是東漢哲學家、思想家桓譚的主要論着，但早己亡佚。今存之輯本有《指海》內佚名氏輯本、清孫馮翼輯本、清嚴可均輯本、黃以周輯本，及近人朱謙之輯本，但均有不足。有鑒於此，吳則虞先生於1962年着有新輯本，收錄 二百餘條，以類相從，分為八卷，並添加附編，匯涵桓譚佚文、存疑、訂訛之文；記載桓譚事跡、著述、評論之文。 桓譚，后漢時人，官至給事中。博學多識，破讖緯迷妄，去虛妄偽飾，先於王充、張衡，具有唯物啟蒙學者之學識，是漢時哲學思想家。《新諭》是桓譚主要論着，但早已亡佚。據歷史記載，明有二卷本，清有孫之騌輯本，皆不 傳。另有《指海》內佚名氏輯本、清孫馮翼輯本、清嚴可均輯本、黃以周輯本及近人朱謙之輯本。從今日的學術、校勘、編排諸方面來看，諸本均有不足：或短椾零篇，漫無倫紀；或望文歸屬，強系篇名；或條目重復，內容雜陳 迭見；或引用刻本，多有遺漏；或雖沿用十七卷篇目之名稱，但其條目已不能再顯現原書各篇的思想內容。有鑒於此，吳則虞先生於一九六二年着有新輯本，收錄二百余條，以類相從，分為八卷，並添加附編，匯涵桓譚佚文、存 疑、訂訛之文；記載桓譚事跡、著述、評論之文；最后殿以輯校引用書目及版本之詳目，以便於讀者查閱與研究。此書成為目前桓譚《新論》集大成之著作。.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Studying Penguins to Understand BirdsJacinta O. A. Tan (bio), Anne Stewart (bio), Ray Fitzpatrick (bio), and Tony Hope (bio)Keywordsanorexia nervosa, treatment decision-making, competence, valuesWe are grateful to Grisso, Appelbaum, Charland, and Vollmann for their thoughtful commentaries on our paper. We would like to respond by picking up on some of the points they make, although we do not address all the issues raised.Our general aims in the paper are (...) less immediately pragmatic than are the central concerns of Grisso and Appelbaum. Our interest is primarily in a number of ethical, and related conceptual, issues that arise from empirical data. In the long run, of course, we believe that these ethical and conceptual issues are important to the care of people with mental disorders, but our focus is philosophical.Our central interest is what justifies overriding treatment refusal. We are unhappy with a "status" approach according to which, for example, the mere fact that a person suffers a mental disorder provides grounds for overriding her wishes. Such an approach, it seems to us, fails to identify reasons, and discriminates against those with mental disorder, a view shared by the Law Commission (The Law Commission 1995). We are, on the other hand, attracted by the approach that grounds any overriding of treatment refusal on lack of capacity (or competence) to make treatment decisions. The concept of capacity has been well developed through legal cases and conceptual analysis, not least by Grisso and Appelbaum themselves. We were struck, however, first through clinical experience, and subsequently from the pilot study reported in our paper, that many patients with anorexia nervosa who refuse treatment do not necessarily lack capacity, using the current criteria, and yet show features or give reasons that raise serious doubts as to whether it is right to respect their refusal of treatment.To avoid reliance on a "status" approach, the issue with which we are grappling is whether the concept of capacity (and therefore lack of capacity) can be developed to encompass some of our findings, and whether it is ethically right to do so. Charland makes the important point that the concept of competence, or capacity, has both a descriptive and a prescriptive component. It is for this reason that the question of whether, for example, we should extend the criteria for capacity is part of the question of when it is morally right to override treatment refusal.Grisso and Appelbaum suggest that our work advances "our thinking about appreciation, rather than requiring that we add new elements" (2006, 297). From our perspective, and at this stage, it is a secondary issue whether we are suggesting a development of appreciation, or a new element (e.g., "pathological values"). The primary issue for us is whether the reasons for refusal to which we draw attention provide grounds for overriding refusal, and if they do how they can be characterized in [End Page 299] such a way as to avoid the ever-present danger of simply overriding autonomy in a patient's best interests.We chose to study anorexia nervosa for various reasons, but we expect that the issues raised have a more general relevance (such as to substance abuse and impulse control disorders as Grisso and Appelbaum and Charland suggest). We do not expect the results to be relevant to all, or even most, mental disorders. Our main interest is not the specific management of people with anorexia, but how the data challenge, and help to develop, the concept of capacity, and the ethical analysis of overriding patient refusal of treatment. Our paper aims to address what we understand Charland to be referring to by the "pretheoretical desiderata" (2006, 283) of the concept of capacity. One reason why we chose anorexia as the focus of this work is because it is different from many mental disorders in the issues that it raises. In this it is, perhaps, rather like studying penguins to better understand the concept of bird just because penguins, although clearly birds, have unusual features.We agree, therefore, with Grisso and Appelbaum's caution that it would be unwise to jump in and change the MacCAT-T on the basis of the results... (shrink)

