This book offers a unique insight into the long history of the housing crisis, focusing on the development of the politics of the property-owing democracy, the growth of housing finance, the history of property crashes, and the rise and fall of a different vision of housing policy, which enabled far more people to realize their right to housing.

The view that social kinds (e.g., money, migrant, marriage) are mind-dependent is a prominent one in the social ontology literature. However, in addition to the claim that social kinds are mind-dependent, it is often asserted that social kinds are not real because they are mind-dependent. Call this view social kind anti-realism. To defend their view, social kind anti-realists must accomplish two tasks. First, they must identify a dependence relation that obtains between social kinds and our mental states. Call this the (...) Dependence Task. Second, they must show that social kinds are not real because they are mind-dependent. Call this the Anti-Realist Task. In this paper, I consider several different ways of defining the relation that is supposed to obtain between social kinds and our mental states. With respect to each relation, I argue that either it fails to accomplish the Dependence Task, or it fails to accomplish the Anti-Realist Task. As such, anyone who wishes to defend social kind anti-realism must provide an alternative explanation of how social kinds depend on our mental states in a way that impugns their reality. In the absence of such an explanation, there is no reason to endorse social kind anti-realism. (shrink)

As Louisiana and Cuba emerged from slavery in the late nineteenth century, each faced the question of what rights former slaves could claim. Degrees of Freedom compares and contrasts these two societies in which slavery was destroyed by war, and citizenship was redefined through social and political upheaval. Both Louisiana and Cuba were rich in sugar plantations that depended on an enslaved labor force. After abolition, on both sides of the Gulf of Mexico, ordinary people-cane cutters and cigar workers, laundresses (...) and labor organizers-forged alliances to protect and expand the freedoms they had won. But by the beginning of the twentieth century, Louisiana and Cuba diverged sharply in the meanings attributed to race and color in public life, and in the boundaries placed on citizenship. Louisiana had taken the path of disenfranchisement and state-mandated racial segregation; Cuba had enacted universal manhood suffrage and had seen the emergence of a transracial conception of the nation. What might explain these differences? Moving through the cane fields, small farms, and cities of Louisiana and Cuba, Rebecca Scott skillfully observes the people, places, legislation, and leadership that shaped how these societies adjusted to the abolition of slavery. The two distinctive worlds also come together, as Cuban exiles take refuge in New Orleans in the 1880s, and black soldiers from Louisiana garrison small towns in eastern Cuba during the 1899 U.S. military occupation. Crafting her narrative from the words and deeds of the actors themselves, Scott brings to life the historical drama of race and citizenship in postemancipation societies. (shrink)

I defend a novel view of how social kinds (e.g., money, women, permanent residents) depend on our mental states. In particular, I argue that social kinds depend on our mental states in the following sense: it is essential to them that they exist (partially) because certain mental states exist. This analysis is meant to capture the very general way in which all social kinds depend on our mental states. However, my view is that particular social kinds also depend on our (...) mental states in more specific ways—some of them causal, others metaphysical. I defend a minimal but metaphysically important notion of essence—one that takes as primary that the essential properties of a kind constitute its identity—and argue that this minimal notion of essence is all that is needed to vindicate my claim that social kinds are essentially mind-dependent. (shrink)

In the current framework of international protection, refugees almost invariably live in states where they hold no formal political status: they cannot vote, they cannot run for office, and they mu...

When I was an undergraduate in Oxford, we were taught economics almost as though it were a natural science. The subject matter of economics might be different from physics, but only in the way that the subject matter of chemistry or biology is different from physics. The actual results were presented to us as if they were scientific theories. So when we learned that savings equals investment, it was taught in the same tone of voice as one teaches that force (...) equals mass times acceleration. And we learned that rational entrepreneurs sell where marginal cost equals marginal revenue in the way that we once learned that bodies attract in a way that is directly proportional to the product of their mass and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. At no point was it ever suggested that the reality described by economic theory was dependent on human beliefs and other attitudes in a way that was totally unlike the reality described by physics or chemistry. Some years ago, when I published The Construction of Social Reality, I was aware that it had implications for the ontology of economics, but I was not aware that there had already been an important revival of the tradition of institutional economics. It would be an understatement to say that I welcome this interest in institutions; I enthusiastically support it. But I think that in the institutional literature there is still an unclarity about what exactly an institution is. What is the ontology, the mode of existence, of institutional reality? This article tries to add to this discussion. Economics as a subject matter, unlike physics or chemistry, is largely concerned with institutional facts. Facts about money and interest rates, exchange and employment, corporations and the balance of payments, form the very heart of the subject of economics. When Lionel Robbins, in a classic work, tells us that “Economics is a study of the disposal of scarce commodities,”2 he takes for granted a huge invisible institutional.... (shrink)

