CEO compensation by nonprofit organizations is controversial. Higher-qualified CEOs should be compensated more than lesser-qualified individuals because of better performance regarding organizational goals and missions. Alternatively, an ethical issue may exist if CEOs are overcompensated resulting in a negative impact on the operations of their organizations. Donors have the incentive to monitor nonprofit organizations, but their role is limited to their ability to acquire nonprofit organization information. However, charity rating agencies make information more accessible and understandable, thus reducing information asymmetry (...) between donors and nonprofit organizations. This study examines whether charity rating availability is associated with negative pay-to-performance sensitivity. Using a sample derived from the IRS Form 990 s and Charity Navigator ratings, this study provides evidence that rating availability is negatively related to pay-to-performance sensitivity in nonprofit organizations. Additional tests provide evidence that the overall rating score and its financial rating component are negatively associated with pay-to-performance sensitivity. (shrink)

Richard Rorty (1931–2007) was one of the most provocative and controversial philosophers of the past 50 years. He had a rare ability to combine sophisticated arguments with wit, charm, and humor. He was never dull – and he reached a wide public throughout the world. Originally trained in the history of philosophy and the grand tradition of metaphysics, he became fascinated with the linguistic turn in philosophy. During his early philosophical career, he wrote articles that were at the (...) cutting edge of analytic philosophy. He developed a new approach to the mind-body problem and raised troubling questions about the viability of the conceptual analysis of ordinary language. Soon, he began to question what he called the “Kantian foundations” of analytic philosophy. In 1979, he published Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, a book that became an immediate sensation. Rorty, employing ingenious arguments, questioned the basis of analytic philosophy, and more generally the very idea of systematic philosophy. He called into question the Descartes-Locke-Kant tradition and claimed that the metaphor of the “mirror of nature” had misled philosophers into thinking that the task of philosophy is to “get things right” by representing objective reality. In the mid-twentieth century, the analytic-continental split in philosophy became bitterly entrenched. Many Anglo-American philosophers were convinced that linguistic analytic philosophy is “the only game in town.” They disdained what they took to be the lack of clarity and argumentative rigor among continental thinkers. The “compliment” was returned by continental thinkers who thought that much of analytic philosophy was trivial and insignificant. Rorty employed clever analytic techniques to challenge the pretentions of analytic philosophy. Many of his professional colleagues were furious. At the same time, Rorty engaged thinkers like Sartre, Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas, Derrida, and Foucault. This delighted aficionados of continental philosophy – although they frequently judged his interpretations of these thinkers to be distorted caricatures. Rorty was one of the rare philosophers who transcended the analytic-continental split. At the same time, Rorty increasingly identified himself with the American pragmatic tradition. He entitled his 1982 collection of essays, “Consequences of Pragmatism,” which included his famous 1979 presidential address to the American Philosophical Association: “‘Pragmatism’ is a vague, ambiguous, and overworked word. Nevertheless it names the glory of our country’s intellectual tradition. No other American writers have offered so radical suggestion for making our future different from the past, as have James and Dewey” (Rorty 1982, p. 160). Rorty helped to revive a serious interest in James and Dewey. In the Introduction to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, he declared that the three most important philosophers of the twentieth century were Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey. Analytic philosophers might agree about the importance of Wittgenstein; continental thinkers might acknowledge the importance of Heidegger; but virtually no professional philosopher (except devotees of Dewey) would have ranked Dewey with the other two. Rorty claimed that each of these three thinkers had originally sought to find a new way to make philosophy “foundational,” but they came to realize that their earlier work was self-deceptive and they spent the rest of their time warning us against the temptations to which they had succumbed. “Their later work is therapeutic rather than constructive, edifying rather than systematic, designed to make the reader question his own motives for philosophizing rather than supply him with a new philosophical program.” (Rorty 1979, pp. 5–6) Rorty acknowledged that Dewey lacked Wittgenstein’s “dialectical acuity” and Heidegger’s “historical learning,” but Dewey articulated a vision of a new type of society. “In his ideal society, culture is no longer dominated by the ideal of objective cognition but by that of aesthetic enhancement. In that culture, as he said, the arts and sciences would be the ‘unforced flowers of life.” (Rorty 1979, p. 13) This was also Rorty’s vision of a liberal utopia. He developed this vision in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, where the central figure becomes the liberal ironist. Whereas Philosophy and the Mirror and Nature was filled with brilliant (although controversial) arguments, Rorty now debunked the role of argument in philosophy. “On the view of philosophy which I am offering, philosophers should not be asked for arguments against, for example, the correspondence theory of truth or the idea of the ‘intrinsic nature of reality’.” (Rorty 1989, p. 8) He favored redescription rather than argument. “I am not going to offer arguments against the vocabulary I want to replace. Instead, I am going to try to make the vocabulary I favor look attractive by showing how it may redescribe a variety of topics.” (Rorty 1989, p. 9) Interesting philosophy is not really a matter of argument at all but rather “a contrast between an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a half-formed vocabulary which vaguely promises great things” (Rorty 1989, p. 9). Rorty deflated what many philosophers took to be the central concerns of philosophy, the nature of truth, reality, objectivity, knowledge, and morality. He sought to replace the appeal to objectivity with the appeal of solidarity. He is famous for his slogan “Take care of freedom and truth will take care of itself” (Rorty 1989, p. 176). Even admirers of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature were distressed by the radical turn of Contingency where he suggested that novels, journalism, and literary reflection might be more effective than philosophical argumentation in bringing about his liberal utopia. Some of his fiercest critics claimed that Rorty could no longer be taken seriously as a philosopher. Contingency was savagely criticized and ridiculed, so much so that Rorty was provoked to write his revealing and delightful autobiographical sketch, “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids.” “I am sometimes told, by critics from both ends of the political spectrum, that my views are so weird as to be merely frivolous. They suspect that I will say anything to get a gasp, that I am just amusing myself by contradicting everybody else. This hurts. So I have tried, in what follows, to say something about how I got into my present position—how I got into philosophy, and then found myself unable to use philosophy for the purpose I had originally in mind.” (Rorty 1999, p. 5) What follows is an account of how Rorty grew up in a family that was deeply committed to furthering social justice. (“Trotsky” is a synecdoche for social justice.) Rorty also tells of his early nerdish love of the wild orchids of New Jersey. (“Wild orchids” is the synecdoche for private pleasures.) When Rorty became interested in philosophy, he wanted to find some intellectual or esthetic framework that would hold reality and justice in a single vision – one that would integrate social justice and private idiosyncratic pleasures. He tells the story of his eventual discovery that there was no such overarching framework and his growing realization that there was no need for such a framework. As a public citizen, one can be deeply committed to advancing social justice and at the same time, as a private person, enjoy idiosyncratic pleasures. There is no need to reconcile or synthesize these two incommensurable dimensions of human life. (shrink)

