In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos: The Philosophical Arguments by Simon TruwantTobias EndresSimon Truwant. Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos: The Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. viii + 266. Hardback, $99.99.Simon Truwant has written a very well-researched study of Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s 1929 encounter in Davos. Because of its historical setting at the origin of the analytic-continental divide, this book is of interest to everyone working in (...) contemporary philosophy. As there is already a considerable mass of secondary literature on this topic, Truwant acknowledges he needs to show that his book sheds new light on it. He does so by stressing his choice to focus exclusively on the philosophical arguments that were at stake in the Cassirer-Heidegger encounter rather than considering its reception and so adding to other scholars’ “non-philosophical assessments” (6). Truwant argues that the “Cassirer-Heidegger dispute” is an exchange that goes well beyond the Davos encounter (15), supposedly extending from 1923 until 1946 (8, 10–11). Its core topics are (a) the Kantian legacy, (b) the conditio humana, and (c) the role of philosophy. Accordingly, the book, which comprises ten chapters, an introduction, and a conclusion, is structured into three parts. In the introduction, Truwant presents his guiding hypothesis and its positioning in the scholarly literature. Against the standard view that Cassirer and Heidegger did not have a genuine debate, Truwant claims that a careful reconstruction of the philosophical content of the Davos encounter shows that “a true philosophical debate” (14) took place between the two thinkers. This reading is accompanied by a critical assessment of most other works on the topic, which, according to Truwant, strive either to give “an exhaustive overview” (8) of the encounter by focusing on a merely chronological reconstruction of the events or to single out just one topic of the debate to the exclusion of all the others.In the first chapter, Truwant presents evidence of a dispute transcending the Davos encounter by pointing the reader to all the occasions where Cassirer and Heidegger were in dialogue, either through their works or in person (15–18). Then, Truwant proceeds, first, to establish the philosophical core of the 1929 debate along lines (a)–(c) listed above (18–36); and, second, to map that brief and, at first sight, failed debate onto the longer dispute between the two thinkers running from 1923 through 1946 (36–44). The first [End Page 515] chapter thus serves to introduce the general structure of what follows by arguing that the Davos debate must be considered against this wider context.The first part of the book, which deals with the Kantian heritage in both Heidegger and Cassirer, includes chapters 2–4. The second part includes chapters 5–7, devoted to the philosophical anthropology of the two thinkers, which Truwant sees as centered on the questions of subjectivity and of selfhood in both Cassirer and Heidegger (73, 112, 126, 151, 167–75). The third and final part of the book includes chapters 8–10. This third part presents first a reconstruction of Cassirer’s normative stance on philosophy as an “ethical task” aimed at “deconstructing ideologies” (195), on the basis of his early writings on the history of ideas (181–86) and the philosophy of culture (186–92). Then, Truwant proceeds to situate Heidegger’s “recovery of the Seinsfrage, the analysis of Dasein, and the reinterpretation of Kant’s thought” (197) within a “hermeneutical conception of philosophy” (219). Finally, he sets Cassirer’s enlightenment view of philosophy (220–32) against Heidegger’s (non-Wittgensteinian) therapeutic conception of philosophy (232–44). In the conclusion, Truwant both sums up the evidence in support of his hypothesis about the philosophical nature of the Davos exchange and argues that Heidegger and Cassirer agree that a correlation between a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem is essential to any philosophical project, although they differ in their determinations of those terms (247).Truwant’s attempt to give a systematic reconstruction of the Cassirer-Heidegger debate is commendable and, for the most part, a thorough success, which adds a significantly new viewpoint to the existing scholarly literature. Nevertheless, one might wonder whether... (shrink)

