Predictive processing (PP) has been repeatedly presented as a unificatory account of perception, action, and cognition. In this paper, we argue that this is premature: As a unifying theory, PP fails to deliver general, simple, homogeneous, and systematic explanations. By examining its current trajectory of development, we conclude that PP remains only loosely connected both to its computational framework and to its hypothetical biological underpinnings, which makes its fundamentals unclear. Instead of offering explanations that refer to the same set of (...) principles, we observe systematic equivocations in PP‐based models, or outright contradictions with its avowed principles. To make matters worse, PP‐based models are seldom empirically validated, and they are frequently offered as mere just‐so stories. The large number of PP‐based models is thus not evidence of theoretical progress in unifying perception, action, and cognition. On the contrary, we maintain that the gap between theory and its biological and computational bases contributes to the arrested development of PP as a unificatory theory. Thus, we urge the defenders of PP to focus on its critical problems instead of offering mere re‐descriptions of known phenomena, and to validate their models against possible alternative explanations that stem from different theoretical assumptions. Otherwise, PP will ultimately fail as a unified theory of cognition. (shrink)

The widespread idea that infinitesimals were “eliminated” by the “great triumvirate” of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass is refuted by an uninterrupted chain of work on infinitesimal-enriched number systems. The elimination claim is an oversimplification created by triumvirate followers, who tend to view the history of analysis as a pre-ordained march toward the radiant future of Weierstrassian epsilontics. In the present text, we document distortions of the history of analysis stemming from the triumvirate ideology of ontological minimalism, which identified the continuum (...) with a single number system. Such anachronistic distortions characterize the received interpretation of Stevin, Leibniz, d’Alembert, Cauchy, and others. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 1, January 2022.

There is a current effort to borrow the concept of trauma from medicine and psychiatry and to introduce it into sociological theory. The author explicates the notion of cultural trauma as applicable to the theory of social change. He defines cultural trauma as the culturally defined and interpreted shock to the cultural tissue of a society, and presents a model of the traumatic sequence, describing typical conditions under which cultural trauma emerges and evolves. Drawing on the work of Robert K. (...) Merton on anomie, and of Anthony Giddens on risk, he suggests a number of typical strategies by which societies cope with cultural traumas. Cultural trauma is treated as a link in the ongoing chain of social changes; depending on the number of concrete circumstances, cultural trauma may be a phase in the constructive morphogenesis of culture or in the destructive cycle of cultural decay. (shrink)

Predictive processing models of psychopathologies are not explanatorily consistent with the present account of abstract thought. These models are based on latent variables probabilistically mapping the structure of the world. As such, they cannot be informed by representational ontology based on mental objects and states. What actually is the case is merely some terminological affinity between subjective and informational uncertainty.

What is the class of possible semiotic systems? What kinds of systems could count as such systems? The human mind is naturally considered the prototypical semiotic system. During years of research in semiotics the class has been broadened to include i.e. living systems like animals, or even plants. It is suggested in the literature on artificial intelligence that artificial agents are typical examples of symbol-processing entities. It also seems that semiotic processes are in fact cognitive processes. In consequence, it is (...) natural to ask the question about the relation between semiotic studies and research on artificial cognitive systems within cognitive science. Consequently, my main question concerns the problem of inclusion or exclusion from the semiotic spectrum at least some artificial systems. I would like to consider some arguments against the possibility of artificial semiotic systems and I will try to repeal them. Then I will present an existing natural-language using agent of the SNePS system and interpret it in terms of Peircean theory of signs. I would like also to show that some properties of semiotic systems in Peircean sense could be also found in a discussed artificial system. Finally, I will have some remarks on the status of semiotics in general. (shrink)

In the discussions concerning the date of Dharmakīrti, Jaina sources have never been seriously taken into account. They may, however, provide a valuable insight because Dharmakīrti both criticised and was criticised by Jaina thinkers. Two Jaina authors, Samantabhadra and Pūjyapāda Devanandin, may prove crucial in determining the actual dates of Dharmakīrti. The paper argues that Dharmakīrti directly influenced Samantabhadra in a number of ways, which sets the terminus ante quem for Dharmakīrti, and his traditional chronology has to be reconsidered in (...) the light of new findings. The paper suggests new dates for all the three authors. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 1, January 2022.