This paper explores the ethical and conceptual implications of the findings from an empirical study (reported elsewhere) of decision-making capacity in anorexia nervosa. In the study, ten female patients aged thirteen to twenty-one years with a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa, and eight sets of parents, took part in semistructured interviews. The purpose of the interviews was to identify aspects of thinking that might be relevant to the issue of competence to refuse treatment. All the patient-participants were also tested using the (...) MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool—Treatment test of competence. This is a formalized, structured, interviewer-administered test of competence, which is a widely accepted clinical tool for determining capacity. The young women also completed five brief, self-administered questionnaires to assess their levels of psychopathology. The issues identified from the interviews are described under two headings: difficulties with thought processing and changes in values. The results suggest that competence to refuse treatment may be compromised in people with anorexia nervosa in ways that are not captured by traditional legal approaches. (shrink)

Since the official history-writing is a defining aspect for the formation and consolidation of nation-states, it is crucial to explore the attempts to legitimize particular discourses regarding historical atrocities. The selective representations of the past, in this regard, contradict counter-memories and propagate hegemonic patterns of remembrance and/or forgetting of past crimes. This article accordingly addresses how the representations of counter-memories as threats to national security and the silencing of gender-specific experiences and remembrances by sanctioned historical narratives become manifest in the (...) history-making of the Turkish nation-state. By focusing on the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide as two cases of crimes against humanity, it is intended to discuss the shifting positions and roles that the Turkish state adopts in the remembering and forgetting of historical offences. The article argues that through prioritizing national security and national interests, the securitization of memory reconstructs collective traumas of distinct ethnic and religious groups on the basis of a nation-state’s perceived internal and external threats. It also claims that the competing voices of women and their distinct experiences and patterns of remembrance and forgetting past atrocities are suppressed for the sake of the preservation of national security. By incorporating the issue of gender into the debate on the securitization of memory, this article elucidates the mismatch between positions of femininity and masculinity within the official national historiography of the Turkish state. (shrink)

