Renunciation as a creative force is the animating idea behind Ross Posnock s new book. Taking up acts of abandonment, rejection, and refusal that have long baffled critics, he shows how renunciation has reframed the relationship of writers, philosophers, and artists to society in productive and unpredictable ways.".

Religion of the Rabaris of the Rajasthan, India; a study.

The aim of this dissertation is to present a systematic exposition of renunciation (Samnyasa) as a philosophico-religious category within Indian tradition with special reference to Advaita Vedanta of Samkaracarya.

For Gianni Vattimo, the renunciation of violence is the starting point for constructing a post foundational politics. So far, criticism of Vattimo’s argument has focused on his larger commitment to metaphysical nihilism and whether the renunciation of violence is a thicker principle than his post foundational philosophy can support. I argue that Vattimo’s renunciation of violence can also be criticized for two other reasons. First, Vattimo attempts to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable uses of violence through (...) an under developed idea of self-defense. Second, despite his attention to the political and philosophical impact of mass communications technology, Vattimo ignores emerging technological challenges to our understanding of violence. Nonetheless, I argue that Vattimo’s renunciation can still serve as a useful starting point for contemporary political thinking. What Vattimo’s logic shows is that we can enhance the moral standing of democracy by decisively detaching its practices and institutions from historical artifacts of political violence. (shrink)

Migration and diversity are important factors in education of teachers around the globe. From an intercultural perspective, we shall analyse how metaphysical and religious assumptions overlap and enable teachers to motivate pupils from different religious-cultural backgrounds to understand in greater detail the facets of (minimal) universalism, relativism and other concepts that obtain in more or less open societies. We argue for a concept of Intercultural Human Rights Education that uses different texts in philosophy classes, includes controversial positions from different (...) cultures, and is methodologically versatile. According to this concept, we think that a) human dignity (as a typically Western concept) and human rights and b) one tradition of interpreting the Qur’an (renunciation of force and the Indian concept of ahimsā (nonviolence)), can motivate teachers to discuss the efforts and also the limits of an overlapping consensus about the intercultural perspective. Finally, we provide the outlines of a teaching unit plan in accordance with our theoretical insights. (shrink)

In the essay “Das Wort” (“Words”), Martin Heidegger wrote about “renunciation” (verzicht) in the context of the poetry of Stefan George. According toHeidegger the entrance into the possibility of Saying, with the capital “S” – as opposed to the chatter of every-day life – could be achieved in the instance of the poet’s deliberate acceptance of renunciation. Heidegger’s writings, including “Words,” have had an enormous influence in the second part of the 20th century on authors and thinkers alike. (...) And yet this influence may have had a pernicious effect, at least in the opinion of some commentators. In the 2005 book L’adieu à la littérature, William Marx, for instance, claimed that the 20th century is the time of a literature sans style. If on the one hand literature achieved its autonomy, on the other it farewelled the cognitive purpose with regard to the world, which, some could argue, equates with a retreat from its civilizing purpose. This essay does two things: first it illustrates and contextualizes the notion of “renunciation” from philosophical as well as literary and cultural perspectives: second it discusses a set of authors who have experienced the category of “renunciation” in different ways and with different outcomes. I refer to Maurice Blanchot, Frances Ponge and Édouard Glissant. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 6, Page 813-832, July 2022. Ricoeur interpreted the work of compromise as a creative process to imagine a new world by projecting ourselves into other people. The challenge of compromise is to learn to tell our own story differently within the contours of a broader collective narrative, in compliance with the paradigm of translation. As such, Ricoeur’s political ethics of compromise is at risk of highlighting the element of creation, which refers to (...) the social imagination of a shared vision of a better society, at the cost of recognition of the element of renunciation, which refers to the reciprocal shelving of ideas and desires that the other side considers to be truly intolerable. However, I argue that we can read a delicate connection between forgetting, forgoing and forgiving in Ricoeur’s thought. It is, then, the model of forgiveness, as part of the paradigm of translation, that gives due respect to the importance of renunciation through the emphasis on the unjustifiable, for which renunciation even cannot suffice. The ‘poetics of pardon’ brings creation and renunciation together and, by doing so, it highlights that compromise always remains an object of hope. (shrink)

The Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads characterize the life of the saṃnyāsin as devoid of earthly pleasures. At the same time, these and other texts record confusion and suspicion toward those who would pursue such a life, and disbelief that such severe austerity could be required. To many, the saṃnyāsin seems to forsake the good life in forsaking earthly pleasures. I call this the ‘Precluded Pleasures Objection’ to the saṃnyāsin ideal. A number of replies to the Precluded Pleasures Objection might be drawn from (...) the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads themselves. The first points out that the saṃnyāsin ideal is typically reserved for members of the twice-born classes, and perhaps only brāhmaṇa men, who have reached relative... (shrink)

본 연구는 출가 동기를 「능동적 출가」와 「수동적 출가」로 분류하여여성수행자의 출가 동기를 사회적인 측면에서 분석했다. 「능동적인 출가」 동기로는, 붓다의 설법을 듣고 출가한 여성수행자들은 전통적인 바라문(승려계급)사회의 의례주의와 합리주의와의 대립, 사문(沙門)에 관한보수적인 가치관과 새로운 가치관의 대립, 금전으로 여성의 가치를 재어 구혼하는 남성들의 배금주의 등을 언급하고 있는 반면, 「수동적인 출가」 동기로는 근친자의 출가, 어린이의 죽음과 약혼자의 죽음으로 인한 출가 등을 볼 수 있는데,이는 여성의 자립을 용납하지 않으며, 여성을 성적대상과 출산의 도구로 여기던당시의 여성차별에서 비롯된 출가 동기인 것이다. 이처럼 능동적인 출가 동기에서는, 고대인도의 사회적 가치관의 변화와 (...) 대립을 볼 수 있는데 반해, 수동적인 출가 동기에서는 당시의 여성들에게 불합리했던 사회적 규범으로 인해 겪을 수밖에 없었던 고통스런 경험을 볼 수 있다. Thī 의 여성수행자 73명중 「능동적 출가」는 34명으로 47%가 「수동적 출가」로는 39명인 53%의 비율을 나타낸다. 이 비율은 고대인도의 여성들의 출가에는사회적인 요인이 영향을 많이 끼쳤음을 보여준다. 남성수행자의 출가의 동기가 능동적이든지, 수동적이든지 그들이 읊는 시의대부분은 교훈과 설법의 내용으로 사회지도자로써의 역할에 가치를 두고 있는것1)과는 대조적인 이와 같은 현상은 여성의 삶이 사회의 변화와 밀접한 관계가있다는 것을 보여준다. (shrink)

This essay develops a new account of the work the self must perform on itself in disciplinary relations through the cultivation of resources from Foucault’s later work. By tracing the ethical self-relation from Greco-Roman antiquity to the Benedictine monastery, I am able to provide insight into the relationship of self-renunciation that underlies disciplinary docility and obedience. This self-renunciation undermines individuals’ ability to lead themselves and makes them reliant on another who has mastery of the truth through which the (...) subject must be constituted. Disciplinary relations were thus seen to be doubly efficacious in producing relations of domination: they attempt to eliminate the self- leadership of the individual which not only un- dermines the individual’s potential to resist; it leaves them in need of the dominating training that disciplinary relations institute. This insight into the activity of the individual in the produc- tion of their own docility was then used to clarify and develop aspects of two perennially enigmatic but powerful areas of Foucault’s work, his focus on “bodies and pleasures” and his turn to the “aesthetics of existence.”. (shrink)

Marc Van den Bosche suggests that Heidegger’s conceptions of Gestell and Gelassenheit, taken together with his analysis of Nietzschean Nihilism, depicts our era in a way that “supplements” Andrew Feenberg and Don Ihde’s work. Weaving these sources together, he sees the possibility of our becoming “technicians” that “live, in a released way, within the groundless.” Here, I raise some questions about whether the author has really fitted all these sources together and argue that his idea of becoming post-modern “technicians” appears (...) to require that we first practice a very un-Heideggerian kind of “renunciation.”. (shrink)

The fierce propaganda campaign against the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties developed in the 1960s by the Mao Tse-tung group in China confronted the international communist movement with the fact that a new front in the ideological struggle had come into being. The significance of this struggle is defined by the fact that the matter at issue is what constitutes a contemporary, truly scientific interpretation of the principles of revolutionary theory, and the determination of the future of socialism and communism.

Comparative and analytical study of renunciation in Indic philosophy and religion.

This article investigates and compares Max Scheler’s and Wang Yangming’s analyses of the disorder of the heart as the inversion of values. Both Scheler and Wang affirm an objective hierarchy of val...