The question of the relationship of the making of value judgments in a typically ethical sense to the methods and procedures of science has been discussed in the literature at least to that point which e. e. cummings somewhere refers to as “The Mystical Moment of Dullness.” Nevertheless, albeit with some trepidation, I feel that something more may fruitfully be said on the subject.

Books about the law can sometimes be dull and hard to follow. This one is not. It is easy to read; the writing style is accessible and the book is well organised and well structured. The author clo...

This paper will seek to explore some of the implications of the new evangelization from an ecclesiological perspective. A key question is, what is an appropriate ecclesiological context for the new evangelization? Any conclusions or recommendations about how to respond and contextualize the new evangelization need to be grounded in an appropriate ecclesiology; one that sits well with contemporary Catholic scholarship, especially in light of the teaching of the Second Vatican Council. Following Dulles, no single approach to ecclesiology can fully (...) explain the complex nature of the Church. Taking the ecclesiology of Lumen Gentium as a departure point a number of perspectives will be addressed, but an argument will be made for understanding the new evangelization within an ecclesiology of communion and of discipleship. (shrink)

Ecology has had a lower profile in Biology & Philosophy than one might expect on the basis of the attention ecology is given in public discussions in relation to environmental issues. Our tentative explanation is that ecology appears theoretically redundant within biology and, consequently, philosophically challenging problemsrelated to biology are commonly supposed to be somewhere else, particularly in the molecular sphere. Richard Levins has recognized the genuine challenges posed by ecology for theoretical and philosophical thinking in biology. This essay (...) sets the stage for appreciating his work; it was preceded by four articles published in Biology & Philosophy 15(2),and is followed by a personal reminiscent. (shrink)

This photodocumentary reveals the second city through the stories and black-and-white images of its inhabitants.

