Abstract This paper reports the results obtained in an aid project designed to improve transport in the municipal area of Jocotán (Guatemala). The rural road network of an area occupied by indigenous people was analysed and a road chosen for repair using the labour-intensive method–something never done before in this area. The manpower required for the project was provided by the population that would benefit from the project; the involvement of outside contractors and businesses was avoided. All payment for labour (...) went into the pockets of the local people. The small earth movements made and the use of local materials guaranteed the project’s environmental sustainability, while the on-site training of the local community prepared its members for the continued maintenance of the road, thus investing the project with social sustainability. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-24 DOI 10.1007/s11948-011-9290-2 Authors Rodrigo Ares, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain José-María Fuentes, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Eutiquio Gallego, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Francisco Ayuga, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Ana-Isabel García, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Journal Science and Engineering Ethics Online ISSN 1471-5546 Print ISSN 1353-3452. (shrink)

This paper examines employees’ reactions to Corporate Social Responsibility programs at the attitudinal level. The results presented are drawn from an in-depth study of two Chilean construction firms that have well-established CSR programs. Grounded theory was applied to the data prior to the construction of the conceptual framework. The analysis shows that the implementation of CSR programs generates two types of attitudes in employees: attitudes toward the organization and attitudes toward society. These two broad types of attitudes can then be (...) broken down into four different categories : acceptance of the new role of the organization, identification with the organization, importance attached to the work performed and a sense of social justice. In turn, each of these categories is a grouping of many different concepts, some of which have at first sight little to do with CSR. Finally, the analysis reveals an attitudinal employee typology: the committed worker, the indifferent worker, and the dissident worker. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i.e. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather (...) by factors that are independent of consciousness. Whether people hold problem intuitions, and what factors drive those intuitions, are largely empirical questions. However, there is a lack of empirical research on these issues to date. The results of four studies will show that (1) problem intuitions are not widespread, and (2) when they arise, they do so because of factors that are unrelated to the nature of consciousness. This suggests that consciousness is, after all, not so problematic. (shrink)

At a time when ideas of crisis and critique are at the forefront of public discourse, this article seeks to understand moments of crisis vis-à-vis critique as a key feature of critical social theory. It addresses Jürgen Habermas’s strong claim that this relationship accounts for a ‘model of analysis’ concerned with grasping the ‘diremptions’ of social life. To elaborate this reading, the article pays attention to the main problems Habermas identifies in conventional ways of understanding the concepts of ‘crisis’ and (...) ‘critique’ in social theory. The aim is to examine the mode in which he reconsiders each of these terms and then reasserts the dialectical link between them. I reconstruct this relationship by taking as cases two of his most substantive works of social theorizing: The Theory of Communicative Action, and Between Facts and Norms. Based on this interpretation, I suggest that though Habermas contributes to resituating the practice of critique as a communicative translation of objective crisis, he does not adequately account for another key movement: when critique actually initiates, enacts and furthers the moment of crisis. (shrink)

Aesthetics and communications theories are often applied to art, media and popular culture but not within legal empirical (audiovisual) material—despite the fact that a judicial and legal process comprises a palpable utilisation of the visual as evidence of an historical reality. Based on four distinct Swedish cases, this study analyses the court’s reasoning, interpretation and use of (audio)visual evidence. Inspired by an embodied film theory, Benjamin’s thoughts on the technical-dramaturgical components of the camera and the later Barthes’ notion of the (...) ‘punctum’, the article discusses how (audio)visual evidence cannot be disconnected from affective and aesthetic significances that ultimately can be taken to affect the perception of truth and (the crime’s) reality. The gap between theory and practice is debated and argued as beginning to co-exist; instead of seeing (visual) theory and (judicial) practice as a dichotomy, an attempt should be made for a conversation between seemingly different but in practice related areas of knowledge. The author’s aim is to suggest that photographic and filmic evidence has a particular significance in itself, which means that the relation between (judicial) interpretation and outcome should be considered within an affective and aesthetic dimension, rather than being placed and/or theorized outside of it. (shrink)

Testimonial injustices occur when individuals from particular social groups are systematically and persistently given less credibility in their claims merely because of their group identity. Recent “pluralistic” approaches to folk psychology, by taking into account the role of stereotypes in how we understand others, have the power to explain how and why cases of testimonial injustice occur. If how we make sense of others’ behavior depends on assumptions about how individuals from certain groups think and act, this can explain why (...) speakers are given different degrees of credibility depending on their group identity. For example, if people assume that women are more emotional than men, they will systematically give less credibility to women’s claims. This explanation involves three empirical claims: people assume that women are more emotional than men, people assume that emotionality hinders credibility, and people give less credibility to women’s claims. While extant studies provide some support for and, no study to date has directly tested. In two different studies, we tested all these three claims. The results from both studies provide support for, as we found significant negative correlations between emotionality and credibility attributions. However, in contrast to what some accounts of folk psychology posit, we did not find any significant difference in people’s attributions of emotionality and credibility towards women versus men speakers. We hope that our studies here pave the way for further empirical studies testing the phenomenon of testimonial injustice in a context-sensitive way, in order to have a better understanding of the conditions in which testimonial injustices are likely to happen. (shrink)

Over the past decade or so within this journal, there have been critical debates concerning the role of mindfulness within education, the influence of neoliberalism on education in general and well-being interventions specifically, and the relevance of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger for critiquing modernity including the nature and purpose afforded education. In this article, we propose that these debates are sufficiently interrelated to develop a more unified argument. We will show how a Heideggerian perspective is conceptually rich, in both (...) its heritage, as it draws upon both East-Asian wisdom and western thinking, and its engagement, as it confronts the implications of what Heidegger called a ‘technical-era’, for offering such a unified critique. The focus of this critique is on instrumental forms of mindfulness (mindfulness ‘in’ education), which when framed by neoliberalism has rather narrow goals concerning individual well-being and performance. In contrast, more critical and integral forms of mindfulness (mindfulness ‘as’ education) offer the potential for more holistic and authentic learning. Throughout the article, we discuss how Heideggerian philosophy offers a number of useful concepts (e.g., enframing, Dasein, authenticity, meditative thinking), which are able to both critique the instrumentalisation of approaches like mindfulness by neoliberalism and speak to more holistic education oriented toward more authentic being in the world. (shrink)