In the 1920s, John Dewey's followers in China, led by his student Hu Shih, attempted to put his pragmatism into practice in their quest for democracy. This essay compares Hu Shih's thought, especially his emphasis on pragmatism as method, with Dewey's philosophical positions and evaluates Hu's achievement as a pragmatist in the context of the tumultuous times he lived in. It assesses Hu's claim that the means to democracy lies in education rather than politics, since democracy as a way of (...) life requires a cultural renewal beyond institutional changes. It argues that a problem‐centered approach to social change does not preclude radical action, even revolution. But pragmatism is against gratuitous use of violence in the service of wholesale and abstract ideals advocated by various “isms.” While Hu's experiment of democracy in China is a significant episode in the history of pragmatism, its “failure” does not prove that there are inherent flaws in the pragmatist method, that pragmatism is unviable for China. The failure needs to be understood in the context of the pragmatist conception of experiment, in which failures are to be expected; what is important is to learn from them to achieve better results in the next stage of inquiry. Hu Shih's pragmatism contains lessons for pragmatists and for those interested in the continued quest for democracy in China—the experiment continues. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Decision-Making as a Broader ConceptJacinta O. A. Tan (bio), Anne Stewart (bio), and Tony Hope (bio)KeywordsCompetence, decision-making, capacity, anorexia nervosa, autonomy, values, identityWe thank Demian Whiting for the thoughtful critique of aspects of our paper (Tan et al. 2006a). A primary aim of our research was to provide empirical grounds on which to stimulate discussion about the nature of decision-making capacity (DMC). Whiting criticizes in particular the concept of (...) 'pathological values' that we suggested might be relevant in the assessment of DMC and in the related issue of deciding when a patient's refusal of beneficial treatment should be overridden.Whiting's central concern is with DMC. Whiting argues that the absence of pathological values should not be a criterion for DMC. We are unclear whether he is also arguing that pathological values do not provide a reason of any kind for overriding treatment refusal. At the end of the paper he writes: "we cannot justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values... on the grounds that these patients lack DMC" (2009, XX). This seems to leave open the possibility that we may be able to justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values on grounds other than that they lack DMC. As we wrote in our response to the discussants of our original paper, "The primary issue for us is whether the reasons for refusal to which we draw attention provide grounds for overriding refusal, and if they do how they can be characterized in such a way as to avoid the ever-present danger of simply overriding autonomy in a patient's best interests" (Tan et al. 2006b, 300).In deciding on whether to use compulsory treatment, there are other relevant factors that may need to be considered, such as the seriousness of the decision, which determines the threshold for competence. However, in this response we consider three issues. First, we argue that the current concept of DMC is by no means so clear cut or generally agreed upon as Whiting implies, and that some of the lack of clarity relates to pathological values. Second, that the concept of DMC is itself dependent on accounts of autonomy, and that it is plausible that pathological values can affect autonomy. Third, we directly consider the question of whether a coherent account of pathological values might be given based on a concept of authenticity.The Current Criteria for DMCWhiting argues that the current criteria for DMC are correct and that an additional criterion along the lines of absence of pathological values should not be added. This argument assumes that there is a clear and agreed understanding of the current criteria. We believe this is not the case for three reasons.(i) Whiting begins his account of DMC by saying that it is normally taken to include: "(1) [End Page 345] understanding (and appreciation)" (2009, 341). Already there is an area of dispute, and the use of parentheses reflects this. The concept of 'appreciation' was developed by Grisso and Applebaum (Grisso, Appelbaum, and Hill-Fotouhi 1997). It is not included in either English common law development, for example (ReC), nor in the criteria specified in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. More important, Grisso and Appelbaum in their comment on our original paper (2006) argue that our work advances thinking about 'appreciation' rather than requiring that we add new elements. The implication is that they believe that what we have called pathological values are relevant to the assessment of capacity and are already included in an account of capacity that incorporates the criterion of 'appreciation.' In our response, we argued that pathological values are not entirely captured within the account of appreciation that Grisso and Appelbaum had previously given. We do not want to revisit that issue here, but the point of relevance is that on one view (that of Grisso and Appelbaum) pathological values are already included in the current criteria for DMC as part of the concept of appreciation, whereas on Whiting's view they are not.(ii) Even if there were agreement over the wording and concepts relevant to DMC there is a further important issue: how are those concepts... (shrink)

I argue that an account of national responsibility, as both collective and inheritable, that allows for making sense of holding nations responsible as an entity for past international injustices and to make reparations for these injustices is not at odds with the demands of global egalitarianism. A global distributive commitment does not deny this account of national responsibility; to the contrary, we can properly appreciate the scope of national responsibility only in light of what global justice truly demands. Thus while (...) I agree with David Miller that we can hold nations accountable for past international injustices, I do not agree with Miller that this is in tension with global egalitarianism. (shrink)

Liberal nationalism is a boundary‐making project, and a feature of this boundary‐making enterprise is the belief that the compatriots have a certain priority over strangers. For this reason it is often thought that liberal nationalism cannot be compatible with the demands of global egalitarianism. In this essay, I examine the sense in which liberal nationalism privileges compatriots, and I argue that, properly understood, the idea of partiality for compatriots in the context of liberal nationalism is not at odds with global (...) equal concern for all persons. In particular, I argue that the three central goals and aspirations of liberal nationalism—promoting individual autonomy and cultural identity, the realization of deliberative democracy, and the aspiration for social justice within the state—do not entail or require a form of compatriot partiality that is inconsistent with the demands of global egalitarian justice. (shrink)

