This paper argues that in the search for explanatory power, critical realist research has neglected, trivialized, or dismissed prescriptive power, the capacity for an explanation to offer insights for informing practical ameliorative action. In addition to explanatory power and multitheoretic-linguality, the effective exercise of judgmental rationality also requires a consideration of prescriptive power, else it fails to realize its emancipatory commitment. Building on previous discussions of the criteria for judgmental rationality, the paper considers a prescriptive fallacy in critical realist research (...) that conflates explanatory and prescriptive power, and that instead researchers have a prescriptive commitment which can be realized in part through reflective questioning. The paper hopes to stimulate reflection and debate on the role of prescriptive power throughout the research process, and thereby support increased impact in research. (shrink)

Claims about the distinctness or non-distinctness of introspective beliefs from the mental states they are about have played a central role in the philosophy of introspection in the past fifty years or so. In A Materialist Theory of the Mind and work leading up to it, David Armstrong famously argued against infallibilist theories of introspection, and in defence of his own self-scanning theory of introspection, on the ground that introspective beliefs are distinct from the mental states they are about. (...) Sydney Shoemaker, one of Armstrong’s most ardent critics, famously argued against Armstrong’s self-scanning theory of introspection, and in favour of his own constitutive theory of introspection, on the ground that introspective beliefs are not distinct from the mental states they are about. Yet the relevant sense or senses of distinctness involved here, and the role such claims about distinctness plays in such arguments, is notoriously hard to pin down. This essay explores some of the issues concerning distinctness and non-distinctness in the philosophy of introspection and in the dispute between Armstrong and Shoemaker and offers a reassessment of some of the central arguments offered in that dispute. (shrink)

There is, it is claimed, a long-standing link between photography and the realist novel. Nancy Armstrong in particular argues that the pictorial veridicality of literary realism is at least partly premised upon the rapid propagation of photographic images through late 19th century culture. In doing so, Armstrong argues that photography and realist fiction were mutual participants in an epistemological project wherein the horizons of the ‘real world’—at least within the context of literary fiction—were continuously and unconsciously drawn and (...) redrawn. Meanwhile, within the context of science and technology history, it is often taken for granted that late 19th century science photographers assumed that photographs provided direct, untrammelled access to an entirely different notion of the real: a real unviolated by the messy business of human perception and agency. While this notion is a gross misrepresentation of the facts of the matter, this is not to imply that late 19th century science photographs were ‘fictive’, at least in the sense intended by Armstrong, Novak, Helen Groth, and others. Although it might be the case that non-scientific applications of photography in the late 19th century were conducted in a fictive register, science photography proves a rather more challenging case. In the wake of this observation, this chapter first demarcates and define these conflicting notions of realism, in which I will demonstrate that the epistemic commitments of literary and metaphysical realism (specifically Cartesian realism) are categorically incompatible, though they share a common intuition. Subsequently, I then explain the value of photography to scientific practitioners by appealing to the formal properties of photographs. Third, I argue that although photographic processes guarantee that photographs are traces of the world, there is no further guarantee that those traces will be isomorphic to experience; whilst 19th century science photographs were undeniably visions of the world, they are parts of the world hitherto unseen by human eyes. Finally, I contend that science photography in the late 19th century anticipated key developments in philosophical realism—not least the transition from 18th and 19th century Cartesian realism to 20th century scientific realism. By revealing an invisible universe entirely unlike the one of our phenomenological experience, late 19th century science photography helped reintroduce humanity to a world in which we lack ontological rank or priority. (shrink)

In this article I will introduce and outline the concept of resistance as it relates to health and healthcare. Starting with a number of examples of action, I will then turn to the broader literature to discuss some conventional definitions and related concepts, outlining debates, controversies and limitations related to conceptualizing resistance. I conceptualize resistance broadly, as any act, performed by any individual (or collective) acting as or explicitly identifying as a healthcare professional, that is a response to power, most (...) often in opposition to contentious, harmful or unjust rules, practices, policies or structures. Practically this could account for any public action, marches, sit‐ins and civil disobedience, but also forms of ‘everyday resistance’, such as working slowly, feigning sickness, or even providing care for marginalized groups that would otherwise not have access. Such action could go unrecognized by those in power and perhaps more contentiously, those resisting needn’t even recognize their actions as resistance. I will then apply this conceptualization to explain action that has been undertaken by healthcare professionals, identifying its key features. I will briefly discuss future directions for inquiry that appear particularly pressing. These including ongoing conceptual development, identifying the functions of resistance in health and healthcare along with what makes it distinct from healthcare as usual and other forms of resistance and finally, the range of normative questions resistance raises. (shrink)