This special issue focuses on two related topics in Ernst Cassirer’s thought: objectivity and truth. Through this lens, the guest editors attempt to illuminate (a) the historical and systematic value of Cassirer’s philosophical project, (b) the continuing relevance of his account of the plurality and universality of human understanding in view of the crisis of truth that currently permeates Western culture, and (c) the way Cassirer’s style can inspire contemporary scholars who wish to evade the analytic-continental divide. Tobias Endres (...) and Simon Truwant gathered twelve contributions from more analytic oriented authors from the philosophy of science and more continental oriented authors from the philosophy of culture. By bringing these scholars together on a shared topic, they hope to help bridging this divide that is also reflected within Cassirer scholarship by preoccupation with either his philosophy of science or philosophy of culture. The articles in this special issue are preceded by a ceremonial speech that Cassirer gave on the occasion of his assumption of the rectorate of the University of Hamburg on November 7, 1929 and that was translated into English for the first time by the guest editors. (shrink)

Climate change and loss of biodiversity are advancing rapidly, making a transition to a more sustainable society one of the most pressing tasks facing humanity. This special section shines a spotlight on how emotions shape and are shaped by the climate and biodiversity crises, and how they intersect with pro-environmental behavior. To this end, leading sustainability scholars and policy makers articulate what they believe are the most important questions that emotion research should answer to support a sustainable societal transition. Here, (...) we first provide an overview of the articles in the special section, which include a wide range of topics including global analyses of distress related to climate change and biodiversity loss, case studies on emotional experiences toward locally specific instances of climate change consequences and adaptation or mitigation efforts, discussions of the motivational functions of emotions and their potential to drive pro-environmental action, and reflections on how we can make affective science more salient to policy makers in the sustainability domain. In the second part, we summarize the emerging overarching themes that point to promising research objectives and questions for affective sustainability science. Finally, we discuss how the study of sustainability can also be beneficial for the affective sciences. Our hope is that this special section will put sustainability on the research agenda of emotion researchers and stimulate more research in affective sustainability science. (shrink)

In this review essay, I examine the central tenets of sociologist Dave Elder-Vass’s recent contribution to social ontology, as put forth in his book The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency. Elder-Vass takes issue with ontological individualists and maintains that social structures exist and have causal powers in their own right. I argue that he fails to establish his main theses: he shows neither that social structures have causal powers “in their own right” (in any sense of (...) this expression) nor that they exist. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to highlight a hidden reception of Ernst Cassirer’s works in the writings of Wilfrid Sellars. To set out such reception, I will begin with defining criteria that allow us to point out a possible influence from one thinker on another. In a second step, I will present several links between the set-out criteria and the constellation Sellars-Cassirer. Finally, the Cassirer Lectures Series at Yale, Sellars’ review of Language and Myth as well as Sellars’ lecture (...) Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man will serve as at the basis for an analysis of historical and systematic connections between Cassirer and Sellars. The conclusion will show that we actually can speak of a hidden influence from Cassirer on Sellars’ thought and that philosophical desiderata remain in this context which are worth to explore even today. (shrink)

Appraisal theories have described elaborate mechanisms underlying the elicitation of emotion at the psychological-cognitive level, but typically do not integrate neuroscientific concepts and findings. At the same time, theoretical developments in appraisal theory have been pretty much ignored by researchers studying the neuroscience of emotion. We feel that a stronger integration of these two literatures would be highly profitable for both sides. Here we outline a blueprint of the “appraising brain.” To this end, we review neuroimaging research investigating the processing (...) of major appraisal variables, and sketch a neuro-cognitive process model of appraisal with a special emphasis on the chronometry and the recursive aspect of emotional evaluation. We hope that this contribution will stimulate more hypothesis-driven research on the neuroscience of appraisal. (shrink)

Appraisal and constructivist theories of emotion both emphasize that emotions are not modular phenomena, but are constructed from more basic psychological parts. In the scientific debate, differences between the two approaches are sometimes overplayed, by classifying appraisal theories as “natural kinds” models, and sometimes underplayed, by basically merging them into constructivist accounts. The aim of this contribution is to illustrate some similarities and some differences between contemporary appraisal and constructivist approaches, and to highlight the fact that appraisal theory has indeed (...) already confronted the idea of construction in the elicitation of emotion. In doing so, I want to argue that, while there is a distinction between appraisal and constructivist camps, it is not as stark as one might think, even though the names of the “ingredients” of emotions may differ. (shrink)