O objetivo de meu texto consiste em reconstruir um aspecto da recepção da compreensão de Duns Scotus sobre a noção de ente em dois autores pertencentes à geração que imediatamente o sucedeu: no franciscano Guilherme de Alnwick e em seu confrade Francisco de Meyronnes. O problema que surge nessa primeira recepção de Scotus pode ser assim resumido: uma vez que tenhamos aceitado que a noção de ente é simultaneamente unívoca, primeira, a mais geral e a mais simples das noções, como (...) podemos evitar a ameaça de se ter de conceder que a ciência de tal noção – que a metafísica, noutras palavras – não seja capaz de se distinguir claramente de uma investigação que não lida necessariamente com realidades extramentais? Ou, pondo a questão em outros termos: não nos vemos depois de Scotus condenados a ter de escolher entre uma noção de ente como uma noção real ou como uma noção perfeitamente geral? Veremos que, tratando da mesma questão, Alnwick e Meyronnes seguem diferentes caminhos, cada um deles com seus custos e méritos. The aim of my text is to reconstruct the reception of Duns Scotus's comprehension of the notion of being between two authors belonging to the generation which immediately follows his: the Franciscan William of Alnwick and his confrere Francis of Meyronnes. The issue that arises in this early reception of Scotus's can be summarized as follows: once we have accepted that the notion of being is simultaneously univocal, primary, the most general and the simplest possible notion, how can we avoid the threat of having to concede that the science of such a notion – that metaphysics, in other words – is not capable of distinguishing itself clearly from an investigation that does not necessarily have to do with extramental realities? Or, rephrasing the question: after Scotus, are we not condemned to having to choose between the notion of being as a real notion or the notion of being as a perfectly general notion? We shall see that, addressing the same issue, Alnwick and Meyrones follow different paths, each one with its own costs and its own merits. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on the link between different types and degrees of experience that can be gone through within a form of life or collectivity—the so-called levels of immersion—and the development of distinct types of tacit knowledge and expertise. The framework is then probed empirically and theoretically. In the first case, its ‘predictions’ are compared with the accounts of novices who have gone through different ‘learning opportunities’ during a pre-operational training programme for running a huge nickel industrial plant in Brazil. (...) These are also analysed vis-à-vis the experience of an expert who has designed and experienced the outcomes of two pre-operational training sessions in the nickel industry before developing and managing the one discussed here. Theoretically, the framework is used to pinpoint exactly what interactional experts who have developed their expertise through linguistic socialisation alone are able to do as well as to analyse the case of technical connoisseurs. The results indicate that the proposed framework is useful. It supports the design and improvement of training programmes for the development of tacit knowledge while at the same time bringing about a refined analysis of claims concerning the abilities of types of experts and expertise. (shrink)

This paper addresses the epistemological problem of the myth of “the given” from an evidentialist and pragmatic perspective concerning the attribution of knowledge: if the evidence supporting p may be based on «the given» for S, how can “the given” be considered the basis of the evidence if it is a myth? The principal objective is to introduce a pragmatic solution to the above question. The main thesis is that there is a dogmatic relationship between the evidence necessary for the (...) legitimacy of our attribution of knowledge and «the given»; however, this dogma does not suggest that these attributions are irrational. (shrink)

Dentre os problemas que têm norteado nossas investigações, duas indagações ganham destaque. Como a informação e o conhecimento estão inseridos no arcabouço teórico de Karl Marx? Que janelas o pensamento de Marx nos abre para discutir do papel da informação e do conhecimento no universo do trabalho, na atualidade? Fazendo dessa perspectiva objeto de pesquisa, busca-se apreender a inserção da informação e do conhecimento no arcabouço teórico marxiano, tendo como referências principais O Capital, Teorias da mais-valia e Capítulo VI Inédito. (...) A exposição aborda alguns construtos categoriais da obra marxiana onde a informação e o conhecimento laboral são elementos centrais, a exemplo das categorias mercadoria, força de trabalho, trabalho simples e trabalho complexo, subsunção formal e subsunção real, trabalhador coletivo, trabalho produtivo e trabalhador produtivo. Após a discussão das ideias de Marx, são apresentados alguns aspectos do trabalho na atualidade, para os quais o complexo categorial marxiano revela-se pertinente e necessário. Labour, information and knowledge: rereading marx in the information age AbstractAmong the problems that have guided our investigations, two questions are crucial. How information and knowledge take part in the theoretical framework conceived by Karl Marx? Which windows does Marx's thought open to discuss the role of information and knowledge in the current labour realm? Adopting this perspective, we aim to apprehend the insertion of information and knowledge in the Marxian theoretical framework, especially in the books Capital, Theories of Surplus-Value and Chapter VI (unpublished). The exposition presents some Marxian categorical constructs where information and labour knowledge are central elements, such as the categories commodity, labour force, simple unskilled labour and complex skilled labour, formal subsumption and real subsumption, collective labour, productive labour and productive worker. After discussing the ideas of Marx, we present some aspects of the contemporary labour, where the Marxian categorical complex is pertinent and necessary. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they are experienced. People consider that (...) emotions are not just about feeling in certain ways, but also about feeling the right way. (shrink)

This article proposes an exposition and analysis of perceptions intrinsic to rituals carried out with the use of the jurema plant, especially when mixed with Syrian rue (juremahuasca) in contexts of contemporary esoteric re-actualizations in Brazil. These rituals are conducted by people who look at jurema as a spiritual path, once acquainted with its psychedelic properties. We highlight the mystical attributes and the cultural bricolage elaborated by these individuals, who conduct ceremonies in ritual spaces in which participants experience altered states (...) of perception and consciousness. Considered as an entheogen, jurema leads to states of mystical transformation in people. Such personal changes are often considered by users as the rhetoric of healing. Life stories and ethnographic contexts form the background of the article, which seeks to advance understandings about jurema based on speculations around the intertwining of the themes of consciousness, mysticism, and healing. (shrink)