Abstract:To date, our understanding of ethical decision making and behavior in organizations has been concentrated in the area of moral judgment, largely because of the hundreds of studies done involving cognitive moral development. This paper addresses the problem of our relative lack of understanding in other areas of human morality by applying a recently developed construct—moral approbation—to illuminate the link between moral judgment and moral action. This recent work is extended here by exploring the effect that organizations have on ethical (...) behavior in terms of the moral approbation construct. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to advance understanding of intellectually virtuous honesty, by examining the relationship between a recent account of intellectual honesty and a recent account of intellectual transparency. The account of intellectual honesty comes from Nathan King, who adapts the work of Christian Miller on moral honesty, while the account of intellectual transparency comes from T. Ryan Byerly. After introducing the respective accounts, I identify four potential differences between intellectual honesty and intellectual transparency as understood by (...) these accounts. I then turn to the question of how to think about the relationship between these traits in light of these potential differences. I make the case that intellectual transparency can either be regarded as an exceptionally strong or ideal variety of intellectual honesty, or it can be regarded as a distinct virtue from intellectual honesty which is a more cardinal virtue than the latter. Along the way, I also note some places where a case can be made that Miller's and King's accounts of honesty and intellectual honesty are in need of refinement or clarification. (shrink)

Theists are, according to Lovering, in an “unenviable position.” Lovering . Noting that debates on evil and God’s existence depend conceptually upon claims about what God would or would not do, he lays out three frameworks within which such claims could operate, all of which raise significant problems for theism. While his contention that these arguments depend on such claims is correct, the dire consequences for theism do not follow. After briefly discussing his three alternatives, I will argue that while (...) some of his supporting arguments are successful, his overall conclusion is not. Although both Broad Skeptical Theism and Broad Epistemic Theism are untenable, the latter has more resources than he suggests for dealing with the evidential argument from evil. More significantly, Narrow Skeptical Theism need not be ad hoc as Lovering contends, but is a position which we ought to accept provided it is not itself used as a pseudo-theodicy. The upshot of these observations is that theistic arguments may reasonably be grounded in considerations about what God would do. (shrink)

It has become an article of faith among historians of logic that the square of opposition diagram is due not to Aristotle, but to Apuleius. I examine three Aristotelian texts and argue that Prior Analytics I.46 contains a square of opposition, making Aristotle the discoverer of the diagram.

We generalize ordinary register machines on natural numbers to machines whose registers contain arbitrary ordinals. Ordinal register machines are able to compute a recursive bounded truth predicate on the ordinals. The class of sets of ordinals which can be read off the truth predicate satisfies a natural theory SO. SO is the theory of the sets of ordinals in a model of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms ZFC. This allows the following characterization of computable sets: a set of ordinals is ordinal register (...) computable if and only if it is an element of Gödel’s constructible universe L. (shrink)

Laura Odwazny and Benjamin Berkman have raised several challenges regarding the new reasonable person standard in the revised Common Rule, which states that in‐ formed consent requires potential research subjects be provided with information a reasonable person would want to know to make an informed decision on whether to participate in a study. Our aim is to offer a response to the challenges Odwazny and Berkman raise, which include the need for a reasonable person standard that can be applied consistently (...) across institutional review boards and that does not stigmatize marginal groups. In response, we argue that the standard ought to be based in an ordinary rather than ideal person conception of reasonable person and that the standard ought to employ what we call a liberal constraint: the reasonability standard must be malleable enough such that a wide variety of individuals with different, unique value systems would endorse it. We conclude by suggesting some of the likely consequences our view would have, if adopted. (shrink)

This study examines the importance of microcultural differences on perceived ethical problems. This study also sought to identify the relationship between perceived ethical problems and value orientations as shown in the Hunt and Vitell's (1993) General Theory of Marketing Ethics. The data was collected from 173 Javanese, 128 Batak, and 170 Indonesian-Chinese marketing managers in Indonesia. The results indicate that, (1) Religious Value Orientation is positively related to the perceived ethical problems scores, and (2) there are significant differences among the (...) three ethnic microcultural groups relative to their perceived ethical problems scores. These results imply that acculturation training program for expatriates should include aspects of microcultures and ethical perceptions held by the local managers. The establishment of ethical corporate culture and formalised codes of conduct are recommended for future ethics training. (shrink)