We examine Paul Halmos’ comments on category theory, Dedekind cuts, devil worship, logic, and Robinson’s infinitesimals. Halmos’ scepticism about category theory derives from his philosophical position of naive set-theoretic realism. In the words of an MAA biography, Halmos thought that mathematics is “certainty” and “architecture” yet 20th century logic teaches us is that mathematics is full of uncertainty or more precisely incompleteness. If the term architecture meant to imply that mathematics is one great solid castle, then modern logic tends to (...) teach us the opposite lesson, namely that the castle is floating in midair. Halmos’ realism tends to color his judgment of purely scientific aspects of logic and the way it is practiced and applied. He often expressed distaste for nonstandard models, and made a sustained effort to eliminate first-order logic, the logicians’ concept of interpretation, and the syntactic vs semantic distinction. He felt that these were vague, and sought to replace them all by his polyadic algebra. Halmos claimed that Robinson’s framework is “unnecessary” but Henson and Keisler argue that Robinson’s framework allows one to dig deeper into set-theoretic resources than is common in Archimedean mathematics. This can potentially prove theorems not accessible by standard methods, undermining Halmos’ criticisms. (shrink)

The measure of trust that people vest in their fellow citizens or institutions depends on three factors: the `reflected trustworthiness' of the target as estimated by themselves in a more or less rational manner, the attitude of `basic trustfulness' deriving from socialization, and the `culture of trust' pervading their society and normatively encouraging the trusting orientation. The author presents a model of a structural context conducive for the emergence of the culture of trust, and then argues that democratic organization contributes (...) to trust-generating conditions, such as normative certainty, transparency, stability, and accountability. This influence is found to be doubly paradoxical. First, democracy breeds the culture of trust by institutionalizing distrust at many levels of democratic organization. And second, the strongest influence of democracy on the culture of trust may be expected when the institutionalized distrust remains a resource used sparingly and only when there appear significant breaches of trust. (shrink)

The paper discusses possible roles of consciousness in a semiotic activity of a cognitive agent. The discussion, we claim, is based on two related approaches to consciousness: on Chalmers’ theory of phenomenal and psychological consciousness and on Damasio’s neural theory, which draws a distinction between core and extended consciousness. Two stages of cognitive-semiotic processing are discussed: the moment of perception of a sign as a meaningful entity and the metasemiotic processes understood as the human capacity to reflect on signs and (...) their usage, analyse and control processes of recognition, interpretation of signs and to detect and correct errors in semiotic activity. In the case of the first stage, it is argued that signs as meaningful entities have a distincly experiential character. The feeling of meaningfulness is a result of phenomenal consciousness, in particular a result of the so-called valuation features of phenomenal experience. I claim that this aspect of cognitive-semiotic activity is possible owing to a special neural mechanism called a semiotic marker. It is argued that semiotic systems have to be able to use signs as signs, i.e. they should display some metacognitive capacities, in particular an ability to analyse semiosis at a metalevel. It is argued that such metasemiosis is dependent on psychological consciousness and is realized at the neural level in the form of extended consciousness. The paper is based on a particular understanding of cognitive semiotics as a discipline involving analyses of cognitive processes as semiotic processes, i.e. processes requiring usage of signs. (shrink)

L’article aborde la problématique des actes normatifs de droit pénal adoptés en Pologne dans les années 1944–1956. L’auteur essaie de répondre à la question : comment le régime politique et l’idéologie stalinienne ont-ils influencé la manière de rédiger les textes juridiques de cette branche du droit lors des plus grandes répressions par le pouvoir d’après-guerre en Pologne? À partir de 1944, le droit pénal a été adapté aux besoins des autorités communistes, contrôlées par l’Union soviétique. Dans la période analysée, on (...) a introduit en Pologne plus de cent actes normatifs englobant des dispositions pénales. L’idéologisation du droit pénal est visible dans toutes les parties des actes normatifs : titres, préambules et dispositions juridiques. On retrouve dans leur contenu les valeurs politiques, économiques et sociales fondamentales pour l’idéologie du stalinisme, dont les thèses ont été mises en œuvre en Pologne après la fin de l’occupation allemande. (shrink)

