Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas, ar globalios migracijos sąlygotus procesus Lietuvoje tikslinga nagrinėti naujo socialinio reiškinio, apibrėžiamo kaip prekariatas, aspektu? Remiantis ankstesnėmis publikacijomis ir reprezentatyviu Lietuvos gyventojų tyrimu parodoma, jog migraciją patiriantys asmenys yra socialinė grupė, turinti šiam reiškiniui būdingų bruožų. Jo esminė charakteristika – nesaugumas – laikomas pagrindine empirinių duomenų organizavimo kategorija. Nesaugumą siūloma analizuoti skiriant tris raiškos lygmenis – nesaugumą „stūmos“ priežasčių, socialinių reikšmių kilmės šalyje ir problemų, kylančių migracijos tikslo šalyje, požiūriais. Vadovaujantis migracijos pokyčių tyrimams pritaikytu R. Hillo modeliu (...) ir integruojant A. H. Richmondo, J. Trosto, R. S. Parrenas, V. L. Bengtsono, R. Milardo ir B. Wellmano teorines koncepcijas atlikta migraciją patiriančių žmonių nesaugumo įveikos resursų ir repertuarų sociologinė analizė. (shrink)

This volume is the first book-length analysis of the problematic concept of the ‘horizon’ in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, as well as in phenomenology generally. A recent arrival on the conceptual scene, the horizon still eludes robust definition. The author shows in this authoritative exploration of the topic that Husserl, the originator of phenomenology, placed the notion of the horizon at the centre of philosophical enquiry. He also demonstrates the rightful centrality of the concept of the horizon, all too often viewed (...) as an imprecise metaphor of tangential significance. His systematic analysis deploys both early and late work by Husserl, as well as hitherto unpublished manuscripts. Opening out the question to include that of the origins of the horizon, the book explores the horizon as philosophical theme or notion, as a figure of intentionality, and as a signification of one’s consciousness of the world—our ‘world-horizon’. It argues that the central philosophical significance of the problematic of the horizon makes itself apparent in realizing how this problematic enriches our philosophical understanding of subjectivity. Systematic, thorough, and revealing, this study of the significance of a core concept in phenomenology will be relevant not only to the phenomenological community, but also to anyone interested in the intersections of phenomenology and other philosophical traditions, such as hermeneutics and pragmatism.​. (shrink)

Husserl is the philosopher who transformed the geological metaphor of sedimentation into a philosophical concept. While tracing the development of Husserl's reflections on sedimentation, I argue that the distinctive feature of Husserl's approach lies in his preoccupation with the question concerning the origins of sedimentations. The paper demonstrates that in different frameworks of analysis, Husserl understood these origins in significantly different ways. In the works concerned with the phenomenology of time consciousness, Husserl searched for the origins of sedimentation in the (...) field of subjective experience, and more precisely, in impressional consciousness. By contrast, in the later works concerned with history, he maintained that the origins of sedimentations lie in the field of historical past that stretches beyond the reach of individual experience. Building on the basis of these resources, I argue that the Husserlian concept of sedimentation has three distinct components of senses: static, genetic, and generative. In the static sense, sedimentations are modifications of retentions and necessary conditions of recollection. In the genetic sense, sedimentations are necessary for the formation of types, habits and moods, and as such, they shape present experiences. In the generative sense, sedimentations refer to what consciousness inherits from the historical tradition. (shrink)

The paper explores the meaning of the phenomenological concept of sedimentation in the framework of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. The analysis I offer suggests that Merleau-Ponty initiates a transition from the constitutional problematic of sedimentations that we come across in Husserl’s phenomenology to the analysis of existential sedimentations. Merleau-Ponty accomplishes this transformation by binding the Husserlian conception of sedimentations with the Heideggerian conception of facticity. The distinction Merleau-Ponty draws between originary sedimentations and secondary sedimentations is especially important, for it allows one to (...) claim that Merleau-Ponty recognizes all experiences as sedimented. Against the background of this realization, I offer a reevaluation of Merleau-Ponty’s cryptic remarks in the Phenomenology of Perception regarding the “original past,” also described as “a past that has never been a present.” I argue that these are metaphors for originary sedimentations. In place of a conclusion, I suggest that especially when the concept of sedimentation is universalized, we come to recognize its inherently paradoxical nature. In the final analysis, besides being a genetic concept, sedimentation is also a limit problem and a limit phenomenon. (shrink)

