This paper argues for a fundamental overhaul of the current competence constellation in the EU, which is necessary to address the problem that the current arrangement does not respect the important values that it is supposed to uphold, namely those of democracy, subsidiarity and national diversity. While pretending otherwise, it effectively contains neither negative nor positive EU integration in areas of Member State competence. Furthermore, it enables European integration of these areas through even less accountable intergovernmental mechanisms. It will be (...) argued that the root cause of this problem is that demarcation of competences as a method to contain the EU does not work, because such an approach of ‘categorical federalism’ is bound to fail, especially in the EU context since it is incompatible with the functionality that is written in the legal order’s DNA. It is therefore proposed to dispose of demarcation as a way to contain EU action and instead to openly recognise the inevitable broadness of the EU’s powers while containing the exercise of these powers through a democratisation of the legislative process. The paper tables a number of proposals that on the one hand enhance the EU’s formal legislative powers, while on the other hand strengthen national parliaments in their powers politically to review proposed EU legislation. (shrink)

This paper addresses a number of closely related questions concerning Kant's model of intentionality, and his conceptions of unity and of magnitude [Gröβe]. These questions are important because they shed light on three issues which are central to the Critical system, and which connect directly to the recent analytic literature on perception: the issues are conceptualism, the status of the imagination, and perceptual atomism. In Section 1, I provide a sketch of the exegetical and philosophical problems raised by Kant's views (...) on these issues. I then develop, in Section 2, a detailed analysis of Kant's theory of perception as elaborated in both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment; I show how this analysis provides a preliminary framework for resolving the difficulties raised in Section 1. In Section 3, I extend my analysis of Kant's position by considering a specific test case: the Axioms of Intuition. I contend that one way to make sense of Kant's argument is by juxtaposing it with Russell's response to Bradley's regress; I focus in particular on the concept of ‘unity’. Finally, I offer, in Section 4, a philosophical assessment of the position attributed to Kant in Sections 2 and 3. I argue that, while Kant's account has significant strengths, a number of key areas remain underdeveloped; I suggest that the phenomenological tradition may be read as attempting to fill precisely those gaps. (shrink)

In our digital world, we are confused by privacy – what is public, what is private? We are also challenged by it, the conditions of privacy so uncertain we become unsure about our rights to it. We may choose to share personal information, but often do so on the assumption that it won't be re-shared, sold, or passed on to other parties without our knowing. In the eighteenth century, philosopher Jeremy Bentham wrote about a new model for a prison called (...) a Panopticon, where inmates surrounded the jailers, always under watch. Have we built ourselves a digital Panopticon? Are we the guards or the prisoners, captive or free? Can we be both? When Kim Kardashian makes the minutiae of her life available online, which is she? With great rigour, this important book draws on a Kantian philosophy of ethics and legal frameworks to examine where we are and to suggest steps – conceptual and practical – to ensure the future is not dystopian. Privacy is one of the defining issues of our time; this lively book explains why this is so, and the ways in which we might protect it. (shrink)

In Sein und Zeit Heidegger makes several claims about the nature of ‘assertion’ [Aussage]. These claims are of particular philosophical interest: they illustrate, for example, important points of contact and divergence between Heidegger's work and philosophical movements including Kantianism, the early Analytic tradition and contemporary pragmatism. This article provides a new assessment of one of these claims: that assertion is connected to a ‘present-at-hand’ ontology. I also indicate how my analysis sets the stage for a new reading of Heidegger's further (...) claim that assertion is an explanatorily derivative phenomenon. I begin with a loose overview of Heidegger's position and then develop a sharper formulation of the key premises. I go on to argue that existing treatments of the supposed link between assertion and the ‘present-at-hand’ are unsatisfactory, and advance a new, ‘methodological’, interpretation of that link. Finally, I sketch the implications of my interpretation for the further claim that assertion is explanatorily derivative. (shrink)

This article advances a new account of Kant’s views on conceptualism. On the one hand, I argue that Kant was a nonconceptualist. On the other hand, my approach accommodates many motivations underlying the conceptualist reading of his work: for example, it is fully compatible with the success of the Transcendental Deduction. I motivate my view by providing a new analysis of both Kant’s theory of perception and of the role of categorical synthesis: I look in particular at the categories of (...) quantity. Locating my interpretation in relation to recent research by Allais, Ginsborg, Tolley and others, I argue that it offers an attractive compromise on this important theoretical and exegetical issue. (shrink)