Naszym dążeniem nie jest osiągnięcie ostatecznych rozwiązań w kwestii Cóż jest prawda? , obraliśmy skromniejszy cel. Podtytuł O prawdzie nie sugeruje, iż praca stanowi kompendium wiedzy o problemie prawdy w całej filozofii współczesnej. Rezygnujemy bowiem z ujęć syntetycznych i systematycznych, w zamian chcemy skupić się na obiektywnych i rzetelnych prezentacjach i interpretacjach wybranych koncepcji prawdy w poglądach Martina Heideggera, Johna Graya, Xaviera Zubiriego, Jacques'a Derridy, Johna Rawlsa i Stefana Swieżawskiego. Zdaniem autorów tekstów, poglądy tych właśnie filozofów wskazały nowe drogi myślenia (...) o prawdzie bądź twórczo nawiązywały do ujęć tradycyjnych. My ufamy, iż pozwolą one dostrzec panoramę filozoficznych dyscyplin debatujących o prawdzie (ontologia, epistemologia, filozofia polityki, historiozofia) oraz dylematy związane z prawdą, które są ważne dla innych dziedzin wiedzy i życia codziennego, w różnych jego aspektach (prywatnym, społecznym, politycznym). (shrink)

The article presents the key problems relevant to the issue of “transcendent Action,” as Peirce calls it. The author focuses on the relation between “belief” and the “transcendentals:” unity, truth, goodness, and beauty, in their peculiar Peirceian context. He considers firstly “belief” in the sense of “an original impulse to act consistently, to have a definite intention” and, secondly, “Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, (...) and Beauty.” Finally, he considers Peirce's defense again two popular accusations: one on the part of the logicians which “confounds psychical truths with psychological truths,” and the second one regarding hedonism. (shrink)

English title: Master Eckhart’s God Confronted with Nietzschean Critique of Christianity. Author tries to demonstrate that the way of thinking about Christian God developed in the late Middle Ages by Master Eckhart goes beyond the interpretation which underlies Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity as a religion of the other world. In the paper, Author first presents the said criticism, followed by the vision of God outlined by Eckhart. He demonstrates that Christianity, criticized by Nietzsche, uses a commonsense vision of God’s transcendence (...) based on spatial images. The author also demonstrates that Eckhart defines this transcendence in such a way that it does not fall under Nietzsche’s criticism, in particular it cannot lead to the depreciation of worldliness in favour of an invented other world, which Nietzsche observes. Eckhart’s thought makes room for Christianity ‘after Nietzsche.’. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to investigate the relations between the basic moral categories, namely those of norms, ideals and supererogation. The subject of discussion is, firstly, the ways that these categories are understood; secondly, the possible approaches towards moral acting that appear due to their use; and thirdly, their relationship within the moral system. However, what is of a special importance here is the relationship between the categories of norms and ideals (or in a wider aspect — laudable (...) acts) and a thesis about their complementary character. For it seems that the omission of one of the elements that are analysed within a moral system must result in an essential limitation of both the possibilities of finding an adequate approach to a given moral problem (on a descriptive level), as well as defining the full set of normative guidelines. Therefore, as I shall argue, resigning from a two-level method of moral analysis may lead to the atrophy of the very idea of ethics itself. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a reinterpretation of Roman Ingarden's theory of intentional objects. There are four types of intentional objects in Ingarden's ontology, we offer a detailed analyses of an intentional object that is a correlate of a text. Such an object is characterised by Ingarden as a two-sided and schematised formation. We focus on the notion of schematism. We classify different interpretations of schematism and propose our own definition of schematism of a purely intentional object.

Basing itself on Edith Stein's research into philosophy of psychology and the humanities, this article focuses particularly on discussions of the theory of association. Stein's approach, rooted in Husserlian phenomenological perspective, seems to represent a significant contribution to the establish of an intellectual framework for the exploration of the philosophy of consciousness, and also seems helpful for inquiries into the issue pf practical know-how pertaining to remembering things, as well as the use of schemata in intellectual activity generally.

The issue “Human being in the digital era” is not superfluous. Every technology, i.e. literacy, print etc., gives tools, but at the same time impacts deeply human being. The article attempts to answer the following questions: what kind of change is taking place nowadays? what are the associated challenges? Is it true what Einstein once said: “The problems that exist in the world today cannot be solved by the level of thinking that created them”?

