A careful reading of the Gorgias along with related dialogues, such as the Apology, the Theaetetus, and other texts, shows that agonism is indispensable to the critique of prevailing opinions, to the transformation of the interlocutor through shame-inducing elenchos, and to philosophy as an ongoing, lifelong ‘training’ (askêsis) of oneself in relation to others. In this way, following Plato’s texts in understanding philosophy as agôn involves rethinking philosophy as an engaged contestation of one’s peers and the received opinions that are (...) part of our relatedness to one another, as well as rethinking agôn as involving not just verbal combativeness, but also—in line with its root-meaning—as a matter of being gathered together in community through discourse (logos). (shrink)

Abstract Although the concept of “groundedness/autochthony“ ( Bodenständigkeit ) in Heidegger's writings receives far less scholarly attention than, for example, that of “releasement“ ( Gelassenheit ), a careful examination of the famous “ Gelassenheit “ speech of 1955 demonstrates that, in fact, Bodenständigkeit is the core concept around which everything else turns. Moreover, in the “ Gelassenheit “ speech and the writings on Hebel that follow, Heidegger understands Bodenständigkeit to be, fundamentally, something made possible by language in its particularities of (...) tradition and locale. Thus, there is an intriguing continuity of meaning between that concept and the concept as it was used phenomenologically in his writings from the summer 1924 course up to Sein und Zeit. (shrink)

The use of pesticides is one of the more controversial of public issues. This is so because their very widespread use produces immediate benefits to a small section of society, the agricultural industry, while the long term risks are shared by society as a whole. This discussion focuses on the contrast between benefits and risks and outlines some of the long term ecological problems that have resulted from the overuse, misuse, and injudicious use of pesticides. Detailed discussion is provided for (...) such ecological disasters as insect pest resistance to pesticides, pest resurgences and the development of secondary pests; together with contamination of food webs and general ecotoxicity. It is concluded that implementation of integrated pest management (IPM) tactics provides the only practical answer to the manifold problems arising from the sole reliance on pesticides for pest control. IPM provides an ecological oriented strategy for pest control that can maximize the benefits of pesticide use and minimize the risks. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:For the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character, and the Ethics of BeliefRobert MetcalfFor the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character, and the Ethics of Belief. Eugene Garver. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. pp. 264. $55.00, hardcover; $22.50, paperback.Professor Garver's book, For the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character, and the Ethics of Belief, is a provocative and illuminating study of practical reasoning, and one that develops (...) many of the ideas found in his magisterial study, Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). The previous book concluded by arguing that Aristotle's Rhetoric is philosophically more interesting today than it was in Aristotle's time, in part because for us there is no polis to which the argumentative facility of rhetoric would be subordinate (1994, 233ff.). This idea is echoed in the present book when Garver writes: "The more we take disagreement to be a permanent part of the situation of practical reasoning, and not something soon to be overcome by appropriate theory or universal enlightenment, the more rhetorical facility becomes a central part [End Page 95] of practical reason" (2004, 175). It is, indeed, a fascinating feature of For the Sake of Argument that it defends the autonomy and integrity of practical reason through Aristotle's insights on the various connections between argument, persuasion, and ethos (153), and illustrates these through examples such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the landmark Brown v. Board of Education, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions.The book is divided into eight chapters, and, as Garver explains, these represent four pairs of essays in which a more concrete or "applied" chapter is followed by a chapter that draws generalizations from the examples of the prior chapter. Among the themes most prominent in the book are the connection between reason and character, on which Garver writes, "Practical reason has its own integrity when who we are and how we think are intimately connected" (2); the compatibility, within practical reason, of truth and one's own interest; the "ampliative" nature of practical reason, such that the implications of one's beliefs can lead to discoveries unanticipated at the beginning; the connection between the ethos of a leader and the ethos of a community; and the underappreciated power of epideictic rhetoric "to affirm values and articulate new vocabularies" (178). In addressing such broad themes, Garver's attention to concrete examples, like Brown v. Board of Education, is thoroughly instructive. The Brown decision, he argues, is "an epideictic declaration that equality and antidiscrimination are fundamental American Constitutional values" (73). Brown clearly demonstrates the ampliative nature of practical reason in that the conclusion it reaches is stronger than the premises from which it begins (i.e., the Fourteenth Amendment); moreover, it generates what Garver calls an "ethical surplus" that allows for unanticipated implications that are stronger still, such as the later Court decision striking down antimiscegenation laws (71–73). This "increase" in strength in proceeding from premises to conclusion is "impossible under a purely deductive conception of rationality," Garver writes (73), yet it is well explained by his Aristotle-inspired account of practical reasoning.Surely some readers will recoil from Garver's more provocative claims, such as that "we decide... to be convinced and choose to find a line of reasoning compelling" (119), offered within a discussion of the responsibility we bear in ethical argumentation. However, the issue that is more problematic, to my mind, concerns Garver's treatment of Plato. This may seem odd, given that Plato only appears as a foil in the book—but the problem is that it is merely a caricature of Plato that Garver allows to act as [End Page 96] a foil. Garver argues against "the Platonic program which will save reason by removing it from human contamination" (3) and "the Platonic hope of replacing ethical reasoning by the certainties of science" (5). He sides with Aristotle's idea that we can aim at effectiveness and at rightness together (48, 200) over against the allegedly Platonic idea that we must choose between truth and our own interest, reason and emotion, and so forth, or else... (shrink)

