We investigate ideals of the form {A⊆ω: Σn∈Axnis unconditionally convergent} where n∈ωis a sequence in a Polish group or in a Banach space. If an ideal onωcan be seen in this form for some sequence inX, then we say that it is representable inX.After numerous examples we show the following theorems: An ideal is representable in a Polish Abelian group iff it is an analytic P-ideal. An ideal is representable in a Banach space iff it is a nonpathological analytic P-ideal.We (...) focus on the family of ideals representable inc0. We characterize this property via the defining sequence of measures. We prove that the trace of the null ideal, Farah’s ideal, and Tsirelson ideals are not representable inc0, and that a tallFσP-ideal is representable inc0iff it is a summable ideal. Also, we provide an example of a peculiar ideal which is representable inℓ1but not in ℝ.Finally, we summarize some open problems of this topic. (shrink)

For given Boolean algebras$\mathbb {A}$and$\mathbb {B}$we endow the space$\mathcal {H}(\mathbb {A},\mathbb {B})$of all Boolean homomorphisms from$\mathbb {A}$to$\mathbb {B}$with various topologies and study convergence properties of sequences in$\mathcal {H}(\mathbb {A},\mathbb {B})$. We are in particular interested in the situation when$\mathbb {B}$is a measure algebra as in this case we obtain a natural tool for studying topological convergence properties of sequences of ultrafilters on$\mathbb {A}$in random extensions of the set-theoretical universe. This appears to have strong connections with Dow and Fremlin’s result stating (...) that there are Efimov spaces in the random model. We also investigate relations between topologies on$\mathcal {H}(\mathbb {A},\mathbb {B})$for a Boolean algebra$\mathbb {B}$carrying a strictly positive measure and convergence properties of sequences of measures on$\mathbb {A}$. (shrink)

We study cardinal invariants connected to certain classical orderings on the family of ideals on ω. We give topological and analytic characterizations of these invariants using the idealized version of Fréchet-Urysohn property and, in a special case, using sequential properties of the space of finitely-supported probability measures with the weak* topology. We investigate consistency of some inequalities between these invariants and classical ones, and other related combinatorial questions. At last, we discuss maximality properties of almost disjoint families related to certain (...) ordering on ideals. (shrink)

We present several naturally defined σ-ideals which have Borel bases but, unlike for the classical examples, these ideals are not of bounded Borel complexity. We investigate set-theoretic properties of such σ-ideals.

We investigate several ideal versions of the pseudointersection number \(\mathfrak {p}\), ideal slalom numbers, and associated topological spaces with the focus on selection principles. However, it turns out that well-known pseudointersection invariant \(\mathtt {cov}^*({\mathcal I})\) has a crucial influence on the studied notions. For an invariant \(\mathfrak {p}_\mathrm {K}({\mathcal J})\) introduced by Borodulin-Nadzieja and Farkas (Arch. Math. Logic 51:187–202, 2012), and an invariant \(\mathfrak {p}_\mathrm {K}({\mathcal I},{\mathcal J})\) introduced by Repický (Real Anal. Exchange 46:367–394, 2021), we have $$\begin{aligned} (...) \min \{\mathfrak {p}_\mathrm {K}({\mathcal I}),\mathtt {cov}^*({\mathcal I})\}=\mathfrak {p},\qquad \min \{\mathfrak {p}_\mathrm {K}({\mathcal I},{\mathcal J}),\mathtt {cov}^*({\mathcal J})\}\le \mathtt {cov}^*({\mathcal I}), \end{aligned}$$ respectively. In addition to the first inequality, for a slalom invariant \(\mathfrak {sl_e}({\mathcal I},{\mathcal J})\) introduced in Šupina (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 434:477–491, 2016), we show that $$\begin{aligned} \min \{\mathfrak {p}_\mathrm {K}({\mathcal I}),\mathfrak {sl_e}({\mathcal I},{\mathcal J}),\mathtt {cov}^*({\mathcal J})\}=\mathfrak {p}. \end{aligned}$$ Finally, we obtain a consistency that ideal versions of the Fréchet–Urysohn property and the strictly Fréchet–Urysohn property are distinguished. (shrink)

We show that there exist uncountably many pairwise nonisomorphic density-like ideals on $\omega $ which are not generalized density ideals. In addition, they are nonpathological. This answers a question posed by Borodulin-Nadzieja et al. in [this Journal, vol. 80, pp. 1268–1289]. Lastly, we provide sufficient conditions for a density-like ideal to be necessarily a generalized density ideal.