Zasadnicza teza tekstu brzmi, że możliwość totalnego chaosu empirycznego, która jest rozpatrywana w ramach eksperymentu unicestwienia świata, nie jest możliwością realną, lecz możliwością logiczną. Według Husserla hipoteza totalnego chaosu empirycznego pozostaje w związku z zasadniczą nieadekwatnością doświadczenia świata, która nie wyklucza możliwości nieistnienia świata. Unicestwienie świata jako efekt całkowitego załamania się doświadczenia świata mogę jednak przyjąć tylko hipotetycznie i taka fikcyjna możliwość nie ma charakteru możliwości realnej, ponieważ absolutny fakt mojego doświadczenia poprzedza wszelkie możliwości, nadając im dopiero znaczenie możliwości realnych. (...) Doświadczenie w swej pierwotnej strukturze obejmuje zarówno doświadczenie świata, jak i doświadczenie ego cogito i jest jednym, absolutnym doświadczeniem, tak że możliwość globalnego chaosu empirycznego okazuje się jedynie pustym eksperymentem myślowym i jako taka możliwość ta pozostaje w zasadniczej analogii do możliwości niepoznawalnych rzeczy samych w sobie. Słowa kluczowe: fenomenologia transcendentalna, eksperyment unicestwienia świata, doświadczenie świata, doświadczenie ego cogito, realna możliwość, logiczna możliwość. (shrink)

The subject of the paper is an attempt to apply the category of “negative certainty” to cognition of man according to Jean-Luc Marion and a discussion of his project. Marion developed this concept inspired mainly by Kant’s philosophy. It is about the certainty of something negative, something that cannot be captured as an object. Negative certainty is not the certainty of negativity, but the certainty of that, which positivity cannot be reduced to objectivity. Marion offers criticism the Cartesian ideal, which (...) privileges the object and, following Heidegger, emphasizes the event-based nature of the phenomenon. Negative certainty is a re-elaboration of a saturated phenomenon, but from the point of view of its recipient. The category of “negative certainty” is then applied to human, who is not an ordinary phenomenon, but a set of saturated phenomena. The analysis of the views of Descartes and Kant leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to approach man objectively and define his quidditas. There is no answer to the question “who is a man?”, because it itself is a question (St. Augustine), not an answer. Marion points to three aporias of the objective understanding of human: epistemological, alienation and otherness. As a result, the metaphysics of man is not possible, and his negative knowledge is grounded in the field of theology. Although Marion’s thought is interesting, several objections can be leveled against it, which are formulated in the last part of the paper. Despite them, the project of negative certainty in relation to human defends itself and shows the convergence of egology and dialogics. (shrink)

In Husserl's phenomenology, the concept of evidence remains inextricably linked with the concept of the possibility of doubt, because this possibility is the condition for distinguishing between the apodictic nature of transcendental experience and the non-apodictic nature of the experience of the world. The phenomenological method is aimed at checking the degree of validity of all knowledge by searching for its possible alternatives or counterexamples, and if all previous attempts at such a search end in failure, we are dealing with (...) knowledge of the rank of apodictic evidence, and there is always the possibility of eliminating all evidence in further course of the experience. As a consequence, lack of alternatives is not the final criterion of the evidence of knowledge. The concept of the possibility of doubt is directly related to the concept of the possibility of negative verifiability, i.e. the possibility of falsification, and consists in constructing in the imagination possible counterexamples of evidence given things and states of affairs, so that the verifiability of philosophical theses is not empirical and takes place in the area of ​​possibility, not reality. (shrink)

Contributed papers presented at seminar held at Warsaw University, Poland, 8-9 September, 2000.