As with other fields of applied ethics, philosophers engaged in business ethics struggle to carry out substantive philosophical reflection in a way that mirrors the practical reasoning that goes on within business management itself. One manifestation of the philosopher’s struggle is the field’s division into approaches that emphasize moral philosophy and those grounded in the methods of social science. I claim here that the task for those who come to business ethics with philosophical training is to avoid unintentionally widening the (...) gap between philosophical theory and business management by emphasizing the centrality of practical wisdom to both good managment and to the moral life. Distinguishing my own approach from recent emphases on phronesis in management literature, I draw on the concepts of social practice and of narrative to tie practical reasoning to a company’s unique story. Practical reason, social practices and narrative are employed together to give an account of the art of management at Patagonia. The essay hopes to both provide a way for philosophers engaged with business ethics to see family resemblances between their practices and those of business management and to offer a pedagogical example useful for those in any discipline interested in viewing businesses ethically. (shrink)

Effective altruism is a growing philosophical and social movement, whose members design their lives in ways aligned with doing the most good that they can do. The main focus of this paper is to explore what effective altruism has to say about the moral obligations people have to do good with their organs, in the face of an organ-shortage problem. It is argued that an effective altruism framework offers a number of valuable theoretical and practical insights relevant to ongoing debate (...) about how to resolve the organ-shortage problem. Its recommendations constitute a plausible and promising strategy for increasing the supply of, and decreasing the demand for, human organs, in a way that protects the global poor. And, many of its recommendations can be implemented into policy without requiring that citizens actually become effective altruists themselves. (shrink)

This paper advances an interpretation of what Hume called ‘the general rules’: natural principles of belief-formation that nevertheless can be augmented via reflection. According to Hume, reflection is, in part, what separates the wise from the vulgar. In this paper, I argue that for Hume being wise must therefore be, to some degree, voluntary. Hume faced a significant problem in attempting to reconcile his epistemic normativity, i.e. his claims about what we ought to believe, with his largely involuntarist theory of (...) the mind. Reflection on the General Rules, and an interpretation of that reflection as voluntary, helps explain not only Hume's theory of belief, but also how he hoped to reconcile epistemic normativity with naturalism about the mental. (shrink)

An experienced educationalist comments on the views of top Polish business students on ethics in public life, government and business in modern Poland. The author is Wicklander Professor of Professional Ethics at DePaul University, Chicago, and also served recently as Visiting Fulbright Professor at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland. He is currently President of the Society of Business Ethics in the USA.

Reid's unusual primary/secondary quality distinction is drawn along epistemic lines. Reid takes an epistemic turn because of Locke's failure to draw a metaphysical distinction. Secondary qualities differ from primary qualities in virtue of the fact that we acquire notions of secondary qualities via the mediation of sensations. Primary qualities require no such mediation. In one respect, the analysis I set out renders qualities relative to agents. I address whether Reid advocates a dispositional theory of secondary qualities, whether the phenomenology of (...) color underlying Reid's theory is tenable, and whether Reid's distinction coheres well with his theory of perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

In this response to Pritchard’s “In Defence of Veritism”, I defend the view that it is wisdom rather than truth that is fundamental in epistemology. Given that recent philosophical discussions of the nature of wisdom may be unfamiliar to some epistemologists, a brief overview of these discussions is provided and that which is relevant for the subsequent discussion in this piece is highlighted. I explain that scholars working on the topic tend to accept that wisdom comprises at least one familiar (...) epistemic standing and that, unlike other epistemic goods, wisdom is thought to be tied to a narrowly specified content. I clarify the philosophical question to which veritism is the proposed answer and clarify the different senses of fundamental in play in that question. As Pritchard points out, fundamentality in epistemology concern both conceptual and axiological claims. Next, I explicate Pritchard’s veritism, his defence of the claim that truth is fundamental in epistemology, explaining the case made for it’s superiority over the considered alternatives. One alternative I consider is that there is no fundamental good in epistemology, either conceptually or axiologically. I examine whether Pritchard can reject truth equality successfully while maintaining his monism with regard to what he takes to be epistemically fundamental. Indeed, while Pritchard’s appeal to the intellectually virtuous inquirer here seems appropriate, his view that this ultimately provides support to his truth monism is less convincing for reasons that will be explored. I follow up this discussion by arguing that an appeal to the intellectually virtuous agent better lends support to wisdom as epistemically fundamental, rather than Pritchard’s veritism. I make the point that Pritchard’s claim that the intellectually virtuous agent loves the truth is plausible but I question whether it’s also plausible that the love of the intellectually virtuous agent stops at the truth. Rather, I claim that such an agent ultimately loves wisdom. In fact, wisdom seems likely to be the highest good prized by the intellectually virtuous agent – the good that they strive to attain or become better with regard to across a lifetime. In support of this claim, I point out that wisdom is the most prized of all epistemic goods. (shrink)

