Consideration of reference systems for semivalues leads us to a global representation of the action of a semivalue on a game. Using this representation, we show how to modify semivalues to take account of coalition structures on the player set. The players' allocations according to a semivalue, including a modified semivalue, can be computed by means of products of matrices obtained from the multilinear extension of the game.

We examine the effects of leader–member exchange differentiation on team members’ outcomes by using team moral disengagement as a psychological mechanism mediating this relationship and LMX differentiation bases moderating the relationship. Analysis of multilevel data collected from 289 frontline employees organized into 76 finance-related customer service teams shows that LMX differentiation significantly reduced team moral disengagement only when the performance basis was high, and that the negative relationship between LMX differentiation and team moral disengagement was significant only when the personal (...) liking basis was low. Furthermore, we found that the LMX bases moderated the indirect effect of LMX differentiation on team members’ outcomes through team moral disengagement. The findings advance team moral disengagement as a novel mechanism for cross-level relationship between LMX differentiation and team members’ outcomes at the individual level, and project differentiation bases as a condition under which LMX differentiation unpacks the reasons for team members’ favorable or unfavorable responses. They reveal LMX differentiation as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, whose essence can only be understood if examined from multiple levels. We also contribute to the literature by revealing the cognitive pathway through which LMX differentiation may be associated with team members outcomes. (shrink)

Current suggestions for capacities that should be targeted for moral enhancement has centered on traits like empathy, fairness or aggression. The literature, however, lacks a proper model for understanding the interplay and complexity of moral capacities, which limits the practicability of proposed interventions. In this paper, I integrate some existing knowledge on the nature of human moral behavior and present a formal model of prosocial motivation. The model provides two important results regarding the most friction-free route to moral enhancement. First, (...) we should consider decreasing self-interested motivation rather than increasing prosociality directly. Second, this should be complemented with cognitive enhancement. These suggestions are tested against existing and emerging evidence on cognitive capacity, mindfulness meditation and the effects of psychedelic drugs and are found to have sufficient grounding for further theoretical and empirical exploration. Furthermore, moral effects of the latter two are hypothesized to result from a diminished sense of self with subsequent reductions in self-interest. (shrink)

The article tries to prove that the famous formula "epekeina tês ousias" has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We make hereby three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, (...) showing that not only self-predication of the form of the Good, but of any form is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an ens imaginarium and a chimaera to Plato’s Idea of the Good. (shrink)

Not only is freedom a shared concern of Sartre and Schelling, which would not be anything particularly unique, but for both philosophers, freedom must be articulated out of an ontological ground, or within the confines of an ontological system. A contradiction nevertheless appears to arise regarding the “orientation” of Sartre and Schelling’s respective “ontologies of freedom”: the freedom of Sartre, reflecting a contemporary stoic-inspired doctrine, is directed toward the future, while for Schelling, with affinities to the temporal logic of psychoanalysis, (...) freedom is oriented toward the past. This article presents both Sartre and Schelling’s ontological reasoning out of which either a progressively oriented freedom (the freedom to negate the present in the name of future “possibles”) or a retrogressively oriented freedom (the freedom to determine the ground of the present out of an indefinite, a-temporal becoming), before attempting to resolve this contradiction in the temporality of freedom by examining the position and role of the negative (of negation, contradiction, or nothingness), as either secondary or primary, within the ontology of each respective philosopher. (shrink)

Traditional cognitive science is Cartesian in the sense that it takes as fundamental the distinction between the mental and the physical, the mind and the world. This leads to the claim that cognition is representational and best explained using models derived from AI and computational theory. The authors depart radically from this model.

This article asks the question “Why did Plato not write the ‘unwritten doctrine’?” and answers it by citing a combination of two obstacles. The first derives from the limitations of the episteme available to an embodied soul about the essence of the good. Even if the dialectician has access to some kind of knowledge, the mismatch between the unchanging essence of the good and the precarious logoi which aim to identify it (and allow others some measure of access to it) (...) can never fully be overcome. At best, Socrates (or Plato) can lead souls to an incomplete account of it: It is possible that even the most expert dialectician can only have a claim to knowledge, but no absolute certainty. Another obstacle lies in the audience or readership itself: No shortcut to understanding is possible, and yet a mere written presentation, which is all they have, is just such a shortcut, and so represents an empty promise. In memory of Charles H. Kahn (1928–2023), a letter of his from September 5, 1989, concerning the question “Why did Plato not write the ‘unwritten doctrine’?” is published, along with some comments. (shrink)

Na era das tecnologias digitais, entender vieses algorítmicos por meio das teorias da verdade ajuda a fazer perguntas cujas respostas facilitam a filtragem da informação de forma mais eficaz. O ganho é a compreensão aprofundada da realidade.