The Phenomenology of Pain is the first book-length investigation of its topic to appear in English. Groundbreaking, systematic, and illuminating, it opens a dialogue between phenomenology and such disciplines as cognitive science and cultural anthropology to argue that science alone cannot clarify the nature of pain experience without incorporating a phenomenological approach. Building on this premise, Saulius Geniusas develops a novel conception of pain grounded in phenomenological principles: pain is an aversive bodily feeling with a distinct experiential quality, which (...) can only be given in original first-hand experience, either as a feeling-sensation or as an emotion. Geniusas crystallizes the fundamental methodological principles that underlie phenomenological research. On the basis of those principles, he offers a phenomenological clarification of the fundamental structures of pain experience and contests the common conflation of phenomenology with introspectionism. Geniusas analyzes numerous pain dissociation syndromes, brings into focus the de-personalizing and re-personalizing nature of chronic pain experience, and demonstrates what role somatization and psychologization play in pain experience. In the process, he advances Husserlian phenomenology in a direction that is not explicitly worked out in Husserl's own writings. (shrink)

As a phenomenological concept, absorption refers to the ego's capacity to experience the world from a displaced standpoint. The paper traces the emergence and development of this concept in Husserl...

The paper strives to clarify the essential structures of productive imagination using the resources of Husserlian phenomenology. According to my working hypothesis, productive imagination is a relative term, whose meaning derives from its opposition to reproductive imagination. One thus first needs to clarify what makes imagination into a reproductive mode of consciousness, and in this regard, Husserl’s phenomenology proves exceptionally fruitful. My analysis unfolds in four steps. First, I fix the sense in which phantasy is an essentially reproductive mode of (...) consciousness. Secondly, I argue that phantasy cannot be conceived as an ingredient of perceptual consciousness. Thirdly, I show that both memory and phantasy generate patterns of sense, which can subsequently be transcribed into the field of positional experience. Finally, I conclude with a suggestion that the plurality of cultural worlds can be conceived as diverse configurations of sense, which are the constitutive accomplishments of productive imagination. (shrink)

The following investigation aims to determine the historical origins of the phenomenology of pain. According to my central thesis, these origins can be traced back to an enthralling discussion between Husserl and two of his most important teachers, Brentano and Stumpf. According to my reconstruction of this discussion, while Brentano defended the view that all feelings, including pain, are intentional experiences, and while Stumpf argued that pain is a non-intentional feeling-sensation, Husserl of the Logical Investigations provides compelling resources to resolve (...) the polemic between his teachers by showing how pain can be conceived as a pre-intentional experience. According to my argument, this largely forgotten discussion is of significance not only because it enriches our understanding of pain, but also because it modifies the phenomenological conception of consciousness. Thus in the concluding section, I show why the Husserlian resolution of the controversy between Brentano and Stumpf is of importance for our understanding of the central phenomenological theme—intentionality. (shrink)

Countless differences between Hegel and Husserl notwithstanding, there is a common element in both of their accounts of the genesis of otherness. According to both, only if one delves into the interiority of self-consciousness, can one account for the rudimentary appearance of the Other. Following the Hegelian and Husserlian variants of such a strategy, this paper argues that: at the primitive levels of self-consciousness, subjectivity is intersubjective through and through; an irreducible distance separates the Other from the self, due to (...) which plurality cannot be surpassed by totality. In contrast to the view which sees these claims as though they were irreconcilable with each other, this paper shows how each of them calls for its apparent opposite. While it is common to establish the unanimity of these claims in opposition to Hegel, or Husserl, or both, this paper shows how such a concordance itself emerges from an Auseinandersetzung between them. (shrink)

This innovative collection traces the heretical development of productive imagination in post-Kantian philosophy. The book offers an original study that comprises unprecedented investigations into the kinaesthetic, pre-linguistic, poetic, historical, artistic, social and political dimensions of the productive power of imagination.

