In this paper, I explore the ways that phenomenological concepts like intercorporeality and mutual incorporation offer new tools in trying to make sense of human experiences via mediating systems. In particular, I think about how the COVID-19 pandemic hastened a large population into mediated interactions, and what is lost, perhaps contingently or perhaps intrinsically, when human experiences are mediated in this way. I look to research in presence, skillful interaction, and enactive social cognition to argue that there remains something ineffable (...) or at least extremely hard to pin down about intercorporeality, and embodied togetherness has not yet been replicated in the mediating systems we currently embrace. (shrink)

Like some other human sciences, sociology has had a recurrent concern to clarify the ambivalent relationship between its professional accounts of social reality on the one hand and lay understandings of social reality on the other. Sociological ethnographers have claimed to accomplish this clarification by including in their accounts both direct representation and responsive interpretation of the vernacular voice of those human subjects whose actions and understandings comprise the focus of their inquiries. I briefly examine some of the practical and (...) textual strategies by which studies have accomplished this. I go on to note that the authenticity of ethnographic work has itself become a matter of dispute on the grounds of the ineradicable asymmetry between the professional voice of the researcher and the vernacular voice of research subjects. Drawing on work in literary theory, anthropology and feminist scholarship, a favoured solution to this problem has argued for the necessity of acknowledging the essentially dialogical character of the relationship between researchers and subjects and also of finding ways to make ethnographic texts reflect this character. This article draws attention to an alternative set of professional practices that prefer ‘co-construction’ to ‘dialogue’ as a term of art. Its use encourages and facilitates the close and detailed examination of the multiple ways in which subjects already speak of and for themselves and others within the local sites of their real-world activities. Studies of these matters accord the vernacular voice of human subjects renewed significance for sociological investigation as part of a radical ‘respecification’ of prior understandings of the proper relationship between vernacular and professional accounts of social reality. The article assesses the upshot of these claims for the current practice and future prospects of sociology as one of the human sciences. (shrink)

There has been consistent interest in telepathy within psychoanalysis from its start. Relational psychoanalysis, which is a relatively new development in psychoanalytic theory and practice, seems more receptive to experiences between patient and analyst that suggest ostensibly anomalous communicative capacities. To establish this openness to telepathic phenomena with relational approaches, a selection of papers recently published in leading academic journals in relational psychoanalysis is examined. This demonstrates the extent to which telepathy-like experiences are openly presented and seriously considered in the (...) relational community. The article then discusses those characteristics of the relational approach that may facilitate greater openness to telepathic experience. The argument is that relational psychoanalysis provides a coherent framework in which otherwise anomalous phenomena of patient–analyst interaction can be understood. (shrink)

This essay examines narratives about cadaver dissection through the lens of psychoanalytic theory in order to better understand the nature of medical students’ socialization into medicine and its implications for physician-patient communication. The theoretical framework provided by Julia Kristeva focuses attention on the nature of subject-formation in relation to abjection – that which reveals the contingent nature of the speaking self. Analysis of memoirs and other narratives by medical students demonstrates that students encounter the abject in the process of dissecting (...) a corpse, but are rigorously trained to map over this experience using the technical tools of biomedicine. Other students rely on dark and morbid forms of humor to develop a sense of emotional distance from their cadaver. This analysis reveals new insights about the nature of the gap between physicians and their patients. In particular, it indicates that this gap is not fixed or static but fluid and malleable. Physicians are always shifting between the symbolic realm of biomedicine and the affective, semiotic mode of encountering the abject. This malleability provides the key to training and educating medical students, socializing them in such a way that they are reflexive about this process of oscillation. How physicians handle the reality of their fluctuation between the semiotic and the symbolic is what will determine their ability to engage with patients. (shrink)

Processed pseudogenes may serve as a genetic reservoir for evolutionary innovation. Here, we argue that through the activity of long interspersed element‐1 retrotransposons, processed pseudogenes disperse coding and noncoding sequences rich with regulatory potential throughout the human genome. While these sequences may appear to be non‐functional, a lack of contemporary function does not prohibit future development of biological activity. Here, we discuss the dynamic evolution of certain processed pseudogenes into coding and noncoding genes and regulatory elements, and their implication in (...) wide‐ranging biological and pathological processes. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/iUY_mteVoPI. (shrink)

A work in progress, where our two friends exemplify logical fallacies, types of causation and other cool stuff. Quotations are from memory, and so may not be entirely accurate, e.g. I may have substituted "buttmunch" for "buttknocker"...

