Referential opacity is the failure of substitutivity of identity (SI, for short) and in Quine’s view of existential generalization (EG, for short) as well. Quine thinks that its “solution” in epistemic and doxastic contexts, which relies on the notion of exportation, leads to undesirable results. But epistemic logicians such as Jaakko Hintikka and Wolfgang Lenzen provide another solution based on a different diagnosis: opacity is not, as in Quine’s view, due to the absence of reference, it is rather due to (...) the plurality of references; therefore, one must stabilize the reference to restore SI and EG. However, Hintikka’s semantics remains classical in its treatment of existence, which makes EG non-applicable to possible objects, while in Lenzen’s system, EG is applicable by means of a particular quantifier. But this requires adding the predicate of existence to account for real objects. In this paper, I will show the advantages and disadvantages of both solutions and will end by providing an alternative approach to the problem of non-existent objects, which stays into the frame of possible worlds semantics, but introduces some more restrictions, eliminates the problematic predicate of existence, and applies a neutral quantifier to possible non-existent objects. (shrink)

We re-examine the problem of existential import by using classical predicate logic. Our problem is: How to distribute the existential import among the quantified propositions in order for all the relations of the logical square to be valid? After defining existential import and scrutinizing the available solutions, we distinguish between three possible cases: explicit import, implicit non-import, explicit negative import and formalize the propositions accordingly. Then, we examine the 16 combinations between the 8 propositions having the first two kinds of (...) import, the third one being trivial and rule out the squares where at least one relation does not hold. This leads to the following results: (1) three squares are valid when the domain is non-empty; (2) one of them is valid even in the empty domain: the square can thus be saved in arbitrary domains and (3) the aforementioned eight propositions give rise to a cube, which contains two more (non-classical) valid squares and several hexagons. A classical solution to the problem of existential import is thus possible, without resorting to deviant systems and merely relying upon the symbolism of First-order Logic (FOL). Aristotle’s system appears then as a fragment of a broader system which can be developed by using FOL. (shrink)

RésuméDans cet article, je pose le problème suivant: quelles propositions ont un import dans la logique modale d'Avicenne? Lesquelles n'en ont pas? Partant de l'assomption que les propositions singulières et quantifiées ont un import si elles requièrent l'existence de leur sujet pour être vraies, j'analyse d'abord l'import des propositions absolues, ensuite celui des propositions modales en tenant compte des définitions d'Avicenne et des relations entre ces propositions. Cette analyse conduit aux résultats suivants: Avicenne défend l'opinion générale selon laquelle les affirmatives, (...) qu'elles soient modales ou assertoriques, ont un import alors que les négatives n'en ont pas. Il attribue un import aux propositions possibles affirmatives aussi bien dans l'interprétation externaliste que dans l'interprétation internaliste des logiciens post-Avicenniens, pourvu que le sujet ne soit pas impossible. Toutefois, la théorie n'est pas toujours claire, car Avicenne attribue un import aux propositions contenant ‘parfois non’ et aux nécessaires négatives contenant ‘tant qu'il est P’ malgré leur caractère négatif; les propositions nécessaires affirmatives contenant ‘tant qu'il est P’ sont considérées comme ayant un import alors qu'elles ne l'exigent pas. De plus, l'analyse qu'il donne des assertoriques spéciales E et O et de leurs contradictoires est erronée, ce qui ne permet pas de déterminer clairement leur import. Mais quand elles sont correctement analysées, ces propositions E et O n'ont pas d'import, alors que leurs contradictoires – les assertoriques spéciales I et A respectivement – ont un import. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyse categorical propositions and their oppositional relations in Avicenna’s frame. For Avicenna’s expression and conception of categorical propositions is different from those of the authors who preceded him, due to the various conditions he adds to these categorical propositions. These additions make the oppositional relations richer and give rise to many more figures than a simple square. Our analysis exhibits some of these figures by relating all kinds of quantified propositions in various ways. (...) We thus find many squares of oppositions, several octagons, two hexagons and many complex figures which are different from each other and have specific and original structures, due to the propositions they contain. The hexagons are of Blanché’s kind, but one of them is asymmetric. Some octagons are of Buridan’s kind, but one of them is very unusual and seems to be a reversal of Buridan’s octagon. These octagons can also be replaced by cubes, which are three dimensional figures having the same number of vertices. (shrink)