The main goal of concentration control and basic legal tests applied worldwide for the evaluation of concentrations, such as “dominance”, “significant impediment of competition” and “substantial lessening of competition” are analysed in this article. Every control, whatever its nature, is implemented in order to reach certain goals. In the first part of this article we analyse the goals of concentration control in different jurisdictions – mostly in the European Union, the USA and Lithuania. Four basic market security standards are excluded: (...) economic efficiency, protection of consumers, protection of competitors and protection of effective market competition. At the end we make a conclusion that the same standard, namely that of consumer protection, is applied in all those jurisdictions and that more attention should be paid for the protection of competitors and competition as a whole. Secondly, “dominance” test, applied in the EU under Regulation 4064/89, is analysed in detail. Moreover, the article discusses the meaning of a “dominant position”. We uphold the clarification of “dominance” provided by the Court of Justice, according to which dominance means the ability “to act to a considerable extent independently of their competitors, their customers and, ultimately, of consumers”. It is argued that “dominance” test is not sufficient for contemporary economics. The main disadvantage of this rule is that it is inapplicable for concentrations that do not create or strengthen dominant position. Furthermore, the new European Union rule of “significant impediment of competition” can be named as a smart European decision that tackled several problems: the practice of the Court of Justice remained applicable for future cases, because no serious changes to the wording of the rule were made. The detection of “dominant position” became only an alternative means to impede competition. In addition to this, the USA, the UK rule of “substantial lessening of competition” is compared to the two rules referred above. The concept of “monopoly” used in the wording of the rule, as well as the practice of the USA courts concerning the evaluation of market concentrations is analysed. We conclude that literally the phrases “significant impediment of competition” and “substantial lessening of competition” are different, but the content of these rules is the same. Different decisions taken in the same or similar cases on both sides of the Atlantic depend not on a certain rule but on the means of its application and some other circumstances (social, political factors, etc.). Finally, it is argued that practice of the evaluation of concentrations in the Republic of Lithuania is extremely poor. According to the present findings of the Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania, it is hard to say the kind of approach the Council follows or, in other words, what kind of a rule the Council applies. Despite the fact that competition law in Lithuania was updated in conformity with the changes made in the EU competition law, we state that the test of “dominance” is further applied in certain concentration cases. (shrink)

I argue that imagination has an inherently paradoxical structure: it enables one to flee one’s socio-cultural reality and to constitute one’s socio-cultural world. I maintain that most philosophical accounts of the imagination leave this paradox unexplored. I further contend that Paul Ricoeur is the only thinker to have addressed this paradox explicitly. According to Ricoeur, to resolve this paradox, one needs to recognize language as the origin of productive imagination. This paper explores Ricoeur’s solution by offering a detailed study of (...) reproductive and productive imagination in the framework of poetic imagination. My analysis subjects Ricoeur’s distinction between reproductive and productive imagination to a critique that relies upon the principles of classical phenomenology. According to my central thesis, the imaginative powers of language are themselves rooted in perception. This thesis broadens the scope and significance of Ricoeur’s solution by enabling one to resolve the paradox of imagination not only at the level of language-based imagination, but also at the level of dreams and daydreaming as well as at the level of non-language based art. No less significantly, this thesis enables one to open a fresh dialogue between phenomenology and hermeneutics. (shrink)

The paper aims to develop a phenomenology of pain on the basis of the insights introduced in Husserl’s phenomenology. First, I suggest that pain is given to intuition as an indubitable and a bodily localizable experience. Since these two characteristics are incompatible with each other, I argue that the experience of pain is paradoxical. Second, I contend that philosophy of pain provides six ways to resolve this paradox: semiological, causal, associationist, representational, perceptual, and phenomenological. Third, my central goal is to (...) develop the phenomenological resolution and to show that it culminates in the realization that the subject of pain is neither the disembodied consciousness nor the physiological body but the lived-body, conceived as the field of sensings. Fourth, I offer a phenomenological account of the structure of pain experience. I suggest that this structure could be characterized as the already appropriated body’s inner protest against its constitutive appropriation. (shrink)

