could be found responsible for another’s injuries ‘on the balance of probabilities’. The incidence of accidents should decrease as a result of improved deterrence, reduce the ‘suing fest’, and so resolve the PL&I crisis. So whilst the first solution involves contracting the scope of tort liability, Robinson’s solution involves an expansion of its scope. However Robinson acknowledges that LFRC seems prima facie incompatible with current tort principles which in the least require the presence of plaintiff losses, defendant fault, and causation to be established before making defendants liable for plaintiffs’ compensation. Since losses would be absent in LFRC cases by definition, the first evidentiary requirement would always be frustrated, and in its absence proof of defendant fault and causation would also seem scant. If such an expansion of tort liability were not supported by current tort principles then it would be no better than proposals to switch accident law across to no-fault, since both solutions would require comprehensive legal reform. However Robinson argues that the above three evidentiary requirements could be met in LFRC cases to the same extent that they are met in other currently accepted cases, and hence that his solution would therefore be preferable to no-fault solutions as it would only require incremental but not comprehensive legal reform. Although I believe that actual losses should be present before allowing plaintiffs to seek compensation, I will not present a positive argument for this conclusion. My aim in this paper is not to debate the relative merits of Robinson’s solution as compared to no-fault solutions, nor to determine which account of the cause of the PL&I crisis is closer to the truth, but rather to find out whether Robinson’s solution would indeed require less radical legal reform than, for example, proposed no-fault solutions. I will argue that Robinson fails to show that current tort principles would support his proposed solution, and hence that his solution is at best on an even footing with no-fault solutions since both would require comprehensive legal reform. (shrink)

A new view of the extended mind thesis argues that a stark binary opposition between really extending and seeming to extend oversimplifies the issue.

This article interprets Foucault's life-long involvement with transgressive experiences as an art of not being oneself, an effort to escape identity and become other. By bringing together Foucault's own theoretical practices with those drawn from Deleuze and Blanchot, and linking these with biographical material (modes of existence), I show how Foucault's `encounters' with passion and pleasure in film, philosophy, S/M, drugs, the Greeks and suicide amount to an `art of living', an intensification of the power to affect oneself and others (...) in processes of `subjectivation', creating new possibilities of life. This is what Foucault more precisely called an `ethics' - an immanent ethics in which one becomes worthy of what happens to oneself by becoming a work of art. (shrink)

In arguing that autistic people are socially motivated, Jaswal & Akhtar miss the opportunity to puncture the notion that social motivation is a prerequisite for humanity. Instead, we contend that some autistic people may indeed find social interactions to be unmotivating and that this doesn't have to be seen as a problem.

In paragraph 48 of the Critique of Judgment, Immanuel Kant claimed that ‘only one kind of ugliness cannot be represented in accordance with nature without destroying all aesthetic satisfaction, hence artistic beauty, namely that which arouses disgust.’ However, from Baudelaire to Damien Hirst, there have been artists who delight in arousing disgust through their works, and many of these disgusting works, such as Baudelaire's Une Charogne, have high aesthetic merit. In her splendid new book, Savoring Disgust, Carolyn Korsmeyer rejects Kant's (...) suggestion and argues that there is something called ‘aesthetic disgust,’ that is, ‘the arousal of disgust in an audience, a spectator, or a reader, under circumstances where that emotion both apprehends artistic properties and constitutes a component of appreciation.’. (shrink)

A new therapeutic approach is being developed for the treatment of Alzheimer's disease (AD). This approach involves the deliberate induction of an autoimmune response to amyloid‐β (Aβ) peptide, the constituent of neuritic plaques that is thought to cause the neurodegeneration and dementia in AD. If this approach is to be effective, antibodies must be produced that can selectively target the toxic forms of Aβ, while leaving the functionally‐relevant forms of Aβ and its precursor protein untouched. Furthermore, an approach needs to (...) be found that avoids provoking an acute neuroinflammatory response. The situation is made even more challenging by uncertainty regarding which isoforms of Aβ contribute to the pathogenesis of AD. BioEssays 25:283–288, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The starting point for this article is the question of the relationship between Darwinism and Christian theology. I suggest that evolutionary theory presents three broad issues of relevance to theology: the phenomena ofcontinuity, naturalism, andcontingency. In order to formulate a theological response to these issues I draw on the semiotics (theory of signs) and cosmology of the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce developed a triadic theory of signs, underpinned by a threefold system of metaphysical categories. I propose a semiotic (...) model of the Trinity based on Peirce's semiotics and categories. According to this model the sign‐processes (such as the genetic “code”) that are fundamental to life may be understood as vestiges of the Trinity in creation. I use the semiotic model to develop a theology of nature that addresses the issues raised by evolutionary theory. The semiotic model amounts to a proposal for a new metaphysical framework within which to understand the relationship between God and creation and between theology and science. (shrink)