Un itinéraire est proposé pour comprendre la réception de Petrus Ramus dans la pensée catholique, puisqu’il s’agit d’un sujet totalement inexploré : 1) 1545-1585 (stade de compréhension et d’absorption des idées de Ramus), 2) 1585-1640 (époque du combat apologétique, confrontation et éclectisme), 3) 1640-1670 (période d’étude et de discussion détaillée des auteurs scolastiques et des rationalistes), et 4) après 1670 (époque de suspension et de dissolution progressive de l’intérêt pour les œuvres de Ramus). La réception de Ramus dans les œuvres (...) de Lalemandet, Mersenne, Sorel, Gassendi et Caramuel est particulièrement étudiée, ainsi que l’influence de Ramus sur les jésuites. On conclut à une réception très différente. Les auteurs les plus aristotéliciens (Mas, Raynaud...) étaient absolument contre La Ramée, alors que d’autres avaient une position plus éclectique (Lalemandet, Caramuel), d’autres estimaient son travail (Mersenne, Gassendi) et certains ont formulé un jugement très élogieux (Sorel). (shrink)

The article first gives an exegesis of the famous passage in the "Republic", 505d11-506a2. Attention is drawn to the fact that the principle that every soul does everything for the Good can be translated in two ways: Every soul does everything for the sake of the Good, or goes to all lengths for the sake of the Good. Depending on the different translations, we have a different picture of the platonic Socrates in the Republic, an intellectualistic Socrates for whom irrational (...) desires do not exist, or a Socrates who also accepts irrational desires. The article favours the first one. Then it attempts to show that we can elucidate some dark points in the Socratic thesis that the Good is what every soul pursues and for which every soul does everything, with the help of Aquinas’s distinction between it actio hominis and actio humana. Finally, the article outlines three substantive answers to the question “What is the Good?” – the henological, the perfectionist and the structuralist. Instead of advancing a new answer, the article suggests an uncontroversial formal starting point for an answer to this question. (shrink)

El crecimiento y el desarrollo de la complejidad cultural a lo largo de la historia humana, poseen la forma de una espiral en movimiento que se abre a las posibilidades; desde un punto se extienden una serie de círculos concéntricos que amplían el espectro cultural. Esta apertura la podemos percibir desde un concepto clave en la obra wittgensteineana, a saber, la noción de ver aspectos. Por otra parte, con ella también podemos distinguir y entender otro punto clave en esa dinámica (...) cultural, ello es: la idea de cambio y conflicto social. Así pues, la idea del presente trabajo es mostrar las estructuras epistémicas con las que operan los conflictos y los cambios socioculturales -tan relevantes para el desarrollo social y la teoría antropológica-, tomando como fondo la idea wittgensteineana de visión de aspectos. Con lo que encontramos, que el presente artículo además de ser una contribución al “estudio cultural” con base en un interés epistemológico, pretende vincular la filosofía wittgensteineana con la antropología científica.Palabras clave: Visión de aspectos, conflicto, cambio social, Wittgenstein, epistemología.The growth and development of cultural complexity throughout human history has had the form of a moving spiral that opens to possibilities; from one point, a series of concentric circles is extended that expand the cultural spectrum. This opening can be perceived from a key concept in Wittgenstein’s thought, namely, the notion of seeing aspects. On the other hand, with this concept we can also identify and understand another key point in that cultural dynamic: the idea of change and social conflict. Thus, the idea of this paper is to show the epistemic structures through which conflicts and socio-cultural changes operate, which are so relevant to social development and the anthropological theory, taking the Wittgensteinian idea of seeing aspects as a background. This article is not only a contribution to “cultural study” based on an epistemological interest, but it also tries to link Wittgenstein’s philosophy with scientific anthropology.Key words: Vision of aspects, conflict, social change, Wittgenstein, epistemology. (shrink)

Con el objetivo de contribuir al debate actual sobre la necesidad del esclarecimiento de los fundamentos filosóficos de la investigación científica y su declaración en el discurso que expone sus principales resultados, se valoró la forma en que se asume la perspectiva dialéctico-materialista y se precisó en torno a algunos enfoques polémicos sobre la necesidad de su empleo consecuente como referente cosmovisivo en la construcción de la ciencia y la legitimación de sus resultados. Se enfatizó en la necesidad de su (...) consecuente empleo en el proceso de investigación. In order to contribute to the current debate on the necessity for clarification of the philosophical foundations of scientific research and its interpretation in discourse that exposes its main results, it was assessed how dialectical materialistic perspective is assumed and it was clarified around some controversial approaches about the necessity of its consistent use as a comprehensive reference in building science and the legitimacy of its results. It was emphasized on the need of its consistent use in the research process. (shrink)