Although Husserl’s analyses of the unconscious are scattered throughout various writings, many of which have been published in Hua III/2, Hua VI, Hua X, Hua XI, Hua XV, Hua XVII, Hua XXXIX and _Experience and Judgment_, nowhere else has he addressed the unconscious in such fascinating detail as in the manuscripts collected in Hua XLII. The publication of this volume has made it patently clear that the unconscious has many meanings in Husserl. A clarification of the different ways in which (...) Husserl has spoken of the unconscious is still missing in the literature and it is much needed. With the aim of developing a taxonomy of the unconscious in Husserl, here I trace the different meanings Husserl has given to this concept and I argue that in his phenomenology, the unconscious can be understood at least in seven ways: as the horizonal unconscious, the time-constituting unconscious, the sedimented unconscious, the repressed unconscious, the absorbed unconscious, the dormant unconscious, and the instinctual unconscious. Besides articulating the essential features of each determination, I also clarify what they all share. With the aim of showing what is distinctive of Husserl’s approach to the unconscious, I offer some reflections on what differentiates Husserl’s phenomenology of the unconscious vis-à-vis Freud’s psychoanalysis. In general, I maintain that while it is a limit problem in phenomenology, the unconscious should also be considered a central phenomenological theme, for as Husserl’s reflections show, without offering a phenomenology of the unconscious, phenomenology can only operate with a preliminary and insufficient conception of consciousness. (shrink)

Offering the first book-length study of a central concept in modern European philosophy to appear in the English-speaking world, this book provides an authoritative collection of articles that systematically address the concept of productive imagination in pre-Kantian philosophy, Kant, German Idealism, Phenomenology and Hermeneutics.

Situating phenomenological reflections on nostalgia within a historical context, I argue that Kant's temporalization of nostalgia remains incomplete. Bringing into question the widespread assumption that the object of nostalgia must be the past, I argue that nostalgia can be spoken of in three fundamental ways: as nostalgia for the past, for the present, and for the future. I further clarify the relation between the three forms of nostalgia here distinguished, and some other nostalgia that have been addressed in the literature. (...) I conclude with a contention that a characteristic feature of present-day nostalgia is that it is more often lived through not only as nostalgia for the past but also as nostalgia for the present and for the future. (shrink)

This paper examines Georg Lukács’s conception of rei????ied subjectivity under capitalism. I claim that Lukács’s transition from his ethical pre-Marxist notion of the reified subject, to his early-Marxist understanding of capitalist reification of the subject contains the elements of a potential Lukácsian anti-critique of any epistemic or normative reinterpretation of his theory of reification. In particular, the shift in Lukács’s conceptualization of the thinglikeness of objects implied in his dialectical social theory points to a historically precise interpretation of the subject’s (...) reification. The paper also suggests that Lukács’s project of dereification is rooted in the affective experience of reified subjects.Cet article examine la conception lukacsienne de la subjectivité réifiée en régime capitaliste. Mon propos est de montrer que le passage de la notion éthique pré-marxiste du sujet réifié à une compréhension marxiste précoce de la réification capitaliste du sujet chez Lukács contient des éléments d’une critique lukacsienne potentielle de toute réinterprétation normative de sa théorie de la réification. Le tournant dans la conceptualisation lukacsienne de l’apparente « choiséité » des objets, implicite dans la dialectique de sa théorie sociale, fait signe vers une interprétation historiquement précise de la réification du sujet. L’article suggère également que le projet lukacsien de la dé-réification est enraciné dans l’expérience affective des sujets réifiés. (shrink)