It is time to pose directly and seriously the question of the fate of Marxist philosophical theory at the end of the twentieth century. And not only the question of Marxism in general, but more specifically the question of Leninism, of the essence of the "Leninist stage in the development of the philosophy of Marxism," of Lenin the philosopher. It is Lenin's theoretical legacy that calls for an especially careful investigation today, because it above all is what has undergone (...) canonization and distortion for over half a century. The time has finally come, it seems, for an assiduous analysis of the set of ideas dubbed "Lenin's creative contribution to the philosophy of Marxism" and even the "Leninist stage in the history of Marxist philosophy." Of course, renunciation of a cultist, essentially religious relation to Leninism is bound to be painful and is bound to affect the interests of those for whom it is easier to believe than to know…. But there is simply no other way to a genuine, noniconographic Lenin than a scholarly study of his activity and the ideas he developed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhist Literature as Philosophy and Buddhist Philosophy as Literature ed. by Rafael K. StepienVesna A. Wallace (bio)Buddhist Literature as Philosophy and Buddhist Philosophy as Literature. Edited by Rafael K. Stepien. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2020. Pp. xi + 381. Paperback $26.95, isbn 978-1-4383-8070-1.The editor of the Buddhist Literature as Philosophy and Buddhist Philosophy as Literature should be commended (...) for bringing together an excellent collection of essays and producing the first comprehensive volume that offers a coherent study of the relationship between Buddhist literature and philosophy. This book is an ambitious and praiseworthy project, which covers a wide range of Buddhist literary genres produced in India, Tibet, and East Asia over two millennia. As a whole, the volume invites the reader to reexamine a centuries-long binary division between the categories of literature and philosophy, which have been often approached in academic studies as mutually exclusive. It does so by demonstrating that in the context of Buddhism, philosophy and literature continuously converge, diminishing the overarching binary and broadening their scopes. Most contributions to this volume demonstrate that Buddhist philosophy as presented and enacted in Buddhist literature is not limited to what some would consider a "pure philosophy." The volume is divided into the two, mutually mirroring sections, with each section containing six chapters. Chapters forming the section one, "Buddhist Literature as Philosophy," aim at broadening our perspective about literary forms, such as tales, novels, hymns, and court poetry, which have not been usually explored as the means of articulating Buddhist philosophical views. Chapters grouped in the section "Buddhist Philosophy as Literature" focus on Buddhist literary theories as philosophy of language and introduce the Buddhist biographical and autobiographical genres characterized by practical philosophy to further challenge our preconceptions of what it is that constitutes literature and philosophy. While some contributors endeavor to demonstrate the presence of rational, analytical reasoning in unexpected literary forms, other contributors problematize a strict distinction between literature and philosophy as inapplicable to Buddhism, which is undeniably cross-disciplinary.The first two chapters in section one, authored by Amber Carpenter and Sarah Shaw respectively, draw examples from jātaka stories to show us how Buddhist ethical lessons work in the narrative tales of the Buddha's former births. These two chapters also draw our attention to an accessible and engaging, [End Page 1] narrative manner that presents the Bodhisattva's philosophical exercises to the audience, a manner that stands in contrast to the a priori reasoning characteristic of philosophical treatises. In the first chapter, titled "Transformative Vision: Coming to See the Buddha's Reality," Carpenter analyzes two jātaka stories--"Bodhi the Wandering Ascetic" and "The Man Without an Heir"--taken from Āryaśūra's Jātakamālā. In the first story, a renunciant Bodhi, while repudiating the king's ministers who are intent on disqualifying him as a king's advisor on morality, makes metaphysical claims regarding the nature of reality, causation, and the universe, and provides the reasons and arguments. According to Shaw, by offering an insight into the Buddhist worldview and morality, jātaka tales have a transformative power not only with regard to ethics but also in transforming the reader's vision of reality. In the chapter "Jātakas and the Abhidhamma: Practical Compassion and Kusala Citta," Shaw suggests that a reason why jātaka stories are rarely discussed seriously in the way that they were intended is their literary format based in narrative and mundane situations. Analyzing the concepts of momentariness and kusala citta ("virtuous consciousness") in these stories, Shaw shows that by communicating the technical and insight-based Buddhist doctrinal elements, jātaka tales significantly contribute to Buddhist practical ethics. The Pāli Javanahaṃsa-jātaka, a tale about the friendship between a goose and a king, introduces the reader to some of the most complex Buddhist ideas such as impermanence, momentariness, and mental states, expounded in the Abhidhamma in extraction. Through her analysis of the Kurudhamma-jātaka and Mahosaddha-jātaka, Shaw further shows the integration of narrative literature and Buddhist philosophical tenets, of Buddhist tales and the Abhidhamma, of the relationship between the intention and consciousness... (shrink)