Joining voluntary thematic initiatives can be a means for firms to legitimate their business activities. However, a lack of review mechanisms could create incentives for free-riding. This might lead to a lower commitment to the initiative’s principles, and endanger its credibility and its members’ legitimacy benefits. Whether members of voluntary initiatives take advantage of the opportunity to free-ride has not been analyzed empirically so far. To fill this research gap, we investigate from an institutional theory perspective the actual implementation behavior (...) of publicly listed signatories of the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI) in a difference-in-differences and an event study setting. Our empirical results show that, after signing, UN PRI signatories integrate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria in their business activities significantly more than matched non-signatories from the financial sector, indicating the commitment of the signatories to the UN PRI in general. However, while the initial members show a high commitment to the initiative’s principles by increasing their ESG integration performance substantially, new members signing at a later stage of the initiative perform considerably less, and thus undermine the UN PRI’s credibility. We derive implications for voluntary thematic initiatives to avoid such a development. (shrink)

ABSTRACTEvaluative conditioning is proposed as a mechanism of automatic preference acquisition in dual-process theories of attitudes. Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 692–731. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.692). Evidence for the automaticity of EC comes from studies claiming EC effects for subliminally presented stimuli. An impression-formation study showed a selective influence of briefly presented primes on implicitly measured attitudes, whereas supraliminally presented behavioural information about the target person was reflected in explicit ratings. (...) Of two minds forming and changing valence-inconsistent implicit and explicit attitudes. Psychological Science, 17, 954–958. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01811.x) This finding is considered one of the strongest pieces of... (shrink)

One of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s most distinctive philosophical theories is the pre-established harmony, his big-picture explanation for the appearance of causal interaction in the world. According to Leibniz, and despite how it seems, neither you, me, nor any other thing created by God can cause changes in any other thing! When I high-five you, it’s not really me that causes the stinging sensation in your hand. Instead, every change each created thing undergoes—including that sting in your hand—is actually, surprising as (...) it might seem, caused internally by that thing itself. But then, why does the world appear to be a place of orderly, law-like pushings and pullings, actions and reactions? This is because God chose to create only those things that would each, of its own internal nature, cause changes in itself in perfect harmony with what every other created thing causes in itself, sort of like a symphony of automata programmed and synchronized to play their own individual parts of the same overall composition in perfect, well, harmony. Leibniz offers perhaps his best-known statement of the pre-established harmony in “A New System of Nature” (1695), where he also argues that we ought to accept his theory instead of its major competitors at the time, namely, Descartes’s interactionism and Malebranche’s occasionalism. The present work is an open-access, peer-reviewed, and user-friendly version of "A New System of Nature”, intended for use in teaching courses on early modern philosophy. It's edited for clarity and accessibility, and includes commentary, examples, and other elements meant to help engage readers. (shrink)

The legal corpus linguistics movement is one of the most exciting recent developments in legal theory. Justice Thomas R. Lee and Stephen C. Mouritsen are its pioneers, and their new article thoughtfully responds to critics. Here, Part I applauds their response as a cautious account of how those methods might, in some circumstances, provide relevant evidence about ordinary meaning in legal interpretation. Some disagreements persist, but The Corpus and the Critics makes significant progress in academic debates about legal interpretation. Part (...) II turns from theory to practice: Judges are increasingly discussing corpus linguistics and conducting sua sponte analyses in their opinions, and this Essay collects and analyzes these cases. Corpus linguistics is theorized as apolitical, neutral, and objective. But in practice, it has been used largely by Republican-appointed judges, often inconsistently with standards that Lee and Mouritsen recently endorse. This Essay identifies a set of best practices, endorsed both by Lee and Mouritsen’s new cautious account and by many critics of the movement. It elaborates those commitments and evaluates whether they are met by courts citing or conducting legal corpus linguistics. If courts continue to employ legal corpus linguistics methods, the practice should be guided by these shared standards. (shrink)

