Peter Sloterdijks opgør med modernitetens metafysik.

I en lang række neoliberalisme-kritiske fortolkninger forstås og beskrives neoli- beralisme som decideret anti-demokratisk, hvis ikke i åben intention så i effekt og konsekvens. I dette kapitel undersøges en aktuel opblussen af neoliberal demokra- tikritik, der startede i slut-90’erne med en globaliseringsfortælling om, at interna- tionale markeder og virksomheder samt rige enkeltindivider nu er de nye suveræ- ner på bekostning af stat og demokrati til det, der i 00e’rne og 10’erne bevægede sig ind i forskellige teknovarianter af at kunne skabe (...) neoliberalisme nu-og-her i sprækkerne af det bestående til i dag mere at handle om en anti-populisme, hvor folket iscenesættes som farligt for, for dumt til, demokrati. Artiklens formål er at undersøge, hvilken rolle folke- og demokratibegrebet spiller i disse kritikker, dels for at undersøge den neoliberale demokratikritik, dels som en privilegeret indgang til neoliberalismen selv og endelig for at kunne diskutere neoliberalismens forhold til demokratiet i dets forskellige udtryk, der dog alle trækker på samme flertalsfrygt. (shrink)

In this first paperback edition, a new introduction by Tom Burke establishes the ongoing importance of Sleeper's analysis of the integrity of Dewey's work and ...

Jeg diskuterer i denne artikel en række principielle spørgsmål angående det der kaldes «religionens genkomst» i det moderne demokrati. Mit hovedeksempel er den såkaldte «Muhammed-krise», som stadigvæk debatte­res med stor intensitet i nationale og internationale sammenhænge. De tre hovedspørg­smål lyder: Hvilken plads kan religiøse synspunkter og ytringer gøre krav på i den demokratiske offentlighed? Kan vi indholdsmæssigt fastsætte grænsen for religiøs blasfemi ved lov eller står den til løbende demokratisk debat? I hvilken grad kan reli­giøse minoritetsgrupper kræve anerkendelse fra – (...) og beskyttelse mod – majoritetskultu­ren i moderne, liberale demokratier? Til det første spørgsmål svarer jeg med Jürgen Habermas at religiøse grupper bør forsøge at oversætte deres holdninger til ikke-religiøse argumenter, samtidig med at denne oversættelse af forskellige årsager ikke kan fremtvin­ges retsligt eller afkræves som betingelse for demokratisk deltagelse. Mht. til det andet spørgsmål argumenterer jeg – igen med Habermas – for, at den konkrete anvendelse af abstrakte retsprincipper som ytringsfrihed og religionsfrihed kræver åben, demokratisk debat med bred deltagelse for athave legitimitet. Resultatet af denne debat kan godtvære et strengt syn på, hvad der tæller som blasfemisk, men muligheden for at kritisere dette syn – eller for generel religionskritik – kan ikke undertrykkesuden at gå kompromis med det liberale demokratis grundprincipper. Som svar på det tredje spørgsmål, og som et kritisk supplement til Habermas, fremfører jeg med Axel Honneth, at samfundsmæssig integration ikke skabes af demokratiske debatter alene. Der kræves også en vis før-dis­kursiv atmosfære af solidaritet: Religiøse minoritetsgrupper kan ganske vist ikke kræve juridisk beskyttelse af religiøse følelser, men de kan påpege «asymmetriske anerkendel­sesforhold», f.eks. ensidigt negative fremstillinger i medierne, som forringer deres mulighed for at bidrage til samfundet som anerkendte og anerkendende medborgere. (shrink)

PREFACE The first three of these lectures, or rather an abbreviated version of them, were first given as the Lindsay Memorial Lectures at the University of ...

This distinction has sometimes been read as purely epistemic, resting not on things, but on our knowledge of them: there is one world, not two, though it may be apprehended in two ways. But this view is patently at odds with the text. Knowledge and opinion are δυνάμεις, "faculties," to be distinguished and defined by their objects, no less than by the state of mind they produce, and Plato clearly states that the fallibility and unclearness of opinion is rooted in (...) the relative unreality of opinables. (shrink)

History of Mongolian philosophy, intellectual life, and politics; covers until 14th century.

He then proceeds with an examination of the picture theory developed by Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Goodman, and concludes with an examination of Patricia Churchland, Ruth Millikan, Robert Cummins, and Mark Rollins. The use of the historical development of representationalism to pose a central problem in contemporary cognitive science is unique.