UNESCO in the 2030 agenda for sustainable development establishes respect for the environment and sustainability education as key elements for the challenges of society in the coming years. In the educational context, physical education can have a vital role in sustainability education, through Traditional Sporting Games. The aim of this research was to study from an ethnomotor perspective the different characteristics of two different groups of TSG in the Canary Islands, Spain. The corpus of this investigation was made up of (...) 513 TSG, identified by two analysis techniques and collected in a database. The categories corresponding to the variables of the internal logic of the game were the type of motor interaction, related to space, relationships with time, and relationships with objects. The study also examined the variables of external logic or sociocultural conditions such as the protagonists, playing areas, and game moments. The data analysis was carried out using descriptive and inferential statistics: cross-tables, effect sizes, classification trees, and the identification of frequency areas. Of the total number of playful activities identified, most were physical activities. These activities were Quasi-games without rules and TSG as well as activities with Objects and without material. This research confirms that the TSG in the Canary Islands is a mirror of traditional culture and, from a pedagogical approach, shows great potential for material and social sustainability. (shrink)

PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da (...) ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade.ENGLISH: In this article we present a particular view of the development of scientific theories which (following Ortega y Gasset), we term "perspectivism". Making use of this view, we discuss how we can accommodate distinct and apparently incompatible descriptions of a supposed reality under investigation. We distinguish between a "reality" (R) and its "empirical description", (Re). Acknowledging that we can have diverse empirical descriptions of the same reality, we discuss the particular case in which the view is applied to current debates on the ontology of quantum physics, especially of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As it is well known, this theory is compatible with treating quantum objects either as individuals or as non-individuals. Both ontologies are possible and deserve to be developed. We propose that the perspectivism developed here is neutral not only with respect to the choice of an ontology, but also concerning the debates among realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science. We conclude that to go beyond the pluralism accepted by perspectivism, and to adopt realism or anti-realism, involves commitment to strong theses about the relation between reality and its descriptions. PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade. (shrink)

The book is a collection of essays written by Gustavo Esteva over the last 20 years. In this book, Gustavo Esteva, renowned in Mexico as a philosopher on education and on developmentalism, collects four major areas of his writings: on learning, development, autonomy, and interculturality. A memorial to a great thinker, this book stimulates thoughts on developmentalism across the global south.

Nosso artigo visa um estudo sobre os cadernos intitulados como “Manuscritos econômico-filosóficos” de Karl Marx, do ano de 1844, tendo em vista a posição privilegiada que o texto ocupa no desenvolvimento do pensamento do autor. Do mesmo modo, os manuscritos guardam os primeiros estudos teóricos da economia política de um jovem Marx e seu pensamento precoce – anterior àquele de “O capital” –, ao mesmo tempo que também representou o aprimoramento das “armas da crítica” pela “crítica das armas” contra os (...) jovens hegelianos do grupo de Berlim (principalmente Bauer e Stirner) e o pensamento e herança deixada por Hegel. Tais estudos possivelmente também foram importantes para a edificação da amizade que ele também começaria poucos meses após os manuscritos serem “concluídos” – conclusão que só seria realizada com a publicação mas que nunca ocorreu durante a vida de Karl Marx, senão, ocorreria apenas em 1932 (integralmente) com a redescoberta dos mesmos alguns anos antes com o impulso da revolução bolchevique na Rússia. Por fim, buscaremos apontar em que medida as concepções e o pensamento do jovem autor se conservam ou se transformam – parcial ou completamente – nos anos imediatamente posteriores. (shrink)

The first part of the paper (p. 10-21) tries to answer the first question of the title and describes a set of seven “knowledge-claims” made by Socrates: 1. There is a distinction between right opinion and knowledge. 2. Virtue is knowledge. 3. Nobody willingly does wrong. 4. To do injustice is the greatest evil for the wrongdoer himself. 5. An even greater evil is if the wrongdoer is not punished. 6. The just person is happy; the unjust person is unhappy. (...) 7. The pleasant is not the good. These claims seem to be the “few” (oliga) (Men. 98 b3) but “very important” (kallista) (Grg. 472 c8) things that Socrates claims to know. The second part (p. 22-39) tries to answer the second question and defends the thesis that the supposed “knowledge” of Socrates is dianoetic, but not noetic. The main new idea of this paperis the comparison of the Socratic knowledge-claims with the upper states of the mind symbolized in theDivided Line, noesis and dianoia (cf. R. 511 d7-e1). Posted. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy offers a therapeutic way out of some conundrums stemming from taxonomic expectations regarding philosophical description of experience in general. The paper asks if this is also true of the facts of aesthetic experience. This possibility is hinted at by examining an application of the notion of certainty to aesthetic experience. Some traits of possible uses of central concepts of the mature Wittgenstein to a philosophical aesthetics inspired by the “new method” are also canvassed.