RESUMO: Tradução dos passos 2.7.5A- 2.7.5B da Epitome de Etica Estoica, do filósofo estoico e doxógrafo alexandrino Ário Dídimo. Não há traduções em língua moderna das obras completas de Ário Dídimo. Assim, para esta tradução, usamos a fixação da exposição sobre a ética estoica presente em Estobeu, realizada por Pomeroy. A seção que traduzimos versa sobre o conceito estoico de excelência, explicando o que ela é, quais as virtudes que dela participam, e como. Por antítese, Ário Dídimo também elucida o (...) conceito estoico de vício, o que ele é e qual a sua taxonomia. ABSTRACT: Translation of 2.7.5A- 2.7.5B of the Epitome of Stoic Ethics by the Stoic philosopher and Alexandrian doxographer Arius Didymus. There are no translations of Arius Didymus' complete works into modern languages. Thus for this translation we utilized Pomeroy's fixation of the exposition of Stoic ethics found in Stobaeus' Florilegium. Parts 2.7.5A- 2.7.5B deal with the Stoic concept of excellence, explaining what excellence is, what virtues participate in it, and how. Arius Didymus also explains the Stoic concept of vice, what it is, and its taxonomy. (shrink)

The New Parish, beloved by the most recent church documents, meets several challenges for its renewal, among them the caring for the poor. This commitment, the agape expression of Christ, is fundamental in this world in which the seeds of individualism and neo-paganism are gaining strength. Thus, in an exercise of systematic theology that re-connects biblical theology and pastoral, an important way is to look at the caring for the poor in the example of the Apostle Paul. Paul organized a (...) collection for the saints of the Jerusalem church among the Asian communities, making visible church unity between Jews and Gentiles through charity. It was not only a solidary action, but the experience of Christian love that is given as Thanksgiving to God, He who by his grace saved us first. (shrink)

College students have become more representative as blood donors, mainly to help other people. This study ascertained the association between spirituality and adherence or intention to donate blood in post-graduate students. In this quantitative and cross-sectional study, participants were 281 students from a post-graduate programme at a Brazilian public university. After complying with ethical requirements, data were collected through a questionnaire for sociodemographic characterization and identification of blood donation practices, followed by the Spiritual Well-Being Scale. Descriptive statistics and parametric tests (...) were used for data analysis. A total of 74% of the participants were female and 26% were male. Previous experience and/or intention to donate blood were found in 75.3%; 14.3% donated blood periodically. In addition, 12.2% were not adept to donation and 12.5% were inapt. Spiritual Well-Being scores were similar between individuals who are not adept and those who donate periodically. In conclusion, in the sample, spirituality and blood donation are not associated, but spiritual well-being and gender are. To enhance blood donation, further research is needed. (shrink)

This article aims to make a philosophical interpretation of the phenomenon of stress based on Heidegger’s thought. Firstly, I present a general review of the scientific concept of stress as well as the main theories about it. Secondly, the concept of stress in Heidegger’s thought is analyzed and I propose to understand it as a load or requests that are directed to the Dasein in its openness to the entities of the world. Finally, this shows that the approach to the (...) phenomenon of stress from Heidegger’s phenomenological-existential perspective allows us to overcome the causal and physiological explanations that do not consider stress as a fundamental way of being typical of human beings in so far as they are a Dasein. (shrink)

The study of the medieval reception of Aristotle’s Topics has largely been oriented toward debates on dialectical argumentation. And this is surely right. Nonetheless, I wish to approach John Buridan’s commentary on the Topics from another perspective, which highlights some semantic features of the set of predicates around which the work is organized. Thus, in my paper I will first reconstruct Buridan’s account of the identification of the predicates discussed in the Topics. I will argue that, for him, they are (...) different in that they reflect one or more features of the way in which definiens and definiendum relate. By doing this, I will shed light on the role the notion of definition plays in Buridan’s commentary, so that an interpretation of it as a work on definition becomes promising. In the second part of the paper, I will offer an analysis of Buridan’s first move in his commentary toward a theory of definition. It concerns the problem of whether there is a definition of definition. In examining Buridan’s answer, I will argue for the close connection between his treatment of definitions and his theory of supposition, so that distinctions among the different modes of supposition help him to disambiguate statements in their possible meanings, and thus to clarify the difficulty related to the definability of definition. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to offer a reading of Reinhart Koselleck’s work as an ally of critical theory. My contention is that, despite customary accusations of Koselleck being an anti-Enlightenment historian detrimental to social criticism and emancipatory politics, his investigations on the semantic fabric of modern society may actually expand our resources for the critique of domination. In order to make this argument plausible, I reconstruct some antinomies that are at the basis of Koselleck’s work (state/society, language/reality, (...) experience/expectation) and discuss their critical potential. This analysis shows that, rather than a rejection of the spirit of critique, Koselleck contributes to the temporalization of the practice of critique as such: namely, a clarification of the contradictions and potentials of a reflexive practice imbued in the struggle between the need to comprehend the world as it is and the right to experiment with other forms of life. (shrink)

Can we experience emotion without the feeling of accelerated heartbeats, perspiration, or other changes in the body? In his paper “What is an emotion”, William James famously claimed that “if we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind” (1884, p. 193). Thus, bodily changes are essential to emotion. This is known as the Subtraction Argument. The Subtraction Argument is still (...) used to support Embodied theories of emotion. Proponents of Disembodied theories, however, have different intuitions regarding the role of bodily changes in the experience of emotion. In order to advance this debate, I conducted a series of studies testing people’s intuitions regarding the Subtraction Argument. Results show that, against James’ claims, most people consider that their hypothetical (Study 1) and actual (Study 2) emotions persist in the absence of bodily feelings. Furthermore, Study 1 found that participants’ responses were not related to individual differences in reflection or interoceptive awareness. These results pose a problem for Embodied theories of emotion and challenge extant explanations for the persistence of emotional experience in cases of impaired interoception. (shrink)