There is relatively little literature on Indian skepticism, with hardly any monograph on the subject comparable to, e.g., Julia Annas’ and Jonathan Barnes’ The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations, R.J. Hankinson’s The Sceptics: The Arguments of the Philosophers, a series of Richard H. Popkin’s monographs on the history of skepticism, or two recent competing volumes as collective efforts: The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism edited by John Greco and The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism edited by Richard Bett. (...) Therefore what promises to provide a survey of the skeptical tradition of South Asia should potentially be regarded as a milestone work in the... (shrink)

In this paper we show that the field of the real numbers is an intentional object in the sense specified by Roman Ingarden in his Das literarische Kunstwer and Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt. An ontological characteristics of a classic example of an intentional object, i.e. a literary character, is developed. There are three principal elements of such an object: the author, the text and the entity in which the literary character forms the content. In the case of (...) the real numbers the triad consists of Richard Dedekind, his work Steitigkeit und irratinale Zahlen, and the intentional object determined by this work. Showing that we are indeed faced with the inten-tional object we analyse three moments: two-sidedness of the formal structure of the intentional object, the moment of its existentional derivation, and schematism of the intentional object. Since there are many constructions of the real numbers known in mathematics, we show what relation obtains between Dedekind's and Cantor's constructions of the real numbers as these are taken as intentional objects. Moreover, we show what relation obtains between Dedekind's construction and the axiomatic characteristics of the real numbers. (shrink)

COVID-19 did not disappear in the third year (2022) of the global pandemic. On the contrary, the number of infected people several times exceeded the highs of previous years, but the greater morbidity was not accompanied by a relatively comparable number of deaths. Some studies showed that the SARS-CoV-2 virus impact, e.g. in CEE EU countries, characterizes the seasonal intensity as temperatures fall or rise in relative humidity. All researchers agree that the number of COVID-19-infected people is only an estimate (...) based on the volume of tests performed and that the true numbers are usually much higher. The implementation of spatial interaction modeling could potentially aid in the control of the COVID-19 pandemic due to the inherently spatial nature of its diffusion. The gravity models used in this investigation to simulate the regional spread of the COVID-19 epidemic are based methodologically on previous empirical studies. The proposed methodology uses techniques for modeling spatial interactions due to the epidemics described above, which are a direct result of the number of contacts between individuals. The COVID-19 pandemic can be studied regionally using spatial diffusion methods as well as population potential models (spatial interaction models) and visualized using geographic information system software. Empirical verification and geovisualizations are based on available recent population and pandemic statistics that are possible to acquire from national health services. Methodologically, this type of modeling and simulation aimed at reconstructing a factual situation can be defined as abductive chorological inferring. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Filozofia analityczna. Koncepcje, metody, organiczenia [Analytic Philosophy. Concepts, Methods, Limitations], by Tadeusz Szubka.

The concept of power shapes both the political philosophy and the general worldview of the modern age. For this reason, two areas of philosophy - ontology and political philosophy - which were hitherto treated separately, must be brought together. Freedom, Equality, Power brings out the ontological framework shared by the political philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. In the last chapter (The Ontological Consequences), the author uses the results of his earlier analyses as the stepping stone for developing some themes (...) belonging to ontology in general. (shrink)

Affective knowledge of God is a kind of knowledge which follows human affectivity. This knowledge takes place on two levels: the level of the natural inclination of man towards God and the level of the religious bias of man towards God. What is the nature of affective knowledge of God? It seems there are three problems in question. First of all, as there is a natural inclination towards God in man, one will be restless unless one recognizes or finds God. (...) Secondly, one who loves God has a new deeper knowledge of the divine things through connaturality and inclination. Thirdly, as the result of one's encounter with God and of uniting with Him, man experiences certain subjective states which cannot be expressed by words. (shrink)