That India once had a sustained ‘dialogue’ with Scottish Philosophy is not gener- ally known, or that the exchange occurred in the medium of Sanskrit, not English. The essay explores an important cross-cultural encounter in the colonial context of mid 19th-century Benares where two Scots, John Muir and James Ballantyne, served as principals of a Sanskrit college established by the East India Company. Educated toward the end of the Scottish Enlightenment, they endeavoured to translate such distinctive concepts of ‘Scotch Metaphysics’ (...) as Externalism into Indian philosophical categories. The ensuing ‘dialogue’ with Brahmin interlocutors shows that the prob- lems they faced were less terminological than conceptual, having to do with contras- tive ways of understanding ‘mind’ and ‘man’. Between the two Scots, there were also signifi cant differences, although both had gone to India as Scottish Calvinists. While Muir remained largely impervious to Indian infl uence, Ballantyne was profoundly changed, becoming, in effect, a ‘Vedantic Calvinist’. (shrink)

"Younker delves into and illustrates every aspect of Putman's life: how he works, what he does to relax, how he interacts with family and friends. He shows how Putman fished, divulging some of the secrets of the professional fisherman. Examining this fisherman's life - as well as the lives of his relatives and friends - Younker demonstrates Putman's skill as colorful storyteller with a rich vocabulary. Putman proved forthright when expressing his views about life, river lore, and the changing ecology."--Jacket.

(2005). Reflections on the Appointment of Dr. Edmund Pellegrino to the President's Council on Bioethics. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 5, No. 6, pp. W8-W9. doi: 10.1080/15265160500388640.

I argue with my friends a lot. That is, I offer them reasons to believe all sorts of philosophical conclusions. Sadly, despite the quality of my arguments, and despite their apparent intelligence, they don’t always agree. They keep insisting on principles in the face of my wittier and wittier counterexamples, and they keep offering their own dull alleged counterexamples to my clever principles. What is a philosopher to do in these circumstances? (And I don’t mean get better friends.) One (...) popular answer these days is that I should, to some extent, defer to my friends. If I look at a batch of reasons and conclude p, and my equally talented friend reaches an incompatible conclusion q, I should revise my opinion so I’m now undecided between p and q. I should, in the preferred lingo, assign equal weight to my view as to theirs. This is despite the fact that I’ve looked at their reasons for concluding q and found them wanting. If I hadn’t, I would have already concluded q. The mere fact that a friend (from now on I’ll leave off the qualifier ‘equally talented and informed’, since all my friends satisfy that) reaches a contrary opinion should be reason to move me. Such a position is defended by Richard Feldman (2006a, 2006b), David Christensen (2007) and Adam Elga (forthcoming). This equal weight view, hereafter EW, is itself a philosophical position. And while some of my friends believe it, some of my friends do not. (Nor, I should add for your benefit, do I.) This raises an odd little dilemma. If EW is correct, then the fact that my friends disagree about it means that I shouldn’t be particularly confident that it is true, since EW says that I shouldn’t be too confident about any position on which my friends disagree. But, as I’ll argue below, to consistently implement EW, I have to be maximally confident that it is true. So to accept EW, I have to inconsistently both be very confident that it is true and not very confident that it is true. This seems like a problem, and a reason to not accept EW.. (shrink)