Health has an important role in the achievement of a good quality of life. Many public policies intended to enhance individual and population health. Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach (CA) offers a framework to assess well-being, as well as interventions seeking to increase it. There are, however, important practical challenges that must be faced before applying CA to concrete situations, such as health. One of these challenges is defining whether it is functioning or a capability that is the feature to be (...) assessed. Moreover, some aspects of freedom that are relevant for CA are frequently neglected, such as agency. These aspects must be considered when performing a health assessment using the CA as a framework. A health assessment using the CA as a framework should include indicators based on the achieved dimension (health functioning), resources and conversion factors (health capability), and freedom to achieve (agency). (shrink)

In emotion research, both conceptual analyses and empirical studies commonly rely on emotion reports. But what do people mean when they say that they are angry, afraid, joyful, etc.? Building on extant theories of emotion, this paper presents four new studies (including a pre-registered replication) measuring the weight of cognitive evaluations, bodily changes, and action tendencies in people’s use of emotion concepts. The results of these studies suggest that the presence or absence of cognitive evaluations has the largest impact on (...) people’s emotion attributions, and that bodily changes and action tendencies are considered to depend on cognitive evaluations. Implications for theories of emotion (concepts) and the interpretation of emotion reports are discussed. (shrink)

The transcription of two hitherto unpublished letters between Yves Simon and Hanna Arendt in 1953 is offered. The documents contain valuable reflections on the concept and meaning of work.The texts are preceded by an introduction, which attempts to establish the relevance of the texts in the general body of Yves Simon's thinking about work.

The embodiment approach has shown that motor neural networks are involved in the processing of action verbs. There is developmental evidence that embodied effects on verb processing are already present in early years. Yet, the ontogenetic origin of this motor reuse in action verbs remains unknown. This longitudinal study investigates the co-occurrence of manual verbs and actions during mother-child daily routines when children were 1 to 2 and 2 to 3 years old. Eight mother-child dyads were video-recorded in 3-month intervals (...) across 12 months, and the timing of verbs and manual actions were coded by independent observers. Results showed that the probability of matched verb-action co-occurrences were much higher than that of random co-occurrences for Group 1 and Group 2, respectively. The distributions of the verb-action temporal intervals in both groups were quite symmetrical and skewed with the peak corresponding to both 0.00 s synchronic intervals and the shortest +5 s interval. Mother-led instances occurred in both groups whereas child-led instances were restricted to Group 2. Mothers pragmatically aligned their verbal productions, since they repeatedly used those verbs they shared with their children’s repertoire. In conclusion, the early multisensory communicative and manipulative scene affords grounding of verb meanings on the ongoing actions, facilitating verb-action pairing in the realm of social interactions, providing a new dimension to the prevailing solipsistic approach to embodiment. (shrink)

The use of images in education has received little attention despite the dual role of images in school textbooks, one aimed at the acquisition of knowledge and the other at the transmission of attitudes, values and norms, that constitute a valuable source of historical, educational and communicative research. We will study, through the analysis of content, the characteristics of the catechisms, the legislation of the time related to the publication of school textbooks, the presence of images, types, the didactic function (...) and the transmission of social models and ideology. The research suggests that the images of school catechisms are not simply reflections of a reality that facilitates the learning of the contents taught in schools, but that they also become an effective tool in the transformation of the values and ideological thinking of the social context in which they are produced. (shrink)

In “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Edmund Gettier (1963) attacked the thesis ‘S knows that P iff P is true, S believes that P, and S is justified in believing that P’. His intention was to sustain that someone can have a justified true belief without knowing that belief. He made that by creating two counter-examples to that thesis. In this article, I try to show that Gettier’s arguments are based in a weak account of justification, and that such a (...) weak view cannot talk about someone knowing something. I begin by presenting his counter-examples, and then I show they do not work. (shrink)

We ordinarily use epistemic concepts to evaluate our moral views. We know certain things are wrong, we are sometimes uncertain about the morally best thing to do, we think there are rational and irrational ways of reaching moral conclusions, etc. Like most meta ethicists, expressivists aim to explain this; they want to offer accounts of our moral thought, talk, and practice. However, most expressivists think moral thought and talk are fundamentally non-representational or desire-like. Critics have argued that this makes the (...) view incompatible with central aspects of our epistemic evaluations. In this paper, I survey the main epistemic challenges for expressivism, highlight their interconnections, and discuss the most promising responses. (shrink)

O-minimal geometry generalizes both semialgebraic and subanalytic geometries, and has been very successful in solving special cases of some problems in arithmetic geometry, such as André–Oort conjecture. Among the many tools developed in an o-minimal setting are cohomology theories for abstract-definable continuous manifolds such as singular cohomology, sheaf cohomology and Čech cohomology, which have been used for instance to prove Pillay’s conjecture concerning definably compact groups. In the present thesis we elaborate an o-minimal de Rham cohomology theory for abstract-definable $C^{\infty (...) }$ manifolds in an o-minimal expansion of the real field which admits smooth cell decomposition and defines the exponential function. We can specify the o-minimal cohomology groups and attain some properties such as the existence of Mayer–Vietoris sequence and the invariance under abstract-definable $C^{\infty }$ diffeomorphisms. However, in order to obtain the invariance of our o-minimal cohomology under abstract-definable homotopy we must work in a tame context that defines sufficiently many primitives and assume the validity of a statement related to Bröcker’s question.Abstract prepared by Rodrigo Figueiredo.E-mail: rodrigo@ime.usp.brURL: https://doi.org/10.11606/T.45.2019.tde-28042019-181150. (shrink)

It is often claimed that fear has an important epistemological function in making us aware of danger. Reactive theories challenge this view. According to them, fear is a response to real or apparent danger. In other words, real or apparent danger is the reason for which we experience fear. Thus, fear depends on awareness of danger instead of making us aware of danger. Proponents of the reactive theory have appealed to phenomenological and, most prominently, linguistic observations to support their views. (...) In particular, they argue that how we talk about the objects of fear supports the view that fear is a response (rather than a perception), and that how we talk about reasons for fear supports the view that reasons for fear are necessarily evaluative (about danger). Building on systematic linguistic observations in the form of corpus analyses and survey data, we argue that how we talk about the objects of fear and how we talk about reasons for fear do not support the reactive theory. Indeed, these linguistic considerations undermine the reactive theory. Most importantly, they suggest that there are non-evaluative reasons for fear. This is good news for rival theories, like perceptual theories, which hold that emotions have epistemic value in contributing to knowledge of evaluative properties such as danger. (shrink)