Although the teaching of medical ethics and law in medical education is an old story that has been told many times in medical literature, recent studies show that medical students and physicians lack confidence when faced with ethical dilemmas and medico-legal issues. The adverse events rates and medical lawsuits are on the rise whereas many medical errors are mostly due to negligence or malpractices which are preventable. While it is true that many medical schools teach their students medical law and (...) ethics, there are wide variations in what is being taught because there is no universally agreed syllabus. Yet the knowledge of medical law and ethics is closely relevant to the medical profession and that failure in abiding the law may result in serious civil or even criminal consequences. While this paper does not propose to lay detailed analysis of the relevant areas of law or ethics, it proposes to cover some legal areas so as to highlight and bring to attention the need for a medical law and ethics course. This article also considers the problems faced and recommendation as to future directions to be taken with respect to teaching medical law and ethics. It concludes with a suggested course outline for the teaching of medical law and ethics. (shrink)

Int. intr nseca i derivada. Condicions de satisfacci . Atribuci literal i metaf rica d'Int. Int. intr nseca-cervell. Ment-cervell. Panorama Filosof a de la Ment. Ryle. Causaci intencional. Teleolog a. Explicaci de les CC. Socials.

Pragmatism has enjoyed a major resurgence in Anglo-American philosophy over the course of the last decade or two, and Robert Brandom’s work – particularly his 1994 tome Making it Explicit (MIE) – has been at the vanguard of this resurgence (Brandom 1994).2 But pragmatism comes in several surprisingly distinct flavours. Authors such as Hubert Dreyfus find their roots in certain parts of Heidegger and in phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty, and they privilege embodied, preconceptual skills as opposed to discursive practices as (...) the basic sites of meaning and agency (Dreyfus 1991; Dreyfus 1992; Todes 2001). With strong inheritances from Dewey and Wittgenstein, Richard Rorty has championed a pragmatism whose core emphasis is on the rejection of transcendental truth and high metaphysical theorizing (Rorty 1982), and this anti-theoretical banner has been taken up by several prominent ethicists, among others. For his part, Brandom, who purports to offer a systematic theory of language and meaning grounded on a foundation of pragmatic normative relationships between speakers, looks back instead to Sellars and Quine for his stripe of pragmatism. Near the start of MIE, he writes: The explanatory strategy pursued here is to begin with an account of social practices, identify the particular structure they must exhibit in order to qualify as specifically linguistic practices, and then consider what different sorts of semantic contents those practices can confer on states, performances, and expressions caught up in them in suitable ways. (Brandom 1994, xiii) Despite his professed pragmatism, Brandom is no foe of high theory or metanarratives, and he is vastly more interested in language and theoretical reason than in the rest of human bodily activity. For Brandom, inferentially articulated discourse forms an autonomous domain of normativity, while our bodily encounters with the world in perception and in action serve as language entry and exit points respectively.. (shrink)

Should incarcerated persons be able to participate in medical research? While this is a much-debated question, Elizabeth Victor offers a fresh perspective on current regulatory approaches to research with prisoners. She delivers exactly what her book title promises: a reevaluation of protective frameworks based on her adaptation of the concept of vulnerability.Victor employs a definition of vulnerability that is “dynamic, capturing the particularities of an individual’s situation within a community of practices, norms, and a specific history”. However, she also emphasizes (...) that “by reinforcing vulnerability in populations, these practices create, sustain, or reinforce asymmetric power relations”, which... (shrink)

What sorts of systematic explanations should we and can we seek in cognitive science for perception, language comprehension, rational action and other forms of cognition? In broad outline I think the answer is reasonably clear: We are looking for causal explanations, and our subject matter is certain functions of a biological organ, the human and animal brain.