Hermeneutics, the Bible and Literary Criticism. Edited by Ann Loades and Michael McLain.The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System. By Avery Dulles.The Shape of Soreriology. By John McIntyre.Not the Cross But the Crucfied. By H.‐E. Mertens.Verbum Curo: An Encyclopedia on Jesus, the Christ. By Michael O'Carroll.The Search for the Origins of Christian Worship: Sources and Methods for the Study of the Early Liturgy. By Paul Bradshaw.Worship: Initiation and the Churches. By Leonel L. Mitchell.The Eucharistic Mystery: Revitalizing the Tradition. By (...) David Power.Church of Churches: The Ecclesiology of Communion. By J.‐M. Tillard.God and History, Aspects of British Theology 1875‐1914. By Peter Hinchliff.Clear Heads and Holy Hearts: The Religious and Theological Ideal of John Henry Newman. By Terrence Merrigan.The Desert Fathers on Monastic Community. By Graham Gould.John Moschos, ‘The Spiritual Meadow’. Introduction, translation and notes by John Wortley.A Gentle Touch. By David Pailin.The Eye of the Storm: Spiritual Resources for rhe Pursuit of Justice. By Kenneth Leech.The Church and the Arts. Edited by Diana Wood.Anti‐Christian Polemic in Early Islam: Abu Isa al‐Warraq's ‘Against the Trinity’. Edited by David Thomas.Bernardus Magister: Papers Presented at the Nonacentenary Celebration of the Birth of St Bernard of Clairvaux. Edited by John R. Sommerfeldt.Church and City 1000‐1500: Essays in Honour of Christopher Brooke. Edited by David Abulafia, Michael Franklin and Miri Rubin.‘Piers Plowman’ and the Problem of Belief. By Britton J. Harwood.Ignutius of Luyola: The Psychology of a Saint. By W. W. Meissner.Jerome Naahl, S. J., 1507‐1580: Tracking the First Generation of Jesuits. By William V. Bangert, edited and completed by Thomas M. McCoog.From Bishop to Witch: The System of the Sacred in Early Modern Terra d'Otranto. By David Gentilcore.Civic Politics in the Rome of Urban VIII. By Laurie Nussdorfer.Michel de Montaigne: The Complete Essays. Translated by M. A. Screech.Montaigne and Melancholy: The Wisdom of the ‘Essays’. By M. A. Screech.Religion and Philosophy. Edited by Martin Warner.What is Faith? Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. By Anthony Kenny.Truth and Hisroriciry. By Richard Campbell. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Evangelical Adrift: The Making of John Henry Newman's Theology by Geertjan ZuijdwegtReinhard HütterAn Evangelical Adrift: The Making of John Henry Newman's Theology by Geertjan Zuijdwegt (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2022), xii + 365pp.What do we know of St. John Henry Newman's life, thought, and theological development before 1833, the year in which the Oxford Movement or Tractarian Movement was launched by Newman, John (...) Keble, and Richard Hurrell Froude? Newman, in his rightly famous and indispensable Apologia Pro Vita Sua, covers this period in one brief chapter offering at best a rough outline and some central signposts. A more nuanced and somewhat more expansive picture is emerging in Newman's Autobiographical Writings, published posthumously in 1956. Wilfrid Ward, in the two immense volumes of his 1912 Newman biography, dedicates one single chapter entitled "Life in the Church of England (1801–1845)" to the first forty-four years of Newman's life, and of those fifty-four pages, only thirty cover the time from Newman's birth in 1801 to the signal year 1833. Ian Ker, in his 1988 biography, arguably still the normative and unsurpassed scholarly Newman biography, acknowledged as such by admirers and critics alike, dedicates one chapter of fifty-three pages to the same time period. Finally, Geertjan Zuijdwegt, in his very well written and equally well-researched and well-argued monograph of 344 pages, offers a detailed and nuanced account of Newman's theological development from his teenage conversion to Calvinist Evangelicalism up to and including the beginnings of the Tractarian Movement from 1833 to 1835. One must go back to Maisie Ward's lovely portrait, Young Mr. Newman, from 1948, to find a book that covers roughly the same territory. Ward's captivating biographical portrait and Zuijdwegt's meticulously researched theological biography may be read with great benefit as mutually enlightening and complementary accounts—at least in the eyes of this reader. The latter's new work is, however, a commendable and indeed indispensable achievement of its own. For one, what lies between Ward's portrait of the young Newman and Zuijdwegt's reconstruction of Newman's [End Page 1097] early intellectual and theological development is Frank M. Turner's 2002 John Henry Newman: The Challenge to Evangelical Religion, a 750-page ad hominem attack on Newman's person and character, not only making Evangelicalism (and not theological and political liberalism) the alleged primary if not sole object of the post-Evangelical Newman's Tractarian and post-Tractarian, Catholic polemic, but also insinuating alongside in so many ways that Newman was dishonest about his work and thought, that he cared deeply for money or the security of a "living," that he was a closeted and repressed homosexual, and that he was lying about his conversion experiences—charges advanced by Charles Kingsley and other contemporaries of Newman's day and age and debunked—now warmed up und recycled under the guise of what pretended to be a massive scholarly study of intellectual history published by an Ivy League university press. Much ink has been spilled by Newman scholars in the years since Turner's book appeared to set the record straight, while others thought the time was ripe to form a "Turner school" of critical, iconoclastic Newman scholarship. Unsurprisingly, since 2002, there has been no dull moment in the small world of Newman scholarship, now divided between two well-defined camps, with "iconographers" (so called by the iconoclasts) on one side, and on the other those who aim at advancing a hard-nosed form of critical, detached historical Newman scholarship that at points has a hard time identifying the fine line between historical criticism and barely camouflaged detraction.Zuijdwegt's book is a considerable achievement first and foremost simply because he escapes to a commendably high degree, albeit not completely, the trench warfare between the warring camps of Newman scholarship. His unavoidable engagement with Turner's work is judicious, balanced, and overall, in a measured way, critical. He is far more frequently disagreeing with Turner's interpretation than agreeing with a limited number of interpretive points about Newman's early... (shrink)