“Experimental jurisprudence” draws on empirical data to inform questions typically associated with jurisprudence or legal theory. Scholars in this flourishing movement conduct empirical studies about a variety of legal language and concepts. Despite the movement’s growth, its justification is still opaque. Jurisprudence is the study of deep and longstanding theoretical questions about law’s nature, but “experimental jurisprudence,” it might seem, simply surveys laypeople. This Article elaborates and defends experimental jurisprudence. Experimental jurisprudence, appropriately understood, is not only consistent with traditional jurisprudence; (...) it is an essential branch of it. (shrink)

In September 1886, the poet and critic Josef Victor Widmann penned a review of BGE titled "Nietzsche's Dangerous Book,"1 observing that a keen sense of danger pervaded the work.2 Nietzsche, who often felt misunderstood and wrongfully attacked, responded enthusiastically to Widmann on June 28, 1887: Mainly, I have to thankfully inform you, after a year's time no less, that your review has been by far the most "intelligent" one that this uncongenial book has received until now. Poets are, after all, (...) "divinatory" beings: in the end, such a book of riddles will much sooner be deciphered and "cracked open" by a poet, than by a philosopher and "specialist."3 Indeed, Widmann identified a motif that runs not only... (shrink)

One of the older questions in the debate about Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is whether it is worthwhile for organizations to pay attention to societal demands. This debate was emotionally, normatively, and ideologically loaded. Up to the present, this question has been an important trigger for empirical research in CSR. However, the answer to the question has apparently not been found yet, at least that is what many researchers state. This apparent ambivalence in CSR consequences invites a literature study that (...) can clarify the debate and allow for the drawing of conclusions. The results of the literature study performed here reveal that there is indeed clear empirical evidence for a positive correlation between corporate social and financial performance. Voices that state the opposite refer to out-dated material. Since the beginnings of the CSR debate, societies have changed. We can therefore clearly state that, for the present Western society, “Good Ethics is Good Business.”. (shrink)

Within legal scholarship and practice, among the most pervasive tasks is the interpretation of texts. And within legal interpretation, perhaps the most pervasive inquiry is the search for “ordinary meaning.” Jurists often treat ordinary meaning analysis as an empirical inquiry, aiming to discover a fact about how people understand language. When evaluating ordinary meaning, interpreters rely on dictionary definitions or patterns of common usage, increasingly via “legal corpus linguistics” approaches. However, the most central question about these popular methods remains open: (...) Do they reliably reflect ordinary meaning? This Article presents a series of experiments that assess whether (a) dictionary definitions and (b) common usage data reflect (c) how people actually understand language today. -/- The Article elaborates the implications of two main experimental results. First, neither the dictionary nor legal corpus linguistics methods reliably track ordinary people’s judgments about meaning. This shifts the argumentative burden to jurists who rely on these tools to identify “ordinary meaning” or “original public meaning”: these views must articulate and demonstrate a reliable method of analysis. Moreover, this divergence illuminates several interpretive fallacies. For example, advocates of legal corpus linguistics often contend that the nonappearance of a specific use in a corpus indicates that the use is not part of the relevant term’s ordinary meaning. The experiments reveal this claim to be a “Nonappearance Fallacy.” Ordinary meaning exceeds datasets of common usage — even very large ones. -/- Second, dictionary and legal corpus linguistics verdicts diverge dramatically from each other. Part of that divergence is explained by the finding that broad dictionary definitions tend to direct interpreters to extensive interpretations, while data of common usage tends to point interpreters to more prototypical cases. This suggests two different criteria that are often relevant in interpretation: a more extensive criterion and a more narrow, prototypical criterion. Although dictionaries and corpus linguistics might, in some cases, help us identify these criteria, a hard legal-philosophical question remains: Which of these two criteria should guide the interpretation of terms and phrases in legal texts? Insofar as there is no compelling case to prefer one, the results suggest that dictionary definitions, legal corpus linguistics, or even other more scientific measures of meaning may not be equipped in principle to deliver simple and unequivocal answers to inquiries about the so-called “ordinary meaning” of legal texts. (shrink)