Samuel J. Wheeler defends Wittgenstein's criticism of Cantor's set theory against the objections raised by Hilary Putnam. Putnam claims that Wittgenstein's dismissal of the basic tenets of this set theory concerning the noncountability of the set of real numbers was unfounded and ill‐conceived. In Wheeler's view, Putnam's charges result from his failure to grasp Wittgenstein's intention and, in particular, to consider the difference between empirical and logical impossibility. In my paper, I argue that Wheeler's defence is unsuccessful and, at the (...) same time, that Putnam's objections go too far. (shrink)

In recent years there has been growing interest in adapting virtue ethics to the ethics of technology. However, it has most typically been invoked to address some particular issue of moral importance, and there is only a limited range of works dealing with the methodological question of how virtue ethics may contribute to this field. My approach in this paper is threefold. I start with a brief discussion of Aristotelian virtue ethics, with a view to constructing a framework in which (...) to then address at least some of the aspects of the growing technicization of life that call for scrutiny. I subsequently proceed further by outlining three possible models of virtue-theoretical analysis within the ethics of technology, giving special attention to those changes in human agency where technicization can be seen to exert a significant influence. Finally, I focus on the third such possibility, the extended virtue model, as a basis for calling for a more inclusive account of moral agency. (shrink)

The truly philosophical issue in machine conscioiusness is whether machines can have 'hard consciounsess'. Criteria for hard consciousness are higher than for phenomenal consciousness, since the latter incorporates first-person functional consciousness.

The paper discusses a relatively underexamined element of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics associated with his critique of set theory. I outline Wittgenstein’s objections to the theories of Dedekind and Cantor, including the confounding of extension and intension, the faulty definition of the infinite set as infinite extension and the critique of Cantor’s diagonal proof. One of Wittgenstein’s major objections to set theory was that the concept of the size of infinite sets, which Cantor expressed by means of symbols אₒ and (...) c, had no application, i.e. that there was no grammatical technique that could show how such expressions were to be used. Notions of set theory are, so to speak, exterior – they find themselves outdoors, outside of what we usually do. They form a discourse that takes us beyond the horizon of everydayness and commonality. They are like an engine idling of the language of mathematics. (shrink)

OBJECTIVE PREDICATION The author claims that there are two kinds of predicates that are used to describe cognitive states of mind like beliefs or perception. Using some of them, one can describe the cognitive states of mind directly, whereas using some others, one can describe these states in comparison with one’s own. For example, one can say that a person has a belief or one can say that that person’s belief is according to his own beliefs. In the latter situation, (...) he uses the predicate “to know”. The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John knows that p” are as follows: (1) Peter believes that John believes that p; (2) Peter believes that p; (3) Peter believes that the reasons for which John believes that p have a good justification. In a similar way one can ascribe to somebody a visual impression of an object x or to compare that person’s impressions with his own cognitive states. In the latter situation one uses the predicate “to see” (to perceive). The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John can see x” are the following: (I) Peter believes that John has visual impression of object x; (II) Peter believes that object x exists; (III) Peter believes that this that John has visual impression of object x is according to the laws of vision. When one uses predicates that describe cognitive states of mind of a person (possession of beliefs or sensory impressions), one speaks subjectively, whereas when one speaks objectively, he uses predicates that allow him to compare cognitive states of mind of a person with his own. Keywords: PREDICATION, BELIEFS, PERCEPTION. (shrink)