Straipsnyje šiandien dominuojantis požiūris į kentėjimą kritiškai palyginamas su Husserlio bei Nietzsche‘s sampratomis. Mūsų dienomis dominuojanti kentėjimo samprata yra susijusi su esminiu klausimu: „ką privalau daryti, kad panaikinčiau kančią?“ Kentėjimas suprantamas kaip nepageidaujamas ir nereikalingas fenomenas. Kita vertus, huserliškoji perspektyva gimsta iš klausimo: „ką gali kentėjimas atskleisti apie pačią žmogaus būklę?“ genetinės fenomenologijos požiūriu kentėjimas yra suprantamas kaip atskleisties fenomenas. Pagaliau, Nietzsche‘s filosofijos kontekste, kentėjimo refleksija yra susijusi su pamatiniu rūpesčiu: „Ar tam tikras kentėjimo supratimas teigia gyvenimą, ar veikiau jis (...) turi būti suprastas kaip pastarojo neigimas?“ Šis požiūris kentėjimą interpretuoja kaip paslėpties fenomeną. Atlikta analizė leidžia padaryti dvi išvadas: 1) genetinė ir genealoginė perspektyvos esmingai apriboja šiandieną dominuojantį požiūrį į kentėjimą; 2) Nietzsche‘s ir Husserlio traktuotės oponuoja viena kitai ne menkiau, nei šiandieniniam požiūriui. Bent jau kentėjimo problematikos kontekste galime tarti, kad genealogija yra genetinės fenomenologijos nešvari sąžinė ir atvirkščiai.Esminiai žodžiai: kentėjimas, genetinė fenomenologija, genealogija, Husserlis, nietzsche.The following analysis brings the nowadaysdominant perspective on suffering into a critical confrontation with Husserl and Nietzsche. The nowadays-dominant view arises out of the question “what must I do in order to eliminate suffering?” It therefore interprets suffering as an unsettling and unnecessary phenomenon. By contrast, the Husserlian perspective asks: “what can suffering tell me about the human condition?” As a genetic theme, suffering is a revealing phenomenon. Finally, within the Nietzschean context, our understanding of suffering should spring from yet a different concern: “Does a particular perspective on suffering affirm life, or is it rather a rebellion against it?” This perspective identifies suffering as a concealing phenomenon. Two conclusions follow: 1) the genetic and genealogical reflections on suffering significantly limit the nowadays-dominant perspective; 2) the Nietzschean and the Husserlian perspectives are just as sharply opposed to each other as they are opposed to the contemporary view. Thus at least in the context of the problematic of suffering one can say that genealogy is the bad conscience of genetic phenomenology, and vice versa.Key words: suffering, genetic phenomenology, genealogy, Husserl, Nietzsche. (shrink)

The article presents a geographic position of the Arctic. Legal regimes of the Arctic and the Antarctic are compared. In a geographical terms, the Arctic is part of the ocean that is covered by ice, and Antarctic is a continent covered by ice which is surrounded by an ocean. It follows that Arctic should be considered a part of the world’s ocean, which is governed by 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Currently, a sectoral regime is established (...) in the Arctic. The article analyzes the views of international law scholars on the issue and shares an opinion of those who criticize sectoral regime of the Arctic as incompatible with international law. Yet, what principles should underpin legal regime of the Arctic? Recent scholarly writings have considered a concept of common heritage of mankind. The article discusses the concept of common heritage of mankind. In the view of the author, this concept can be applied only to specific maritime areas but not to Arctic in its entirety. The article further thoroughly discusses Russia’s practice as regards its claims regarding the continental shelf of the Arctic. Furthermore, it evaluates the grounds of Russia’s policy in the Arctic until 2020 and also examines Russia’s application for extension of continental shelf in the Arctic and the Pacific Oceans. The article ends with conclusions. (shrink)

The United Nations has shown recurrent inability to respond to international threats caused by severe human rights violations and thus failed to perform one of its main function—preservation of international peace and security in the world. This evidenced gaps in the United Nations, caused mainly by the veto right in the voting system within the Security Council and limited powers of the General Assembly. The international community gave a twofold answer to this problem: radical humanitarian intervention and the recent concept (...) of the responsibility to protect. The main problem with regard to humanitarian intervention is its legality—its compliance with the prohibition of the use of force. The responsibility to protect does not clash with the prohibition of the use of force, but its legal implications are rather vague—being intensively discussed in the international forum, the responsibility to protect has not yet appeared in any legally binding international document. This article discusses the legal significance of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect, and aims to determine how they affect, if at all, the regulation of the use of force in the international relations, as well as how they respond to the issue of large scale atrocities in the world. (shrink)

The central questions that guide phenomenological investigations of daydreaming can be formulated as follows: What must consciousness be if it is to be capable of daydreaming? How does daydreaming relate to other modes of experience, especially mind-wandering, lucid and non-lucid dreaming, and phantasizing? What are the eidetic features and constitutive functions of daydreaming in the overall life of consciousness? My goal in this chapter is to show that a phenomenological analysis of daydreaming can make an important contribution to the cross-disciplinary (...) science of daydreaming precisely because it directly addresses these fundamental questions. The phenomenological analysis of daydreaming developed here suggests the following: (1) The life of consciousness is characterized by the intertwining of sleep and wakefulness. Just as there is wakefulness in sleep, so also is there sleep in wakefulness. (2) The life of consciousness is not confined to the here and now. Besides those experiences which unfold from the present standpoint, there is also another group of experiences that can be qualified as absorbed, or displaced, experiences. (3) A phenomenological analysis of daydreaming brings to light how different modes of experience are characterized by different modes of self-awareness. (shrink)