I am proud to introduce this special issue of Philosophy in the Contemporary World, which is devoted to the range of possibilities open to us in dialogue with ancient philosophers. Needless to say, there will always be reason to return to ancient philosophical texts and retrace their lines of argument, precisely because these works will never cease to challenge us and offer us insight. But there is a special reason for us to take up this task in the present. As (...) I write this introduction, in July 2006, public discourse in the United States is bitterly divided over a wide range of moral and political controversies: chief among these are the issues surrounding the military occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, the various means employed by the U.S. government in investigating and imprisoning suspected terrorists; but also, there are deep divisions within the country over environmental issues, such as that of global warming, and ongoing debate over immigration policy, same-sex marriage, limits of free speech, and so on. While this list of controversies is typical enough, and while some conflict of opinion is surely a necessary part of any living democracy, the rancor in contemporary discourse has escalated to a point that would seem to call into question whether discourse has any role to play in public life besides bludgeoning one’s opponents. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Philosophical Rhetoric of Socrates’ MissionRobert Metcalf"We shall dismiss this business of Chaerephon, as it is nothing but a cheap and sophistical tale [sophistikon kai phortikon diegema]"—Colotes, according to Plutarch's Moralia 14, 1116f-1117a.Socrates' account of his "mission" on behalf of the god at Delphi is one of the most memorable parts of his most famous memorial in Plato's Apology. But it is also controversial as to what it means (...) to Socrates and what it should mean to readers of Plato's text.1 First, there is the curious fact that the story occurs nowhere outside the competing versions of Socrates' defensespeech in Plato and Xenophon, and in the latter version the oracular report differs significantly in content and import: there the Pythia proclaims, not that no one is wiser than Socrates, but that no one is more generous or more just or more "soundminded" (sophron), and Xenophon's Socrates uses this as evidence that he "outshone the rest of mankind" and "deserves congratulations from gods and men alike" (Apology 14-18).2 Furthermore, the sequence of events that make up Socrates' "mission" is itself difficult to discern, from its apparent prompting by the oracular message to Chaerephon, to Socrates' initial effort to refute it, to his ultimate practice of elenchos in order that the oracle (or, at least, his interpretation of the oracle) might remain unrefuted.3 Not surprisingly, it was already a matter of controversy in the third century BC, as we read in the above quotation from Plutarch's Moralia. Whereas Arcesilaus interpreted the story of the Delphic oracle, and the account of elenctic practice occasioned by the oracle, as a model for his own skeptical orientation, Colotes, the Epicurean, charged that he had been duped by Socrates' sophistic oratory.4 To be sure, Colotes' charge of sophistry is meant to be abusive and has value for us only insofar as it counters a piously uncritical reading of Socrates' self-portrayal in Plato's Apology.5 In what follows I shall argue that an appreciation of the irony and mock-humility with which Socrates accounts for his "mission" to philosophize [End Page 143] affords us insight into the philosophical rhetoric that is essential to Socrates' practice of elenchos.But let us begin by examining those strange elements in Socrates' account that have made it "notorious" in the way suggested by the ancient debate.6 Socrates introduces the story of the oracle only after he dismisses, somewhat cursorily, the charges circulated by his "first accusers"—namely, that he investigates the things under the earth and heavenly things, and that he educates people for money (19b-20c). Insisting that he does not dishonor the knowledge involved in these activities (19c, 20b-c), Socrates nonetheless offers little defense apart from simply disowning such knowledge, presumably because these activities are not related to that "matter" (pragma) which has earned him his peculiar reputation (20c-d). It is here, in his explanation of this matter, that Socrates recounts the story of Chaerephon and the Pythia.7 As he begins the story he repeats his vow from the beginning of his defense to tell the jury only the truth (20d), assures them that he is not joking, and then is compelled to plead with them not to make any disturbances—"even," he says, "if I seem to you to be boasting [mega legein] somewhat" (20e). These successive declarations are all necessary, for the story has it that Socrates acquired his reputation through the human wisdom for which Socrates was singled out by the oracle at Delphi (20d-e).Socrates' puzzlement over the oracle and his effort to subject it to elenchos are offered as an explanation for the elenctic practice by which he comes, over time, to acquire his reputation.8 Although he does not say that his practice of elenchos begins with his investigation of the oracle's meaning, he does portray his subsequent practice of elenchos as being "in accordance with the god [kata ton theon]" (22a), an activity for which the god stands as a trustworthy witness (20e), and thus as a "matter of the god [to tou theou]" (21e). Ironically, the account Socrates... (shrink)