In this study, we aim to investigate how multinational corporations (MNCs) balance ethical pressures from both the home and host countries. Drawing on theories from institutional theory, international business, and business ethics, we build a theoretical framework to explain the ethical behavior of MNCs. We apply the institutional logic concept to examine how MNCs with established logics and principles that have grown in the home country respond to local ethical expectations in the host country. We differentiate the core values from (...) the peripheral components of a MNCs institutional logic and propose that a MNC will pursue distinctive ethical strategies under different scenarios and choose the "right" configuration of core values and peripheral components that align with institutional environment in host countries. (shrink)

This essay argues two main points by analyzing Sengzhao’s contentions regarding several basic Buddhist concepts such as emptiness, being, and nonbeing. First, Sengzhao synthesizes Daoist methods of argumentation into his description of the middle path and other Buddhist concepts. Second, he revives Daoist concepts, giving them Buddhist meaning and expressing them in Buddhist terms. In the process, he consciously differentiates Madhyamika Buddhism from earlier Buddhism as understood from a Daoist perspective, such as the teachings of the School of Original Non-Being (...) and the School of No-Mind. However, because his understanding of the middle path is not sufficiently deep, he wavers between Buddhist and Daoist understandings of terms such as prajñā and nirvāṇa, rest and movement, and name and reality. Despite these inconsistencies, his discourse, as the first attempt to differentiate Madhyamika from Daoism, is still a milestone in the development of Chinese Buddhism and has exerted a far-reaching influence on later generations. (shrink)

Better known in his own times than later, Huan T'an (43 BCE-25 CE) was a scholar-official, independent in his thought and unafraid to criticize orthodox currents of his time. A practitioner of the Old Text exegesis of the Classics, he maintained a position on the court during a turbulent time of political crises, uprisings, and civil war, spanning the reigns of four emperors. His principal work, Hsin-lun, differs from other books on political criticism in that it does not deal primarily (...) with history but takes many examples from contemporary social and political life. While belonging to the Old Text group of court officials and scholars, Huan T'an differed radically from them in his stress on direct knowledge, in his range of practical experience, and in his outspoken criticism of popular opinions. He was not a systematic philosopher, but his ideas were influential in the return to a more worldly conception of Confucianism. To translate Huan T'an's writings, one must reconstruct the texts. Timoteus Pokora uses two nineteenth-century fragments as a basis around which to orient quotations from Hsin-lun from sixty-four other sources, primarily encyclopedias and commentaries. Pokora provides notes to give context to these short references and to account for discrepancies between quotations and originals, and he includes a large index to add coherence and points of entry. (shrink)

The cosmopolitan idea of justice is commonly accused of not taking seriously the special ties and commitments of nationality and patriotism. This is because the ideal of impartial egalitarianism, which is central to the cosmopolitan view, seems to be directly opposed to the moral partiality inherent to nationalism and patriotism. In this book, Kok-Chor Tan argues that cosmopolitan justice, properly understood, can accommodate and appreciate nationalist and patriotic commitments, setting limits for these commitments without denying their moral significance. This book (...) offers a defense of cosmopolitan justice against the charge that it denies the values that ordinarily matter to people, and a defence of nationalism and patriotism against the charge that these morally partial ideals are fundamentally inconsistent with the obligations of global justice. Accessible and persuasive, this book will have broad appeal to political theorists and moral philosophers. (shrink)

