For low-risk mothers who do not wish to give birth in a hospital, a nearby birth center led by midwives is an excellent option.

Moral entrepreneurship is the fine art of recycling evil into good by taking advantage of situations given or constructed as crises. It should be seen as the ultimate generalisation of the entrepreneurial spirit, whose peculiar excesses have always sat uneasily with homo oeconomicus as the constrained utility maximiser, an image that itself has come to be universalised. A task of this essay is to reconcile the two images in terms of what by the end I call ‘superutilitarianism’, which draws on (...) the lore of both superheroes and utilitarianism. After briefly surveying the careers of three exemplars of the moral entrepreneur (Robert McNamara, George Soros and Jeffrey Sachs), I explore the motives of moral entrepreneurs in terms of their standing debt to society for having already caused unnecessary harm but which also now equips him with the skill set needed to do significant good. Such a mindset involves imagining oneself a vehicle of divine will, which would be a scary proposition had it not been long presumed by Christians touched by Calvin. In conclusion, I argue that moral entrepreneurship looks most palatable – and perhaps even attractive – if the world is ‘reversible’, in the sense that every crisis, however clumsily handled by the moral entrepreneur, causes people to distinguish more clearly the necessary from contingent features of their existence. This leads them to reconceptualise past damages as new opportunities to assert what really matters; hence, a ‘superutilitarian’ ethic that treats all suffering as less cost than investment in a greater sense of the good. (shrink)

In particular, one of Gould's important contributions as a paleontologist was to convince us that there are long periods in evolution where species don't change very much, that Darwinian gradualism doesn't guarantee a steady course of improvements. And that there are periods -- not at all inconsistent with Darwinian gradualism -- when things progress considerably faster. I tuned right into what Steve was saying since both of my main interests in evolution, the evolution of the big brain in only (...) several million years, and the use of the Darwinian process in the brain to improve the quality of the next sentence you speak in a matter of seconds, involve the search for speedy ways of evolving things. (shrink)

From a logical point of view, Stone duality for Boolean algebras relates theories in classical propositional logic and their collections of models. The theories can be seen as presentations of Boolean algebras, and the collections of models can be topologized in such a way that the theory can be recovered from its space of models. The situation can be cast as a formal duality relating two categories of syntax and semantics, mediated by homming into a common dualizing object, in this (...) case 2.In the present work, we generalize the entire arrangement from propositional to first-order logic, using a representation result of Butz and Moerdijk. Boolean algebras are replaced by Boolean categories presented by theories in first-order logic, and spaces of models are replaced by topological groupoids of models and their isomorphisms. A duality between the resulting categories of syntax and semantics, expressed primarily in the form of a contravariant adjunction, is established by homming into a common dualizing object, now Sets, regarded once as a boolean category, and once as a groupoid equipped with an intrinsic topology.The overall framework of our investigation is provided by topos theory. Direct proofs of the main results are given, but the specialist will recognize toposophical ideas in the background. Indeed, the duality between syntax and semantics is really a manifestation of that between algebra and geometry in the two directions of the geometric morphisms that lurk behind our formal theory. Along the way, we give an elementary proof of Butz and Moerdijkʼs result in logical terms. (shrink)

In "The Cerebral Code," he has solidly embedded his ideas in experimental neurophysiology and neuropharmacology, deriving from his decades in the laboratory.

This book looks back at the simpler versions of mental life in apes, Neanderthals, and our ancestors, back before our burst of creativity started 50,000 years...

In this paper the machinery and results developed in [Awodey et al, 2004] are extended to the study of constructive set theories. Specifically, we introduce two constructive set theories BCST and CST and prove that they are sound and complete with respect to models in categories with certain structure. Specifically, basic categories of classes and categories of classes are axiomatized and shown to provide models of the aforementioned set theories. Finally, models of these theories are constructed in the category of (...) ideals. (shrink)

In this short note we give a glimpse of homotopy type theory, a new field of mathematics at the intersection of algebraic topology and mathematical logic, and we explain Vladimir Voevodsky’s univalent interpretation of it. This interpretation has given rise to the univalent foundations program, which is the topic of the current special year at the Institute for Advanced Study.