The chapter argues from an ethology-inspired internalist perspective that ‘colour’ is not a homogeneous and autonomous attribute, but rather plays different roles in different conceptual forms underlying perception. It discusses empirical and theoretical evidence that indicates that core assumptions underlying orthodox conceptions are grossly inadequate. The assumptions pertain to the idea that colour is a kind of autonomous and unitary attribute. It is regarded as unitary or homogeneous by assuming that its core properties do not depend on the type of (...) ‘perceptual object’ to which it pertains and that‘colour per se’ constitutes a natural attribute in the functional architecture of the perceptual system. It is regarded as autonomous by assuming that it can be studied in isolation of other perceptual attributes. More generally, the chapter argues on the bases of corresponding empirical and theoretical evidence that perception cannot be understood as the ‘recovery’ of physical world structure from sensory structure by input-based computational processes. Rather, the sensory input serves as a kind of sign for biologically relevant aspects of the external world that activates biologically given conceptual forms with their internal parameters. Although the sensory input is a causally necessary requirement for the activation of conceptual forms, the perceptual computations triggered are under the control of an internal programme based on a set of conceptual forms. (shrink)

First paragraph: Some reasons for action are relational. I have a relational reason to Φ when I have reason to Φ in virtue of a relationship in which I stand, or a role that I fill; absent that relationship or that role I would not have that reason to Φ ; others who do not stand in that relationship or fill that role do not have that reason to Φ . I have a relational reason to feed this child -- (...) that he is my child: absent that parental relationship, I might still have a reason to feed him, as might others who are not his parents -- for instance that he is starving; but absent that relationship, I would not have and others cannot have that specific relational reason to feed this child. I have a relational reason to respond to this person's philosophical queries -- that she is my student: absent that pedagogical relationship, I might still have reason to respond to her questions, as might others who are not her teachers -- for instance that it is good to help such seekers after philosophical insight; but absent that relationship, I would not have and others cannot have that specific relational reason to respond to her queries. I have relational reason to pay John ￡10 -- that I borrowed it from him and promised to repay him today: absent that promissory relationship I might still have, and others might have, reason to give him ￡10 -- for instance that he is impoverished and I am (or they are) rich; but absent that promissory relationship, neither I nor others could have that specific relational reason to give him ￡10. (shrink)

Eighty‐two participants listened to sentences and then judged whether two sequentially presented visual objects were the same. On critical trials, participants heard a sentence describe the motion of a ball toward or away from the observer (e.g., “The pitcher hurled the softball to you”). Seven hundred and fifty milliseconds after the offset of the sentence, a picture of an object was presented for 500 ms, followed by another picture. On critical trials, the two pictures depicted the kind of ball mentioned (...) in the sentence. The second picture was displayed 175 ms after the first. Crucially, it was either slightly larger or smaller than the first picture, thus suggesting movement of the ball toward or away from the observer. Participants responded more quickly when the implied movement of the balls matched the movement described in the sentence. This result provides support for the viewthat language comprehension involves dynamic perceptual simulations. (shrink)

We generalize two well-known model-theoretic characterization theorems from propositional modal logic to first-order modal logic. We first study FML-definable frames and give a version of the Goldblatt–Thomason theorem for this logic. The advantage of this result, compared with the original Goldblatt–Thomason theorem, is that it does not need the condition of ultrafilter reflection and uses only closure under bounded morphic images, generated subframes and disjoint unions. We then investigate Lindström type theorems for first-order modal logic. We show that FML has (...) the maximal expressive power among the logics extending FML which satisfy compactness, bisimulation invariance and the Tarski union property. (shrink)

The environmental movement continues to be a dynamic force for protection of the environment despite new organizations emerging from the “birthing” process of the formation of new groups via factions and schisms. I focus on two aspects of the evolution of the environmental movement: how do new organizations emerge from existing environmental groups via benevolent or divisive mechanisms; and, which organizations produce new organizations? I develop a family tree of the American environmental movement from 1955 – 2005 and identify the (...) mechanisms that result in the formation of new organizations from a sample of 48 environmental organizations. I use social network analysis to identify which environmental organizations were most likely to produce new groups and set the stage for future inquiries into how new environmental organizations reestablish and maintain connections with their progenitors. (shrink)

Opstellen eerder verschenen in het Nederlands Tijdschrift voor rechtsfilosofie en rechtstheorie en in andere periodieken.

in UndeterminedSo-called fitting-attitude analyses or buck-passing accounts of value have lately received much attention among philosophers of value. These analyses set out from the idea that values must be understood in terms of attitudinal responses that we have reason to or that it is fitting or that we ought to have regarding the valuable object. This work examines to what extent this kind of analysis also can be applied to so-called personal values - value-for, rather than to the impersonal value (...) period which has been the standard analysandum. The shift from impersonal to personal values can, it is argued, be taken without any major change to the pattern. It is not the normative element that needs to be changed in the analysis but rather the kind of attitude - what is required is that the attitudes all have to be so called 'for someone's sake' attitudes. (shrink)

Elsewhere I have argued that the notion of a normative agent-neutral reason is undermined by certain views on reasons; the existence of agent-neutral reasons can be questioned. Here I shall not repeat my doubts but rather address a way of expressing the distinction that I had not considered and which would, if correct, put an end to my worries about the soundness of this dichotomy. The idea, which was suggested to me by Douglas Portmore is that normative reasons are facts (...) of a peculiar kind: they are subjunctive facts of a certain kind. (shrink)

Invited talk at the so-called Thursday Lecture, Oct 25, at the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte the International Programme at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Leuven, Belgium. Focus was on the distinction between good and good-for.