This 1984 book describes the development of thought, both of Keynes and others, culminating in the publication in 1936 of Keynes' General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. As one of Keynes' close collaborators - from December 1929, when the writing of the Treatise was nearing its completion - Richard Khan provides a uniquely insightful analysis of these events. The author starts with a brief survey of the contributions influential in forming Keynes' early ideas, and moves on to explore (...) the significance of the Quantity Theory of Money, and traces the development of Keynes' attitude towards the theory through his published books. Subsequent lectures are devoted to Keynes' Treatise on Money, and to his more popular writings as an economic adviser which marked the transition from the thinking in the Treatise to that in the General Theory which the author critically examines. The final lecture records the author's memory of his personal relationship with Keynes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:PORTIA'S SUITORS by Richard Kuhns and Barbara Tovey I am always inclined to believe that Shakespeare has more allusions to particular facts and persons than his readers commonly suppose. —Samuel Johnson, "Merchant of Venice," Notes on Shakespeare's Plays. 66f\ver-name them," Portia says to Nerissa, "and as thou namest V^/them, I will describe them, and according to my description level at my affection." This passage in TL· Merchant of (...) Venice (Act I, Scene ii), where Portia describes her suitors, presents certain problems.1 To our knowledge interpreters have not addressed them. In the first place, the lengthy description ofthe discarded suitors serves no apparent function. The suitors play no role whatsoever in the subsequent development of the drama, and the protracted account of their failings retards rather than advances the action of the play. To be sure, Shakespeare wanted die audience to be aware that Portia had many suitors of high rank and from many different countries, but it was scarcely necessary for him to go to such lengths to make the point. In the second place, the denigration of the previous suitors in this scene does not accord with the account ofthem given by Bassanio when talking to Antonio in the first act: Nor is the wide world ignorant of her worth, For the four winds blow in from every coast Renowned suitors, and her sunny locks 325 326Philosophy and Literature Hang on her temples like a golden fleece, Which makes her seat of Belmont Colchos' strond, And many Jasons come in quest of her. (Li. 167-72) The suitors as described by Portia hardly deserve to be called "renowned," or to be referred to as "Jasons." The belittling of his competitors in this scene also has the undesirable effect of trivializing Bassanio 's achievement in Act III. Thirdly, there is something decidedly odd about the sort of failings attributed to the suitors by Portia. Had he so wished, Shakespeare could have utilized this passage to present a sort of catalogue of human frailties. One suitor might have been a representative of pride, another of avarice, another of envy, etc. But Shakespeare does nothing of the sort. With the exception of the German, who is a drunkard, the defects of the suitors can hardly be considered major vices. The Neapolitan Prince talks too much about his horse, the County Palatine frowns excessively, the French lord is an imitator of the others, the English baron is "oddly suited," and so on. Yet Shakespeare dwells at considerable length upon these more or less trivial failings. Now it may be suggested that Shakespeare, who is certainly deeply interested in national differences of character and behavior, may have inserted this discussion of the suitors into the play in order to provide himself with an opportunity for analysis of idiosyncratic national traits. The answer to this objection is simple. The characteristics ascribed to the suitors do not represent genuine or interesting national differences any more than they stand for major human vices. Is it true, as under this hypothesis Shakespeare would seem to be suggesting, that Neapolitans are fonder of horses than most other folk? Or that Frenchmen are particularly prone to imitating others? Or that Germans are uniquely predisposed to alcoholism? If not, we must admit that the discussion of the discarded suitors represents a puzzling and as yet unexplained digression. Commenting upon this scene, Samuel Johnson made a suggestion that we think merits serious consideration. Might it be the case that the suitors represent actual persons, whose descriptions give clues to their real identities? It is our suggestion that the six suitors make up a company of the most gifted, influential, and to Shakespeare—we suspect—the most interesting writers of the tradition in which he worked. These are the writers from whom he derived inspiration and plots. The question may Richard Kuhns and Barbara Tovey327 well be raised, as to why, if this is so, the suitors are depicted in such derogatory terms. We suggest that one very potent way in which to express the deepest gratitude and admiration is by means of a loving insult. This technique ofexpressing affection and indebtedness to one's literary mentors... (shrink)

