v. 1. al-Nuṣūṣ al-manṭiqīyah -- v. 2. al-Shurūḥ al-manṭiqīyah -- al-mujallad 3. al-Shurūḥ ʻalá al-nuṣūṣ al-manṭiqīyah.

v. 1. Arabic text -- v. 2. English translation.

Resumen: Este artículo sostiene que algunas Meta-Picto-Poesías del Paisaje compuestas por el poeta estadounidense Gary Snyder toman como tema la pintura china del paisaje con las características de la antigua poesía china, resplandeciente de incomparable encanto artístico y sustancia cultural. La poesía de este tipo es una combinación perfecta de elementos orientales y occidentales, que integra las culturas, los pensamientos y las artes de ambas partes, cuya apreciación crea una experiencia compleja con un híbrido de formas artísticas y espacios estéticos. (...) Gary Snyder no es sólo un eco-poeta, sino también un estilista y un hombre de práctica. Sus obras poéticas revelan la relación de fomento entre literatura, cultura y naturaleza. El artículo pretende hacer un intento transcultural, interdisciplinar y multidisciplinar en la crítica de Snyder, con métodos analíticos que incluyen culturas orientales y occidentales, visiones antiguas y actuales, así como experiencias dinámicas y estáticas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:One to NGirard's Philosophy of InnovationJohnathan Bi (bio)What does a theorist of imitation have to teach us about innovation? What could a thinker focused on the distant past have to offer us in building the immediate future? The answer to both questions, I hope to show, is a significant amount. I aim to rescue and develop a neglected strand of Girardian thought from one of his overlooked essays on (...) a topic seemingly antithetical to imitation: innovation. This task proceeds in five steps. First, I articulate two contemporary perspectives on innovation, one dominant and one in the minority. Second, I reconstruct Girard's historical argument from "Innovation and Repetition" in favor of the minority view and, third, his psychological argument against the dominant view. Fourth, I show how Girard's philosophy of innovation sublates crucial features of both poles and provides an alternative mode for conceiving the future.1 Lastly, I wrestle with an immanent objection that threatens the prescriptive force of his entire argument and, even when reconciled, leads me to depart from Girard's conclusions, albeit in the most Girardian of ways. [End Page 71]INNOVATION AND IMITATIONThe dominant view of innovation is that it is opposed to imitation. The foundational type of opposition between the two is metaphysical: imitation and innovation are actions different in kind and must be conceived of as such. Peter Thiel's famous formulation is representative: certain actions, companies, and countries are innovative, going from "zero to one," while others are imitative, going from "one to N."2 This distinction is mostly accepted without question in the social sciences, underpinning entire disciplines such as innovation studies.3 This near-universal consensus, however, is a modern phenomenon. The Latin innovatio, for example, described innovation as being inseparable from the imitation of the past: the Jews returning to Jerusalem, Job having his wealth restored, or the rebirth of a phoenix.4 The word itself reveals as much. Innovatio is derived by appending the prefix in- (within, from inside) to novitas (novelty). It meant novelty that preceded from within, or renewal. Under this view, innovation was not about breaking free or starting from a blank slate, zero to one, but rather rescuing and developing an already formed foundation, one to N. Innovation was identical with the imitation and adaptation of that which is essential but has been obscured. Only beginning in the twentieth century has imitation been so strongly demarcated from innovation.5Built on top of this metaphysical opposition is a practical opposition. Not only are the two actions distinct, they are incompatible: the more one imitates, the more one risks eroding one's ability to innovate. This stronger form of opposition is exemplified by the idea of the "untutored genius" whose source of creativity is solely internal: a fully formed natural endowment not requiring learning nor external inspiration from divinity or nature. This idea gained ascendancy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and proponents believed that imitation of tradition impeded the expression of one's own innate genius.6 If one wants to write a great book, this idea goes, one ought not read great books for fear that they will crowd out one's original ideas. Even in the twentieth century, Wittgenstein expressed this exact sentiment when he proudly claimed not to have read any Aristotle or engaged deeply with the history of philosophy and considered those who have "academic and therefore unauthentic philosophers."7 Of course, not all modern thinkers see innovation and imitation as practically opposed in such a strong way.8 But even for most who treat the two as harmonious, imitation tends to be relegated to a secondary afterthought as the mere mechanism by which innovation, the primary source of value creation, spreads. This, then, is the third form of opposition drawn out [End Page 72] between the two concepts: a normative one. Imitation is, at best, of secondary value when compared to acts of innovation.The practical and, to a lesser degree, normative oppositions appear so unsound as to not warrant serious engagement, and already contested by theorists who study innovation as to not require another rebuttal. What makes Girard's response to them... (shrink)

Analytical study of philosophy; includes comparative study of world-renowned philosophers and their ideologies.