We show how to interpret the language of first-order set theory in an elementary topos endowed with, as extra structure, a directed structural system of inclusions (dssi). As our main result, we obtain a complete axiomatization of the intuitionistic set theory validated by all such interpretations. Since every elementary topos is equivalent to one carrying a dssi, we thus obtain a first-order set theory whose associated categories of sets are exactly the elementary toposes. In addition, we show that the full (...) axiom of Separation is validated whenever the dssi is superdirected. This gives a uniform explanation for the known facts that cocomplete and realizability toposes provide models for Intuitionistic Zermelo—Fraenkel set theory (IZF). (shrink)

This paper clarifies the terms “institutions” and “social structures” and related terms “rules”, “conventions”, “norms”, “values” and “customs”. Part one explores the similarities between institutions and social structures whilst the second and third parts explore differences. Part two considers institutions, rules, habits or habitus and habituation, whilst part three critically reflects on three common conceptions of social structures. The conclusion comments upon reflexive deliberation via the internal conversation.

Bryan Van Norden’s _Taking Back Philosophy: A Multicultural Manifesto_ draws on his expertise in Chinese philosophy to launch a comprehensive and often scathing critique of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. I focus on the sense in which “China” figures as a “non-Western culture” in Van Norden’s argument. Here I identify an equivocation between what I call a “functional” and a “substantive” account of culture. I argue that Van Norden, like perhaps most others who have discussed Chinese philosophy, presupposes a “functional” conception, whereby (...) the relevant sense in which “China” matters is exactly as “non-Western,” which ends up incorporating some exogenous influences such as Indian Buddhism but not any of the Western philosophies that made major inroads in the twentieth century. I explore the implications of the functional/substantive distinction for the understanding of cross-cultural philosophy generally. (shrink)

Finn Collin has been the honest broker of social epistemology. In this article, I attempt to come clean on the nature and sources of what I have always regarded as the ‘normative’ horizon of the field. It basically turns on a social constructivist reading of Plato’s Phaedrus, the dialogue from which modern analytic epistemology also takes its inspiration. I pursue the implications of this approach in various normative fields of philosophy.

Image factorizations in regular categories are stable under pullbacks, so they model a natural modal operator in dependent type theory. This unary type constructor [A] has turned up previously in a syntactic form as a way of erasing computational content, and formalizing a notion of proof irrelevance. Indeed, semantically, the notion of a support is sometimes used as surrogate proposition asserting inhabitation of an indexed family. We give rules for bracket types in dependent type theory and provide complete semantics using (...) regular categories. We show that dependent type theory with the unit type, strong extensional equality types, strong dependent sums, and bracket types is the internal type theory of regular categories, in the same way that the usual dependent type theory with dependent sums and products is the internal type theory of locally Cartesian closed categories. We also show how to interpret first-order logic in type theory with brackets, and we make use of the translation to compare type theory with logic. Specifically, we show that the propositions-as-types interpretation is complete with respect to a certain fragment of intuitionistic first-order logic, in the sense that a formula from the fragment is derivable in intuitionistic first-order logic if, and only if, its interpretation in dependent type theory is inhabited. As a consequence, a modified double-negation translation into type theory (without bracket types) is complete, in the same sense, for all of classical first-order logic. (shrink)

The issue of representing access control requirements continues to demand significant attention. The focus of researchers has traditionally been on developing particular access control models and policy specification languages for particular applications. However, this approach has resulted in an unnecessary surfeit of models and languages. In contrast, we describe a general access control model and a logic-based specification language from which both existing and novel access control models may be derived as particular cases and from which several approaches can be (...) developed for domain-specific applications. We will argue that our general framework has a number of specific attractions and an implication of our work is to encourage a methodological shift from a study of the particulars of access control to its generalities. (shrink)

The notion of a continuously variable quantity can be regarded as a generalization of that of a particular (constant) quantity, and the properties of such quantities are then akin to, and derived from, the..