An argument found in the writings of the so-called "New Atheists" has it that the religious indoctrination of children is oppressive in and of itself, but this argument rests on what may be called an epidemiological orientation toward belief. While some forms of religious indoctrination may indeed be oppressive, any adequate phenomenology of religious belief must allow for various ways in which individuals relate themselves doxastically to the religion in which they were raised, and some of these ways could hardly (...) be called "oppressive." Drawing on Wittgenstein's scattered writings on religion, this paper sketches out an account of religion as a form of ligature—in line with its etymology—whose binding-character lies in those life-regulating basic attitudes that are deeper, and more resistant to revision, than any opinion one happens to have. (shrink)

We investigate the effect of priming on pro-social behaviour in a setting where there is a clear financial incentive to free ride. By activating the concept of cooperation among randomly selected individuals, we explore whether it is possible to positively influence people’s voluntary contributions to the public good. Our findings indicate that cooperative priming increases contributions in a one-shot public goods game from approximately 25–36 % compared with the non-primed group. The results call for further explorations of the role of (...) priming in economic behaviours in general. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article brings Cormac McCarthy's novels into discussion with Dewey's thinking, particularly with an eye to the distinction, made famous from A Common Faith, between religion and “the religious.” In this work Dewey argues for emancipating what is genuinely religious from all that is adventitious to it—above all, anything wedded to ideas of the supernatural—so that “the religious aspect of experience will be free to develop freely on its own account.” He concludes by highlighting the need to make explicit (...) and militant “the common faith of mankind”—which lies in the recognition that “the things in civilization we most prize are not of ourselves” but “exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link.” While McCarthy's novels share Dewey's broadly anti-supernatural and anti-ecclesiastical commitments, there are some areas of divergence between the two that allow us to reflect critically on the distinction between religion and “the religious.” Most significantly, whereas Dewey aims to discern the intrinsic quality of the religious apart from what is adventitious to it, McCarthy focuses on the historical givenness of religious practices so as then to imagine their repurposing and radical transformation. (shrink)

This essay argues for a distinction between bioethics in the customary sense and the “bioethical”—where the latter involves exploration of disturbing literary and/or artistic material. The “bioethical” signifies an affective and imaginative sphere in which we experience the mattering-to-us-morally of other human beings and non-human animals. The essay further argues that Cormac McCarthy’s writings allow us to explore the bioethical, with certain philosophical implications of this discussed in detail.