The sciences, from their ancient beginnings, use a double way of investigation. One was applied to mineral and astronomical bodies, another to living ones. A ruling, tacit, common sense methodological or epistemological principle was this: The method of description should respect the inner essential properties of the object. For instance, neither the movements of the astronomical bodies, nor the behavior of the living bodies should be described in the scale of subatomic interactions. In modern times quite another methodological principle has (...) been enthroned. The cosmos, astronomical, mineral and alive bodies altogether, have, allegedly, to be considered as a single natural whole, ruled by essentially the same set of principles. The properties of the mineral world are accepted as a universal model of descriptive concepts, and the explanatory concepts proper to the mineral world are accepted as a universal model of explanation in biology. So, up to now, the academic sciences have been dominated by the philosophical option of materialist monism, or panmaterialism. This option—we may call it antiteleologism and fragmentarism—has a profound impact on empirical research and the way biological phenomena are described. This strange, unnatural, arbitrarily imposed conceptual framework ignores the most fundamental biological dynamisms, and precludes our intellect from seeing the right questions and striving towards the right answers. Consequently it arbitrarily reduces the range of “scientifically acceptable” explanations. This antiteleological methodology of sciences, imposed on biological mind by philosophers, led to major change in the ideas of philosophers of nature. The physiology and anatomy of the fully developed living bodies has become their central object of study. Much less attention is paid to developmental processes such as biosynthesis, morphogenesis, embryogenesis, phenotypic adaptation and regeneration. The fully shaped structures and their functional properties are considered a hopeful basis of all the necessary explanations. For instance the structure of tile DNA molecule has become more important than the problem of its origin, and the structure of the brain more important than the developmental processes which lead to its construction. However, the enormous progress of biological sciences in spite of the widespread, dominating antiteleological and fragmentarist approach corroborates the very ancient, Aristotelian insight, which put the principal stress on the developmental aspect of life. Aristotle, and his more modern followers, was fascinated by the integrated and intrinsically heterogenous tendencies visible in the course of life. Today, we can say that at least eight such tendencies are universal, i.e. appear in every single form of life : The tendency to select the proper kind of raw material and the proper kind of raw energy present in the environment. The tendency to synthesize new, highly selective forms of chemical structures. The tendency to utilize biological material in the process of building the nano-, micro-, and macro-machines. The tendency for a relatively rapid, continuous production and replacement of all the elements of the functional structures of the body. The tendency for a relatively rapid, continuous modification of the functional structures in a way which makes them more efficient within a changing environment. The tendency to repair and to regenerate the damaged elements of the functional structures of the body. The tendency for multiplication, which means the production of such structures and the depots of the biological material as seeds, eggs, spores or buds. These structures, providing the environmental conditions are favorable, are starting points of new instances of the above described tendencies. The tendency—possibly universal—to provide all the structures of the body with the “recognition marks” which help to eliminate all the, “alien” bodies and to recognize members of the own kind. These tendencies are not homogeneous. Homogeneous tendencies can be illustrated by the tendency of bodies to attract one another. This kind of tendency was the empirical source of such abstract concepts as gravitation, electrostatic force or magnetic force. Biological tendencies are heterogeneous and, at the same time, integrated. Human intellect is capable of recognizing the fundamental indivisibility of the set. A great number of observations and experiments have revealed and verified the fundamental indivisibility of the whole set of these tendencies. The concrete, bodily outcomes of these tendencies, however, are quite different in different families and orders of living things. Because of these differences the existence of different kinds of integrative principles was postulated. In this way a plurality of living substances was assumed. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas understands providence as the reason of directing things to ends, and as the execution of that directing, i.e. governance. Thus, providence is one of the fundamental attributes of the person that reveals the person's perfection and dignity. Providence consists in a free and reasonable directing of oneself and the reality subject to oneself in order to actualize potentialities of oneself and of other beings in the context of the ultimate goal of existence. Human providence joins the providence of (...) the Absolute with regard to the world. In spite of its deficiencies human providence reveals the essential dignity of the human person. (shrink)

What determines whether the procedures for proving the affirmative statement of God's existence may be called a proof? Certainly, it is necessary that all premises be true and that a reliable inference schemata be applied. One premise appears to be the most critical in the theistic argument. This premise is the principle of sufficient reason. I hold the view that the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found among the premises of any metaphysical explanation of reality, so I suggest that (...) the terms “proof” and “argument” not be used. Instead, we could speak of ways of acquiring discursive knowledge of God and ways of indirect substantiation of God's existence. (shrink)