The [lambda]-calculus can be represented topologically by assigning certain spaces to the types and certain continuous maps to the terms. Using a recent result from category theory, the usual calculus of [lambda]-conversion is shown to be deductively complete with respect to such topological semantics. It is also shown to be functionally complete, in the sense that there is always a ‘minimal’ topological model in which every continuous function is [lambda]-definable. These results subsume earlier ones using cartesian closed categories, as well (...) as those employing so-called Henkin and Kripke [lambda]-models. (shrink)

Treating consciousness as awareness or attention greatly underestimates it, ignoring the temporary levels of organization associated with higher intellectual function (syntax, planning, logic, music). The tasks that require consciousness tend to be the ones that demand a lot of resources. Routine tasks can be handled on the back burner but dealing with ambiguity, groping around offline, generating creative choices, and performing precision movements may temporarily require substantial allocations of neocortex. Here I will attempt to clarify the appropriate levels of explanation (...) (ranging from quantum aspects to association cortex dynamics) and then propose a specific mechanism (consciousness as the current winner of Darwinian copying competitions in cerebral cortex) that seems capable of encompassing the higher intellectual function aspects of consciousness as well as some of the attentional aspects. It includes features such as a coding space appropriate for analogies and a supervisory Darwinian process that can bias the operation of other Darwinian processes. (shrink)

The notion of a continuously variable quantity can be regarded as a generalization of that of a particular quantity, and the properties of such quantities are then akin to, and derived from, the properties of constants. For example, the continuous, real-valued functions on a topological space behave like the field of real numbers in many ways, but instead form a ring. Topos theory permits one to apply this same idea to logic, and to consider continuously variable sets . In this (...) expository paper, such applications are explained to the non-specialist. Some recent results are mentioned, including a new completeness theorem for higher-order logic. (shrink)

I respond to William Lynch’s critique of the sympathetic reading of my work provided by Remedios and Dusek in Knowing Humanity in the Social World: The Path of Steve Fuller’s Social Epistemology. Lynch harks back to my early works, which he sees as a promoting a ‘naturalism’ lacking in the later works. In response, I observe that my commitment to naturalism has always been ‘reflexive’, which has led me to break with conventional forms of naturalism, though sticking closely to (...) the spirit of science. (shrink)

Computer simulations may allow us to understand the earth’s fickle climate and how it is affected by detours of the great ocean currents. These detours cause abrupt coolings -- the average global temperature can drop dramatically in just a few years, with droughts that set up El-Niño-like forest fires even in the tropics. While volcanic eruptions and Antarctic ice shelf collapses can also abruptly cool things, what we’re talking about here is a flip-flop: a few centuries later, there’s an equally (...) abrupt rewarming. This cycle has repeated every few thousand years (though it has been 12,000 years since the most recent one). (shrink)

"A new translation by Henry Beveridge, Esq.".

Long before signs of staged toolmaking appeared, Homo erectus made symmetrical tools. The handaxe is a flattened tear-drop shape, but often with edges sharpened all around. Before we assign their obsession with symmetry to an aesthetic judgment, we must consider whether it is possible that the symmetry is simply very pragmatic for one particular use in the many suggested.

To fit the magnificence of this setting in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, and the honor of giving the 2007 Sir John Crawford Memorial Lecture, it is well to have a subject of suitable proportions. I have chosen one of global size and urgent time frame: our climate crisis. We only have one future and one global climate–and now it looks as if we only have one chance to rescue our civilization from collapse and prevent a mass extinction of (...) species during the 21st century. Unless you have been keeping up with climate science for the past twenty-five years, you likely do not know how serious the matter has become. The notion that we might slowly get into serious trouble by mid-century has been conveyed by the media and understood by at least some political leaders. But that scenario depends on somehow avoiding sudden shifts in climate in the meantime, instant setbacks at a time when we lack maneuvering room. An abrupt shift in drought area occurred in 1983 and we had a near-miss of a mass extinction of Amazon species in 1999. It is easy to appreciate that one more degree of global warming will seriously reduce crop yields in the tropics, but in the words of climate scientist Claudia Tebaldi 1, “It’s the extremes, not the averages, that cause the most damage to.. (shrink)