Defining the capital vice of sloth (acedia) is a difficult business in Thomas Aquinas and in the Christian tradition of thought from which he draws his account. In this article, I will raise three problems for interpreting Aquinas's account of sloth. They are all related, as are the resolutions to them I will offer. The three problems can be framed as questions: How, on Aquinas's account, can sloth consistently be categorized as, first, a capital vice and, second, a spiritual vice? (...) These two questions lead to a third, namely, how is the condition of sloth possible, given Aquinas's moral psychology and the nature of the will? The resolution of these interpretive issues can help do two things. It can help explain the apparent inconsistency between traditional (ancient and medieval) and contemporary conceptions of this vice, and —if Aquinas's account is right— it can help us diagnose contemporary moral and spiritual maladies that may either go unnoticed or be confused with distinctively modern "virtues" like diligence and industriousness. (shrink)

Moral perception, as the term is used in moral theory, is the perception of normatively contoured objects and states of affairs, where that perception enables us to engage in practical reason and judgment concerning these particulars. The idea that our capacity for moral perception is a crucial component of our capacity for moral reasoning and agency finds its most explicit origin in Aristotle, for whom virtue begins with the quality of perception. The focus on moral perception within moral theory has (...) made a comeback in the last few decades, especially in the hands of self-proclaimed neo-Aristotelians such as John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Nancy Sherman. For these writers, our perceptual capacities are not static, and the laborious honing of our perceptual skills is a crucial moral task. On this picture, as Nancy Sherman puts it, “How to see becomes as much a matter of inquiry as what to do.”Moral particularists—including but not restricted to the neo-Aristotelians—have emphasized the centrality of moral perception to moral agency and judgment, as a corrective to moral theories that treat deliberation in terms of universal principles as the privileged keystone of moral agency. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Analytic Philosophy The Rejection of These Two Distinctions and the Rejection of Foundationalism Some Recent Developments Overall Assessment.

Based on fieldwork in Newmarket, England, and Kentucky, this paper examines the acts of looking that take place at international thoroughbred horse auctions. Racehorse caretakers employ bloodstock agents to select the yearling thoroughbred who will make the best racehorse as a 2-year-old and, hopefully, successful stallion or broodmare after retiring from the track as a 4- or 5-year old. The paper assesses the criteria used to assess yearlings: pedigree, conformation, and "that something extra."The paper concludes that the ambiguous status of (...) the bloodstock agent derives from the liminal task the agent performs, communicating with a young, nonhuman animal to discover the animal's essential properties. Selecting yearlings depends upon a process of divination that mitigates against the characterization of western thought as "rational" and opposed to decision-making processes conventionally thought of as "non-normal" or irrational. (shrink)

Much of John Rawls' later work is concerned with the appli cation of his philosophical conceptions to the reality of liberal-democratic polities. I suggest that given the modern democratic reality of ethno national pluralism, Rawls' political conception of justice is insufficient to ensure democratic stability. Democratic states manage to contain ethnic pluralism while remaining compatible with liberal principles by promoting a corporate national identity. The key, I argue, lies in the particular member ship criteria devised and implemented by the state. (...) Hence, the promotion of a corporate national identity negates state neutrality, but not necessarily political liberalism. Key Words: Israel • Israeli Arabs • national identity • pluralism • Rawls. (shrink)