This is a short overview of Plato’s “greatest thing to be learned” or the “greatest lesson” (megiston mathêma) – the Idea of the Good.

The anthropologist James Frazer investigates the ritual gesture in search of be- liefs about the physical world by the native. Wittgenstein considers this a case of aspect- blindness, one that is disruptive of the conditions for understanding the native’s most triv- ial gestures. Unable to cast his glance from within the native situation, this methodological view from nowhere has an arresting effect on experience – in particular, the experience of speaking. This interruption is to be examined by means of a (...) thought experiment. Then, through the interplay of the concepts of Spirit and Aspect, a philosophical tool is described to assess the problem that can also serve as practical guide back to ordinary experience. The next step is to examine this way out in a particularly sensitive kind of experience of meaning: the aesthetic experience, also seen as a ritual. We conclude by alluding to a pos- sibly mutual illumination between aesthetic experience, translation studies and a Cavellian take on ordinary language. (shrink)

What distinguishes the Socrates of the early from the Socrates of the middle dialogues? According to a well-known opinion, the “dividing line” lies in the difference between the Socratic and the Platonic theory of action. Whereas for the Platonic Socrates of the early dialogues, all desires are good-dependent, for the Platonic Socrates of the middle dialogues, there are good-independent desires. The paper argues first that this “dividing line” is blurred in the "Symposium", and second that we have in the "Symposium" (...) a more distinctive dividing line, namely the introduction of the separate existence of the idea of beauty. This introduction by Diotima/Plato of separate ideas and the lack of understanding of separate ideas – here the idea of beauty – by Socrates may have been the limit not only of the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues, but of the historical Socrates as well. (shrink)

O presente artigo busca caracterizar a querela interna do Movimento Jovem-Hegeliano através da descrição e caracterização do conceito de massa/massificação dentro do pensamento de seus membros primeiros, a saber: Ludwig Feuerbach, David Strauss e Bruno Bauer.

La historia de la Cirugía Pediátrica cubana está pendiente de ser documentada científicamente. Se estableció como objetivo definir las etapas de desarrollo de la especialidad en Cuba, para lo cual se hizo un análisis histórico y se identificó cuatro períodos fundamentales. Este artículo tiene una significación práctica puesto que permite conocer en qué momento se encuentra la especialidad para modelar el futuro de la misma. The history of Cuban pediatric surgery is pending of being scientifically documented. It was established as (...) an objective to define the stages of the development of the specialty in Cuba. For this purpose a historical analysis was carried out and four main periods were identified. This study has a practical importance because it allows knowing the stage in which the specialty is to model its future. (shrink)

Abstract: It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are contradictory theories: (...) If moral judgments are descriptive, it is not possible to deduce norms from them. But if one can deduce norms from moral judgments, they are not descriptive. As a solution to this problem, the paper suggests that moral judgments represent institutional facts; the corresponding theory is moral institutionalism. A moral institutional fact – “an act X is Y”, Y” means “morally right” or “morally false” – is a hybrid of descriptive and prescriptive elements: It is stating a fact in descriptive language (“is”) and at the same time, it is short for the prescriptive constitutive rule “X is Y according to the moral rules of the language community C”. Institutional facts contain normative presuppositions without letting them appear in their grammatical form. Institutional facts are now (in relation to the language community C) objective and intersubjective and they can be generalized (cognitive aspect), although they cannot be reduced to brute physical or psychological facts, and it is also possible to deduce norms from them because they are built into them. The meta-ethical concept of moral institutionalism, which is evolved further in the paper, preserves the best intentions of emotivism and cognitivism without leading to contradiction. As a by-product, the article shows exactly the error in J. R. Searle’s alleged counterexample against the so-called naturalistic fallacy from “is” to “ought”. This lies in the normative “are” of the analytic premise or definition in “2a. All promises are [that is ought to be] acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised”. In “Key concepts in philosophy”, Sankt Augustin 2015, institutionalism is explained further (p.184-191) and confined to what Hegel has called “Sittlichkeit” that is customary morality in in distinction to the “morality” of my personal consciousness (p.212-213):. (shrink)

How can we, perspicuously, explain the relation between a literary text and its interpretation by a reader in a way that supports the hypothesis that literature matters for moral reflection? In this article, based on a critical examination of some anglophone authors, who are more or less engaged in investigations related to the analytic philosophy of language, and who address the relation between philosophy and literature, we propose a distinction between two types of relations: the relation between the literary work (...) and its reception by a reader, and the empirical relation between the reception of the literary work and changes in the reader. For advances in moral reflection, this relation may not be an empirical one. Therefore, we propose a form of explanation for the relation between literary work and its reception by a reader, involving the writer and their literary work, the reader and their interpretative role, and the shared background between writer and reader. (shrink)

This is an introductory blog to the question: "What is a human being?".