Since Richard Dawkins ' The Extended Phenotype got me to thinking about copying units in the mid-1980s, I have been trying to define a cerebral code by searching for what can be successfully replicated in the brain's neural circuitry, a minimum replicable unit. I indeed found such circuitry. But to explore creativity in higher intellectual function, I wanted to see if the resulting copies could compete in a Darwinian manner, the process shaping up quality as it goes. And that forced (...) me to try and boil down a lot of evolutionary biology, attempting to abstract the features that were essential from those that merely contributed to speed or stability. This isn't the place to describe the neural outcome -- it's in The Cerebral Code and, more briefly, in the seventh chapter of my other 1996 book, How Brains Think -- but this does seem an appropriate place to review what I started calling "The Six Essentials." They seem applicable to a wide range of problems within memetics9 as the field attempts to cope with evolutionary models of information transmission. For a more. (shrink)

I argue that the 21st century will be marked by a realignment of science and religion, which I call the “anthropic” versus the “karmic” perspectives. The former is aligned with the major Western religions and was secularized in the 19th century as positivism, with its identification of social science with the religion of humanity. The latter is aligned with the major Eastern religions, but also Epicureanism in the West. It was secularized as the Neo-Darwinian synthesis in the 20th century, since (...) when it has made major inroads in wider precincts of normative thought. In this context, I focus specifically on the work of E.O. Wilson, Richard Dawkins, and Peter Singer — all of whom, in somewhat different ways, argue on naturalistic grounds for the removal of humanity's normative privilege. Moreover, the karmic sensibility enjoys somewhat surprising support from postmodern quarters, where anti-humanism tends to be strong. These emerging trends, even when articulated by scientists, have also been associated with a decline in scientific meliorism. Against all this, I argue for a reassertion of the anthropic perspective, mainly by suggesting how monotheists and positivists may join to reinstate the collective project of humanity. A crucial part of the strategy is to regard participation in science as a civic obligation, if not (à la Comte) a religious service. (shrink)

Hard determinism is hardly a new position, but the most common arguments are not widely convincing. Theological arguments rest on the oversight or control of a supernatural entity, and so are not convincing to any who do not share the metaphysical assumptions latent in the argument. Psychological arguments reston putatively scientific claims that, if examined more closely, seem not to be scientific at all. A doxastic argument avoids these pitfalls. According to this doxastic argument, beliefs are not freely chosen, for (...) to believe X is to be convinced of X, and it is not up to the agent to find something convincing or unconvincing. If an agent's allegedly free actions are based on beliefs, and if those beliefs cannot freely be chosen by the agent, then that agent's actions are not ultimately free. (shrink)

A moral dilemma exists in biomedical research relating to the use of animal or human tissue when conducting scientific research. In human ethics, researchers need to justify why the use of humans is necessary should suitable models exist. Conversely, in animal ethics, a researcher must justify why research cannot be carried out on suitable alternatives. In the case of medical procedures or therapeutics testing, the use of animal models is often justified. However, in forensic research, the justification may be less (...) evident, particularly when research involves the infliction of trauma on living animals. To determine how the forensic science community is dealing with this dilemma, a review of literature within major forensic science journals was conducted. The frequency and trends of the use of animals in forensic science research was investigated for the period 1 January 2012–31 December 2016. The review revealed 204 original articles utilizing 5050 animals in various forms as analogues for human tissue. The most common specimens utilized were various species of rats, pigs, mice, and rabbits although different specimens were favored in different study themes. The majority of studies were conducted on post-mortem specimens. It is, however, evident that more needs to be done to uphold the basic ethical principles of reduction, refinement and replacement in the use of animals for research purposes. (shrink)

That’s Bill Calvin, whose brain is worthy of study in its own right. Technically, he’s a theoretical neurophysiologist and affiliate professor of psychiatry and behavioral sciences at the University of Washington. But he’s also known as a scientist with a wide-ranging intellect and a prolific (and accessible) writer who constantly offers remarkable insights about the world around him. As I sat down to interview Calvin in his book-lined Seattle home last Fall, I recalled the comments of someone who (...) had come to GBN to hear Calvin speak. He said that he didn’t know—or care—what Calvin was going to talk about because everything that Bill Calvin said was not only interesting, but worth learning about. After more than three hours of conversation with Calvin, I couldn’t agree more. (shrink)