Le visage d'Edith Stein a disparu dans le martyre qu'elle subit à Auschwitz le 9 août 1942. Depuis lors, ses différents biographes ont tenté de recomposer les éléments de sa vie et de sa personnalité à partir d'une facette de sa personnalité. Edith Stein philosophe, Edith Stein carmélite, Edith Stein féministe: les approches se succèdent et esquissent les différents traits d'un visage dont l'unité demeure cachée dans le secret d'une destinée. Dans ce livre, Philibert Secretan propose une approche synchronique d'Edith (...) Stein. "Le portrait que je propose ici s'organise autour de trois données de fait : la conversion du judaïsme au christianisme ; le passage de la phénoménologie à la sagesse philosophique ; l'entrée au Carmel. Autant de faits qu'il s'agit de traiter non plus en diachronie, comme autant d'étapes d'une existence étalée dans le temps, mais en synchronie, comme autant de strates d'une personnalité dans laquelle continuent à résonner des échos de ces moments constitutifs de son être singulier". En conclusion, Philibert Secretan s'attache à montrer comment la vertu d'obéissance - à la vérité vue par l'intelligence jusqu'à la volonté de Dieu, de l'université au Carmel - unifie les strates qui constituent la personnalité d'Edith Stein. Un livre de vie. Un testament aussi, de celui qui sur le conseil de Paul Ricoeur a introduit la pensée d'Edith Stein en France. (shrink)

In this paper, I compare all three editions of Bennett Reimer’s A Philosophy of Music Education with early Chinese philosophy, in particular, classical Chinese aesthetics. I structure my analysis around a quartet of interrelated themes: aesthetic education, education of feeling, aesthetic experience, and ethics and aesthetics. This paper suggests that Reimer’s philosophical writings have some degree of transcultural applicability beyond Western thought, counterpointing criticisms that his philosophy is narrow, ethnocentric, and culturally limited. It also serves as a plausible point of (...) departure towards a transcultural theory of aesthetics for music education relevant to the pluralistic and globalized world in which we live. (shrink)

ExtractI must first thank Daniel Halliday for his incisive but fair review essay of my book. Regretfully, I can only consider, and only in outline at that, some of his well-taken questions.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. (...) Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.A Reply to HallidayVolume 25, Issue 1KOK-CHOR TAN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000544Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle email.@free.kindle.com@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. A Reply to HallidayVolume 25, Issue 1KOK-CHOR TAN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000544Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. A Reply to HallidayVolume 25, Issue 1KOK-CHOR TAN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000544Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Kok-Chor Tan addresses three key questions in political philosophy: Where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? He argues for an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck-egalitarian ideal of why equality matters, and a global scope for distributive justice.

Artificial intelligence is not only disrupting industries and businesses, particularly the ones have fallen behind the adoption, but also significantly impacting public life as well. This calls for government authorities pay attention to public opinions and sentiments towards AI. Nonetheless, there is limited knowledge on what the drivers behind the public perception of AI are. Bridging this gap is the rationale of this paper. As the methodological approach, the study conducts an online public perception survey with the residents of Sydney, (...) Melbourne, and Brisbane, and explores the collected survey data through statistical analysis. The analysis reveals that: the public is concerned of AI invading their privacy, but not much concerned of AI becoming more intelligent than humans; the public trusts AI in their lifestyle, but the trust is lower for companies and government deploying AI; the public appreciates the benefits of AI in urban services and disaster management; depending on the local context, public perceptions vary; and the drivers behind the public perception include gender, age, AI knowledge, and AI experience. The findings inform authorities in developing policies to minimise public concerns and maximise AI awareness. (shrink)

Ghazali’s The Beginning of Guidance (Bidayetü'l Hidaye) is a book that represents the beginning for people's salvation. According to Ghazali, in order for the human to be guided, he must first follow the orders of this book and then read the book The Revival of Religious Sciences, which he says contains useful science. According to him, the book of Beginning of Guidance can offer the key to salvation. In this book he made major changes in the understanding of worship of (...) Islam and expanded both the content and the scope of worship. In this book, where the understanding of worship of Islam has become mystical; in addition to the prayers that the Qur'an declares as obligatory, the prophet Mohammed’s worship, the prayers of his companions, the remembrances of the Sufis, the wars made in the life of the ascetics are described in the form of orders that must be made in the way of liberation. Thus, he made the prayer not a part of life, but the whole life, saying that three times as much prayer as the God made obligatory, four times as much as Ramadan fasting, fifty-seven times a day prayer and chant every time of the day. There has been no previous study regarding the issue of Ghazali turning worship into ascetism with the book of Beginning of Guidance. In this paper, in addition to this work of Ghazali, the narrations in his other works will be taken into consideration. Thus, his project of Islam religion and mysticization will be introduced in more detail. There are two important factors that direct Gazali, who presents a way of life based on ascetism and seclusion, as an "ideal life". The first is the Sufi culture that he has been in since his childhood and has never broken. According to Ghazali, the life style of Sufi culture that takes the person away from the world is a prescription for salvation of Muslims who are under the threat of "secularization". The second is the distinction between the community and the upper class in the society with the effect of this Sufi culture. It is not possible to say the same thing for the common people belonging to the religion of 'imitation', while the upper class is liberated with the life of the feast and the deity. The only way of the salvation of the common people is to turn the prayers of the imitation religion to ascertism and to open the way of the seclusion. They can do it with the book Beginning of Guidance. Thus the common people can reach salvation just like the upper class by leaving this world behind. (shrink)