Books and articles about the acceleration of daily life are themselves accelerating. A theoretical basis for expecting the inevitability of these trends has been traced in the writings of major sociologists including Durkheim, Marx, Weber and Sorkin. As deTocqueville observed more than 150 years ago, “The American is always in a hurry.” Economists have also weighed in on these issues of time compression, perhaps starting with Linder’s insightful treatise The Harried Leisure Class, predicting the frantic pace of modern life and (...) leisure. As specialized work led to higher rates of productivity, accelerated consumption led to an acceleration of the pace of life and a harried leisure class. Much of what Linder discussed in regard to time scarcity was perceived scarcity. Interestingly, his conclusions were not that people would work longer, but rather that they would attempt to increase the yield on a unit of time in all areas of life—minimizing activities such as singing or political debate, which could not easily have their yield on time spent increased. The value of efficiency and increased productivity, carried to extremes, he argued, produced a kind of decadence in which the goal of economic growth is never questioned. More recently, economists have played down the seriousness of concerns over a speeded up lifestyle, characterizing it in large part as “Yuppie Kvetch.” Not that higher income couples are making irrational decisions, they are simply facing the inevitable constraints on their ability to enjoy their wealth. This article reviews various of these philosophical issues in the context of US national survey data concerning trends in the time pressures and stress in the activities of Americans over the last 30+ years. It focuses both on the measurable amounts of free time Americans have and on the specific activities done in that free time. It also reviews survey data on Americans’ perceptions of and attitudes toward time and stress. It brings together data from different survey sources that often show conflicting trends and conclusions. (shrink)

I begin with the assumption that a philosophically significant tension exists today in feminist philosophy of religion between those subjects who seek to become divine and those who seek their identity in mutual recognition. My critical engagement with the ambiguous assertions of Luce Irigaray seeks to demonstrate, one the one hand, that a woman needs to recognize her own identity but, on the other hand, that each subject whether male or female must struggle in relation to the other in order (...) to maintain realism about life and death. No one can avoid the recognition that we are each given life but each of us also dies. In addition, I raise a more general, philosophical problem for analytic philosophers who attempt to read Continental philosophy of religion: how should philosophers interpret deliberately ambiguous assertions? For example, what does Irigaray mean in asserting. 'Divinity is what we need to become free, autonomous, sovereign'? To find an answer, I turn to the distinctively French readings of the Hegelian struggle for recognition which have preoccupied Continental philosophers especially since the first half of the last century. I explore the struggle for mutual recognition between womrn and men who must face the reality of life and death in order to avoid the projection of their fear of mortality onto the other sex. This includes a critical look at Irigaray's account of subjectivity and divinity. I turn to the French philosopher Michèle Le Doeuff in order to shift the focus from divinity to intersubjectivity. I conclude that taking seriously the struggle for mutual recognition between subjects forces contemporary philosophers of religion to be realist in their living and dying. With this in mind, the lesson from the Continent for philosophy of religion is that we must not stop yearning for recognition. Indeed, we must event risk our autonomy/divinity in seeking to recognize intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Engineers use neural networks to control systems too complex for conventional engineering solutions. To examine the behavior of individual hidden units would defeat the purpose of this approach because it would be largely uninterpretable. Yet neurophysiologists spend their careers doing just that! Hidden units contain bits and scraps of signals that yield only arcane hints about network function and no information about how its individual units process signals. Most literature on single-unit recordings attests to this grim fact. On the other (...) hand, knowing a system's function and describing it with elegant mathematics tell one very little about what to expect of interneuronal behavior. Examples of simple networks based on neurophysiology are taken from the oculomotor literature to suggest how single-unit interpretability might decrease with increasing task complexity. It is argued that trying to explain how any real neural network works on a cell-by-cell, reductionist basis is futile and we may have to be content with trying to understand the brain at higher levels of organization. (shrink)