The high point of the falsification of physical theories in a standard view of the philosophy of science is the so-called crucial experiment. This experiment is a kind of manipulated empirical test, which provides the criterion for distinguishing between two rival hypotheses, where one is an acceptable theory due to passing the test, and the other turns out to be an unacceptable theory as it does not pass the test. The crucial experiment was supposed to play a significant role because, (...) in virtue of an empirical disconfirmation of one theory, the experiment was assumed to confirm the other as true. However, in 1906, in La théorie physique, son object et la structure (hereafter quoted in English translation as The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1906/1954)), Pierre Duhem famously argued against this view and stated that crucial experiments in physics are impossible as they are necessarily ambiguous and logically incomplete. His contention rested on the claim that, “[a] physical theory is not an explanation [of true reality in itself in virtue of some broad metaphysical ramification of physics]. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as accurately as possible a set of experimental laws” (ibid., p. 19). Furthermore, different theories could be equally suitable to represent a given group of experimental laws. And, assuming holism, no hypothesis could be tested in isolation, but merely as a part of a set of an entire scientific theory. The problem which Duhem identified in 1906 was slightly overshadowed and neglected in mainstream philosophy of science until the appearance of a challenging paper by Willard Van Orman Quine published in 1951 and entitled “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. Quine’s paper caused a revival of interest in Duhem’s original formulation and gave a new impulse towards the problem in the form of the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis. The aim of this paper is to reconsider whether Duhem was right to argue that there are no crucial experiments in physics. In order to assess the validity of the thesis, first, this paper makes an exposition of Duhem’s arguments in their favour, and analyses the major criticisms of this position offered in the subject-literature of Adolf Grünbaum, who explicitly attacked the arguments for the thesis as inconclusive and false. Then, this paper presents possible modes of defence of the Duhem-Quine thesis and argues that the original formulation of the thesis is well qualified and plausible. Finally, this paper offers a pragmatic interpretation of the theory choice. (shrink)

Artykuł poświęcony jest koncepcjom estetycznym polskiego filozofa i teoretyka pedagogiki, Stefana Szumana. Jego zainteresowanie twórczością dziecka i sztuką ludową wpisuje się w szeroki w kulturze europejskiej początków XX w. zwrot ku „prymitywowi”, będący pochodną tyleż krytycznej oceny procesów modernizacyjnych i regeneracyjnych tęsknot, co ówczesnych badań antropologicznych nad strukturą społeczeństw pierwotnych i ich twórczością. Podobnie jak Franz Boas, który w swej teorii sztuki prymitywnej odrzucił model ewolucjonistyczny i utożsamienie „prymitywu” z niższym stadium rozwoju, Szuman podkreślał swoistość twórczości dziecięcej i sztuki ludowej. (...) Nawiązując do etnologa neoewolucjonisty Maxa Richarda Verworna i do psychologicznych hipotez Jeana Piageta, w sztuce dziecka widział związek z organicznym rozwojem zdolności poznawczych i potrzebą ich uzewnętrzniania. Proponowana przez Szumana koncepcja wychowania przez sztukę, zakładająca nie tyle gotowy program kształcenia, co wspomaganie indywidualnego rozwoju uczniów, stała się częścią silnego w polskiej tradycji nurtu pedagogiki personalistycznej, reprezentowanej m.in. przez Henryka Rowida, Janusza Korczaka czy Antoniego Kenara. (shrink)

In view of current political and social challenges, the border between church and state, which was defined in the 19th century, should be reflected in a critical way. As a proposal, one could attempt to re–define this relationship by using the concept of civil society. The political sciences see the church as a part of civil society. The magisterium of the Catholic church and big parts of theology, however, never use this term. In order to better serve its mission, the (...) church with its material and immaterial resources should begin to understand itself as a part of civil society. This requires the church to be transformed into a «public church” and theology into «public theology”, a transformation which will not only help to build a more just society, but will also help the church to fulfil its own mission. (shrink)

Since the discovery of the Neandertal bones 1856, the extremely old, fragmentary fossil remains of hundreds of man-like bodies have been discovered in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Even the oldest ones - usually the most incomplete - look man-like and „un-apish", even to a layman, if compared with a modem apish and human correlate. Sometimes, in the vicinity of these remains, primitive stone tools or the evidence of their production have been found. At present, it seems absolutely certain — within (...) the limits of our present physical and biological knowledge - that at least four million years ago, in Africa, some creatures resembling modern man were living, and that at least two and half million years ago, in Africa, stone tools were produced. In contrast with the firm, scientifically-arguable belief that all modem human tribes - however different they are - belong to a single species, in paleoanthropology an equally firm scientific belief is maintained that the extinct man-like forms belong to several different, „presapient", „prehuman'', more ape-like species. (shrink)