This collection of chapters, written by prominent scholars in their respective fields, re-examines the nature of self-awareness in both Western and Eastern philosophy, inquires into its diverse and variable modes, and significantly broadens the framework of its analysis. The chapters collected focus on reflective and pre-reflective forms of self-awareness, as well as the relation between self-awareness and the awareness of things and the world. Included are examinations of the affective and embodied dimensions of self-awareness, the distinct forms of self-awareness in (...) memory, phantasy, and dreams, as well as the temporal and spatial nature of self-awareness. This edited volume appeals to students and researchers working in phenomenology and on the philosophy of self-awareness. (shrink)

This paper develops a phenomenological approach to the concept of pain, which highlights the main presuppositions that underlie pain research undertaken both in the natural and in the sociohistorical sciences. My argument is composed of four steps: only if pain is a stratified experience can it become a legitimate theme in both natural and sociohistorical sciences; the phenomenological method is supremely well suited to disclose the different strata of pain experience; the phenomenological account offered here identifies three fundamental levels that (...) make up the texture of pain experience: pain can be conceived as a prereflective experience, as an object of affective reflection, or as an object of cognitive reflection; and such a stratified account clarifies how pain can be a subject matter in the natural and sociohistorical sciences. Arguably, the natural and sociohistorical sciences address pain at different levels of its manifestation. While the natural sciences address pain as an object of cognitive reflection, sociohistorical sciences first and foremost deal with pain as a prereflective experience and as an object of affective reflection. (shrink)

The purpose of this manuscript is to bring Mead's pragmatism into contact with Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology. Taking as its focus the question of the I-pole of the self, the paper points to the absence and the need of a concept like auto-affection in Mead's analysis of selfhood. A pragmatic appropriation of this concept does not undermine the social framework of selfhood because the most rudimentary self-givenness is immediate and direct, yet simultaneously a posteriori. The social and biological genesis of mind, (...) self and society reserves a prominent place for auto-affection, which liberates the self from his estrangement within the horizon of objecthood by acknowledging a multiplicity of types of self-givenness besides that of self-objectification. (shrink)

Although the importance of the concept of immersion in game studies is indisputable, its meaning remains imprecise and ambiguous. My goal here is to develop a phenomenological clarification of this concept. I begin by clarifying how immersion has been understood in game studies. I further contend that immersion in digital games should be recognized as one modality of immersion among others. This basic realization allows one to open a dialogue between game studies and phenomenology. I develop a phenomenological conception of (...) immersion, which relies on Alfred Schutz’s phenomenology of multiple realities and Theodor Conrad’s phenomenology of immersion. Although such an approach provides us with a general conception of immersion, it does not clarify what specific features characterize immersion in digital games. I argue that this form of immersion is a hybrid phenomenon, which shares certain features with immersion in non-digital games and other features with immersion in other types of digital media. I further demonstrate that immersion in digital games is characterized by a specific function of embodiment. With this in mind, I conclude my analysis by introducing a phenomenologically grounded distinction between actual and virtual embodiment, thereby clarifying in which sense immersion in digital games is an embodied and a disembodied experience. (shrink)

Although the need of freedom is definite, the concept of individual freedom, while being interpreted with legal terms, causes not only theoretical, but also practical problems. The observed two extremes of freedom are defined as any human self-expression as well as the license, where the state power is generally attributed to disregard personal freedom. In this article the freedom of expression and state enforcement jurisdiction dichotomy are addressed by discussing positive and negative conceptions of freedom and the relationship between the (...) interpretations of political liberalism and Kant and Hegel‘s philosophies. This paper aims to prove that the positive liberty is the assumption of the negative liberty. The paper based on Hegel‘s philosophy shows that freedom is the characteristic of human nature to seek identity. It is also argued that human identity can take many forms and, therefore, a person has a number of inherent rights and liberties. It is human psycho-physical identity that provides the right to life and health care; human creative identity, providing the right to privacy and freedom of occupation; human moral identity, which provides the right of dignity, and the moral autonomy of person’s social and political identity, providing the political and social rights and freedoms. This article concludes that while a person uses the given rights with integrity and the state is limiting people’s arbitrariness, there is no conflict between the freedom and state violation. (shrink)