This article makes the case that a deficit or absence of trust in media sources to report on news- worthy items facilitates acceptance of fake news. The article begins by identifying the sort of fake news that is of interest for the purposes of this article. Epistemic cove rage is then explained—in particular, how an individual’s expectations about their epistemic environment can lead them to accepting or rejecting claims. The article explains that when an individual believes that main- stream media (...) report on what is deemed newsworthy, it follows that an individual will have grounds to dismiss a newsworthy claim that has not been reported upon—such as a claim made by fake news. Trust—which has both a believed competence requirement and a believed good- will requirement—is then discussed as part of this explanation. The article concludes with a dis- cussion of the implications of the argument for regulating mainstream media. (shrink)

There is a well-established literature on the ethics of belief. Our beliefs, however, are just one aspect of our intellectual lives with which epistemology should be concerned. I make the case that epistemologists should be concerned with an ethics of intellectual agency rather than the narrower category of ethics of belief. Various species of normativity, epistemic, moral, and so on, that may be relevant to the ethics of belief are laid out. An account adapted from virtue ethics for an ethics (...) that goes beyond the ethics of belief is defended. The main claim advanced here is that we should act as the virtuous agent would characteristically act in the circumstances. This claim is supported with reference to a number of examples, as well as considerations informing virtue ethics. An acknowledged feature of this account is that it provides limited guidance regarding right action in intellectual agency. While the account draws on virtue responsibilism to offer guidance, the case is made that it’s a mistake to think that an account in this area can provide a successful decision procedure. (shrink)

This paper identifies experiential processes through which social structures become taken for granted, termed processes of “structure marginalization”. Passive processes of structure marginalization relegate social structures to the margin of experience without the use of higher-order cognitive acts such as evaluation and reflection. Examples include adapting to social structures via routine and habitual practices, a lack of conscious awareness of the complexity, historical formation, and other details of social structures, and rendering social structures irrelevant when they are unreflectively judged to (...) be of no value for achieving ends. Active processes of structure marginalization reflectively and discursively relegate social structures to marginal consciousness. Examples include the use of naturalistic and necessitarian explanations for the social order that implicitly justify it as inalterable or “just the way things are”, normative justifications for the status quo, and conscious awareness of one’s powerlessness to control social-structural conditions. Active processes of structure marginalization originate in passive processes. The goal of the typology is to explain, at the level of experience, why social structures typically remain unproblematic and unnoticed in everyday life, even during periods of social crisis and change or when existing structures produce harmful effects. (shrink)

The article makes two substantive contributions to the existing literature on the ethics of international assistance and global justice. First, it builds what we take to be a widely held set of propositions about international assistance into a consistent view, and articulates a strong case against its desirability. Second, it sketches a more attractive alternative. To do so the article uses Sen’s idea of agent-oriented development as a starting point while at the same time providing a generalization of Sen’s account (...) and a justificatory framework that does not rely on the capability approach. (shrink)

This is a simple essay. It raises a familiar question about equality, adduces a very small amount of empirical evidence about the social consequences of equality as distinct from prosperity, and broods on the difficulty of providing a really persuasive answer to the question raised. I begin with the view that there simply cannot be anything intrinsically wrong with inequality, move on to the view that there are extrinsic reasons for anxiety, dividing these into conceptual and empirical reasons, though without (...) any great commitment to the clarity of that distinction in this context, and end with some reflections on recent social and political theory. The essay thus begins with what I hope are clear and (what I am sure are) very simple thoughts, before muddying the water pretty thoroughly thereafter. (shrink)

Translation of the death scene from Phaedo by Plato.