This article presents conceptual bridges that exist between the philosophy of G.W.F Hegel and a feminist ethics of care. To do so, it engages with Slavoj Žižek’s contemporary reading of Hegel in concert with existing feminist interpretations of Hegel’s thought. The goal of doing so is to demonstrate how both Žižek and a selection of critical feminist thinkers interpret Hegel’s perspective on the nature of subjectivity, intersubjective relations and the relationship between the subject and the world it inhabits, in a (...) way that can further our thinking on the feminist ethics of care as a relational and contextualist ethics that foregrounds vulnerability as a condition of existence. These readings of Hegel highlight the radical contingency of human subjectivity, as well as the relationship between human subjectivity and the external world, in a way that is compatible with the feminist ethics of care’s emphasis on the particularity, fluidity, and interdependency of human relationships. I argue that this confrontation between care ethics and mainstream philosophy is valuable because it offers mutual contributions to both care ethics as a moral and political theory and the philosophy of Hegel and Žižek. (shrink)

`This is an exceptionally good textbook. It covers an unusually wide range of issues in an up-to-date and balanced fashion, and is clearly written. It would be invaluable for all students, both undergraduates and postgraduates, who take a genuine interest in the nature of psychology and the theoretical issues it faces' - Professor Graham Richards, Director, British Psychological Society History of Psychology Centre Psychology is understood by many as the `science of the mind', but what is `mind' and what have (...) modern psychology and philosophy to say about its nature? What is `science' and what is a scientific approach to mind? This thoroughly revised edition o the classic textbook explores a wide range of problems in psychology, philosophy, cognitive and brains sciences identifying the major topics, debates and controversies and presenting them in a balanced and accessible manner for students. Key features of this Second Edition include: } A new, ten chapter structure making it ideal for a lecture course; } Contains new content on advances in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, including neural networks, dynamics systems and situated cognition; } Final chapter focuses on `hot issues' at the interface of psychology and philosophy - making attempts to look forward. } Pedagogical features including chapter summaries and further readings. Brought fully up-to-date with advances in computational, cognitive and neuroscience work on the one hand, and links with philosophy on the other, this book is essential reading for all students needing an understanding of these issues. (shrink)

During a climate of strong disenchantment toward systematic thought, the French philosopher Martial Gueroult (1891–1976) applied the concept of a system to the field of history of philosophy. His ‘dianometics’ is, among other aspects, a philosophy of the history of philosophy that considers each philosophical work as an autonomous system. This article proposes a critical reading of Gueroult’s work (which is rarely discussed outside of the French–speaking community) and aims to demonstrate that his dianoematics offers a new insightful method for (...) approaching and understanding the history of philosophy. First, I will reconstruct Gueroult’s argument to demonstrate how he justifies the possibility of a philosophical history of philosophy. I will then present Gueroult’s conception of system and how it can be used as an analysis technique for the history of philosophy. However, Gueroult’s project sometimes betrays some of its promises. A critical account will be presented as well. (shrink)

'The Laws of Evolution' questions our current understanding of the laws that govern our universe and its evolution.

This paper aims to examine the notion of representation that emerges from development of Malebranche’s thesis of the vision of ideas in God. To do so, we turn to the progressive clarification made by the author to the term idea, seeking to highlight the radically representative character of the concept. We then analyze how this representative idea, in the philosophy of the Oratorian, does not require some correspondence with existence. Finally, we show how this primacy of representation is articulated with (...) the thesis of vision in God. Thus, it becomes possible to conceive how these representative ideas can give the foundation to a true science. (shrink)

In 1820, J. Pelletier and J.-B. Caventou, two French pharmacist-chemists working at the Ecole de Pharmacie of Paris, extracted quinine, a new substance, from cinchona bark. We use this example to illustrate the processes which lead from a crude natural product through the isolation of an active principle to the production of a pure manufactured drug. This allows us to discuss the development of chemical analysis in relation to pharmacy, natural history, medicine and the early pharmaceutical industry. The dynamics of (...) the disciplines involved here show how organic chemistry, which was developing rapidly during these crucial years, expanded and became autonomous. Theoretical aspects and practical innovations are relevant to the scientific methods developed by the first generation of those who integrated the new chemistry into their daily work. Beyond these historical issues, this paper aims to show how a holistic approach can contribute to the debate on discovery and invention in a science that is often considered empirical. (shrink)