Šios analizės tikslas yra trilypis. Visų pirma, bandoma nustatyti pagrindinius Nietzsche’s subjekto kritikos aspektus. Visų antra, bandoma identifikuoti centrinę šios kritikos funkciją. Visų trečia, bandoma interpretuoti Nietzsche’s ginamą subjektą kaip kūnišką stimulų, instinktų, ir reikmių daugialypumą. Esėje parodoma, kad standartinis subjekto problematikos Nietzsche‘s kūriniuose svarstymas nėra adekvatus. Pasak tokio svarstymo, Nietzsche atsisako subjektyvistinių mąstymo kontūrų ir pakeičia juos radikaliai nauja paaiškinamąja schema. Esėje taip pat parodoma, kad Nietzsche niekad nesiekė pateisinti atomistinės ar anarchiškos subjekto sampratos. Nietzsche siekė suprasti subjektyvybę dvigubo (...) patvirtinimo būdu – kaip valdančio stimulo ir subjekto tapsmo patvirtinimą. Tokio dvigubo patvirtinimo dėka, savastis atsiskleidžia kaip tekstas ir jo interpretacija.Esminiai žodžiai: ego, kūnas, Nietzsche, savastis, subjektas.The following analysis has a threefold task. First, it aims to identify the central aspects of Nietzsche’s critique of the subject. Secondly, it aims to identify the main function that this critique serves. And thirdly, it aims to interpret the subject Nietzsche defends and endorses in terms of a bodily multiplicity of drives, instincts and needs. The paper argues against the standard interpretation of the problematic of the subject in Nietzsche, according to which Nietzsche abandons the subjectivistic approach in favor of an entirely different explanatory framework. The paper shows that far from supporting an atomistic or an anarchic view of the subject, Nietzsche’s narrative endorses a notion of subjectivity that entails a double affirmation: the affirmation of the ruling drive of the body and of the style of the subject’s becoming. In virtue of such a double affirmation, the self discloses itself as both the text and its interpretation.Key words: body, ego, Nietzsche, multiplicity, self, subject. (shrink)

Straipsnyje kultūrinių žemėlapių kontekste analizuojamas vertybių erdvėlaikis – vertybių sklaida laike ir erdvėje, erdvę suprantant ne tik kaip „vertybių žemėlapį“, bet ir kaip trečią dimensiją – „vertybių gylį“, jų pakopinę sandarą. Parodoma jų kaita laike ir atkreipiamas dėmesys į tai, kad tiek klasikinėje, tiek modernioje aksiologijoje greta instrumentinių ir sisteminių vertybių regimos savo tapatumą išlaikančios esminės vertybės. Keliamas klausimas, kuo tai paaiškinti ir pagrįsti. Greta fenomenologine refleksija ir analitika paremtų atsakymų į šį klausimą pateikiamas ir naujas požiūris, kuris grindžiamas transdisciplininį (...) pobūdį turinčia sinergetine paradigma. (shrink)

The paper analyses the relevant issue of the relationship of international law and European Union law. Therefore, independent systems of law exist, which inevitably arise the issue of relationship and interaction of these systems. Legal literature analyses the question of the relationship of these two systems of law on the basis of various aspects. The author has chosen the following structure of the paper: first, the general problem of the relationship of international and European Union law is discussed. While describing (...) the problem, the nature of the European Union and international law, as well as the distinguishing features of these systems of law, is analysed. The paper also provides a discussion about the decisions of the Strasbourg court and the Court of Justice of the European Union, which provide the basis of solving the problem of the relationship of these systems of law. In the second part of this paper, the main theories are analysed: the monistic, dualistic and coordination theories, which can be used to answer the issue of interaction of the two systems of law – international law and European Union law. (shrink)