The square of opposition has never been drawn by classical Arabic logicians, such as al-Fārābī and Avicenna. However, in some later writings, we do find squares, which their authors call rather ‘tables’ (sing. _lawḥ_). These authors are Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī and Muhammed b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī. They do not pertain to the same geographic area, but they both provide squares of opposition. The aim of this paper is to analyse these two squares, to compare them with each other and with the (...) traditional square of opposition drawn by Apuleius and Boethius, with regard to their particular structure and their vertices and to evaluate their validity. We will show that both squares are different from each other and from the traditional square both with regard to their vertices, and to the arrangements of the oppositional relations. In addition, while al-Suhrawardī uses the notion of matter modalities to define the oppositions, al-Sanūsī relies rather on al-Rāzī’s and al-Khūnajī’s distinctions. Both authors agree, however, on the fact that affirmatives have an import while negatives do not. For this reason, their squares are valid from a logical viewpoint. As diagrams, these squares are nevertheless entirely original, due to the particular arrangements of their oppositional relations. Our analysis shows also that the later author does not seem to know the square drawn by the earlier one and that both authors do not seem to know Apuleius’ or Boethius’ squares. (shrink)

This monograph explores the logical systems of early logicians in the Arabic tradition from a theoretical perspective, providing a complete panorama of early Arabic logic and centering it within an expansive historical context. By thoroughly examining the writings of the first Arabic logicians, al-Fārābī, Avicenna and Averroes, the author analyzes their respective theories, discusses their relationship to the syllogistics of Aristotle and his followers, and measures their influence on later logical systems. Beginning with an introduction to the writings of the (...) most prominent Arabic logicians, the author scrutinizes these works to determine their categorical logic, as well as their modal and hypothetical logics. Where most other studies written on this subject focus on the Arabic logicians’ epistemology, metaphysics, and theology, this volume takes a unique approach by focusing on the actual technical aspects and features of their logics. The author then moves on to examine the original texts as closely as possible and employs the symbolism of modern propositional, predicate, and modal logics, rendering the arguments of each logician clearly and precisely while clarifying the theories themselves in order to determine the differences between the Arabic logicians’ systems and those of Aristotle. By providing a detailed examination of theories that are still not very well-known in Western countries, the author is able to assess the improvements that can be found in the Arabic writings, and to situate Arabic logic within the breadth of the history of logic. This unique study will appeal mainly to historians of logic, logicians, and philosophers who seek a better understanding of the Arabic tradition. It also will be of interest to modern logicians who wish to delve into the historical aspects and progression of their discipline. Furthermore, this book will serve as a valuable resource for graduate students who wish to complement their general knowledge of Arabic culture, logic, and sciences. (shrink)

In this paper, I raise the following problem: How does Avicenna define modalities? What oppositional relations are there between modal propositions, whether quantified or not? After giving Avicenna's definitions of possibility, necessity and impossibility, I analyze the modal oppositions as they are stated by him. This leads to the following results: The relations between the singular modal propositions may be represented by means of a hexagon. Those between the quantified propositions may be represented by means of two hexagons that one (...) could relate to each other.This is so because the exact negation of the bilateral possible, i.e. ‘necessary or impossible’ is given and applied to the quantified possible propositions.Avicenna distinguishes between the scopes of modality which can be either external or internal . His formulations are external unlike al-F̄ar̄ab̄;’s ones. However his treatment of modal oppositions remains incomplete because not all the relations between the modal propositi.. (shrink)

Dans cet article, j'analyse le problème des significations des constantes logiques. Ces significations sont-elles fixées conventionnellement comme le suggèrent Carnap et Wittgenstein, ou bien doivent-elles s'imposer à tous et ne pas dépendre de décisions préalables? Après avoir examiné le conventionnalisme de Wittgenstein et Carnap et l'anti-conventionnalisme de Peacocke selon lequel les sens des constantes logiques reposent sur des conceptions implicites, je montre que les deux thèses sont également critiquables. La première ne résiste pas à l'incohérence du connecteur « tonk », (...) inventé par Prior, dont les règles montrent que la convention ne peut pas déterminer à elle seule les significations des constantes logiques, la deuxième ne tient pas assez compte des divergences importantes entre les logiques. En me basant sur différents systèmes logiques, je présente de nouveaux arguments pour défendre une position intermédiaire selon laquelle chaque constante logique se déploie en diverses variantes qui forment un spectre allant de la version la plus forte à la version la plus faible. Dans ce cadre, le concept de décision joue un rôle en logique, mais les décisions sont prises en amont, en fonction de certaines conceptions touchant la vérité, la déduction et les critères de logicité adoptés par les logiciens, et tiennent compte des intuitions fondamentales liéesà chaque constante. (shrink)

