This study is an extension of our recent ethics research in direct marketing and information technology. In this study, we investigated the relationships among core organizational values, organizational ethics, corporate social responsibility, and organizational performance outcome. Our analysis of online survey responses from a sample of IT professionals in the United States indicated that managers from organizations with organic core values reported a higher level of social responsibility relative to managers in organizations with mechanistic values; that managers in both mechanistic (...) and organic organizations which were perceived as more socially responsible were also perceived as more ethical; and that perceived ethical attitudes and social responsibility were significantly associated with organizational performance outcome measures. Our article discusses research premises, conceptual framework, hypotheses, research methodology, data analysis, recommendations for further research, and conclusions. (shrink)

This article delves into a potential mindset that may be responsible for the recent financial meltdown. Research relating to this mindset from different perspectives is reviewed. The findings from this literature review are used to create a conceptual framework for the empirical, ethical, and corporate social responsibility study of financial professionals. Data were collected from a survey of the professional membership of a large national association of financial professionals. This article reports the results of the analysis of data relative to (...) the relationships among the four constructs—financial professionals' perceived organizational value clusters, ethics, corporate social responsibility, and corporate performance. The findings indicate that organizational core values significantly affect corporate ethics, social responsibility, and financial performance. We propose that organizations in the financial industry can move toward being more ethical and socially responsible by adopting organic core values (e.g., democratic, open, trusting, enterprising, creative, stimulating) and moving away from mechanistic values (e.g., structured, regulated, procedural, authoritarian, closed, callous). We also found the adaptation of organic core values does not require the organization to suffer a loss in financial performance. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

According to one currently influential line of thinking, the evolution of ostensive communication was a prerequisite for the evolution of human language. In this article, I distinguish between a strong and a weak version of this view and offer a sustained argument against the former. More specifically, the strong version of this view would have it that ostensive communication was a prerequisite not just for the evolution of fully modern language but for any language-like system of communication. I argue that (...) this version is too strong: I show how some distinctive and important features of language may well have been assembled prior to the evolution of ostensive communication. Put another way, I argue that a protolanguage before ostensive communication scenario is a real possibility. I conclude by briefly arguing that such an evolutionary scenario coheres better with archaeological evidence from the early Pleistocene as well as evidence from developmental psychology pertaining to the nature of our mind reading abilities. (shrink)

The author argues for a conjunction of Albert Camus’s “idealism” with Jean-Paul Sartre’s “dialectical realism” as a corrective to the limitation of each for the sake of a viable transformative politics.

Science fiction is fast becoming reality as scientists and engineers seek to develop new ways of directly accessing and controlling our brains through brain-computer and even brain-to-brain interfaces. If such research is to receive continuing public approval and support—and not invite opposition—it must anticipate the special ethical challenges it creates. By pointing to some of the acute concerns raised by neural engineering technologies—around issues of identity, normality, authority, responsibility, privacy, and justice—Eran Klein and colleagues model and stimulate the kind of (...) reflection that will be needed as new brain technologies are developed. And yet, as I read their informative discussion, I find myself asking even more questions. One concerns the ethical novelty of these technologies. For example, in terms of questions of identity, normality, responsibility, and authority, how different is deep brain stimulation from the potent psychiatric drugs that have been administered for decades? How different in terms of issues of liability associated with malfunction or misuse are brain-computer interfaces from other complex devices now routinely in use? Neither ethics nor law will have to rethink things from scratch as new neural devices and capabilities are introduced: the groundwork for answering some of these questions has already been laid in a variety of fields from bioethics, to health and product liability law. Nevertheless, I conclude that there are new questions here. It is not simply the fact that neural technologies pose questions of identity, privacy, and the like but that they do so with a degree of intensity that creates qualitatively new challenges. (shrink)

Of all the memorable, and influential, passages of the Phänomenologie des Geistes none are more famous or enjoyed greater attention than those sections devoted to the master-slave dialectic. It would seem almost inconceivable then that anything would be left to say concerning Hegel's martial struggle, the sheer number of illustrious scholars who have commented on this text bearing ample testimony to the probable redundancy of further comment. However, in actual fact, this is not the case. Indeed, it is probable that (...) Hegel is addressing and utilising not a theory of recognition but rather two quite distinct concepts of recognition. The appropriate passages are of course the master-slave section itself and the rather oblique references to the »confession« of one consciousness to another at the end of chapter six. Commentators have generally been in agreement that the master-slave section marks the beginning of Hegel's theory of recognition; that is, that the continuation of the treatment of recognition in chapter six marks a further development of the concept formulated in chapter four - a further development seemingly promised by Hegel himself - »With this, we already have before us the notion of spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what spirit is«. However the preceding is interpreted, the reader is surely right to recognize that something has been »won«, the triumphalist language being repeated in the following »[it is] in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its turning-point, where it leaves behind the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present«. However, this triumph may have been misunderstood. The theory of recognition referred to in the master-slave dialectic may have been a »turning-point«, a new beginning, but it was a new beginning that was soon realised to be a dead-end. The following will attempt to demonstrate that there is a quite radical discontinuity at the heart of the concept of recognition itself, a discontinuity that can be traced to its origins in the Fichtean system itself. For the master-slave dialectic is »Fichte's wake« - it is at once a celebration and a mourning for the first concept of recognition, the unworkability of which heralded a truly new beginning. That is, the concept of recognition outlined in the Einige Vorlesungen uber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten. The second concept of recognition, that of the Grundlage des Naturrechts cannot be reckoned a further development or emendation of the first concept, its quite peculiar status, and philosophical importance as a »spiritual concept«, precluding any such treatment. The latter concept may mark the birth of Hegelian or speculative idealism itself. It is the contention of the following that understanding this quite radical discontinuity will fashion a better understanding of the connection between transcendental and speculative philosophy, the point of transition or sublation. (shrink)