This article discusses Abū Isḥāq al-Naẓẓām’s (d. 231/845) (one of the first Muʽtazilī thinkers); understanding of Allah-world relationship, his theory of nature (tab‘) and his view on miracles. In a proposal form, Muʽtazilī scholars accept that the miracle, which is the actual confirmation, must occur, since it is not possible for Allah to confirm His messenger (prophet) in a way that everyone can hear and in a direct word. Since the Prophet's message can be authenticated only by a miracle, Muʽtazilī (...) thinkers paid great attention to this issue, organized and formed natural theories about the universe in a way that miracles can occur. Naẓẓām explains a kind of miracle that occurs under the power of Allah, by his theory of nature called latency and occurrence (kumūn-ẓuhūr). His view of miracles is rooted in the Muʽtazilī classification of miracles. Naẓẓām argues that in the theory of nature, things are infinitely divided. He also argues that all qualities considered accident (aʽrāḍ) by other Muslim theologians are different objects as only motion and rest are the only accidents. According to him, the universe consists of objects and accidents of motion only. In each object in the universe, an unlimited number of opposing objects (sub-components) that have different effects on each other is located in the same space. Those objects in the same space are intervened (tadākhul) with each other. Kumūn refers to sub-components that are located inside the object in a state of passing into each other, and a state of balancing each other through the push-pull motion (i‘timād). Ẓuhūr is an outward movement of the sub-component from where it is located when an impact imposed outside the object interacts with one of the sub-components contained in it. Naẓẓām says that too many opposing sub-components, such as heaviness-lightness, heat-coldness contained in the object, form an internal dynamic by providing balancing each other through inside the object with the push-pull motion. The state of balance inside the object is disrupted by an external factor affecting one of the sub-components. An external thing approaching the object interacts with one of the sub-components contained in the object. Then, the affected sub-component moves out of the object and thus the state of balance inside the object is disrupted. According to the theory of kumūn-ẓuhūr, change in objects occurs when the balance within the object is disturbed. The change in the balance also occurs not by the direct intervention of Allah and the creation of accidents, but by the disruption in the balance of natures within the object. Naẓẓām, who advocates the intrinsic natures in things, has been criticized for not leaving any room for Allah’s influence on objects at least through miracles. This criticism is not correct. Naẓẓām says that the nature of objects depends on God, and it is possible for God to intervene in them at any time. According to him, Allah can force opposing objects into a union that is not in their natures. In their natures, unification can separate those by applying pull and push. In this way, Naẓẓām sees the intervention of Allah as possible in the occurrence of a situation that is the opposite of what is present in the nature of objects. In Naẓẓām's theory of kumūn-ẓuhūr, there are suppressed natures and sub-components that are in a weak state inside the actual object. Furthermore, they cannot go out in any way from the actual object. One of these suppressed natures found in the object is removed from the nature of the object by the intervention of Allah when a miracle occurs in the hands of theProphet. In this case, the miracle is not something new that Allah has created, but that Allah has disclosed a hidden sub-component that is hidden in that thing that has never appeared before. Naẓẓām’s view of miracle is something occurring under the power of the created, which Muʽtazilī scholars accept in the classification of miracles in relation to, the theory of sarfa. He suggests that the Qur'an, which he accepts under the power of the created, would not be a miracle, if the Arabs could dispute it. However, according to him, the Qur'an is a miracle because Allah prevents them from the dispute. In his understanding of sarfa, the miracles occur directly as an act of God’s divine intervention with human beings. This study investigates Naẓẓām’s view of miracles along with his theory of nature and his understanding of sarfa. (shrink)

A group of Sogdian documents from the area of Khotan was recently acquired by Renmin University of China, Beijing. Four economic documents were edited in JAOS 130/4 ; the present article, comprising the edition of one complete letter and several fragments of letters, completes the publication of this collection, which adds to a growing body of evidence for the presence of Sogdian-speakers on the trade routes to the south of the Taklamakan desert.

The inscription edited in this paper is the third bilingual Chinese-Sogdian epitaph to be made known, following that of Wirkakk and Wiyusi and that of Nanai-vande and Kekan, published in 2005 and 2017 respectively. The new epitaph is that of a Sogdian lady who died in 736 CE. Apart from its linguistic interest, it is important as attesting the conversion of a Sogdian lady to the “heretical” Buddhist Sanjie or “Three levels” movement, which remained popular despite being officially suppressed under (...) the Tang. (shrink)

The Yoga Sutras of Patañjali is the foundational text of yoga philosophy, used by millions of yoga practitioners and students worldwide. This book is a new rendering into English of the Arabic translation and commentary of this text by the brilliant eleventh-century polymath al-Bīrūnī.