Cancer stem cells (CSC) represent malignant cell subsets in hierarchically organized tumors, which are selectively capable of tumor initiation and self‐renewal and give rise to bulk populations of non‐tumorigenic cancer cell progeny through differentiation. Robust evidence for the existence of prospectively identifiable CSC among cancer bulk populations has been generated using marker‐specific genetic lineage tracking of molecularly defined cancer subpopulations in competitive tumor development models. Moreover, novel mechanisms and relationships have been discovered that link CSC to cancer therapeutic resistance and (...) clinical tumor progression. Importantly, proof‐of‐principle for the potential therapeutic utility of the CSC concept has recently been provided by demonstrating that selective killing of CSC through a prospective molecular marker can inhibit tumor growth. Herein, we review these novel and translationally relevant research developments and discuss potential strategies for CSC‐targeted therapy in the context of resistance mechanisms and molecular pathways preferentially operative in CSC. (shrink)

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of legal interpretation is the presumption that terms should be given their “ordinary” (i.e., general, non-technical) meanings. This principle is a central tenet of modern textualism. Textualists believe a universal presumption of ordinary meaning follows from their theory’s core commitment: A law should be interpreted consistently with what its text communicates to the ordinary public. This Article begins from this textualist premise, empirically examining what legal texts communicate to the public. Five original empirical studies (N (...) = 4,365) reveal a surprising finding: Ordinary people consider genre carefully and regularly take terms in law to communicate technical legal meanings, not ordinary ones. -/- This discovery carries implications for legal interpretation’s theory and practice. Modern textualists—especially at the Supreme Court—justify their theory through “democratic,” fair notice, and rule-of-law appeals to ordinary people. But the empirical studies reveal that fidelity to ordinary people does not imply an unwavering commitment to ordinary meaning. Instead, it requires interpreters to also look to technical meanings. On a practical level, the results support a new presumption of legal meaning and ground a new challenge to textualism’s claim to promote fair notice. As a case study, we consider Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, which held that both sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination are prohibited forms of sex discrimination. The Article’s empirics and theory offer a new justification of the Court’s landmark decision. (shrink)

BackgroundHealth behavior change is among the top recommendations for improving health of patients with lifestyle-related chronic diseases. An array of behavior change techniques have been developed to support behavior change initiation and maintenance. These BCTs often show limited success when they are not informed by theory, leading to a mismatch between the intention of the BCT and patients’ needs or expectations. Previous studies have identified a number of resources which patients may require to initiate and maintain health behavior change. Indeed, (...) not yet well established is how BCTs address these resources, i.e., the functional mechanisms of BCTs.PurposeProvide a theoretical framework of the functional mechanisms of BCTs for developing and implementing successful interventions for health behavior change.MethodsConceptual review, including literature analysis and synthesis as well as conceptualization of a new model based on the synthesis.ResultsThrough the integration of dual-process models as well as reward and motivation proceeding, i.e., affective, emotional, or intuitive neurobiological cues, into the rational framework of rather linear cognitive or task-related decision progress, we categorize previously identified resources into three distinct sets: external, internal reflective, and internal affective resources. Based on this triad, we classify BCTs according to their functional mechanisms into facilitating, boosting, and nudging. Consequently, we present a simplified Behavior Change Resource Model that is centered on patients’ resources.ConclusionThe model can be applied to develop health behavior change interventions, which promote engagement and empowerment. Future studies should aim at testing the applicability and practicality of the BCRM. (shrink)