This paper addresses the philosophical problems posed by shame-consciousness, specifically with respect to the question as to whether the feelings of shame signify an apprehension of truth. After reviewing several methodological problems posed by shame-consciousness, the paper takes up the theoretical treatment of shame in Freud, Scheler, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, in order to show how shame illuminates the constitution of subjectivity by power relations in society. This psychoanalytic and phenomenological account of shame is shown to be confirmed by material drawn (...) from cultural studies of shame, and by contemporary feminist critique. (shrink)

While many scholarly interpretations of Plato’s Symposium express skepticism toward the content of Alcibiades’ speech, this essay argues Alcibiades’ portrait of Socrates is credible on the whole, is consistent with the portrayal of Socrates elsewhere, and is of great significance for our understanding of philosophical eros as exemplified in Socrates’ philosophical activity. Furthermore, by putting Socrates on trial for hybris, Alcibiades’ speech raises important philosophical questions as to whether the contempt with which he treated Alcibiades is not part and parcel (...) of the wholesale contemning of human particularity implicit in Diotima’s teaching about eros. (shrink)

Volume 18 of Martin Heidegger's collected works presents his important 1924 Marburg lectures which anticipate much of the revolutionary thinking that he subsequently articulated in Being and Time. Here are the seeds of the ideas that would become Heidegger's unique phenomenology. Heidegger interprets Aristotle's Rhetoric and looks closely at the Greek notion of pathos. These lectures offer special insight into the development of his concepts of care and concern, being-at-hand, being-in-the-world, and attunement, which were later elaborated in Being and Time. (...) Available in English for the first time, they make a significant contribution to ancient philosophy, Aristotle studies, Continental philosophy, and phenomenology. (shrink)

The disorientation experienced by those new to philosophy attests to the fact that philosophy is, essentially, a self-transformative focal practice requiring long training and renewed commitment, and this has implications for how we think about the use of technology in teaching philosophy. By examing Plato's famous critique of writing in his Phaedrus, Statesman, and Seventh Letter, we find that his account of philosophy as an epitēdeuma, or "focal practice," demonstrates why teaching philosophy is not a matter of "content-delivery," but rather (...) a process of reorienting the student toward the subject matter of philosophy. The implications of this for the debate over online instructional formats in higher education are then explored in some detail. (shrink)

One will never be able to interrogate wonder philosophically except by way of a questioning that the operation of wonder will already have determined. It is a well-known teaching in the writings of both Plato and Aristotle that wonder (thauma) is the beginning of philosophy. But few philosophers have given wonder much thought—certainly, no philosopher that I am aware of has, like Professor Sallis, returned time and again to think through wonder. Sallis’s thinking through wonder is guided by his reading (...) of ancient Greek philosophy, and furthermore, as I hope to show, it opens up a reengagement with Greek philosophers—in particular, with those early Greek thinkers who are known collectively as the .. (shrink)

While it may be controversial to categorize Plato’s Theatetetus as “epistemological,” given what is implied by this term, the dialogue does offer a discourse on knowledge, at least in the minimal sense of questioning knowledge. But more than that, the dialogue “situates” its questioning, and its critical examination of attempted definitions of knowledge, in two ways that are particularly illuminating: first, its dramatization of Socrates coming-to-know Theaetetus through philosophical dialogue; second, its taking for granted a whole array of epistemic practices (...) and keeping them in view, peripherally, throughout the discussion. The most interesting example of the latter is found in the famous Digression of the Theaetetus, where the difference between philosophy and rhetoric is understood in terms of the knowledge/lack-of-knowledge belonging to each. (shrink)

Robert Maydole has recently presented a sophisticated ontological argument that he calls the Modal Perfection Argument for the existence of a supreme being. While this ontological argument is probably better than most of its peers, it is nonetheless open to at least one decisive objection. The purpose of this brief comment is to develop that objection. I claim that this objection indicates an important further point about the concept of entailment and its role in ontological arguments at large, the (...) recognition of which helps to refute other conceivable ontological arguments. (shrink)