Science des poisons, la toxicologie est une spécialité pluridisciplinaire dont l’enseignement est dispersé entre médecine, pharmacie et chimie. Les manuels de toxicologie soulèvent des enjeux disciplinaires et éditoriaux. Une première partie montre, à travers une approche sérielle et comparative, comment la publication de manuels constitue un moyen de promouvoir et de revendiquer la reconnaissance institutionnelle d’une discipline aux contours fluctuants. Une deuxième partie présente l’histoire éditoriale du Manuel complet de médecine légale (10 éditions : 1821-1880) de Briand & Chaudé et (...) les conséquences disciplinaires de l’insertion d’un Traité élémentaire de chimie légale écrit par des pharmaciens-chimistes. (shrink)

A little over a year ago, we lost one of the leading historians of philosophy of her generation, Prof. Maria Rosa Antognazza. So many in this community also lost a dear friend.Rosa, as she was know...

This paper argues that there is a relationship between understandings of anorexia nervosa (AN) and how the ethical issues associated with involuntary treatment for AN are identified, framed, and addressed. By positioning AN as a construct/discourse (hereinafter “AN: the diagnosis”) several ethical issues are revealed. Firstly, “AN: the diagnosis” influences how the autonomy and competence of persons diagnosed with AN are understood by decision-makers in the treatment environment. Secondly, “AN: the diagnosis” impacts on how treatment and treatment efficacy are defined (...) and the ethical justifiability of paternalism. Thirdly, “AN: the diagnosis” can limit the opportunity for persons with AN to construct an identity that casts them as a competent person. “AN: the diagnosis” can thus inherently affirm professional knowledge and values. Postmodern professional ethics can support professionals in managing these issues by highlighting the importance of taking responsibility for professional knowledge, values, and power and embracing moral uncertainty. (shrink)

In the context of a history of the emotions, Martin Heidegger presents an important and yet challenging case. He is important because he places emotional states, broadly construed, at the very heart of his philosophical methodology—in particular, anxiety and boredom. He is challenging because he is openly dismissive of the standard ontologies of emotions, and because he is largely uninterested in many of the canonical debates in which emotions figure. My aim in this chapter is to identify and critique the (...) distinctive role which Heidegger allots to the emotions, focusing on Sein und Zeit's famous treatment of anxiety. Having outlined his position, I close by considering a number of challenges, both methodological and substantive, to Heidegger's approach. (shrink)

This paper argues that Heidegger’s ‘history of being’ is a debunking narrative, characterised by both analogies and disanalogies to genealogy, at least in its Nietzschean form. I begin by defining such narratives in terms of non-truth-tropic explanation. In §2, I argue, contra Foucault, that the debate is not best approached via the idea of an “origin” or “Ursprung.” Instead, having flagged some classic features of at least Nietzschean genealogy, I examine two case studies from Heidegger’s ‘history of being’. The first, (...) I argue, is not a debunking history. The second is and its target is ironically Nietzsche himself. I highlight Heidegger’s psychological and epistemic claims, and I draw a comparison with MacIntyre’s discussion of ‘dead-end’ problems. I conclude that Heidegger’s history of being is a debunking history, but not a genealogy, at least in the Nietzschean sense: amongst other things, Heidegger’s method differs in its stance on truth and on the role of polemical writing. (shrink)

We agree with Cushman that rationalizations are the product of biological adaptations, but we disagree about their function. The data available do not show that rationalizations allow us to reason better and make better decisions. The data suggest instead that rationalizations serve reputation management goals, and that they affect our behaviors because we are held accountable by our peers.

Este artículo trata de poner en claro el estatuto del �cartesianismo� de Richir en su tercera Meditación fenomenológica, en la cual Richir propone una nueva versión de la reducción fenomenológica. Mostraremos en primer lugar cómo Richir centra su lectura de Descartes sobre el carácter hiperbólico de la duda, descubriendo en él un momento propiamente fenomenológico. Examinaremos luego el modo en el que Richir ensaya un acercamiento del cogito cartesiano respecto de la concepción heideggeriana del ser-para-la-muerte. Por último, explicaremos cómo Richir (...) critica esta �vía cartesiana� (y, por ende, también heideggeriana) para elaborar su propia concepción de la facticidad. (shrink)

The structure of this article is very simple. In the first half, I will introduce a sophisticated way of reading Heidegger as a relativist; I draw here on the work of Kusch and Lafont. In the second half, I present the counter-argument. As I see it, Heidegger is not a relativist; but understanding the relations between his approach and a relativistic one is crucial for an evaluation of both his own work and the broader trajectory of post-Kantian thought.