In his stimulating and provocative collection of essays, Globalization and Justice, Kai Nielsen defends a cosmopolitan account of global justice. On the cosmopolitan view, as Nielsen understands it, individuals are entitled to equal consideration regardless of citizenship or nationality and global institutions should be arranged in such a way that each person's interest is given equal consideration. Nielsen's defense of cosmopolitan justice in this collection will be of no surprise to readers familiar with his socialist egalitarian commitments. Indeed, the internationalism (...) underlying socialism, Nielsen would argue, naturally entails the cosmopolitan account of justice. (shrink)

Anonymous didactic verse work, with paraphrase in Tamil and English; transcribed from a palm-leaf manuscript preserved in the Tanjore Maharaja Serfoji's Sarasvati Mahal Library.

Nurettin Topçu (1909-1975) built religious philosophy on the philosophy of willpower and motion. For him, willpower is the existence of a conscious balance between driving and braking forces that are innate and flowing from the inside out of us. Willpower is constantly rising towards God and infinity with a historical motion. The aim of willpower is to help human reach eternity. This historical motion occurs in accordance with certain steps. Willpower is affected not only by individual habits and passions but (...) also by the social structure. The function of willpower for humans, who are longing for eternity, is to make them recognize the consciousness and anguish of God. With this awareness, the human moves on to the motion. The willpower, which realizes the direction and aim of the motion, emerges in social structures such as State and nation, and takes up the role of establishing and sustaining these structures. Willpower lastly shows itself in art. The artist, who longs for eternity and can’t find a way to reach it, feels the lack in his willpower, acts to complete the lack and gets engaged in an existence or a thing. This engagement is a savior illusion and love that means sheltering someone other than himself with his total willpower is born. Upon the completion of this lacking, faith (love) emerges. The spirit falls in love with motion. Faith has two dimensions. When the artist turns to ‘the only” and “the internal”, this is called religious faith. If he leans to/relies on/believes in plurality and the external, this is called aesthetical faith. When, in time, the body that leans to the external and the spirit that turns to the internal surrenders to the eternity, the transcendent, God as a whole, mystic faith occurs. ‘Truth’ rises from this mystic union and surrender to love and thereby renaissance initiates. Because the driving power that starts renaissance is art. The understanding of religious experience of Topçu is nested with art. As art generates religious experience, renaissance emerges as a result of religious experience and the human reaches salvation in every sense. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Of Diversities and Comparisons...Sor-hoon TanEncyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy. Edited by Antonio S. Cua. New York and London: Routledge, 2003. Pp. 1,020.Encyclopedias can be useful in teaching philosophy when students need some reading that sets out the basics on a key topic in a few pages without their getting lost in too many complex details or being misled by oversimplifications. They can also be edifying for the philosophy teacher and (...) scholar—providing reliable, up-to-date information on topics that lie in their field but that are not part of their working knowledge. For these reasons, those working in Chinese philosophy will welcome the publication of the Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy. The 187 entries cover a variety of subject areas such as "Moral Philosophy" and "Philosophy of language"; Confucianism in different periods and countries, Daoism, Mohism, Legalism, the school of names, Buddhism, and Marxism in China; philosophical trends in post-Mao China, Taiwan, and overseas; key concepts such as dao (the way), fa (law, standards), liyi fenshu (principle and manifestations), and quanli (rights); texts such as the Huainanzi and the Wenzi; and thinkers from Laozi and Confucius to Hu Shih and Mou Zongsan.Instead of more numerous short entries, this encyclopedia has opted for fewer entries of greater length—the Preface tells us that entries on important thinkers and philosophical topics typically range from five thousand to nine thousand words in length, and a quick check reveals that even the shortest entry is at least two pages long (more than