This paper begins the study of first-order functions, which are a generalization of truth-functions. The concepts of truth-table and systems of truth-functions, both introduced in propositional logic by Post, are also generalized and studied in the quantificational setting. The general facts about these concepts are given in the first five sections, and constitute a “general theory” of first-order functions. The central theme of this paper is the relation of definition among notions expressed by formulas of first-order logic. We emphasize that (...) logic is not concerned only with the consequence relation among notions expressed by formulas. It also attends to the relation of definition among notions, where a notion is defined from other notions. Sections 5 and 6 deal exclusively with the relation of definition among notions expressed by formulas of first-order logic. In these sections, we study the systems of first-order functions, which are the sets of first-order functions closed under definitions. Sections 7 and 8 are concerned with the relativization of first-order functions to a class of structures. The relativization to a class of structures is a fundamental operation which is used in order to relate the theory of first-order functions with set theory and first-order model theory, a subject which we have barely scratched the surface. The apparatus developed in this paper enables us to define what is a vehicle for the foundation of classical mathematics in set theory, and, in Sect. 8, we prove that first-order logic with one binary predicate variable is not a minimal vehicle for the foundation of classical mathematics in set theory. Sections 9 and 10 introduce further operations and ideals of first-order functions. Besides some results on the influence of the arguments of a first-order function, a result about definability is proved in Sect. 10.1. It is this theorem that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a first-order function to be in a finitely generated ideal. In Sect. 11, this result is applied to the problem of predicate definability in classes of structures, the problem with which Beth’s theorem dealt in the case of elementary classes. (shrink)

Although the implementation of mindfulness-based interventions in educational contexts appear to have demonstrated some benefits for students and teachers in research studies conducted over the last two decades, there are also those who criticize MBI’s for their instrumental focus. Exploring this debate, this article offers a case for the implementation of a more holistic and integral approach to mindfulness in educational settings. It will draw upon the philosophical legacy of Martin Heidegger and other critical theorists, who contest the dominant framing (...) of neoliberalism and encourage engagement with more systemic perspectives. During this exploration, we examine two polemics: whether mindfulness should be implemented technically or holistically and, whether the focus should be individual and/or collective. The article concludes that although mindfulness may be an efficient ‘self-technology’ to improve certain aspects of individual well-being, it is necessary to challenge this perspective as it promotes a type of ‘iatrogenic effect’. Specifically, it is argued that systemic failure is reframed as individual fallibility via a simplistic focus on well-being that may contradictorily foster appeasement to exploitative conditions. As an alternative, we offer a more integrative version, drawing in particular on the work of Ken Wilber, which proposes systemic as well as individual transformation. (shrink)

“Flesh” and “Figure” in Merleau-Ponty and DeleuzeGilles Deleuze points out, in his work on Francis Bacon, that “the phenomenological hypothesis is perhaps insufficient because it invokes only the lived body. But the lived body is still very little in relation to a more profound and almost unlivable Power.” The present study fi rst seeks to specify what is this intensive Power of a life carried out at the limit of the unlivable. This leads to an analysis of Deleuze’s notion of (...) Figure. Thus, we come back to the explicitly anti-phenomenological position of Deleuze, in other words, to his will, which he constantly reaffirms, to liberate philosophy – by following the path opened by Bergson – from the ruinous presupposition of a merely human measure of appearing, which would still be the presupposition of phenomenology. In particular, we are asking ourselves if Merleau-Ponty’s notions of “being in depth” and of “pregnancy” do not escape from Deleuze’s critique, and if it is also substantiated that Deleuze was able to assert that phenomenology “erects as a norm ‘natural perception’ and its conditions.” It is the confrontation of Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty’s theses on art and the world, which finally allows us to put forward an answer.“Carne” e “Figura” in Merleau-Ponty e DeleuzeGilles Deleuze fa notare, nella sua opera su Francis Bacon, che «l’ipotesi fenomenologica è forse insufficiente, in quanto si rifà solamente al corpo vissuto.Ma il corpo vissuto è ancora poca cosa rispetto ad una Potenza più profonda e quasi invivibile». Il saggio presente cerca innanzitutto di precisare che cosa sia questa Potenza intensiva di una vita portata al limite dell’invivibile. Questo condurrà in un secondo momento ad un’analisi della nozione deleuziana di Figura.Il saggio ritorna quindi sulla posizione esplicitamente anti-fenomenologica di Deleuze, in altri termini sulla sua volontà, incessantemente riaffermata, di liberarela fi losofi a, nel solco di Bergson, dal pericolo di una misura semplicemente umana dell’apparire, premessa che a suo giudizio starebbe ancora al fondo del progetto della fenomenologia. Ci chiederemo, in particolare, se le nozioni merleau-pontiane di “essere della profondità” e di “pregnanza” non sfuggano alla critica di Deleuze, al di là del fatto quest’ultimo abbia affermato che la fenomenologia “erige a norma la ‘percezione naturale’ e le sue condizioni”. È il confronto tra le tesi di Deleuze e di Merleau-Ponty sull’arte ed il mondo che permetterà, in ultima analisi, di avanzare una risposta a questo insieme di interrogativi. (shrink)

Christine Tappolet’s book Philosophy of Emotion: A contemporary introduction, and many other works in emotion theory, focus primarily on emotional episodes at the expense of so-called “emotional dispositions.” I argue that there are no reasons for theories of emotion to focus on emotional episodes, or to reserve the term “emotion” for emotional episodes.