Recent research shows that in reasoning tasks, subjects usually produce an initial intuitive answer, accompanied by a metacognitive experience, which has been called feeling of rightness. This paper is aimed at exploring the complimentary experience of feeling of error, that is, the spontaneous, subtle sensation of cognitive uneasiness arising from conflict detection during thinking. We investigate FOE in two studies with the “bat-and-ball” reasoning task, in its standard and isomorphic control versions. Study 1 is a generation study, in which participants (...) are asked to generate their own response. Study 2 is an evaluation study, in which participants are asked to choose between two conflicting answers. In each study, the FOE is measured by the FOE questionnaire. Results show that the FOE is significantly present in the standard B&B task when participants give a wrong answer, that our questionnaire can measure it, and furthermore, that it is diagnostic of genuine error. (shrink)

This book offers a fundamentally new account of the arguments and concepts which define Heidegger's early philosophy, and locates them in relation to both contemporary analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy. Drawing on recent work in the philosophy of mind and on Heidegger's lectures on Plato and Kant, Sacha Golob argues against existing treatments of Heidegger on intentionality and suggests that Heidegger endorses a unique position with respect to conceptual and representational content; he also examines the implications of (...) this for Heidegger's views on truth, realism and 'being'. He goes on to explore Heidegger's work on the underlying issue of normativity, and focuses on his theory of freedom, arguing that it is freedom that links the existential concerns of Being and Time to concepts such as reason, perfection and obligation. His book offers a distinctive new perspective for students of Heidegger and the history of twentieth-century philosophy. (shrink)

RESUMO O artigo analisa o modo como Malebranche apresenta o conhecimento que possuímos de nossa própria alma a partir da noção de sentimento interior. Para tanto, tomamos como ponto de partida a concepção malebrancheana do argumento do cogito, opondo-a à de Descartes, tomando-o como uma constatação imediata da existência de algo que sente, sem, no entanto, poder afirmar algo sobre sua essência. O conhecimento da alma torna-se assim algo puramente afetivo, sem nenhum conteúdo positivo, e por natureza distinto do conhecimento (...) propriamente dito. Buscamos desse modo mostrar como, na filosofia de Malebranche, cria-se um campo propriamente humano do sentimento cujo conteúdo é irredutível a qualquer ciência clara e distinta, ao mesmo tempo que é constatado pela experiência vivida.: The article aims to analyze the way by which Malebranche presents the knowledge that we possess of our own soul through the notion of inner sentiment. Therefore, we take as our starting point the Malebranchean notion of the cogito argument, contrasting it with that of Descartes, taking it to be the immediate ascertainment of the existence of something that feels without, however, being able to assert anything about its essence. The knowledge of the soul becomes therefore something purely affective, deprived of a positive content, and by its nature distinguished from knowledge properly understood. We aim thus to show how, in Malebranche's philosophy, a properly human domain of the feeling, irreducible to a clear and distinct science, but ascertained by experience, is created. (shrink)

The phenomenological tradition developed sophisticated techniques to draw attention to pre-theoretic or pre-reflective experience. This article examines how one of the most famous, Heidegger’s ‘broken tool’, might work in a pedagogical context. I contend that it can be highly effective there, fleshing out his vision of teaching as ‘letting learn’ with a distinctive educational method. At the same time, that context suggests fundamental changes to the standard reading of the ‘broken tool’, shifting the focus towards what I call ‘information tools’. (...) My conclusions link to recent research stressing disruption in the learning process, and I close by contrasting my position with ‘bricolage’ theories and work by Applebaum and others. (shrink)