This work examines the self-renouncing dimension which Wittgensteinian philosophy subscribes to ethico-religious ideals. Wittensteinian values are explored through a range of literary and cultural illustrations from Wittgenstein's own European milieu. The book also highlights an alternative model of self-renouncing faith, which has methodological implications for how a Wittgensteinian descriptivist approach should be carried out. Wittgensteinian assumptions about the nature of self-renunciation, the religious believer's orientation to the world and the place of the metaphysical in religion are among some (...) of the elements that need to be reappraised. (shrink)

What is ‘evil’? What are the ways of overcoming this destructive and morally recalcitrant phenomenon? To what extent is the use of punitive violence tenable? _Evil and the Philosophy of Retribution _compares the responses of three modern Indian commentators on the Bhagavad-Gita — Aurobindo Ghose, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi. The book reveals that some of the central themes in the Bhagavad-Gita were transformed by these intellectuals into categories of modern socio-political thought by reclaiming them from pre-modern debates (...) on ritual and renunciation. Based on canonical texts, this work presents a fascinating account of how the relationship between ‘good’, ‘evil’ and retribution is construed against the backdrop of militant nationalism and the development of modern Hinduism. Amid competing constructions of Indian tradition as well as contemporary concerns, it traces the emerging representations of modern Hindu self-consciousness under colonialism, and its very understanding of evil surrounding a textual ethos. Replete with Sanskrit, English, Marathi, and Gujarati sources, this will especially interest scholars of modern Indian history, philosophy, political science, history of religion, and those interested in the Bhagavad-Gita. (shrink)

Discourses on the Jaina philosophy of renunciation.

When referring to his first efforts in philosophy, particularly those contained in his Hypothesis Physica Nova and Theoria Motusa, Leibniz would often introduce them with vaguely disparaging remarks, such as “When my philosophy was not yet mature…,” or “Before I became a mathematician….” This is understandable, I would think, in terms of his desire to show how much his thought had progressed since that time, especially in mathematics. But some commentators, on being confronted with the unsystematic style of (...) these early works and the apparent contradictions of the theory of the continuum contained in them, seem to have interpreted Leibniz’s disclaimers as amounting to a complete renunciation of them. At any rate, they have been correspondingly dismissive in their estimation of the content of these early works. (shrink)

I examine the consistency between contemporary environmentalist ideals and Buddhist philosophy, focusing, first, on the problem of value in nature. I argue that the teachings found in the Pāli canon cannot easily be reconciled with a belief in the intrinsic value of life, whether human or otherwise. This is because all existence is regarded as inherently unsatisfactory, and all beings are seen as impermanent and insubstantial, while the ultimate spiritual goal is often viewed, in early Buddhism, as involving a (...) deep renunciation of the world. Therefore, the discussion focuses mostly on the Mahāyāna vehicle, which, I suggest has better resources for environmentalism because enlightenment and the ordinary world are not conceived as antithetical. Still, many contemporary green ideas do not sit well with classical Mahāyāna doctrines. Mahāyāna philosophers coincide in equating ultimate reality with ‘emptiness,’ and propose knowledge of this reality as a final soteriological purpose. Emptiness is generally said to be ineffable, and to involve the negation of all views. An important question is how to reconcile environmentalism with the relinquishing of views. I consider several prevalent themes in environmentalism, including the philosophy of ‘Oneness,’ and other systems that are often compared with Buddhism, like process thought. Many of these turn out to have more in common with an extreme view that Buddhism seeks to avoid, namely, eternalism. I attempt to outline an environmental position that, like the doctrine of emptiness, traverses a Middle Path between eternalism and nihilism. I conclude by proposing that emptiness could be regarded as the source of value in nature, if it is seen in its more positive aspect, as ‘pliancy.’ This would imply that what Buddhist environmentalists should seek to protect is not any being in its current form, nor any static natural system, but the possibility of adaptation and further evolution. (shrink)