Dans cet essai, je me propose d’analyser l’interprétation que fait Ricœur de la théorie frégéenne du sens et de la référence des noms et des propositions. Contre les structuralistes, Ricœur présente dans La Métaphore vive ce qu’il appelle une théorie référentielle de la métaphore et puise dans le texte frégéen pour la défendre en se basant sur la distinction sens-référence. Toutefois, les analyses qu’il présente de la théorie frégéenne ne sont pas fidèles au texte de ce logicien, qu’elles mélangent avec (...) ceux de Wittgenstein et Benveniste entre autres, ce qui conduit à une vision faussée de la théorie frégéenne. Pour cette raison, son analyse le conduit à des résultats qui sont aux antipodes de ceux de Frege pour qui ni le discours poétique ni le discours fictif en général n’ont une portée référentielle. (shrink)

RésuméLa logique d'Avicenne est présentée dans plusieurs traités, dont le plus important est Al-Qiyās, qui est inclus dans son livre encyclopédique Al-Šifā’. Mais le traité intitulé Manṭiq al-mašriqiyyīn est celui qui, selon certains commentateurs, exprime la véritable logique d'Avicenne. On peut donc poser la question suivante : ce traité est-il en conflit avec Al-Qiyās et les autres écrits d'Avicenne? Dans cet article, nous répondrons à cette question en comparant les analyses d'Avicenne des propositions absolues, i. e. non modales. Nous montrerons (...) qu'il n'y a pas de différence radicale entre les deux traités sur ce sujet puisque la plupart des conditions ajoutées aux propositions absolues dans Al-Qiyās peuvent être trouvées dans Manṭiq al-mašriqiyyīn. Ces conditions sont les suivantes : “tant que S existe”, “tant qu'il est S”, “tant qu'il est P”, “parfois”, “à un moment déterminé”, “parfois mais pas en permanence”. Dans Manṭiq al-mašriqiyyīn, la ḍarūrīya contient, la lāzima contient, la muntašira contient, la mafrūḍa contient, la wujūdiyya contient, mais est abandonnée. La waqtiyya était évoquée dans Al-Qiyās mais sans être classifiée. L'analyse temporelle initiée dans Al-Qiyās est donc poursuivie et développée dans Manṭiq al-mašriqiyyīn, même si dans ce dernier elle est parfois confuse. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Avicenna’s conception of the consequence relation. I will consider in particular his categorical and hypothetical logics. I will first analyse his definition of the implication and will show that this relation is not a consequence relation in his frame. Unlike the medieval logicians, he does not distinguish explicitly between material and formal consequences. The arguments discussed in al-Qiyās, where the conclusion is true only in some matters, and would seem close to a material consequence for (...) that reason, are rejected explicitly as not syllogistic. He also rejects the ‘enthymemes’ unless they are complemented by their missing premise and the superfluous premises which, according to him, should promptly be ruled out. It seems then that the consequence relation in his theory is formal. It can be characterized as being ‘productivity in all matters’ or ‘necessary truth preserving’. It is illustrated by some single premise arguments, and above all by all kinds of syllogisms which, in his theory, are more numerous and various than in Aristotle’s one. The syllogism may contain two or more premises, including disjunctive ones. When it is hypothetical, it may lead to several conclusions. The premises may be in conflict, but then, the conclusion is false. He thus rejects the principle according to which ‘anything follows from a contradiction’. But, unlike what some scholars say, he does not admit any connexive principle. In the compound syllogisms, the conclusion follows by steps, each step taking two premises at once. (shrink)

RésuméDans son analyse des propositions hypothétiques, conditionnelles et disjonctives, Ibn Sīnā suggère que ces propositions peuvent être quantifiées et présente dans la section VI de son traité un système hypothétique contenant les propositions conditionnelles, qui est exactement parallèle à la syllogistique des propositions catégoriques et utilise les mêmes règles de conversion et les mêmes démonstrations. Dans la section VII, il présente quatre listes de propositions hypothétiques quantifiées dont les composants sont eux-mêmes quantifiés et affirme que les relations du carré aristotélicien (...) des oppositions valent pour ces propositions. Par ailleurs, il affirme que certaines propositions conditionnelles universelles affirmatives sont équivalentes à certaines universelles négatives dont les conséquents sont opposés, et également à certaines propositions disjonctives. Le problème est que ces thèses sont incompatibles entre elles, car elles requièrent deux lectures différentes de la proposition conditionnelle universelle affirmative, qu'Ibn Sīnā ne distingue pas clairement. Dans le présent article nous résolvons le problème en distinguant explicitement entre ces deux interprétations et en montrant que la première valide la conversion de l'universelle affirmative et les relations du carré des oppositions ainsi que tous les modes admis, alors que la seconde valide la règle de contraposition et les équivalences énoncées par Ibn Sīnā, ce qui rend compte des affirmations d'Ibn Sīnā et rend le système cohérent. (shrink)