According to Hebrews, the Son of God appeared to "break the power of him who holds the power of death--that is, the devil--and free those who all their lives were held in slavery by their fear of death." What does it mean to be enslaved, all our lives, to the fear of death? And why is this fear described as "the power of the devil"? And most importantly, how are we--as individuals and as faith communities--to be set free from this (...) slavery to death?In another creative interdisciplinary fusion, Richard Beck blends Eastern Orthodox perspectives, biblical text, existential psychology, and contemporary theology to describe our slavery to the fear of death, a slavery rooted in the basic anxieties of self-preservation and the neurotic anxieties at the root of our self-esteem. Driven by anxiety--enslaved to the fear of death--we are revealed to be morally and spiritually vulnerable as "the sting of death is sin." Beck argues that in the face of this predicament, resurrection is experienced as liberation from the slavery of death in the martyrological, eccentric, cruciform, and communal capacity to overcome fear in living fully and sacrificially for others. (shrink)

Pluralism in Theory and Practice not only brings McKeon to the attention of contemporary philosophers and students; it also puts his theories into practice. Some of the essays explicate aspects of McKeon's thought or situate him in the context of American intellectual and practical engagement. Others take the concerns he raised as starting points for inquiries into urgent contemporary problems, or, in some cases, for reexamining McKeon's work as fertile ground for shaping the direction of new investigation.

This provocative book explores the difficulties surrounding the attempt to understand the relationship between literary and political discourse. It examines the initial formulation of these difficulties in Georgian Britain, and traces them through the cultural debates of the Victorian men of letters to the critical ideologies of the twentieth-century literary academy. Richard Bourke offers an incisive critique of the way in which the idea of Culture has been used as a means of resolving the failure to establish an adequate (...) theory of politics in the wake of the French Revolution. (shrink)

'Insight' is not a very popular word in psychology or biology. Popular terms-like "intelligence", "planning", "complexity" or "cognitive"- have a habit of sprawling out to include everyone's favourite interpretation, and end up with such vague meanings that each new writer has to redefine them for use. Insight remains in everyday usage: as a down-to-earth, lay term for a deep, shrewd or discerning kind of understanding. Insight is a good thing to have, so it's important to find out how it evolved, (...) and that's what this book is about. Coming 20 years after publication of Richard Byrne's seminal book The Thinking Ape, Evolving Insight develops a new theory of the evolutionary origins of human abilities to understand the world of objects and other people. Defining mental representation and computation as 'insight', it reviews the evidence for insight in the cognition of animals. (shrink)

Since literary historian Robert Bone published his seminal essay ‘Richard Wright and the Chicago Renaissance’ in 1986, scholars have created new cartographies of previously unexplored terrain in American cultural history. The earliest studies focused on literature, but more recently attention has turned to other disciplines, including visual arts. Recent publication of The Muse in Bronzeville: African American Creative Expression in Chicago, 1932–1950 (2011) by Robert Bone and Richard A. Courage promises to decisively broaden scholarly understandings of the scope (...) and significance of Chicago-centred cultural production during the Great Depression and post-war years. Of particular relevance to contemporary studies of new media art is the manner in which then-emergent ideas and practices – centring on racialized subject matter, elite and mass audiences, traditional and new mediums of expression, private vs public sponsorship, and passive vs active reception of art objects – converged to create new paradigms and possibilities for visual artists to reshape consciousness in a period of institutional collapse and change. Chicago’s New Negro artists of the 1930s and 1940s, like their counterparts in 1920s Harlem, sought to reframe perceptions of African American life, to re-present the black subject as something other than an object of contempt or amusement beneath the privileged gaze of the white viewer. Just as these artists sought to revise perceptions of racial reality, examination of the wide range of actual images they created and the mediums and styles they explored revises reductive notions about creative expression in this period, which often portray a mere subordination of art to propaganda and an embrace of representational aesthetics and simplistic narratives in a fruitless detour in the evolution from modernism to postmodernism. On the contrary, Andrew Hemingway notes the range of stylistic experiment and characterizes so-called ‘social art’ as ‘a hybrid and unstable mode [which] had to carry the imperative to be an art equal in formal achievement to both the great art of the past and the modern tradition … [and] to suggest a political orientation without becoming overt revolutionary propaganda’ (2002).New media theorist Oliver Grau observes thatIn many quarters, virtual reality is viewed as a totally new phenomenon… but it did not make its first appearance with the technical invention of computer-aided virtual realities. On the contrary, virtual reality forms part of the core of the relationship of humans to images… grounded in art traditions that have receivedscant attention up to now.(2004)In the midst of another period of change, of transformed and transforming ideas and practices in the arts, we have much to learn from the attempts of Chicago’s New (Media) Negro artists to create ‘art for the people’, to immerse broad audiences in such accessible media as mural painting, photography and graphic arts. (shrink)