With growing awareness of a crisis in pollinator health, the practice of urban hobbyist beekeeping has grown in Canada with practitioners arguing that this activity can help to foster healthier honey bees and more mindful beekeeping practices. However, urban hobbyist beekeepers have been critiqued for encouraging improper beekeeping practices and over-saturation of honey bees in cities. Drawing on a multispecies ethnography based in London, Ontario and Toronto, including participant observation with the Toronto Beekeeping Collective and the London Urban Beekeeping Collective (...) and interviews with 26 urban beekeepers, I argue that urban hobbyist beekeepers develop a sensuous and embodied relationship with honey bees that typifies playful work. By integrating participant perspectives with social reproduction theory, I demonstrate that the playful work of urban hobbyist beekeeping allows practitioners to engage with non-human nature outside of the constraints of capitalist labour regimes, enabling the expression of delight, enchantment, and curiosity. This relationship between beekeepers and honey bees encourages the development of bee-centred practices in which the preferences and physiological needs of the bees are consciously put ahead of the needs of the beekeeper. The possibility for honey bee flourishing is increased significantly when bee-centred beekeeping is coupled with integrated pest management. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the role of values in theory selection is an important issue within medical education. I review the underdetermination argument, which is the idea within philosophy of science that the data serving as evidence for theories are by themselves not sufficient to support a theory to the exclusion of alternatives. There are always various explanations compatible with the data, and we ultimately appeal to certain values as our grounds for choosing one theory over another. I (...) explore some of the ways contemporary feminist philosophers have chosen to grapple with the problem of underdetermination and proposed solutions to systematize how values might be incorporated into theory choice, drawing primarily from the work of Helen Longino and Elizabeth Anderson. I conclude by discussing how value‐laden inquiry should be incorporated within medical education to promote reflection towards medicine’s normative underpinnings. (shrink)

Crime fiction by women writers across the globe has in recent years begun to explore the position of women detectives within post-feminist cultural contexts, moving away from the explicit refusal of the heterosexual romance plot in earlier feminist ‘hard-boiled’ fiction. In this article, I analyse Hawa Jande Golakai's The Lazarus Effect (2011) and The Score (2015) as part of the tradition of crime fiction by women writers in South Africa. Joining local crime writers such as Angela Makholwa, Golakai not only (...) questions orthodox conceptions of gender and sexuality in traditional iterations of the crime novel, but also combines elements of chick-lit with the crime plot. Reading the archetypal quest structure of the two genres against the background of Sara Ahmed's cultural critique of happiness, I argue that Golakai inventively recasts the recent sub-genre of the chick-lit mystery from the perspective of an Afropolitan detective. Her detective tenaciously undercuts the future-directed happiness script that structures conventional chick-lit and detective novels with their respective focus on finding a fulfilling heterosexual, monogamous romantic relationship, and the resolution of the crime and restoration of order. In this way, the novels defy the frequently assumed apolitical nature of chick-lit texts and also allow us to reimagine the idea of Afropolitanism, outside of its dominant consumerist form, as a critical Afropolitanism that emerges from an openness to be affected by the unhappiness and suffering of others. (shrink)

This essay considers the relation between Don Quixote's hunger and the disenchantment (Entzauberung) that Max Weber understood as paradigmatic of the modern condition. Whereas hunger functions within a Hegelian dialectic of desire in Cervantes' novel, literary representations of hunger from later periods (in Kafka and post-Holocaust Polish poetry) acknowledge the cosmic insignificance of human need by substituting the desire for recognition with a desire for self-abdication. While Don Quixote's hunger drives him to seek recognition for his dream world, modern literature's (...) hungry heroes respond to hunger by changing their metaphysical identities. Like desire, hunger functions in the literatures of modernity as an index of psychic wholeness or of its lack, both enabling and resisting the hero's assimilation with the world outside the self. (shrink)

In Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004] U.K.H.L. 30, the U.K. House of Lords upheld the right of a man to succeed to the tenancy of his deceased same-sex partner as if he had been the husband or wife of the deceased. This note examines the five judgements delivered by the court and considers the implications of the decision. It argues that, within the context of family law, Mendoza was a welcome decision but an evolutionary dead-end. The case signals a more promising (...) approach to the development of human rights, but the appropriate use and scope of s.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 remain somewhat unclear. (shrink)

(2) they really think there is some more or less clear meaning attaching to the archaic vocabulary of "dualism," "monism," "materialism," "physicalism," etc., and that the issue have to be posed and resolved in these terms.