This article was compiled from a bibliographic review and aims to: analyze what a concept is; present the two main approaches by which leisure and recreation are understood in Latin America, expanding thus the possibilities for new meanings to these concepts; and discuss the alternatives that these concepts -from a new perspective- can provide to the construction of participative, solidary and sustainable societies. In conclusion, it's emphasized that most of the concepts of leisure and recreation widespread in Latin America , (...) were formulated in other contexts, showing to be insufficient and inappropriate to the problems, contradictions and potentialities of this region. That is why they need new approaches and resignificances. Understanding leisure as a dimension of culture outlines the need to promote a critical/creative education by and for a non-hegemonic leisure, which rescues and appreciates cultural diversity as one of the key elements for social transformation. (shrink)

This work shows how systematically studying people’s use of emotion concepts (what people think emotions are), can inform debates regarding the nature of emotion (what emotions are). As such, it makes a contribution both in terms of method and content. In regards to the methodological approach, this work constitutes the first experimental philosophy Intuitions Project approach (see Article 4) to general questions regarding the nature of emotion. It does not only bring together the philosophical and scientific literature on emotion (as (...) much research has already done) but directly combines philosophical analysis and empirical research methods to study emotion. Articles 1 – 3 use quantitative (inferential statistics) and qualitative (text analysis) methods on data from surveys whose design was guided by philosophical analysis. And Article 4 considers the use of neuroimaging methods in philosophy. Finally, Article 2 builds bridges between analytic philosophy and the scientific study of concepts. In particular, by considering concepts’ internal structure (typicality, weight, and dependency relations). In regards to the content, the main contribution of this work consists in testing the premises used in arguments for (and against) emotion theories. This helps us discriminate between sound and unsound arguments, and select the appropriate conclusions regarding the nature of emotion. Figure 1 graphically represents the state of the debate after this contribution (see Figure 5 in the Introduction for a comparison point). In the following, I will detail the contribution of each of the articles in this work, and how they converge and complement each other to provide a coherent picture of emotion (concepts). Figure 1. Arguments from conditional and problem cases as applicable for both Cognitive / Perceptual theories and Somatic / Attitudinal theories. Solid black arrows indicate support, dashed red arrows indicate opposition. Claims challenged in this work are flagged using dashed lines. Claims not tested are flagged using transparency. -/- The studies presented in Article 1 tested the Subtraction Argument in favor of Somatic theories of emotion. The results of these studies showed that people apply emotion concepts (fear, anger, sadness) in cases of absence of bodily feelings. This questions the claim that bodily perceptions (attitudes) are necessary for emotion (see Introduction §4.1.) and supports the existence of “calm” cases of emotion (see Introduction §4.3.2.). As we saw in the introduction, these two claims are incompatible. The first one supports the Subtraction Argument in favor of Somatic (Attitudinal) theories, while the second one supports arguments against them. With these results in hand, we can conclude that the Subtraction Argument is unsound (its main premise is likely false), and the argument from calm emotions is sound (see Figure 1). This poses a problem for Somatic and Attitudinal theories of emotion, but also Hybrid theories of emotion, as they are also committed to the claim that felt bodily changes constitute emotions. The studies presented in Article 2 went beyond those in Article 1 by testing people’s use of emotion concepts in cases where the presence (absence) of bodily feelings, cognitive evaluations, and action tendencies is independently manipulated. The results show that people consider that bodily feelings are non-necessary for emotion, in line with the results in Article 1. Action tendencies were also regarded as non-necessary, which poses a problem for Motivational theories of emotion (see Introduction §5.2.1.). Finally, cognitive evaluations were considered non-necessary in two out of three studies. However, across all studies, cognitive evaluations were the most important factor in determining people’s use of emotion concepts. Thus, it seems like we should not give up the claim that “When someone does not [value perception/belief], she is not emotion]” (see Figure 1). Furthermore, the results show that bodily changes and action tendencies depend on cognitive evaluations. These last two results square well with the core tenets of Cognitive, Perceptual, and Appraisal theories of emotion. Thus, the results presented in Article 2 support these theories. Article 3 complements Article 1 and 2 by testing the weight of yet another factor in people’s use of emotion concepts. Namely, the value of the situation in which the emotion is experienced. The results of Article 3 show that this factor significantly influences people’s use of emotion concepts. This poses a challenge for theories of emotion as non-intentional states (Morag, 2017; Whiting, 2011). According to these accounts, emotions are only causally related to the situation in which they are experienced, but they are not about that situation. Thus, they seem unable to explain why differences in the value of the situation influence the use of emotion concepts even when the reaction of the agent is the same. By stressing the importance of the intentionality of emotion and the (normative) connection between emotion and value, these results (as those in Articles 1 and 2) favor Cognitive, Perceptual, and Appraisal theories. As we saw in the Introduction, these theories are especially well-suited to explain the intentionality of emotions and their relation to value. Finally, the main goal of Article 4 is to analyze the prospects of using fMRI to inform philosophically relevant questions concerning emotion. First, we saw that there are no brain areas specifically associated with emotion. The brain correlates of emotions are also involved in other psychological processes, so we cannot infer emotion from localized brain activity. Second, and against the predictions of Basic Emotion theories (see Introduction §5.2.), we saw that patterns of brain activity are not significantly different across emotion types. This provides evidence against this particular Componential account. However, other Componential theories (e.g. Appraisal theories) are compatible with the results. Note that the same approach used to test the claims of Basic Emotion theories (Ontology testing) could potentially be used to inform questions regarding the role of evaluative cognitions / bodily feelings in emotion. In particular, we could test the degree of overlap between the neural correlates of emotion and evaluative cognitions vs. the degree of neural overlap between emotion and bodily feelings. Future research should consider this approach to further investigate what constitutes emotions. To sum up, Articles 1 to 4 challenge Somatic, Attitudinal, Hybrid, Motivational, and Basic Emotion theories, and instead favor Cognitive, Perceptual, and Appraisal theories. But before declaring winners, some limitations should be taken into account. First, it is important to note that Cognitive, Perceptual, and Appraisal theories still face challenges. Cognitive theories have to account for the emotions of non-human animals as well as the phenomenology of emotion. Appraisal theories have to account for the problem of integration. And all Cognitive, perceptual, and appraisal theories have to account for cases of recalcitrant emotion. The work presented here provides an independent motivation to develop and defend such accounts. Second, as it has been noted in the discussion of Article 1, one could account for mismatches between theoretical and ordinary uses of emotion concepts by appealing to factors that are orthogonal to emotion. For example, it might be that people’s use of emotion concepts is heavily influenced by pragmatic factors. Thus, although the results presented in this work demand proponents of Somatic, Attitudinal, Hybrid, and Motivational theories to develop and empirically support such hypotheses, it doesn’t preclude the possibility to protect these theories from the evidence. Third, note that important issues around the nature of emotion, such as those concerning emotions’ representational (see, e.g. Grzankowski, 2016) or reason-responsive nature (see, e.g. Maguire, 2017), were not treated in this work. Arguably, these questions are better addressed using philosophical analysis alone. However, future work should consider the prospects of using empirical research methods to illuminate these issues. In general, future work should continue to explore the possibilities of combining philosophical analysis and empirical research methods to inform questions regarding the nature of emotion, so we can further advance long-standing debates in emotion theory. Hopefully, this work sets a precedent for this. (shrink)