In the first section of my paper, I want to consider the “paradoxes of complementarity” between polarised notions such as the quantum concepts of “wave” and “particle.” I will argue that if we treat this topic with all the “gravity” it deserves, we will be able to understand once and for all why this debate can never be completely resolved. In the second section, I want to consider the notion of “parody.” At the end, astute readers must determine forthemselves whether (...) I can be trusted to mean what I say, or whether this is all merely ironic, a post-modern hoax, one that undercuts the very boundaries it installs. (shrink)

Hunger and deprivation, lack of education, sanitation, and health care are only a few pressing issues related to poverty in developing countries. Addressing such complex social issues requires pooling complementary resources of the civil, public, and private sector. Over the last decade, stakeholders tried to cocreate innovative solutions in cross‐sector social partnerships (CSSPs) at the base of the economic pyramid (BoP), but collaboration proved to be very challenging. Practitioners become increasingly frustrated with operational differences, intransparency, and mismatched goals in partnerships. (...) This study unravels the black box of collaboration and delivers empirical insights on trust and power inCSSPsbased on social exchange theory. Structural equation modeling (SEM) enables us explore relationships beyond case‐based insights. Our rigorous empirical analysis covers 207 interorganizational relationships and outlines a crucial gatekeeping function of trust inCSSPs. Findings provide strong empirical support for conceptual works calling for an “integrative orientation” inCSSPs. Furthermore, we pinpoint the role of intermediates and draw implications for future research. (shrink)

Is it possible for a person to believe that an act is morally wrong even though he himself does not disapprove of such acts—except, perhaps, in those cases where he is the victim of such acts? Does it make sense to suppose that a person could judge that one is morally obligated to act in a certain way even though he himself has no disposition whatsoever to act in such a way? Although I am inclined to think that the ordinary (...) man would answer these questions in the affirmative, almost all moral philosophers today would answer in the negative. If one examines the views of contemporary moral philosophers, one finds that virtually all of them subscribe to the thesis known as “internalism.”. (shrink)

This book constitutes the best history of post-positivist philosophy and sociology of science we are likely ever to get. To a large extent, the power of the narrative derives from its being restricted to broadly epistemological issues. Thus the title, which mimics the title of a paper by the philosopher of language, Donald Davidson, someone little known among members of the science studies community (Davidson, 1986). The restriction to epistemological issues is surely well justified since among the founding themes of (...) contemporary science studies were ‘the sociology of scientific knowledge’ (SSK) and ‘the manufacture of knowledge’. The opposition to positivist, particularly Popperian, accounts of the nature of scientific knowledge in these early sociological studies was explicit. Of course, as science studies has broadened into science and technology studies (STS) and includes major contributions from many others, including historians and anthropologists of science, many in the broader STS community are now not much concerned with epistemological issues. Nevertheless, this book should be required reading for all graduate students beginning their studies in the history, philosophy, or social study of science, for there is no better account of the debates about the nature of scientific knowledge that have taken place since the 1950s. Part of what makes this a good history is that the author has not been a participant in these past debates. He is neither a philosopher nor sociologist, but an intellectual historian whose previous books include: The Great Debate: ‘Bolshevism’ and the Literary Left in Germany, 1917–1930.. (shrink)

Speculative approaches to history.--v. 2. The critical philosophy of history.

We give an example from the theory of Markov decision processes which shows that the “optimism in the face of uncertainty” heuristics may fail to make any progress. This is due to the impossibility to falsify a belief that a (transition) probability is larger than 0. Our example shows the utility of Popper’s demand of falsifiability of hypotheses in the area of artificial intelligence.

This article brings together the Sartrean concept of bad faith and Edward Upward's novel, Journey to the Border , first published in 1938. The aim is to provide an overtly political reading that challenges the surreal obscurity of Upward's psychological narrative, while at the same time showing the continuing relevance of Sartre's understanding of the psychological tensions and existential dilemmas of the modern condition. Upward's novel has been the focus of much critical debate as to the meaning of the story (...) - the descent of the main character towards madness in the context of the 1930s threat of fascism and war - as well as the generic characterisation of the text in terms of satire, fable, fantasy or political parable. The article argues in contrast a more unequivocally ideological reading of the series of existential choices, both personal and political, of the main character as a struggle for individual freedom and authenticity through a radical commitment to socialism and responsibility for the Other. (shrink)

The essays in this book clarify the technical, legal, ethical, and social aspects of the interaction between eHealth technologies and surveillance practices. The book starts out by presenting a theoretical framework on eHealth and surveillance, followed by an introduction to the various ideas on eHealth and surveillance explored in the subsequent chapters. Issues addressed in the chapters include privacy and data protection, social acceptance of eHealth, cost-effective and innovative healthcare, as well as the privacy aspects of employee wellness programs using (...) eHealth, the use of mobile health app data by insurance companies, advertising industry and law enforcement, and the ethics of Big Data use in healthcare. A closing chapter draws on the previous content to explore the notion that people are 'under observation', bringing together two hitherto unrelated streams of scholarship interested in observation: eHealth and surveillance studies. In short, the book represents a first essential step towards cross-fertilization and offers new insights into the legal, ethical and social significance of being 'under observation'. (shrink)