This book is born from a desire to understand how Plato influenced and was influenced by the intellectual culture of Western Greece, the ancient Hellenic cities of Sicily and Southern Italy. In 2018, a seminar on Plato at Syracuse was organized, in which a small group of scholars discussed a new translation of the Seventh Letter and several essays on the topic. The seminar was intense but friendly, having attracted a diverse group of scholars that ranged from graduate students to (...) senior professors, hailing from at least three different continents, and representing a variety of academic specialties. We tried to create a book that would invite further study of the topic by identifying new questions to be asked while addressing enduring issues. The essays consider the historical, political, and philosophical implications of Plato’s involvement in Syracuse. They also look at the reception of his voyage among fellow philosophers, ancient and modern. Readers may come to their own conclusions, but one thing is clear: the history of philosophy was profoundly influenced by Plato’s voyages in Western Greece. The book begins with a new translation of Plato’s Seventh Letter by Jonah Radding, as well as the epitaph for Dion attributed to Plato. An introduction by editors Heather Reid and Mark Ralkowski is followed by essays from Carolina Araújo, Christos C. Evangeliou, Filippo Forcignanò, Francisco J. Gonzalez, Jill Gordon, Andrew Hull, Tony Leyh, Marina Marren, Mary R. McHugh, Robert Metcalf, Marion Theresa Schneider, Karen Sieben, and Nickolas Pappas. (shrink)

Individuals are a prominent part of the biological world. Although biologists and philosophers of biology draw freely on the concept of an individual in articulating both widely accepted and more controversial claims, there has been little explicit work devoted to the biological notion of an individual itself. How should we think about biological individuals? What are the roles that biological individuals play in processes such as natural selection (are genes and groups also units of selection?), speciation (are species individuals?), and (...) organismic development (do genomes code for organisms)? Much of our discussion here will focus on organisms as a central kind of biological individual, and that discussion will raise broader questions about the nature of the biological world, for example, about its complexity, its organization, and its relation to human thought. (shrink)

It is beliefs of this sort--de linguabeliefs--that Robert Fiengo and Robert May explore in this book.

Seven features which in practice seem to differentiate belief systems from knowledge systems are discussed. These are: nonconsensuality, “existence beliefs,” alternative worlds, evaluative components, episodic material, unboundedness, and variable credences. Each of these features gives rise to challenging representation problems. Progress on any of these problems within artificial intelligence would be helpful in the study of knowledge systems as well as belief systems, inasmuch as the distinction between the two types of systems is not absolute.

'Nadeau and Kafatos supply plenty of food for thought: the apparently recondite concept of non-locality, they suggest, has consequences everywhere.'--Publisher's Weekly.

Susan Wolf’s compatibilism is unique for being ‘asymmetrical.' While holding that blameworthiness entails being able to avoid acting wrongly, she maintains that our freedom consists in single-mindedly pursuing Truth and Goodness. Comparing and contrasting her position to Saint Anselm’s seminal, libertarian approach to the same subject elicits serious questions, highlighting its drawbacks. How could freedom entail the inability to do certain things? In what sense are reasons causes? What sense can be made of a double standard for assignments of responsibility? (...) Is not self-control inconsistent with being caused to act by things independent of oneself? Does not virtue require struggling against falsehoods and evils by which one could be overcome? Wolf’s compatibilism must be rejected, I shall argue, in light of Anselm’s intuitively satisfying response to these concerns: we should prefer a philosophy that entails more of what we want from freedom without begging unanswerable questions of its own. (shrink)

This book offers an in-depth analysis of the wide range of issues surrounding "passive euthanasia" and "allow-to-die" decisions. The author develops a comprehensive conceptual model that is highly useful for assessing and dealing with real-life situations. He presents an informative historical overview, an evaluation of the clinical settings in which treatment abatement takes place, and an insightful discussion of relevant legal aspects. The result is a clearly articulated ethical analysis that is medically realistic, philosophically sound, and legally viable.