Purpose – Ubiquitous computing and “big data” have been widely recognized as requiring new concepts of privacy and new mechanisms to protect it. While improved concepts of privacy have been suggested, the paper aims to argue that people acting in full conformity to those privacy norms still can infringe the privacy of others in the context of ubiquitous computing and “big data”. Design/methodology/approach – New threats to privacy are described. Helen Nissenbaum's concept of “privacy as contextual integrity” is reviewed concerning (...) its capability to grasp these problems. The argument is based on the assumption that the technologies work, persons are fully informed and capable of deciding according to advanced privacy considerations. Findings – Big data and ubiquitous computing enable privacy threats for persons whose data are only indirectly involved and even for persons about whom no data have been collected and processed. Those new problems are intrinsic to the functionality of these new technologies and need to be addressed on a social and political level. Furthermore, a concept of data minimization in terms of the quality of the data is proposed. Originality/value – The use of personal data as a threat to the privacy of others is established. This new perspective is used to reassess and recontextualize Helen Nissenbaum's concept of privacy. Data minimization in terms of quality of data is proposed as a new concept. (shrink)

A classic debate concerns whether reasonableness should be understood statistically (e.g., reasonableness is what is common) or prescriptively (e.g., reasonableness is what is good). This Article elaborates and defends a third possibility. Reasonableness is a partly statistical and partly prescriptive “hybrid,” reflecting both statistical and prescriptive considerations. Experiments reveal that people apply reasonableness as a hybrid concept, and the Article argues that a hybrid account offers the best general theory of reasonableness. -/- First, the Article investigates how ordinary people judge (...) what is reasonable. Reasonableness sits at the core of countless legal standards, yet little work has investigated how ordinary people (i.e., potential jurors) actually make reasonableness judgments. Experiments reveal that judgments of reasonableness are systematically intermediate between judgments of the relevant average and ideal across numerous legal domains. For example, participants’ mean judgment of the legally reasonable number of weeks’ delay before a criminal trial (ten weeks) falls between the judged average (seventeen weeks) and ideal (seven weeks). So too for the reasonable num- ber of days to accept a contract offer, the reasonable rate of attorneys’ fees, the reasonable loan interest rate, and the reasonable annual number of loud events on a football field in a residential neighborhood. Judgment of reasonableness is better predicted by both statistical and prescriptive factors than by either factor alone. -/- This Article uses this experimental discovery to develop a normative view of reasonableness. It elaborates an account of reasonableness as a hybrid standard, arguing that this view offers the best general theory of reasonableness, one that applies correctly across multiple legal domains. Moreover, this hybrid feature is the historical essence of legal reasonableness: the original use of the “reasonable person” and the “man on the Clapham omnibus” aimed to reflect both statistical and prescriptive considerations. Empirically, reasonableness is a hybrid judgment. And normatively, reasonableness should be applied as a hybrid standard. (shrink)

In a recent review article published in this journal, Hansen and Schaltegger discuss the architecture of sustainability balanced scorecards. They link the architecture of SBSCs to the maturity of the value system of a firm as well as to the proactiveness of a firm’s sustainability strategy. We contend that this argument is flawed and that the architecture of SBSC does not matter since—irrespective of their architecture—SBSCs are ill-suited to achieve substantive corporate contributions to sustainability. First, we assess the SBSC against (...) three fundamental conditions for an effective management of corporate sustainability—the generation of positive outcomes at the societal level, the consideration of complexities and tensions, and the integration of heterogeneous and competing logics—to show that the SBSC is diametrically opposed to the complex and multi-facetted nature of corporate sustainability and ill-suited to achieve transformational change of for-profit organisations towards sustainability. Second, we address the question whether architecture of the SBSC matters and find that it is a fallacy to believe that the architecture of SBSCs can address this fundamental misfit. Rather, our argument reveals that irrespective of its architecture the SBSC is not a suitable tool for achieving strategic change for sustainability beyond incrementalism because it is deeply rooted in the idea of aligning sustainability with established core business routines. We propose that the emerging integrative view on corporate sustainability offers a more promising route for scholars and practitioners who are truly concerned with a deep transformation of private firms towards more sustainability. (shrink)