This article discusses Abū ʽUthmān al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/869) (one of the first Muʽtazilī scholars) Allah-world relationship, his understanding of custom, and his view on miracles. The Muʻtazilī thinkers examined the problem of miracles within their concept of prophethood. They divide miracles, which they accept as the only proof of prophethood, into two: those under the power of Allah and under the power of the created. Jāḥiẓ explains these two sorts of miracles with the order in the universe established by Allah (...) and people and expresses this order with the concept of custom (ʻāda). Jāḥiẓ divides custom into three. The first of these is the “qā’im (constant) custom”, which is based on the theory of kumūn-ẓuhūr and expresses the general rules that occur as a requirement of the general functioning in the universe. According to Jāḥiẓ “qā’im (constant) custom” is that knowledgeable people are aware of the custom of the universe. This custom is an order created by Allah in the eyes of intelligent and knowledgeable people, which is continuous and therefore cannot be interrupted, and in which there is no chaos. He states that this order is realized through the natures in the objects, which are knowable to everyone. But rarely a nature in this order can be interrupted due to a situation that takes it out of the natural flow and cannot be explained by natural causes. According to him, this is proof that nature, which has the defining feature of the object, is created by the creator, and maintains its continuity based on an arranged program. However, the creator can involve in this order when necessary. In this type of custom, God’s intervention occurs by breaking the qā’im custom that continues on a regular basis. The second of these is the “regional custom”, which is not known to everyone but only known to people living in a certain area. Jāḥiẓ states that the miracle in this type of custom occurred when Allah broke the custom known to the people in the region. The third of these is “social custom” which is established by people. For Jāḥiẓ, the miracles of this kind are under the power of people. He argues that the miracle in this type of custom occurs with sarfa, that is, by God’s intervention with human’s motive or knowledge. In this study, Jāḥiẓ’s view of miracles is discussed together with his theory of nature, his understanding of custom and sarfa. (shrink)

The adverse effects of life stress on social networking sites addiction are increasingly recognized, but so far there is little evidence on how and which specific types of life stress are conducive to the addictive behavior. Interpersonal relationship stress being the main source of stress for undergraduates, the purpose of the current paper is thus to delve into whether perceived stress in interpersonal relationships significantly leads to WeChat addiction and, if so, how this type of stress drives the excessive use (...) of WeChat. The data was collected from self-report questionnaires completed by 463 Chinese undergraduate students and then analyzed with structural equation modeling. The results revealed that the positive association between WeChat users’ interpersonal relationship stress and addictive behavior is fully and sequentially mediated by WeChat use intensity and social interaction. More specifically, accumulation of stress in interpersonal relationships gives rise to the intensity of WeChat use, which in turn fuels rising addiction to WeChat both directly and indirectly via social interaction on WeChat. These findings contribute to a more refined understanding of the pathological use of WeChat. (shrink)