With his recent contribution to Dewey studies, Deweyan Experimentalism and the Problem of Method in Political Philosophy, Joshua Forstenzer delivers a timely and highly readable examination of Dewey's democratic ideal and its contemporary relevance. Outstanding in its scholarship and compelling in its argument, Forstenzer's fascinating study presents an extensive interpretation of Dewey's experimentalist approach to democratic politics, while highlighting its significant interdisciplinary value and practical interest. Focussing particularly upon its experimentalist character and renunciation of a priori idealisations, Forstenzer (...) examines, over ten well-argued chapters, how Dewey's approach to political philosophy... (shrink)

This provocative work provides a radical reassessment of the emergence and nature of Christian sexual morality, the dominant moral paradigm in Western society since late antiquity. While many scholars, including Michel Foucault, have found the basis of early Christian sexual restrictions in Greek ethics and political philosophy, Kathy L. Gaca demonstrates on compelling new grounds that it is misguided to regard Greek ethics and political theory—with their proposed reforms of eroticism, the family, and civic order—as the foundation of Christian (...) sexual austerity. Rather, in this thoroughly informed and wide-ranging study, Gaca shows that early Christian goals to eradicate fornication were derived from the sexual rules and poetic norms of the Septuagint, or Greek Bible, and that early Christian writers adapted these rules and norms in ways that reveal fascinating insights into the distinctive and largely non-philosophical character of Christian sexual morality. Writing with an authoritative command of both Greek philosophy and early Christian writings, Gaca investigates Plato, the Stoics, the Pythagoreans, Philo of Alexandria, the apostle Paul, and the patristic Christians Clement of Alexandria, Tatian, and Epiphanes, freshly elucidating their ideas on sexual reform with precision, depth, and originality. Early Christian writers, she demonstrates, transformed all that they borrowed from Greek ethics and political philosophy to launch innovative programs against fornication that were inimical to Greek cultural mores, popular and philosophical alike. The Septuagint's mandate to worship the Lord alone among all gods led to a Christian program to revolutionize Gentile sexual practices, only for early Christians to find this virtually impossible to carry out without going to extremes of sexual renunciation. Knowledgeable and wide-ranging, this work of intellectual history and ethics cogently demonstrates why early Christian sexual restrictions took such repressive ascetic forms, and casts sobering light on what Christian sexual morality has meant for religious pluralism in Western culture, especially among women as its bearers. (shrink)

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was a system philosopher in the grand tradition of classical German idealism. Broadly an adherent of Kant’s transcendental idealism, he is now most noted for his belief that Kant’s thing in itself can best be described as ‘will’, something he argued in his 1819 work The World as Will and Representation (WWRI 124/H 2:119). Schopenhauer’s term ‘will’ does not refer primarily to human willing, that is, conscious striving towards a goal. Following Kant he argues that willing remains (...) conditioned by the forms of representation and therefore cannot be identified with the thing-in-itself. To reach the thing-in-itself, all forms of representation must be removed to arrive at a conception of will as striving without a goal. This conception is at the root of Schopenhauer’s pessimism: willing is experienced by conscious beings as suffering; and the world, including each of us, is in-itself endless willing without the possibility of satisfaction. Only two things hold out the prospect of any relief: the disinterested contemplation of works of art provides temporary respite from the striving will for the many; and a very few saintly beings may be able to still or quiet the will completely and achieve a state that Schopenhauer identifies as nirvana. These concerns—with suffering, meaning, asceticism and renunciation—are already problems in moral philosophy in a wide sense. But Schopenhauer also has a moral philosophy in the ‘narrower’ sense (WWRII 589/H 3:676; Cartwright 1999) that addresses questions such as freedom of the will, moral responsibility, the proper criterion for right action, moral motivation, and the virtues and vices. Indeed Schopenhauer makes a distinctive and quite contemporary contribution to virtue theory, advocating compassion (Mitleid) as the source of all human virtues. (shrink)

In the history of Chinese and European philosophy, metaphysics has played an outstanding role: it is a theoretical framework which provides the basis for a philosophical understanding of the world and the self. A theory of the self is well integrated in a metaphysical understanding of the totality of nature as a dynamic process of continuous changes. According to this view, the purpose of existence can be conceived of as the development and realization of the full potential given to (...) the individual by its nature. In regard to human nature specifically, this idea of self-realization includes the development of all cognitive faculties as well as of the moral character. Metaphysics has, however, suffered a loss of importance in current debates, especially in ethics. As a result, we observe the emergence of such philosophical views as moral skepticism and even nihilism. The consequence of this tendency has been the renunciation of a claim to understanding and to providing a solid ground for ethics. Yet an intercultural dialogue can provide us with some hope as the consolidation of debates on crucial topics of our traditions might indeed serve as the basis for a more powerful philosophy in the future. (shrink)