Well-intended natural resource policies that ignore the complexity of socio-ecological systems too often threaten local values and opportunities for sustainable development. Upland areas throughout Indonesia provide examples of complex socio-ecological systems experiencing rapid socio-economic and environmental transformations in response to interactions between development policies and local agendas. Broad natural resource policies influence socio-ecological systems in different ways. In some cases, there are converging national and local goals, while in others the goals of national policy conflict with local aspirations. This study (...) identifies how broadscale policies could respond to the unique characteristics of upland areas to optimise development outcomes and avoid unintended risks for people and the landscape. The theory of reflexive modernity is utilised to illustrate how two national policies, the Community Forestry initiative and the Irrigation Reservoir program, largely discount the complexity of local values in the uplands of Pagar Alam, Indonesia. We identify local farmer aspirations through an analysis of development narratives and relate how they are impacted upon by the two policies. Our findings indicate that dominant development goals and associated sustainability pathways diverge in a range of ways from local farmer values and aspirations. We suggest that policymakers take more consideration of four interacting elements, namely: local ecological traits; local values and institutions; the multiple development pathways; and exogenous market drivers that affect local development, to promote sustainability and increase the likelihood of achieving all desired policy outcomes. (shrink)

Critical Notice of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, by Henry Allison. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. Xv + 477.

Reviews of Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity, Sacha Golob (Cambridge University Press) • Crowell (Rice), Philosophy in Review, pages 2-7. • Cregan (Oxford), International Journal of Philosophical Studies, pages 8-13. • Campbell (Nazareth College of Rochester), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, pages 14-18. • Keiling (Freiburg), Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, pages 19-21.

This article examines the phenomenon of thought insertion, one of the most extreme disruptions to the standard mechanisms for self-knowledge, in the context of Kant's philosophy of mind. This juxtaposition is of interest for two reasons, aside from Kant's foundational significance for any modern work on the self. First, thought insertion presents a challenge to Kant's approach. For example, the first Critique famously held that " The 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations " (Kant, KrV, B132). (...) Yet thought insertion raises the problem of representations which are 'mine' by many natural criteria, and yet which I am unwilling to self-ascribe. Ultimately, my argument will be that thought insertion simultaneously problematises, and yet to some degree also vindicates, the complex distinctions between activity and passivity which underlie Kant's system. Second, I argue that Kant's position contains resources that allow us to model thought insertion, and its broader implications for self-knowledge, in an interesting and distinctive manner. Kant himself held an extreme view of philosophy's competence in the study of mental disorder: in the Anthropology, he suggests that courts must refer such cases to philosophers, rather than medics (Kant, Anth, p.214). My aim is much more modest: to suggest that a Kantian treatment of thought insertion deserves consideration by both philosophers and clinicians. (shrink)

L’histoire des sciences est souvent comprise comme une succession de théories, les nouvelles supplantant les anciennes. Or cette conception de l’histoire des sciences ne rend pas justice à la complexité des dynamiques à l’œuvre dans le développement scientifique. Pour illustrer cela, nous nous intéressons à un type de phénomènes qui ne peut pas être décrit comme relevant d’une simple succession linéaire : la désuétude de certaines théories. Nous portons notre attention sur un cas particulier : la désuétude temporaire qui a (...) frappé la théorie de la neuroplasticité. Nous défendons l’idée que l’étude de cette théorie fait apparaître certaines des insuffisances de la conception linéaire de l’histoire des sciences. (shrink)

Contingent valuation surveys generally elicit stated preferences by asking how much a respondent would be willing to pay for an environmental improvement. By drawing on linguistic theory, we propose that the modal phrasing of this question establishes a particular type of commitment towards a hypothetical payment, namely a subjective want or desire. Based on the idea that beyond subjective desires, considerations about what is morally adequate may guide expressed values and that elicitation of these can be linguistically facilitated, we employ (...) an experimental framework to investigate the effects of different modals ( willing, should and appropriate) in the elicitation question on stated preferences. We find that elicited amounts with appropriate are higher than those elicited with willing and should for environmental improvements more associated with use values, while differences are non-significant for environmental improvements more associated with non-use values. We discuss the implications of our findings for stated preference studies, as well as the potential broader theoretical implications that our study entails regarding linguistic representations of the moral entrenchment of environmental values. (shrink)

Ao afirmar que o tempo é um continuum, Leibniz não pode considerar a percepção como uma simples sucessão de estados perceptivos. Pelo contrário, é necessário que haja uma continuidade de natureza entre esses diversos estados que se deva unicamente a espontaneidade da Mônada. A diferença entre as percepções da Mônada não pode se dar, entretanto, no conteúdo que ela representa, pois ela representa sempre uma mesma multiplicidade, ou seja, o universo tal como ele existe na mente divina, a partir de (...) seu ponto de vista particular. O presente artigo visa examinar como Leibniz concilia a temporalidade da percepção, que se deve à sucessão espontânea dos estados da Mônada, com o caráter eterno da realidade que ela representa a todo o momento. (shrink)

Tradução do opúsculo "A Natureza em si Mesma".