Bilişsel Din Bilimi (CSR), dini inanç ve uygulamaların nedensel açıklamalarını sağlamayı amaçlayan din araştırmalarına bilimsel bir yaklaşımdır. CSR savunucuları, insan zihninin doğal özelliklerini ve nasıl işlediğini açıklayarak dini inançların oluşumu, kabulü, aktarımı ve yaygınlığı sürecini açıklamaya çalışırlar. Tüm insan kültürlerinde var olan ve son on yılda birçok CSR akademisyeninin dikkatini çeken dini inançlardan biri de öbür dünyaya olan inançtır. CSR araştırmacılarına göre, bu inanç, insan zihninin doğal yapılarına dayanmaktadır. Ölümden sonraki hayata olan inancı, zihinsel araçların işleyişinden kaynaklanan, yansıtıcı olmayan veya (...) sezgisel bir inanç olarak görürler. Ölümden sonra hayata inancın oluşumunu, gelişimini, yayılmasını ve aktarılmasını açıklamak için çeşitli teoriler önerdiler. Ancak bu teoriler arasında, iki teori daha geniş kabul görmüştür, sezgisel düalizm teorisi ve simülasyon kısıtlama teorisi. Sezgisel düalizm teorisi, tüm insanların iki zihinsel araca sahip olduğunu söyler: Sezgisel Biyoloji ve Sezgisel Psikoloji. Sezgisel Biyoloji, ölü bir kişinin karşısına geçip hareket edemediği için artık hayatta olmadığına inanmamızı sağlar. Sezgisel Psikoloji, ölü kişiye otomatik olarak görünmez özellikleri (arzular, düşünceler, inançlar ve duygular gibi) atfetmeye devam eder. Yukarıdaki iki zihinsel aracın aynı anda işleyişi, insan zihnini ölü kişinin bir kısmının önemsiz olduğuna ve fiziksel ölümden sonra kaldığına inandırır. Simülasyon kısıtlama teorisi, tüm insanların çevreden gelen bilgileri işlemek ve dini inançlar edinmek için zihinsel araçlara sahip olduğunu söyler. Zihinsel araçların hiçbiri, kişinin arzularının, düşüncelerinin, inançlarının ve duygularının var olmadığını hayal edemez veya simüle edemez. Bu nedenle ölü kişinin karşısındaki insan zihni, fiziksel ölümünü kolayca hayal etmesine rağmen, kişinin başka bir bölümünün (düşünceler, arzular vb.) Varlığına inanmaya devam eder. Bu teorilerin her ikisi de, öbür dünyaya inancın oluşumunu açıklamada zorluklar ve sınırlamalarla karşı karşıya görünüyor. Bunlar arasında nedensel açıklama yapamama, ölümden sonraki hayata olan inancın doğal ve rasyonel temelleri arasındaki ayrım eksikliği ve öbür dünya inancının doğaüstü temellerini göz ardı etme yer alır. İki teoriden hiçbiri öbür dünyaya inancın oluşumu için yeterli nedensel açıklama sağlamıyor gibi görünmektedir. Her iki teori de zihinsel araçların nasıl işlediğine bağlı olarak öbür dünya inançlarının oluşumu hakkında olası bir hikaye sunmaya çalışır. Ölümden sonraki hayata inanmaya yol açan sürecin yalnızca makul bir hikayesini sunarlar. Bu iki teorinin sunduğu şey, insan zihninin ve araçlarının ve bunların nasıl işlediğinin bir açıklamasıdır (nedensel açıklama değil). Bu, kendi başına, bu aletlerin öbür dünyaya bir inanç ürettiğini açıklamaz. Dolayısıyla ahirete olan inancın zihinsel araçların işleyişinin bir sonucu olduğu iddiası, zihinsel araçlar ile bu inanç arasında nedensel bir ilişki gerektirir. Bu iki teoriden hiçbiri bu nedensel ilişkiyi açıklayamaz ve yalnızca aralarındaki ilişkinin makul bir hikayesini açıklarlar. Dahası, dini inancın rasyonel temelleri ile dini inancın doğal temelleri arasındaki ayrım, ahirete inanmak veya onunla ilişkili bilişsel mekanizmaları tanımlamak için doğal bir köken bulmanın hiçbir şekilde bu inancı reddetmek veya itibarını sarsmak anlamına gelmediğini göstermektedir. Ahirete olan inancın doğal kökenleri hakkındaki bilişsel teoriler bize bu inancın rasyonel mi irrasyonel mi olduğunu gösteremez. Bu açıklamalar ancak (eğer yapabilirlerse) bize bu inancın oluşumunun ve yaygınlığının doğal köklerini gösterebilir. Ayrıca Dinsel inanç karmaşık bir kavramdır. Birincisi, doğal bir kavramdır, bu anlamda insan doğasına dayanır ve insanın bilişsel sistemleri ve zihinsel araçlarıyla ilgilidir. İkincisi, kültürel ve sosyal bir kavramdır, bu anlamda hem kültürel ve sosyal değişimden etkilenir hem de onu etkiler. Üçüncüsü, doğaüstü bir kavramdır, bu anlamda hem vahiy hem de kehanet ve insanın maddi olmayan yönüyle derinden bağlantılıdır. Öbür dünyaya inanç, her üç düzeyde açıklamayı gerektiriyor gibi görünüyor. (shrink)

The application of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) technologies in the field of propaganda influences information creation, dissemination, and reception, and introduces new ethical challenges. This paper revisits the philosophical discourses of Jacques Ellul on technology and propaganda, placing them within the context of the rise of today’s generative AI technologies. Ellul identified the First Industrial Revolution as the initial juncture in the history of human technology that formed technique as a social phenomenon, which subsequently shaped the nature of propaganda as (...) a technique. Subsequent developments in computer technology in the latter half of the 20th century enabled the formation of a technological system. This raises the question: Could generative AI represent another pivotal moment in the evolution of the technological system, and what are the ethical implications of propaganda technology in this context? This article seeks to illuminate current discussions on GenAI technology and propaganda ethics with Ellul’s insightful theoretical insights. In terms of research methodology, this study relies on textual interpretation and classical hermeneutics, including three processes: syntactic text interpretation, historical background, and situational application. Ellul’s research delves into the intrinsic links and inherent ethical dimensions between propaganda and technology, examining their comprehensive and enduring impacts. This normative perspective is crucial for a deep understanding of contemporary propaganda within the framework of emerging technologies, helping us to transcend the escalating spiral of propaganda technology and counter-propaganda techniques. By incorporating propaganda facilitated by generative AI technologies into the overall development logic of the technological society, this approach explores its ethical implications from a more macroscopic and holistic perspective. (shrink)

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