This paper seeks to show that the link between individual human life and social life is governed by dialectical movement. First, life is characterized as a process in which the own presuppositions are posited. Subsequently, the process of human social metabolism is explained. Finally, the dialectical form taken by the relationship between the individual self and the process of social individuation is highlighted. It is concluded that the process of individual human life is a potency that actualizes itself as a (...) process of social metabolism based on labour. (shrink)

Whilst individuals deal with divergent sorts of stimuli from the environment, they also tend to display some regularity in the way they respond to related patterns. These consistent responses can be conceptualised as cognitive schemas. A paramount component of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) is the notion of cognitive schemas as they are a favoured point of therapeutic intervention. CBT as articulated by Beck in the 1960s owes intellectual acknowledgment to Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger and their notions of “atmosphere” and “clearing” respectively. (...) This essay explores the notion of cognitive schema and atmosphere as applied to emotional pathology. It suggests that the well-known influence that phenomenology had on existential psychology could be extended to empirical clinical psychology, like CBT. The strategy adopted in this paper is to use Dreyfus’ ontological and epistemological distinction in psychopathology and then make a similar distinction, albeit using different terminology, in the CBT tradition. Some empirical findings from the literature are examined which render support to the existence of cognitive schemas and their crucial contributory role in the aetiology and maintenance of emotional disorders. It is noted that some of the features of these cognitive schemas were espoused well before Beck by Merleau-Ponty and the phenomenological-existential tradition. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 4, Edition 1 July 2004. (shrink)

Bottom of the Pyramid organizations are the ones that develop a set of capabilities that contribute to create short- and long-term sustainability values inside and outside the boundaries of BoP ecosystems. Capabilities have an important role in BoP organizations’ strategies that aim to solve BoP issues. Notwithstanding its developments, BoP research still lacks theoretical contributions for the analysis of organizations. We suggest special attention to the need of advancing knowledge on capabilities of BoP organizations because this field is scattered and (...) fragmented, misinterpreted, and still underdeveloped in the literature. We oriented our research formulating and seeking answers to our main question on what are the capabilities needed to enable organizations to create sustainability values in BoP ecosystems? We conducted an integrative review of BoP research for the period from 1998 to 2019, and we found 22 key capabilities of BoP organizations. We organized the capabilities into four major categories including BoP Responsible Consumption, BoP Responsible Business Model, BoP Responsible Management, and BoP Responsible Innovation. We advanced propositions and discussions regarding the capabilities and major categories’ popularity, interdependence and combination, short- and long-term temporal functions, sustainability roles, and effectiveness to address BoP issues. Our article organizes the field of capabilities of BoP organizations; advances contributions and implications for management, organizations, and policymaking; and opens fruitful avenues for future research. (shrink)

This paper examines two twenty-first-century developments in the enactive approach in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. The first is the surging interest in Hans Jonas, which begins with Weber and Varela's 'Life After Kant' (2002) and continues up to the present. The second is the 'social turn' that the enactive approach has taken, especially after De Jaegher and Di Paolo's (2007) work on participatory sense-making. We look at these two developments through the lens of the problem of other minds. We (...) argue that they are incompatible due to a residual solipsism in Jonasian phenomenology. Ultimately, this leaves enactive theory with a choice between embracing Jonas or embracing the social turn in enactive theory. We recommend replacing Jonasian influences with those from the late work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. We argue that enactivism can evade the problem of other minds using Merleau-Ponty's discussion of 'flesh' and 'expression'. (shrink)

Since the automation revolution of our technological era, diverse machines or robots have gradually begun to reconfigure our lives. With this expansion, it seems that those machines are now faced with a new challenge: more autonomous decision-making involving life or death consequences. This paper explores the philosophical possibility of artificial moral agency through the following question: could a machine obtain the cognitive capacities needed to be a moral agent? In this regard, I propose to expose, under a normative-cognitive perspective, the (...) minimum criteria through which we could recognize an artificial entity as a genuine moral entity. Although my proposal should be considered from a reasonable level of abstraction, I will critically analyze and identify how an artificial agent could integrate those cognitive features. Finally, I intend to discuss their limitations or possibilities. (shrink)

College students have become more representative as blood donors, mainly to help other people. This study ascertained the association between spirituality and adherence or intention to donate blood in post-graduate students. In this quantitative and cross-sectional study, participants were 281 students from a post-graduate programme at a Brazilian public university. After complying with ethical requirements, data were collected through a questionnaire for sociodemographic characterization and identification of blood donation practices, followed by the Spiritual Well-Being Scale. Descriptive statistics and parametric tests (...) were used for data analysis. A total of 74% of the participants were female and 26% were male. Previous experience and/or intention to donate blood were found in 75.3%; 14.3% donated blood periodically. In addition, 12.2% were not adept to donation and 12.5% were inapt. Spiritual Well-Being scores were similar between individuals who are not adept and those who donate periodically. In conclusion, in the sample, spirituality and blood donation are not associated, but spiritual well-being and gender are. To enhance blood donation, further research is needed. (shrink)

Against the epicurean position, the rationality about the preoccupation with death is discussed by the present paper. For this purpose two elemental thesis are proposed. The first one supports that it is rational to worry about death before dying because we conceive the idea of a discourse in which the impossibility of interfere in the world to satisfy our pending goals is lamented. The second thesis is that death afflicts any prejudice only to whom wonders about it, because this question (...) encloses the idea that one transcends by means of the achievement of our purpose, for that it is presupposed that with death the interests and aim are kept constant. (shrink)