What does it mean to be truly human? And, relatedly, what does it mean to be treated as truly human, and with dignity, by the state, or community, of which one is a part? To be fully human, Martha Nussbaum has argued for the better part of two decades, and argues in greater detail in “Women and Human Development”, is not only to be rational, and not only to be happy, but also to be capable - capable, for example, of (...) loving others, of thinking rationally about one's own life, of engaging in dignified labor, of interacting with the natural and political environment, of participating in a society's cultural life. A truly human life is defined by, or perhaps constituted by, these capabilities; to lack anyone of them is in some way to lack a fundamental pillar of one's humanity. Therefore, she continues, a citizen in a constitutional government is treated as fully human by the state when that person's fundamental capabilities - the capabilities which define her humanity - are, at least minimally, protected, promoted or nurtured by the state's governing authorities. Constitutional governments, then, whatever else they do, must protect, promote, or create whatever conditions are necessary for citizens to possess these fundamental capabilities... I will highlight and then amplify what I think is missing or underplayed in Nussbaum's treatment of capabilities and women, and that is the role that authority plays - and the role it should and should not play - in guiding states toward a recognition of their obligation to nurture, promote, or protect women's - and men's and children's - human capabilities. (shrink)

The concept of yinyang lies at the heart of Chinese thought and culture. The relationship between these two opposing, yet mutually dependent, forces is symbolized in the familiar black and white symbol that has become an icon in popular culture across the world. The real significance of yinyang is, however, more complex and subtle. This brilliant and comprehensive analysis by one of the leading authorities in the field captures the richness and multiplicity of the meanings and applications of yinyang, including (...) its visual presentations. Through a vast range of historical and textual sources, the book examines the scope and role of yinyang, the philosophical significance of its various layers of meanings and its relation to numerous schools and traditions within Chinese philosophy. By putting yinyang on a secure and clear philosophical footing, the book roots the concept in the original Chinese idiom, distancing it from Western assumptions, frameworks and terms, yet also seeking to connect its analysis to shared cross-cultural philosophical concerns. (shrink)

Robin Barrow; Skill Talk, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 187–195, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1987.tb00158.x.

In this article, the author proposes a dynamic, interdisciplinary, network conception of expertise that differs from conventional static, linear conceptions. Using a range of graphic images, the author propose specific visualizations of this network conception of expertise. First, he discusses attempts to pin expertise down in a definition. Then he considers the network of notions from which expertise emerges. The author briefly describes representative nodes in the network, such as experience and excellence. He concludes with the view that there is (...) no need to compromise the many existing conceptions of expertise by forcing them into a false common ground. Instead, he shows that existing accounts of expertise can be better understood by viewing them as connected parts of a complex network. (shrink)

The first philosophers paved the way for the work of Plato and Aristotle - and hence for the whole of Western thought. Aristotle said that philosophy begins with wonder, and the first Western philosophers developed theories of the world which express simultaneously their sense of wonder and their intuition that the world should be comprehensible. But their enterprise was by no means limited to this proto-scientific task. Through, for instance, Heraclitus' enigmatic sayings, the poetry of Parmenides and Empedocles, and Zeno's (...) paradoxes, the Western world was introduced to metaphysics, rationalist theology, ethics, and logic, by thinkers who often seem to be mystics or shamans as much as philosophers or scientists in the modern mould. And out of the Sophists' reflections on human beings and their place in the world arose and interest in language, and in political, moral, and social philosophy. This volume contains a translation of all the most important fragments of the Presocratics and Sophists, and of the most informative testimonia from ancient sources, supplemented by lucid commentary. (shrink)

Role morality can be defined as “claim(ing) a moral permission to harm others in ways that, if not for the role, would be wrong” (A. Applbaum: 1999, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) p. 3). Adversarial situations resulting in role morality occur most frequently in the fields of law, business, and government. Within the realm of accounting, professional obligations may place the accountant in a situation where he/she is susceptible (...) to the pressures of role morality. If the accountant engages in acts consistent with role morality, significant harm to others may result. The current study represents an initial investigation into role morality in accounting and includes survey data from three samples of professionals: accountants, physicians, and attorneys. Results suggest that accountants generally do not agree that role morality is acceptable. Additionally, when compared to the groups of physicians and attorneys, physicians agree the least with role morality, while attorneys agree the most. Implications for practicing accountants and suggestions for future research into the theory of role morality are offered. (shrink)

In this book, first published in 1991, the author Dr Robin Barrow adopts the view that utilitarianism is the most coherent and persuasive ethical theory we have and argues in favour of a specific form of rule-utilitarianism. This book will be of interest to students of philosophy.