Trazemos nesta presente edição seis resenhas de livros de e sobre Descartes, abarcando diversos temas de suas obras, publicados entre 2016 e 2019. Embora não se pretenda exaustiva, ela busca traçar um retrato do estado atual dos estudos cartesianos no Brasil. Dos livros resenhados, há duas traduções: a primeira tradução integral do Discurso do método & Ensaios para o português, em uma tradução organizada por Pablo Rúben Mariconda, e a tradução inédita do clássico livro de Martial Gueroult, Descartes e a (...) ordem das razões. Os demais são de pesquisadores brasileiros, e abordam os mais diversos temas da filosofia de Descartes, como a metafísica, a física e a moral e a escrita. Essa coletânea pretende ser a primeira de uma série de coletâneas temáticas, constituídas por resenhas breves, que ambicionam divulgar a produção recente sobre a filosofia seiscentista publicada nos últimos anos em língua portuguesa. Esperamos que elas contribuam para fomentar o debate e a circulação das obras entre as pesquisadoras e os pesquisadores do pensamento do século XVII e para apresentá-las ao público em geral. (shrink)

Early childhood education and care settings in England and the people who work in them constitute an important sphere of influence, shaping young children's characters and values. But the values and dispositions expected of the early years workforce are missing from statutory policy documentation despite its clear requirement that practitioners will espouse and promote particular 'universal' values in their work. The expectations for young children's achievement by the age of five also reveal a complex approach combining a structuralist and postmodern (...) duality of individualistic and collectivist values. These present challenges and dilemmas for the sector. (shrink)

This volume examines the problems of legal and linguistic diversity in the EU legal system. In a union of 27 member states, with 23 different languages, how can the coherence of EU law be guaranteed? Is there a common understanding between lawyers from different national backgrounds as to the meaning and domestic application of EU law? The volume addresses these central questions from a range of theoretical and practical perspectives.

De Montesquieu à Posner, de Durkheim à Foucault, la recherche d'un schéma de causalité qui expliquerait synthétiquement les variations entre les systèmes historiques de pénalité sur une échelle unique d’observation est une entreprise ambitieuse à l'intersection de la sociologie du droit et d'une matière peu à peu décriée : la philosophie de l'Histoire. Aujourd'hui, deux corps théoriques complexes et éclatés prétendent au titre de sciences de l'évolution pénale. Le premier est fondé sur une analogie poussée entre évolution culturelle et évolution (...) biologique, et emprunte à l'analyse économique du droit ainsi qu’aux dernières révolutions des sciences naturelles. Le second trouve ses racines dans la pensée marxiste et perçoit le système pénal comme une machine d'oppression qui évolue au gré des passations de pouvoir. Ces deux courants semblent à première vue théoriser l’évolution pénale d’une façon satisfaisante. Mais en imprimant leur volonté normative sur des considérations descriptives, ces doctrines occultent certaines discontinuités historiques et en façonnent d'autres, nous forçant à voir des ruptures matérielles là où il n'y a que des changements d'intention. En voulant présenter une histoire cohérente et intelligible, elles ont délaissé les contradictions et les rouages manquants de l'évolution pénale, tout ce qui, dans cette histoire, ne ressemblait pas à une machine dont les Hommes contrôlent la direction. En rejetant ce paradigme, la forme de l'histoire pénale se métamorphose, sa chronologie se redéfinit, et l’évolution pénale présente des problématiques nouvelles telles la porosité des législations, la concurrence des normes dans la fonction d’exclusion, la persistance des châtiments physiques ou les superpositions identifiables entre histoire juridique, histoire technique et histoire sacrée. (shrink)

Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two (...) questions. First, how does Heidegger’s Kant understand the concept of the transcendental? Second, what role does the concept of a horizon play in Heidegger’s reconstruction of the Critique? I answer the first question by drawing on Cassam’s model of a self-directed transcendental argument, and the second by examining the relationship between Kant’s doctrine that ‘pure, general logic’ abstracts from all semantic content and Hume’s attack on metaphysics. I close by sketching the implications of my results for Heidegger’s own thought. Ultimately, I conclude that Heidegger’s commentary on the Critical system is defined, above all, by a single issue: the nature of the ‘form’ of intentionality. (shrink)

Cet article s’intéresse à l’évolution récente d’une thématique particulière des nanosciences et nanotechnologies, les nanomachines moléculaires, au prisme d’un événement singulier dont la préparation a mobilisé les efforts des chercheurs avec une intensité particulière : la première course internationale de nanovoitures en avril 2017. Il retrace la genèse de ces objets, explique les motifs de l’organisation de la course, en raconte quelques épisodes et s’interroge sur la signification de cet événement : a-t-on affaire à un processus de gamification d’une technoscience (...) en mal de légitimité socioéconomique et de pertinence scientifique? Il montre qu’autre chose est en jeu, qui n’exclut pas la production de connaissances mais l’inscrit dans une nouvelle manière – technophanique – de réaliser des expériences. (shrink)

This article addresses three questions concerning Kant’s views on non-rational animals: do they intuit spatio-temporal particulars, do they perceive objects, and do they have intentional states? My aim is to explore the relationship between these questions and to clarify certain pervasive ambiguities in how they have been understood. I first disambiguate various nonequivalent notions of objecthood and intentionality: I then look closely at several models of objectivity present in Kant’s work, and at recent discussions of representational and relational theories of (...) intentionality. I argue ultimately that, given the relevant disambiguations, the answers to all three questions will likely be positive. These results both support what has become known as the nonconceptualist reading of Kant, and make clearer the price the conceptualist must pay to sustain her position. (shrink)

Neuroeconomic studies are liable to fall into the reverse inference fallacy, a form of affirmation of the consequent. More generally neuroeconomics relies on two problematic steps, namely the inference from brain activities to the engagement of cognitive processes in experimental tasks, and the presupposition that such inferred cognitive processes are relevant to economic theorizing. The first step only constitutes the reverse inference fallacy proper and ways to correct it include a better sense of the neural response selectivity of the targeted (...) brain areas and a better definition of relevant cognitive ontologies for neuroeconomics. This second way also allows increased coherence between the cognitive processes actually involved in neuroeconomics experiments and the theoretical constructs of economics. We suggest means of increasing neural response selectivity in neuroeconomic experimental paradigms. We also discuss how the choice of cognitive ontologies can both avoid implicit reductionist strategies (from economic constructs to neural patterns) and irrelevance, as cognitive processes engaged in experimental tasks may lack immediate bearing on the study of economic behavior. With these joint improvements neuroeconomics can be a progressive science. (shrink)

The promises of nanotechnology have been framed by a variety of metaphors, that not only channel the attention of the public, orient the questions asked by researchers, and convey epistemic choices closely linked to ethical preferences. In particular, the image of the ‘therapeutic missile’ commonly used to present targeted drug delivery devices emphasizes precision, control, surveillance and efficiency. Such values are highly praised in the current context of crisis of pharmaceutical innovation where military metaphors foster a general mobilization of resources (...) from multiple fields of cutting-edge research. The missile metaphor, reminiscent of Paul Ehrlich’s ‘magic bullet’, has framed the problem in simple terms: how to deliver the right dose in the right place at the right moment? Chemists, physicists and engineers who design multi-functional devices operating in vitro can think in such terms, as long as the devices are not actually operating through the messy environment of the body. A close look at what has been done and what remains to be done suggests that the metaphor of the “therapeutic missile” is neither sufficient, nor even necessary. Recent developments in nanomedicine suggest that therapeutic efficacy cannot be obtained without negotiating with the biological milieu and taking advantage of what it affords. An ‘oikological’ approach seems more appropriate, more heuristic and more promising than the popular missile. It is based on the view of organism as an oikos that has to be carefully managed. The dispositions of nanocapsules have to be coupled with the affordances of the environment. As it requires dealing with nanoparticles as relational entities (defined by their potential for interactions) rather than as stable substances (defined by intrinsic properties) this metaphor eventually might well change research priorities in nanotechnology in general. (shrink)