The present paper investigates the late ontology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which considers being as expressive movement. The paper takes as its point of departure Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on painting, sculpture and especially cinema. Two reasons justify this choice. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on film as a work of art are now starting to be better known, after they have been overshadowed by his writings on painting, sculpture or literature for a long time. This entails a considerable enrichment of our (...) interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics and his ontology. On the other hand, if Merleau-Ponty’s general theory of aesthetics leads to questions concerning the sense and the ontological status of movement, it is certain that, within this theory, the analysis of the particular mode of expression of cinematic images gains an extraordinary relevance. (shrink)

The main intent of this thesis is to defend that the laws of nature are better thought as transcendent universals, such as platonic governism suggests, and that they are metaphysically necessary in a strong way, such as the heterodox version of such platonism defends. With this intention, we sustain that physical symmetries are essential consequences of the laws of nature – what solves the challenge of symmetries – thus being metaphysically necessary, without being governist's necessitation laws. First, we will show (...) what laws of nature are and the reasons to reject other metaphysical theories and to accept platonic governism. Soon after, we will present the challenge of symmetries and the reasons to prefer the platonic governist answer over dispositionalist, regularist, aristotelic (governism), counterfatualist and primitivist ones. At last, we will define what is the metaphysical necessity, argue for the strong metaphysical necessity of laws and their consequences, and show why the reasons for the contingency or weak necessity of laws are bad theoretical paths. (shrink)

Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant (...) to one's motivations. (shrink)

In March 2021, the Mexican Constitution was amended to transition to a system of precedents. This amendment mandates that the “reasons” of Supreme Court rulings will be binding on the lower courts. However, the reform is rooted in a long-standing practice of ‘Tesis’, i.e., abstract statements that the Court itself identifies when deciding a case. Moreover, there is no consensus as to what these reasons are and why they should be binding. The aim of this article is to identify the (...) possible conceptions of reasons to explore the Court’s different judge-made law roles. Different common law conceptions of the ratio decidendi are used as “mirrors” to identify four models of judicial lawmaking in Mexican practice, namely: judicial legislation, implicit rules, moral-political justifications and social categories. Although the first model seems to prevail, the others provide means for a broader understanding of how the Court creates law depending on the interpretative context in which it operates. (shrink)

In this article, I intend to show what the metaphysical possibility is, distinguishing it from the logical and the physical possibilities, and then to indicate that at least there is two kinds of metaphysical possibilities, i.e., the potentialities of the things and the possibilities of the events to occur. This is an important goal because it makes clearer the discussion about possibilities. To show what the metaphysical possibility is, I try to show that we need an absolute modality for the (...) debate about what is possible do not be trivial. And to indicate that there are two kinds of metaphysical possibilities, I show that we can talk independently about these two notions of possibility, and that the debate between determinism and indeterminism presupposes such distinction. The conclusion we achieve is that there really are these two kinds of metaphysical possibilities, and that if we don’t want to be ambiguous, we have good reasons to use such distinction in our theories about the possibilities. (shrink)

The present text discusses whether there is a tension between aphorisms 6.1-6.13 of the Tractatus and the Church-Turing theorem about the decidability of predicate logic. We attempt to establish the following points: (i) Aphorisms 6.1-6.13 are not consistent with the Church-Turing theorem. (ii) The logical symbolism of the Tractatus, built from the N-operator, can (and should) be interpreted as expressively complete with respect to first-order formulas. (iii) Wittgenstein’s reasons for believing that Logic is decidable were purely philosophical and the undecidability (...) result shows that there are aspects of his criticisms of Frege and Russell that become unjustified in light of these results. (shrink)

These days philosophy teaching in universities follows two main views: the continental philosophy and the analytic philosophy. Each one of those traditions has very different philosophical and pedagogical practices. My objectives in this article are: 1. to show the distinctions between the practices that continental and analytical philosophies cultivated at the universities; 2. to indicate that there is a confusion at the characterization of what is analytic philosophy, and that the critics driven to it are in fact driven to logical (...) positivism; 3. to show that the analytic practices are the ones we consider as genuinely philosophical. / Atualmente o ensino de Filosofia nas universidades tem seguido duas visões principais: a filosofia continental e a filosofia analítica. Cada uma dessas duas tradições diferem bastante em suas práticas filosófica e pedagógica. Meus objetivos neste artigo são: 1. mostrar as distinções entre as práticas cultivadas dentro das universidades pela filosofia continental e pela filosofia analítica; 2. indicar que há uma confusão na caracterização do que é filosofia analítica e que as críticas a ela dirigidas na verdade apontam para o positivismo lógico; 3. mostrar que as práticas analíticas são aquelas que consideramos como genuinamente filosóficas. (shrink)

Interpersonal coordination in soccer has become a trending topic in sports sciences, and several studies have examined how interpersonal coordination unfolds at different levels (i.e., dyads, sub-groups, teams). Investigations have largely focused on interactional behaviors at micro and macro levels through tasks from dyadic (i.e., 1 vs. 1) to team (i.e., 11 vs. 11) levels. However, as the degree of representativeness of a task depends on the magnitude of the relationship between simulated and intended environments, it is necessary to address (...) a discussion on the correspondence between competitive and practice/experimental settings in soccer. The aims of this paper are to: (i) provide a brief description of the main concepts underlying the subject of interpersonal coordination in sports teams; (ii) demonstrate, through exemplar research findings, how interpersonal coordination in soccer unfolds at different scales; and (iii), discuss how coaches and researchers may ensure representativeness for practice and experimental tasks. We observed that papers addressing the analysis of interpersonal coordination tendencies in soccer often resort to dyadic (one vs. one) or sub-group (many vs. many) experimental tasks, instead of full-sized (11 vs. 11) games. Consequently, the extent to which such patterns reflect those observed in competition is somewhat uncertain. The design of practice and/or experimental tasks that rely on sub-phases of the game (e.g., 1 vs. 1, 4 vs. 4) should ensure the preservation of players’ behavior patterns in intended match conditions (11 vs. 11). This can be accomplished by measuring the level of action fidelity of the task, ensuring correspondence and successful transfer across contexts. (shrink)