Neurological diseases, particularly in the context of aging, have serious impacts on quality of life and can negatively affect bone health. The brain-bone axis is critically important for skeletal metabolism, sensory innervation, and endocrine cross-talk between these organs. This review discusses current evidence for the cellular and molecular mechanisms by which various neurological disease categories, including autoimmune, developmental, dementia-related, movement, neuromuscular, stroke, trauma, and psychological, impart changes in bone homeostasis and mass, as well as fracture risk. Likewise, how bone may (...) affect neurological function is discussed. Gaining a better understanding of brain-bone interactions, particularly in patients with underlying neurological disorders, may lead to development of novel therapies and discovery of shared risk factors, as well as highlight the need for broad, whole-health clinical approaches toward treatment. (shrink)

pt. I. The mystical ambition.--pt. II. Revelation.--pt. III. Religion and morality.

Central nervous system (CNS)Abbreviations: CNS=central nervous system; PNS=peripheral nervous system; MS=multiple sclerosis; MBP=myelin basic protein; MHC=major histocompatibility complex; EAE=experimental allergic encephalomyelitis; O‐2A=oligodendrocyte‐type 2 astrocyte; GC=galactocerebroside; GFAP=glial fibrillary acidic protein; FGF=fibroblast growth factor; IGF1=insulin‐like growth factor. regeneration is a subject of great interest, particularly in diseases causing a dramatic loss of neurons. However, some CNS diseases do not affect neurons but damage other cells, such as the myelin‐forming cells — called oligodendrocytes — which are also crucial to the harmonious function of (...) the nervous system. Diseases in which oligodendrocytes and myelin are attacked can cause devastating neurological dysfunction which is sometimes followed by recovery and myelin repair or remyelination. The question of the regeneration potential of oligodendrocytes in experimental and human demyelinating diseases such as multiple sclerosis has been debated for a long time. Present evidence suggests that oligodendrocyte precursor cells persist in the adult CNS and that oligodendrocyte regeneration can occur but may be limited by ongoing disease processes. Here we will briefly review recent advances which have broadened our understanding of the cellular and molecular events of CNS remyelination. (shrink)

Ryan, Tom Perhaps the most neuralgic issue shaping the Catholic Church's relationship to wider contemporary society is abortion. In Australia, the Church's efforts to counter abortion's increasing incidence and after-effects are evident in Bishops' statements, websites such as Walking with Love, and, from lay-inspired movements such as the Rachel's' Vineyard Retreat. Further, research is bringing a greater appreciation of the trauma and long-term effects of the abortion experience. Given that, it is reasonable to assume its influence, in some instances, (...) on marital consent. Investigating this question, then, is a timely exercise. At the same time, it can provide an insight into a ministry that is somewhat specialised, and, of its nature, sensitive and confidential, namely, the marriage annulment process. Finally, from within that context, it raises adjacent questions relating to Moral Theology. (shrink)

Ryan, Tom The year 2012 was characterized by extensive re-appraisal, nationally and internationally, of the Second Vatican Council occasioned by the fiftieth anniversary of its opening in 1962. One aspect discussed by Ann N.C. Nolan is the language of the Council documents. In her investigation of John O'Malley SJ's work, she points out how he detects in them a clear shift from the scholastic and logical style to a literary and rhetorical mode aimed at persuasion and a deepening of (...) conviction. O'Malley claims the Vatican II documents' mode of discourse is 'epideictic' in character and it follows 'one of the literary forms of antiquity, the panegyric.'. (shrink)

It is readily apparent to anyone ministering to Australian adolescents in the early twenty-first century that their efforts take place against the backdrop of a general decline in belief and practice among Catholics, and among young Catholics in particular. Rather than simply join the chorus of lament at the decline of young people's belief and participation in the life of the church, this article seeks to understand better the present 'face' or 'faces' of youth ministry by considering the historical relationship (...) between secularity and the church's pastoral activity with young Australians. (shrink)

I argue that coherentists can admit that there are facts about what systems of beliefs communities accept, without being committed to the claim that these facts are the truth conditions of sentences about what communities accept. (edited).

All insects appear to have a transport lipoprotein in the hemolymph (blood) that is responsible for moving hydrophobic materials through aqueous compartments. This has been called lipophorin because it is believed to be a reversible transport shuttle. Since most insects undergo some degree of metamorphosis from larval stages to the adult, the need to transport hydrophobic materials or the nature of these materials may change in the course of the life span. This is especially marked in the case of the (...) holometabolous insects – those which undergo drastic change of form, e.g. caterpillar‐pupa‐adult moth. We have found that lipophorin undergoes a molecular metamorphosis paralleling that of the insect. (shrink)