We discuss various implications of some radical anti-representationalist views of cognition and what they have to offer with regard to the naturalization of intentionality and the explanation of cognitive phenomena. Our focus is on recent arguments from proponents of enactive views of cognition to the effect that basic cognition is intentional but not representational and that cognition is co-extensive with life. We focus on lower rather than higher forms of cognition, namely the question regarding the intentional and representational nature of (...) cognition found in organisms simpler than human beings, because enactivists do not deny that more sophisticated cognitive phenomena are representational and involve content. After introducing the debate on the naturalization of intentionality, we briefly review different varieties of enactivism and introduce their central claims. In Sect. 4 we turn to radical enactivism in order to focus on the arguments for a thoroughly non-representational, enactive account of perception and basic cognition. In particular, we discuss three major issues: First, what is supposed to replace the representational analysis of perception in a radical-enactive explanation of perception? How does the enactive explanation of perception compare to the best scientific work on the neuroscience of perception? Second, what is—on an enactive account—the function of neural processing in the brain for the generation of perception if not to produce representations? This question is especially pressing since one implication of autopoietic enactivism is that even the simplest organisms, i.e. single-celled organisms, have cognitive capacities. Since they lack brains and nervous systems, enactivists must specify the unique contribution of the brain and nervous system in those animals who have them. In Sect. 5, we evaluate the advantages of an autopoietic–enactive approach to the naturalization of intentionality and end with a suggestion how cognition may relate to intentionality and representation. (shrink)

In medical research, patients are increasingly recognized with ‘lay knowledge’ but their views are poorly researched. The study objective was to investigate patients’ attitudes to medical research. This is in comparison to lay and expert members on ethical review boards, as their task is to evaluate the risk−benefits of research, which are ultimately grounded in attitudes and values. From focus-group interviews with patients suffering from chronic inflammatory diseases, a postal questionnaire was developed and sent to patient members of the Swedish (...) Rheumatism Association and to all ERB board members in Sweden. Response rates were 65 percent and the surveys were conducted in Jan−May 2011. Agreement across the groups included priority for medical research on diagnostic and early detection of disease. A key difference was expert and lay ERB members giving higher priority to basic research/research on lifestyle and prevention, whereas patients prioritized research on daily function. On this significant point, lay members did not share the opinion of this patient group, indicating that they may be poor representatives for patients’ views. These results call for further research: how can patient perspectives be included in ERB discussions and in what way should patients’ values influence the research agenda. (shrink)

How do people attribute responsibility in situations where the contributions of multiple agents combine to produce a joint outcome? The prevalence of over-determination in such cases makes this a difficult problem for counterfactual theories of causal responsibility. In this article, we explore a general framework for assigning responsibility in multiple agent contexts. We draw on the structural model account of actual causation (e.g., Halpern & Pearl, 2005) and its extension to responsibility judgments (Chockler & Halpern, 2004). We review the main (...) theoretical and empirical issues that arise from this literature and propose a novel model of intuitive judgments of responsibility. This model is a function of both pivotality (whether an agent made a difference to the outcome) and criticality (how important the agent is perceived to be for the outcome, before any actions are taken). The model explains empirical results from previous studies and is supported by a new experiment that manipulates both pivotality and criticality. We also discuss possible extensions of this model to deal with a broader range of causal situations. Overall, our approach emphasizes the close interrelations between causality, counterfactuals, and responsibility attributions. (shrink)