Musical genius, polemicist, explosive personality-that was the nineteenth-century German composer Richard Wagner, who paid as much attention to his reputation as to his genius. Often maddening, and sometimes called mad, Wagner wrote with the same intensity that characterized his music. The letters and essays collected in Judaism in Music and Other Essays were published during the 1850s and 1860s, the period when he was chiefly occupied with the creation of The Ring of the Nibelung. Highlighting this collection is the (...) notorious 1850 article "Judaism in Music, " which caused such a firestorm that nearly twenty years later Wagner published an unapologetic appendix. Other prose pieces include "On the Performing of Tannhauser, " written while he was in political exile; "On Musical Criticism, " an appeal for a more vital approach to art undivorced from life; and "Music of the Future." This volume concludes with letters to friends about the intent and performance of his great operas; estimations of Liszt, Beethoven, Mozart, Gluck, Berlioz, and others; and suggestions for the reform of opera houses in Vienna, Paris, and Zurich. The Bison Book edition includes the full text of volume 3 of William Ashton Ellis's 1894 translation commissioned by the London Wagner Society. (shrink)

Mit diesem Buch führt Richard Egger in das komplexe Thema Ethik ein: in die Theorie der Menschlichkeit. Er richtet sich damit an Menschen, die Verantwortung für andere tragen – sei es als Vorgesetzte, als Ärztin oder Wissenschaftler, Mutter oder Vater, Lehrer oder in vielen anderen Rollen. Anhand von Beispielen aus unterschiedlichen Lebensbereichen zeigt Egger auf, welche Rolle Vernunft und Gefühl, aber auch unsere Gerechtigkeitsvorstellung für ethisches Handeln spielen. Sein Fazit: Menschlich handeln kann nur, wer einen Sinn für Fairness und (...) Gleichwertigkeit, persönliche Verpflichtung und moralische Integrität entwickelt. Eine solche Haltung durchdringt den ganzen Menschen und macht Verantwortungsträger erst zu wirklichen Leadern.Egger stützt sich dabei auf die Fragen und Argumente, Regeln und Instrumente aus der Geschichte der Ethik, aber auch auf seine langjährige Erfahrung als Berater von Menschen. Der Autor schreibt philosophisch fundiert und gleichzeitig fesselnd und verständlich. Der Inhalt Die Welt: Warum wir Ethik brauchen Regeln: Wie Ethik funktioniert Sie: Was Ethik aus Ihnen macht Natur: Wie Ethik sich ins Ganze fügt. (shrink)

The style of Wittgenstein's writing in his Philosophical Investigations seems quite peculiar to many readers, and is in many way unlike any other style of writing in the history of philosophy. In Philosophical Health, Richard Gilmore argues that Wittgenstein's ultimate goal in the "Investigations" is to restore us to a condition of philosophical health. The traditional methods and styles of doing philosophy, Gilmore suggests, led to a strange kind of philosophical sickness. Philosophical health is a condition that does not (...) repudiate the philosophical search or philosophical wonder, but does free us from a kind of sickness that results from looking in the wrong places for the wrong kinds of answers. According to Gilmore, Wittgenstein thought that to do philosophy in the right way we have to pay careful attention to the way we speak and think about things in our everyday lives. Philosophical Health is an original and thought-provoking look at Wittgenstein's later philosophy. (shrink)

Second, let me offer an apology for not having a handout for this talk. I do have a website that contains most of my talks and published papers, as well as various other ravings collected over thirty-plus years of ruminating, and you are each welcome to visit it and acquire for your own reading pleasure or other legitimate purposes (such as composing refutations of my foolish views) such copies as you may require. Just don’t steal my ideas and misrepresent them (...) as your own! The address is http://www.richard-t-hull.com. This paper should be posted there within the month. (shrink)