In ‘How Androcentric is Western Philosophy?’ (The Philosophical Quarterly, 46 (1996), pp. 48–59), I criticized five claims for the androcentrism of philosophy. In her ‘How Androcentric is Western Philosophy? A Reply’ (ibid., pp. 60–6), Susan Mendus finds my arguments faulty in a number of ways. Much of her criticism has to do with the distinction introduced in my article between pervasive and non-pervasive androcentrism. Pervasive androcentrism in a philosophical theory calls for substantial reform, complete rejection or replacement (...) by a feminist alternative. Non-pervasive androcentrism requires merely a renunciation of some androcentric themes from a philosophical theory. The difference is analogous to the one between a regime, law or idea we judge to be totally or mostly bad and would like to discard completely, and a regime, law or idea we think should be corrected here and there, but is generally worthwhile and after some amendments could be usefully maintained. (shrink)

A systematic presentation of Buddhist philosophy from the Madhyamika standpoint, combining careful documentation and technical precision with effective explications in terms of Western concepts. Often misunderstood as nihilism, the Madhyamika system is here presented as an absolutism which employs a negative dialectic to expose the incompetency of reason to grasp ultimate reality, yet affirms a supra-rational intuitional union with it. Conceptual construction is the source of bondage and pain; freedom is made possible by the critical renunciation of conceptualization (...) but is realized only in the positive, immediate intellectual intuition of the Absolute. This system is presented sympathetically yet not uncritically as a live philosophical alternative by no means incommensurable with our major systems.--L. K. B. (shrink)

Le livre est une étude portant sur le moi ou l'intériorité comme affectivité. Il met en oeuvre une nouvelle science philosophique définie comme ousiologie. Cette dernière est la science des essences. Dans ce livre, cette même science porte sur les essences constitutives de cette même intériorité. Tout en intégrant certains acquis de la philosophie de Michel Henry, elle en remet en cause certains aspects fondamentaux. L'intériorité est en effet définie comme étant immanence, à savoir comme étant à la fois une (...) unité et une absence absolue de distance par rapport à soi ou une absence absolue de sortie de soi. Pourtant, cette unité est aussi paradoxalement reconnue comme étant une triplicité ou encore une trinité des essences internes. Elle est de même paradoxalement définie comme étant une sortie de soi qui reste pourtant au coeur de soi. C'est ce double paradoxe qui constitue l'essence du moi comme renonciation. La renonciation est plus exactement l'histoire interne, essentielle et universelle du moi qui passe par les trois essences de l'aspiration, de l'action et de l'accomplissement. Une combinatoire des trois essences affectives permet par ailleurs de définir une pluralité de natures affectives : la médiocrité, la liberté, la destinée, le dévouement, le génie et la sainteté. Cette définition des natures égologiques est aussi fondamentalement une remise en cause de l'affirmation sartrienne selon laquelle il n'y a pas de nature humaine. (shrink)

Shankara was born in the eighth century on the west coast of south India. After devoting himself to yoga practices and meditation, Shankara wrote commentaries on the Bhagavad Gita, some of the Upanishads and other scriptures, and travelled throughout India declaring the oneness of a supreme reality and refuting erroneous philosophical doctrines. He reorganized the ancient, renunciate swami order and established permanent monastic centres in four regions of India: Sringeri in the south, Puri in the east, Dwaraka in the west, (...) and Badrinath in the Himalayas. Shankara lived during an era when Sanatana Dharma was beginning to be more widely emphasized, authoritative leadership was lacking, and conflicting religious sects were promoting a variety of philosophical opinions. His emphasis on the oneness of a supreme reality and the divinity of each person was a harmonizing influence. Besides expounding his non-dualistic views as presented in Self-Knowledge, he also wrote poems and composed hymns to reverently honour a variety of gods and goddesses to inspire and encourage people in all walks of life to be devoted to right living and spiritual practices. (shrink)