This article offers the first systematic investigation of the linguistic forms in which Kant expresses his transcendental idealism since Gerold Prauss’ seminal book Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich. It is argued that Prauss’ own argument for the claim that ‘in itself’ is an adverbial expression that standardly modifies verbs of philosophical reflection is flawed and that there is hence very poor exegetical evidence for so-called ‘methodological two-aspect’ interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism. A comprehensive investigation of Kant’s adverbial (...) uses of ‘in itself’ rather reveals that there are various groups of verbs that ‘in itself’ modifies, which can more or less all be reduced to a standard use in which ‘in itself’ modifies verbs of predicative being such as the copula. It is also discussed how these findings can be accommodated by the two main alternative kinds of interpretations, that is, two-object and ontological two-aspect interpretations. (shrink)

This article will explore the relation of search engines to the freedom they invoke in human subjects. Away from questions about the social impact of search engines and their ethical use, it shall investigate the influence of search engines on ethical subjectifications. The article will criticise the common critique that search engines should only deliver neutral and objective results to their users, where ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ are defined as anti-subjective. On the contrary, it will argue that search engines are designed (...) to deliver subjective results. A possible ethical critique starts therefore where they fail to do so. Due to reasons immanent to the technology, search engines are never subjective enough in their relevance decisions. Their results collide at the same time with what their users expect them to deliver. The article will show that, far from being a disadvantage, this disagreement between the users’ expectations and the search engines results is what triggers an ethical subjectification. (shrink)

Review on Cicero, On Academic Scepticism, translated with introduction and notes by Charles Brittain, Hackett, Indianapolis and Cambridge, 2006.

How should judges decide which linguistic canons to apply in interpreting statutes? One important answer looks to the inside of the legislative process: Follow the rules that lawmakers contemplate. A different answer, based on the “ordinary meaning” doctrine, looks to the outside: Follow the rules that would guide an ordinary person’s understanding of the legal text. Empirical scholars have studied statutory interpretation from the inside—revealing what rules drafters follow—but never from the outside. We offer a novel framework for empirically testing (...) interpretive canons “from the outside,” recruiting 4,500 people from the United States, as well as a sample of U.S. law students, to evaluate hypothetical scenarios that correspond to each canon’s triggering conditions. -/- The empirical findings provide crucial evidence about which traditional canons “ordinary meaning” actually supports, and they carry several further implications. First, interpretive canons are not a closed set. We discovered new canons that are not yet reflected as legal canons, including one we term the “non-binary gender canon” and another the “quantifier domain restriction canon.” Second, the results support a new understanding of the ordinary meaning doctrine itself, as one focused on the ordinary interpretation of rules, as opposed to the traditional focus on “ordinary language” generally. Third, many of the canons reflect that ordinary people interpret rules with an intuitive anti-literalism. This anti-literalism finding challenges textualist assumptions about ordinary meaning, as well as offering a theme for researching other currently unrecognized canons. Most broadly, we hope the Essay initiates a new research program in empirical legal interpretation. If ordinary meaning is relevant to legal interpretation, interpreters should look to evidence of how ordinary people actually understand legal rules. We see our experiments as a first step in that new direction. (shrink)

Sparse knowledge exists about measuring spiritual, religious, and existential (SRE) constructs in children. Well-validated questionnaires measuring such concepts are necessary when researchers want to quantitatively investigate the spiritual lives of children. We aimed to identify questionnaires measuring SRE constructs in children and assess their psychometric properties. We conducted literature searches in four electronic databases. Studies were included if they described the use of a questionnaire measuring SRE constructs in children under 12 years. Systematic data extraction and assessment of the studies (...) using standardized COSMIN guidelines were performed. A total of 17,681 records were screened. Twenty-seven articles assessing 18 different questionnaires met the inclusion criteria. In total, 16 structural validity, 20 internal consistency, 4 measurement invariance, and 16 construct validity studies were found. We identified no high-quality content validity studies. The Meaning in Life in Children Questionnaire by Shoshani and Russo-Netzer showed promising measurement properties. However, all included instruments need further content validity testing before being recommended for use. (shrink)