In this paper, I raise the following problem: What terms are considered as syncategoremata in the Arabic logical texts? How are they defined? How do they determine the forms of the propositions and the inferences? To answer these questions, I focus on the analyses provided by al-Fārābī and Avicenna. Both authors apply the grammatical distinction between the particle, the noun and the verb to logic. They also state the semantic and the syntactic criterions, but their analyses of the particles are (...) different. For al-Fārābī devotes two treatises to the analysis of particles: al-musta‘malah fī l-maniq, where he provides a listing of particles that he classifies in the manner of the Greek grammarians and Kitāb al-urūf, where he analyzes some particles used in metaphysics; while Avicenna, despite the considerable amount of his logical corpus, does not devote a special book to the analysis of particles. He does not provide any listing either but characterizes each logical particle on its own, while analyzing the propositions, their elements and the inferences. In this paper, I argue that this treatment of particles in the two frames shows a significant difference between the two authors with regard to the relation between logic and grammar, and with regard to the characterizations of the logical particles themselves. For Avicenna is much less interested than al-Fārābī by the grammatical analysis and focuses much more on the logical particles, which he scrutinizes meticulously. This enriches his definitions of the logical constants and leads him in the final analysis to different and more various inferences than those hold by al-Fārābī. (shrink)

In this article, I analyze Quine’s conception of science, which is a radical defence of extensionalism on the grounds that first‐order logic is the most adequate logic for science. I examine some criticisms addressed to it, which show the role of modalities and probabilities in science and argue that Quine’s treatment of probability minimizes the intensional character of scientific language and methods by considering that probability is extensionalizable. But this extensionalizing leads to untenable results in some cases and is not (...) consistent with the fact that Quine himself admits confirmation which includes probability. Quine’s extensionalism does not account for this fact and then seems unrealistic, even if science ought to be extensional in so far as it is descriptive and mathematically expressible. (shrink)

It is common today that organizations have their own distinctive cultures, even in cases when they may not have willfully attempted to create them. Rather, cultures have most likely been created unconsciously, forced by the values of top level managers, the founder, or core people who have built or direct the organization. Leaders frequently attempt to change the culture of their organizations to suit their own preferences. The resulting culture will influence the decision-making process, market demand, and nature of the (...) business. It affects management styles and what everyone determines as success. This study is an attempt to discover how culture influences management styles and decisions, with special reference to the local environment in Oman. (shrink)

The inconclusiveness of previous research on the association between gender diverse boards and corporate social performance has led us to revisit the question in light of stakeholder management and institutional theories. Given that corporate social responsibility is a multidimensional concept, we test the influence of GDB on various groups of stakeholders. By considering the interaction between stakeholders’ power and directors’ personal motivations toward the prioritization of stakeholders’ claims, we find that GDB are positively related to CSR dimensions that are related (...) to less powerful stakeholders such as the environment, contractors, and the community. However, GDB do not appear to have a significant impact on CSR dimensions that are associated with stakeholders who benefit from more institutionalized power, such as employees and customers. (shrink)

Explanation of the philosophical position (siddhānta) of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism.

Elementary Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Summary The contribution of the Antwerp mathematician and instrument maker Michiel Coignet to the development of the sector is investigated. It will be shown that he invented a rule, the reigle platte, which he later used in conjunction with Mordente's reduction compass, thus in effect performing the same operations as with a sector. Later Coignet transferred the scales to the legs of the compass thereby making his first sector, which bore a resemblance to the reduction compass.

This article critically analyzes the environmental economics paradigm of David Pearce and Robert Kerry Turner. Our analysis is inspired by the philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd, in particular his transcendental criticism and theory of modalities. We describe how Pearce and Turner theorize the concept of sustainable development. On the basis of this description we identify immanent tensions in their approach and analyze to what extent these tensions are caused by implicit normative presuppositions in the key concepts used by Pearce and Turner. (...) Finally, we examine whether Dooyeweerd’s conception of the economic aspect can diminish these tensions. (shrink)