Since the turn of the century, however, a double upheaval has occurred, the formulation of the quantum theory and the theory of relativity, providing the ground for the development of modern physics. These theories issued from the problems of light that, in their strict forms, could not be assimilated by Newtonian physics. Before the turn of the century the wave theory had been victorious over the emission theory, and an hypothetical ether was assumed which was intended ultimately to represent absolute (...) space and to play a role similar to that of Anaximander's apeiron or Aristotle's prima materia. This last role seemed required since many philosophers of nature believed that they should see in matter and its elementary components the singularities, the exceptional peculiarities of the ether. However, since the ether held itself strictly incognito, Albert Einstein renounced it and declared that all systems in uniform, rectilinear motion are equivalent. The first portentous ontological consequence of this renunciation was that statements concerning spatial and temporal separation become relative. True relativity means, however, that objectivity and subjectivity enter equally into all statements, for to everything relative, as Max Planck once said, an absolute belongs. In this case the absolute was the combination of space and time into a four-dimensional spatio-temporal unity, which observers in different systems split into different space and time determinations. Our statements concerning space and time are thus neither merely subjective nor merely objective; rather a subject-object relation enters into them and makes them all relative. There is, to be sure, within the four-dimensional spatio-temporal unity a region of a spatial type within which the space-axes of the different observers lie, and the same is true for the temporal region. But even if there is no one universal time or simultaneity, temporality nevertheless plays its own role in contradistinction to spatiality, though both are expressible mathematically. We can say in the sense of critical realism that our spatial and temporal measurements are commensurate with the ordering relations of things and events. (shrink)

Pandey, V. Introduction.--Kalelkar, K. S. Jainism, a familyhood of all religions.--David, M. D. From Risabha to Mahavira.--Chalil, J. E. Glimpses of Southern Jainism.--Gopani, A. S. Life and culture in Jaina narrative literature, 8th, 9th and 10th century A.D.--Gopani, A. S. Position of women in Jaina literature.--Ranka, R. Evolution of Jaina thought.--Pandey, V. Jaina philosophy and religion.--Shah, C. C. Jainism and modern life.--Sankalia, H. D. The great renunciation.--Shah, U. P. Jaina contribution to Indian art.--Gorakshkar, S. Early metal images of (...) the Jainas.--Bhagwati, U. Bibliographical aids for the study of Jainism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche’s Case: Philosophy as/and LiteratureJeff MitchellNietzsche’s Case: Philosophy as/and Literature, by Bernd Magnus, Jean-Pierre Mileur and Stanley Stewart; 284 pp. New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1993, $16.95.In their “Pre(post)faces,” which open and conclude Nietzsche’s Case, the authors explain that the essay was primarily motivated by a problem they perceived in English-speaking Nietzsche criticism. Critical discussion of Nietzsche has suffered, they argue, from institutionalized “mutual shunning” (...) which creates a neat divide between literary and philosophical discourses. From within the safety of their professional keep, philosophers have generally adjudged literary treatments of Nietzsche’s writings negatively, assigning them a place on a scale ranging from “inaccurate” to “inept.” Viewed from the walls surrounding the literary stronghold, philosophical analyzes of Nietzsche have appeared naive and/or uninteresting. The authors assert that especially in the case of Nietzsche this turf mentality in the humanities has impoverished our cultural imagination, since he presents us with a sort of writing which defies mutually exclusive pigeon-holing as either philosophical or literary.Philosophy, the authors maintain, arises “out of the possibilities of idealization” (p. 138). Literary criticism, on the other hand, is “based on the possibilities of textualization” (p. 138). Philosophers studying Nietzsche tend to look for coherent meaning and, even more importantly, for logical rigor, whereas literary critics generally read “for novel new ideas, new insights, for fractures, fissures, and ambiguities in Nietzsche’s texts, for opportunities or connections missed” (p. 4). Nietzsche’s Case is an experiment in genre-mixing, [End Page 164] incorporating as it does all of these concerns into its critical perspective. The authors argue that Nietzsche’s work demands such criticism since his texts are informed by a conceptual rigor whose logic involves exploitation of the literary and rhetorical possibilities of the written word.The book’s project—undertaken, appropriately enough, by a philosopher (Magnus) and two literary theorists (Mileur and Stewart)—sets out to establish a new mode of criticism by carefully tracing the ways in which Nietzsche’s texts exceed traditional boundaries. The book’s extended argument aims at showing that Nietzsche’s transgression of hoary epistemic borders was directly motivated by his own genealogy of Western knowledge. “I, Plato, am the truth”—Nietzsche’s quip from the Twilight of the Idols ironically exposes the philosophical will to truth, and it is this claim to be primarily concerned with truth that the authors say can be seen “with only slight exaggeration,” as “the founding gesture of philosophy as it has been delivered over to us” (p. 4). They helpfully recall that part of Nietzsche’s genealogy which traces the origins of philosophy to religion and the priestly caste. Claims to the possession of knowledge were tied very early on to priestly strategies of asceticism and social domination, which cleverly highlighted the salvational nature of “true” knowledge as well as the discipline and self-renunciation required to attain it. On Nietzsche’s analysis, the dedication of philosophers to truth for truth’s sake and the supposedly disinterested character of their ideas and observations are the descendants of priestly asceticism.Magnus, Mileur and Stewart suggest that the philosophers’ assumption of a wholly objective and definitive access to truth was a pipedream, and that it helped seduce philosophers into a blindness vis-à-vis the interested and personal nature of their own theories, the textuality of their interpretations of world and humankind. If one grants this thesis, then the self-evident contemporary division between philosophy and literary criticism becomes, effectively, much less self-evident.The book’s originality and strength comes out best in the detailed analyses to which the authors’ new critical mode gives rise. In addition to displaying an impressive command of the enormous secondary literature on Nietzsche, the research team draws a series of novel and interesting comparisons between Nietzsche’s texts and texts from the English Renaissance and Romantic periods. Their emphasis on understanding the rhetorical aspects of Nietzsche’s writing—such as his continual use of hyperbole—should prove to be a genuine resource in interpreting his writings in the future. By pointing out and investigating the various rhetorical devices Nietzsche employs, they... (shrink)