one thousand words). This format allows authors to explore the philosophical issues at some depth, and expound even complex arguments in detail. The connections between different concepts, thinkers, texts, philosophical theories, and development that stretch across different periods and territories can be delineated more clearly in a single entry. There is a danger of duplication with this format, as some texts and concepts may be covered in several articles; for example, most of "Confucianism: Constructs of Classical Thought" is on what the author identifies as six key texts of Classical Confucianism: the Analects, Mencius, Xunzi, Yizhuan, Zhongyong (Doctrine of the mean), and Daxue (Great Learning). The sections on Mencius and Xunzi (pp. 66-67) merely introduce a small part of what is discussed in much greater depth and detail in the entries on these two thinkers (pp. 440-448 and 821-829). The Zhongyong and Daxue also have their own entries, and "Confucianism: Confucius" (p. 61) contains an entire section on the Analects.As it turns out, the duplication is less than expected. Pei-jung Fu, author of "Confucianism: Constructs of Classical Thought," implicitly questions Xunzi's Confucian pedigree, beginning his discussion with "Xunzi professed to be an advocate of Confucianism" (p. 67). Such doubt is clearly not shared by A. S. Cua, who authored [End Page 111] the entry on "Xunzi," introducing the thinker as "an important exponent of classical Confucianism" (p. 821). Cua also does not share Fu's view that "the real issue between Mencius and Xunzi lies in their concepts of heaven (tian)" (p. 67). Fu and the author of the entry on the Zhongyong translate key terms in the texts differently: Fu discusses "five ethical codes" and "three comprehensive virtues" (p. 68) while Yanming An calls them "five universal paths" and "three universal virtues" (p. 890). Such differences can be either thought provoking or confusing (especially when unaccompanied by Chinese characters or even pinyin), depending on the reader. The sections on the Analects in "Confucianism: Confucius" and "Confucianism: Constructs of Classical Thought" have hardly anything in common; the first examines it as an account of how Confucius lives as an exemplar remembered by his students, while the latter discusses its content, focusing on ren and li, as well as on Confucius' religious concerns. While concepts such as ren and li are frequently discussed, the different ways in which authors employ them and the different characteristics, contexts, and philosophical stakes they pay attention to enrich one's understanding of the many dimensions of these concepts even as similarities in diverse entries reinforce certain aspects and perspectives.One comes across disagreements to various degrees on common or related topics among different entries. While... (shrink)

Differences in guidance from various organisations is preventing uniform standards of practiceThe emphasis in medical law and ethics on protecting the patient’s right to choose is at an all time high. Apart from circumscribed situations, for instance where the Mental Health Act 19831 is applicable, the only justification for medically treating an adult patient against his or her wishes is on the basis of common law, using the principle of best interests, and only when he or she lacks capacity to (...) refuse treatment. As a result, it is important that clinicians should be able to assess capacity to refuse treatment. Given that judgements of incapacity involve deciding that a person does not have the ability to refuse treatment, a great deal of care needs to go into the assessment and characterisation of incapacity.There is divergence between the characterisation of capacity that is used by the courts and that which is recommended by the British Medical Association . The BMA usefully expands on the first element of capacity as set out in the standard legal definition of capacity in the Re C judgment2 but ignores the other two elements. By doing this, the BMA makes it unclear whether it is rejecting these as relevant to capacity; it also misses the opportunity to expand on these elements in a clinically useful way.We will begin with a description of the BMA’s advice3 and the standard English legal definition of capacity.2,4 Then we will show that there are important discrepancies between these two sources of advice. We think that the BMA ought to clarify its position on capacity in order to safeguard the interests of physicians, healthcare workers, and patients.THE RE C TESTMr C was a patient in a psychiatric secure hospital who had chronic paranoid schizophrenia with …. (shrink)