Fictional names have specific, cognitively relevant features, putting them in a category apart from the category of ordinary names. I argue that we should focus on the name or name form itself and refrain from looking for an assignment procedure and an assigned referent. I also argue that we should reject the idea that sentences containing fictional names express singular propositions. These suggestions have important consequences for the intuition that ‘Sherlock Holmes exists’ is either true or false, and they put (...) our intuitions concerning fictional names into perspective. If Millianism is the view that names only have a referent only as their semantic value, then my proposal on fictional names is not Millian in nature. (shrink)

Humpty-Dumpty affirmait que les mots signifiaient exactement ce qu'il lui plaisait qu'ils signifient, «ni plus, ni moins». Il a parfois des défenseurs chez les chercheurs qui se sont penchés sur le problème de la non-littéralité. On peut cependant affirmer qu'ur locuteur, s'il utilise non littéralement des expressions qui ont ure signification conventionnelle, ne peut en changer à volonté la signification pour leur faire signifier exactement ce qu'il a l'intention de signifier. Par exemple, quelqu'un qui fait une métaphore ne peut changer (...) la signification des expressions qu'il utilise. C'est la thèse que je défendrai au cours des prochaines pages. On verra aussi quelles intentions devrait avoir un locuteur qui signifierait non littéralement quelque chose. (shrink)

Contemporary fiscal theorizing largely assimilates the activities of government to that of some choosing agent. This paper explores an alternative approach where government is assimilated to an emergent process of complex interaction, as a form of complex adaptive system. Within this alternative vision, governments are treated not as objects of intervention into a market economy but as arenas of organized participation within it. While recent developments in computational modeling are starting to provide tools for probing such a vision, the roots (...) of that vision can be traced back to the spontaneous order theorists of the 18th century. After sketching some contours of this alternative vision, the remainder of the paper explores some possible implications of this change in vision for mapping the relationship among taxation, prosperity, and justice. (shrink)

Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation is an intensely polemical attack on many recent expositions of sensory representation in Descartes, and a defense of De Rosa’s own Descriptive-Causal Account of Sensory Representation. For Descartes, she says, there are two kinds of ideas, sensible and intelligible, both of which have presentational and referential content. The presentational content of sensible ideas consists of touches, tastes, sounds, odors, and colored visual images that are obscure and confused, in that there is nothing like (...) these sensible ideas in the material world. The presentational content of intelligible ideas, on the other hand, is clear and distinct, in that it consists of geometric representations of material bodies that do exist in the world outside the mind. Thus, whenever one has a clear and distinct intelligible perception of a material body that exists outside the mind, one also has at the same time an obscure and confused sensible image of that body as hard, sweet, squeaky, odiferous, and colored. Nothing like these sensible images actually exists in bodies. De Rosa says that the role of sensible imagery is to individuate and differentiate material bodies from one another, which would be difficult to do for. (shrink)

This unorthodox volume of related literary-philosophical essays is sure to ruffle a few feathers by making merry with the styles of philosophy fashionable today, and in each of the last four decades. Beginning with a strictly formalistic treatment of the relationship of perfection of form to truth of content in literature, Watson (author of the widely reviewed work, The Philosopher's Diet) comes full circle to a concluding essay in which the content of life is unraveled as a pig's meaningless "tale." (...) In between, the reader is taken on a Cook's Tour of hopping and skipping, meaning, seducing, dying, and dreaming in such alluring essays as "The Seducer and the Seduced," "Ape Dreams," and "A Pig's Tail." The chapters focus on one or more fundamental arguments so dear to philosophers of many stripes, but are written with an attention to style not found in conventional philosophy. Writing in a discipline for which a robust sense of humor applied to the pursuit of "serious" philosophy is apt to mean professional oblivion, Watson aims his wittiest salvos at the Dogmatic and Edifying Intent of popular philosophical objectives. He highlights the stylistic conceits and ambiguity that often turn quite ordinary statements into ponderous pendantics. Are these pieces parodies or not? Does Watson really hold the positions he sets forth, or is he making lighthearted fun? Yes! The Philosopher's Joke will amuse and delight, frustrate and annoy, but above all, it will make readers think. (shrink)