Sartre's Les Mots has given rise to widely divergent competing readings in the philosophical literature, which tend to view it either as a simple continuation of his earlier, radical libertarianism, or as part of an alleged wholesale renunciation of the position we find in his early texts. I argue that most of these readings ignore the very real tensions in Words between the freedom of consciousness and the weight of circumstances. I further argue that Les Mots is a performative (...) text whose double writing (originally composed 1954-1957; rewritten 1963) demonstrates for us that, whereas we cannot simply renounce our past and the original meanings mediated to us in childhood through our families, we do have the power to take it up in ways that skew those meanings in somewhat different directions. No matter what we do, however, the blurred outlines of those original meanings will always remain. (shrink)

Many Buddhist rulers attained the cultic status of divinity as buddhas or celestial bodhisattvas and were expected to exercise their power in accord with Buddhist principles. The bodhisatta is depicted as perfecting both the virtues of kingship and the virtues of renunciation, thus preparing the way for his supreme enlightenment in which the two strands of sovereignty and renunciation “receive their final synthesis and fulfilment”. Politics was realistically seen as an unavoidable exercise of power that can and ought (...) to be used to promote righteousness, while the philosophical interpretation of Buddhist doctrines reflects the pragmatic nature of Buddhist ethics, which, unlike the deontological and absolutist ethical traditions, allows for the expression of multiple and variant attitudes towards the state and the role of religion in shaping and being shaped by social and political conditions. (shrink)

La vie et l'art? Quel lien d'authenticité peut-on dresser de l'un à l'autre? Où cesse la représentation et où commence l'incarnation? Quand le vécu prend-il chair? C'est à ces questions que répond le philosophe Patrice Guillamaud dans un traité d'esthétique fondamentale où le cinéma apparaît non pas comme la synthèse des arts, mais l'art en son essence. Ce postulat repose sur un double paradoxe. A la fois affect et relativisation, la vie intérieure est aspiration à l'absolu et renoncement à l'absolu, (...) sortie de soi qui reste paradoxalement en dedans de soi. Ainsi, cette vie, cette extase interne procède par renonciation. Or, l'art qui incarne par excellence la vie renonciatrice, c'est le cinéma. Dans la mesure où il se veut art de l'espace, mais englobé et dynamisé par le temps, le cinéma est la réalité charnelle de cette extase interne, en tant qu'absolu de la renonciation. Passant de Renoir à Dreyer, de Mizoguchi à Godard, Patrice Guillaumaud montre pourquoi et comment se tient là, universelle, la vérité des grandes oeuvres cinématographiques. Une relecture spéculative du VIIe art qui passe également en revue les grandes interrogations métaphysiques. (shrink)