This chapter investigates the varying stances of the great religions on climate change, their historical backgrounds, and reasons for the diversity to be found among their recent statements. It responds to criticisms of the stewardship interpretation of Christianity and considers the contrasting view that the roots of contemporary ecological problems including that of climate change lie in religious acquiescence in early modern economic individualism. The degree of lasting impact of these stances is held to depend on the attitudes of the (...) different religions to structural change and reform. (shrink)

Im vierten Brief an Clarke behauptet Leibniz, dass Newtons Vorstellung von der Gravitation okkulte Kräfte in die Physik einführe und so ins Übernatürliche münde. Clarke wies diese Behauptung zurück und stellte in seiner fünften Antwort die gleichsam offizielle, positivistische Haltung Newtons heraus. Gleichwohl glaubten Newton und Clarke wahrscheinlich an eine der ihnen durch Leibniz zugeschriebenen durchaus vergleichbare Theorie: dass nämlich dem sonst mysteriösen Phänomen der Fernwirkung Gottes Allgegenwart zugrunde liege. Erst im Jahre 1717, nach Leibniz' Tod, verwarf Newton diese Position. (...) In meinem Aufsatz versuche ich, die Fäden der Kontroverse zu entwirren, ihre Relevanz für Physik wie Theologie einzuschätzen und zu beurteilen, ob Leibniz, wie Austin Farrer es andeutet, eine Art ,physikalischer Theologie' unterlaufen ist. (shrink)

Granted the far-flung impacts of humanity on the future and the biosphere, Hans Jonas has rightly called for our responsibilities to be reconceptualised, and where responsibilities are non-reciprocal Chris Groves has put forward a model of the ethics of care to underpin them. In view, however, of Derek Parfit's work on responsibilities with regard to the possible but unidentifiable people of alternative possible futures, the author suggests that an ethical model grounded in relations, while helpful, is insufficient with regard to (...) these impersonal responsibilities, and is not sufficiently strengthened by resorting to 'constitutive value'. To meet the need for further models, he first presents two familiar ones (those of bequests or legacies and of stewardship or trusteeship), and then a new model appropriate for responsibilities towards unidentifiable parties, based on hospitality and generosity, and Jesus' parable of the great banquet as in Luke 14. This model also has its shortcomings, but could, alongside the others, assist people to take non-reciprocal responsibilities seriously. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 29 - 50 This essay discusses progress and directionality, both in nature, in science and in society, treating as its starting-point the reflections, parallelisms and comparisons of Ruse’s essay, ‘A Threefold Parallelism for Our Time? Progressive Development in Society, Science and the Organic World’, but reaching substantially different conclusions. The essay thus ranges over progress and directionality in the world of natural evolution, in the sciences and the humanities, and in history and society. (...) It defends non-relative progress in science and the humanities, criticising here both the approach to these disciplines of the strongly evolutionary epistemology of Hull and the more moderate evolutionary epistemology of Ruse. It further defends the possibility of progress and directionality in history and society, and also, following Rolston, in the course of evolution within the world of nature, where the kind of directionality to be found has multiple directions rather than being unilinear. Subsequently it relates conclusions about these fields to theological reflections about the creation of nature and society by a value-loving intelligence. (shrink)

An interdisciplinary reappraisal of Lynn White, Jr.’s “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis” reopens several issues, including the suggestion by Peter Harrison that White’s thesis was historical and that it is a mistake to regard it as theological. It also facilitates a comparison between “Roots” and White’s earlier book Medieval Technology and Social Change. In “Roots,” White discarded or de-emphasized numerous qualifications and nuances present in his earlier work so as to heighten the effect of certain rhetorical aphorisms and (...) to generalize their scope and bearing well beyond what the evidence could bear. The meaning of Genesis and other biblical books proves to be just as important in White’s thesis as their historical reception. In “Roots,” White presents, alongside other contentions, the claims that Christian doctrines have all along been both anthropocentric and despotic, especially in the West, and that this is where the real roots of the problems are to be found. These claims, however, conflict with most of the relevant evidence. An adequate reappraisal of White’s work needs to recognize that there is a cultural determinism parallel to the technological determinisms alleged by R. H. Hilton and P. H. Sawyer, to endorse Elspeth Whitney’s “single-cause” critique of links between religion and technological change in the Middle Ages, and to treat sympathetically Whitney’s claim that White and some of his eco-theological critics (despite their disagreements) have in common both their valorizing of individual beliefs and values and their neglect of economic and institutional factors. Nevertheless, our ecological problems need to be understood through explanations turning on beliefs and values as well as on economics and institutions. (shrink)

In this essay, Robin May Schott criticizes leading proponents of just war theory and introduces the notion of justifiable but illegitimate violence. Instead of legitimating some wars as just, it is better to acknowledge that both the situation of war and moral judgments about war are ambiguous. Schott raises the questions: What are alternative narratives of war? And what are alternative narratives to war? Such narratives are necessary for addressing the concepts of evil and of witnessing in the ethical (...) discourse after Auschwitz. (shrink)

Nanotechnology is a subject about which we know less than we should, but probably more than we think we do at first glance. Like Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's “known unknowns,” we have learned enough to know what we should be concerned with. Glimmers of risk cropped up recently when German authorities recalled a bathroom cleansing product, “MagicNano,” that purported to contain nanosized particles and was on the market for only three days. More than one hundred people suffered severe respiratory problems (...) – six of whom were hospitalized with pulmonary edema. Although a subsequent analysis of MagicNano found that the nanoliquid ingredient morphed in the production into “supersized” particles, the recall nonetheless turned a white hot spotlight on the risk of NSPs. Latching onto the risks posed to workers producing materials using nanotechnology, the Washington Post has labeled nanotechnology a “seat-of-thepants occupational health experiment.”. (shrink)

This is my response to what three "critics" have written about my book, Democratic Economic Planning (Routledge, 2021). I thank my "critics" and the Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics for taking my work seriously, and hope this probing exchange will serve to improve thinking about alternatives to capitalism as the twenty-first century proceeds. In each of my responses I begin by highlighting areas of agreement, then identify areas where perhaps our disagreement may not be critical, and conclude by explaining (...) my point of view where I believe our disagreement does matter. (shrink)

We are economists with a long-standing interest in evolutionary psychology, who recently came to appreciate the rich collections of relevant data cultural anthropologists have spent decades collecting on the social environments of a wide range of human societies. While we found some systematic collections of these observations, we could not find a systematic summary of the social environment of the subsample of societies that most resemble the social environment where most human psychology seems to have evolved: small bands of nomadic (...) foragers. This short paper therefore represents our attempt to create such a summary. Using an existing dataset aggregated from diverse ethnographies, we collect statistics on the social environment of the studied cultures which most closely resemble our hunter-gatherer ancestors. Compared with relatively modern societies, nomadic foragers had similar levels of food and disease, and less murder and suicide. They did not fight over land or resources, and they enforced justice directly and personally. They avoided class divisions like rich vs. poor, shared food more, and their leaders had no formal powers. Polygamy, premarital sex, and extramarital sex were all widespread, divorce was easy, and men and women were generally considered equal. Kids were taught to be more generous, trusting, and honest, and were never punished physically. (shrink)

Compared with non-union workers, union workers take more of their compensation in the form of insurance. This may be because unions choose democratically, and democratic choice mitigates adverse selection in group insurance. Relative to individually-purchased insurance, we show that group insurance chosen by an ideal profit-maximizing employer can be worse for every employee, while group insurance chosen democratically can be much better. The reason is that democracy can fail to represent the preferences of almost half the group.

In a simple model of conflict, two agents fight over a fixed prize, and how hard they fight depends on what they believe about their abilities. To this model I add “preagents,” representing parents, leaders, or natural selection, who choose each agent’s confidence in his ability. Depending on the reason for such confidence, I find five different patterns in how confidence varies with ability. Agents who estimate their ability with error have under-confidence when ability is high and over-confidence when ability (...) is low, while strategic commitment incentives induce the opposite pattern. Agents who misjudge their value for the prize, relative to their cost of effort, induce an overor under-confidence that is independent of ability, while cooperating pre-agents choose extreme under-confidence. Agents who use confidence to signal ability have a relatively uniform over-confidence. (shrink)

In their article, McKelvey and Page note that In previous experimental work, ... [researchers] investigated how individuals use public information to augment their original private information, and whether in doing so, a rational expectations equilibrium is attained. ... [But either] the inference processes are complicated because of the enormous number of potential interactions among the individuals, and the optimal inference processes are not analyzed. ... [or] the inference process is analyzed but the working assumption is not altogether satisfactory.

Are you fascinated by some basic questions about science, technology, and our future? Questions like: Is cryonics technically feasible? When will nanoassemblers be feasible and how quickly will resulting changes come? Does a larger population help or hinder the world environment and economy? Will uploading be possible, and if so when? When can I live in space? Where will I be able to live free from tyranny? When will A.I.s be bucking for my job? Is there intelligent life beyond earth? (...) If you are like most Extropy readers, such question matter to you. Now how do we, as a society, go about answering such questions? People who have an appropriate background, and who are interested enough in a particular question, can research that subject in depth themselves, and come to a considered opinion. And people who happen to know, respect, and trust such a person can simply take those opinions as their own, avoiding all the hard work. But what is everyone else to do, people whose actions often implicitly depend on such questions? In practice, people usually defer to larger social institutions on most questions, institutions which combine and evaluate contributions from many specialists, and which offer apparent institutional consensus estimates on many different questions. (shrink)

Being read is not the same as being believed. Most reviewers have praised the book as original, well-written, thought-provoking, etc., and then gone on to take issue with one or more of Penrose's main theses. Penrose seems unfamiliar with the existing literature in cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and AI. The handful of reviewers who agree with Penrose don't seem to have paid much attention to his specific arguments - they always thought AI was bogus. See, for example, the 37 (...) reviews in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS), Dec. 1990, V13, pp.643-705. (shrink)