Child visual discourse: The use of language, gestures, and vocalizations by deaf preschoolers1 This exploratory study examined the linguistic activity and conversational skills of deaf preschoolers by observing child-child dyads in free-play situations. Deaf child of deaf parents - deaf child of deaf parents pairs were compared with deaf child of hearing parents - deaf child of hearing parents pairs. Children from the two groups were videotaped during dyadic peer interactions in a naturalistic play situation. The findings indicated that deaf (...) children were able to engage in successful communicative interaction. However, statistically significant differences were found between the two groups of deaf preschoolers with regard to some categories of communicative behaviors from the point of view of sign and spoken languages. For example, DCHP were found to be less actively than DCDP through using speech. The results of this study suggest that intervention efforts should be focused on improving the language learning environment by facilitating signing by the parents and increasing their skills in visual-gestural strategies. (shrink)

Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutmanowa (1906-1981) was a Polish philosopher and student of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. In 1938 she went to the University of Cambridge (Newnham College) on a Sarah Smitton Fellowship. There she attended George Edward Moore’s lectures as well as one of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics in 1939. In this interview which was conducted with Alois Eder she talks about her encounter with Wittgenstein. It was published in 1978 in the Polish art (...) and culture magazine Odra and is her only published memoir about Wittgenstein. The interview is republished here both in English translation and as facsimile of the original publication with the kind permission of the Odra magazine. (shrink)

Creature consciousness provides a physicalist account of the first-person awareness. I argue that non-reductive consciousness is not about phenomenal qualia ; it is about the stream of awareness that makes any objects of perception epistemically available and ontologically present. This kind of consciousness is central, internally to one’s awareness. Externally, the feel about one’s significant other’s that “there is someone home” is quite important too. This is not substance dualism since creature consciousness and functional consciousness are both at different generality (...) levels of physicalism. Surprisingly, pre-Hegel philosophy of pure subject is more fitting with the current engineering approach than analytical phenomenalism. The complementary view of subject- and object-related perspectives, may come from Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre; but here it is placed, securely within the physicalist paradigm. It is essential to the Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness, which helps us understand under what general conditions a machine would be first-person conscious, but when it is merely functionally conscious. (shrink)

In this paper I present my thesis stated numerous times at APA and NACAP meetings, that the current shortage of online programs in philosophy presents adanger to the profession. I also show how this danger could be averted. I give a snapshot of what teaching philosophy online, and doing it well, looks like. I am a very partial spectator in this debate since the example I am referring to is the program at UIS which I designed and, with my colleagues, (...) led to successful implementation. Finally, I draw a broad brush picture of what an inter-campus, international online program in philosophy may look like (as well as some implications for online learning in Poland). (shrink)

In this paper I present my thesis stated numerous times at APA and NACAP meetings, that the current shortage of online programs in philosophy presents adanger to the profession. I also show how this danger could be averted. I give a snapshot of what teaching philosophy online, and doing it well, looks like. I am a very partial spectator in this debate since the example I am referring to is the program at UIS which I designed and, with my colleagues, (...) led to successful implementation. Finally, I draw a broad brush picture of what an inter-campus, international online program in philosophy may look like (as well as some implications for online learning in Poland). (shrink)

Electronic technologies, from the internet to virtual reality and advanced robotics, are transforming the world we live in, and especially our methods of learning, far more radically than any factors since the invention of the printing press. The process is at its beginnings; it is largely unavoidable; it also presents an opportunity for learning and research. We academics ought to meet this educational and civilizational challenge and make it our own. Otherwise, the process may be appropriated by bureaucratic and narrow (...) business interests, largely to the detriment of academic learning. We have a chance to enjoy shared knowledge as never before, which I call opening the doors to the true Library of Alexandria.Structural changes are necessitated by this new paradigm. Those incorporate three aspects: First, integration of the web into our lives; second, the use of such integration in research and education, which highly increases the opportunities but is unforgiving of excessive individualism and other inefficiencies; third the philosophically broad perspective of non-reductive naturalism facilitated by this global integration. (shrink)

The so-called Common Sense Morality (C) is any moral theory that allows, or requires, an agent to accept special, non-instrumental reasons to give advantage to certain other persons, usually the agent’s friends or kin, over the interests of others. Opponents charge C with violating the requirement of impartiality defined as independence on positional characteristics of moral agents and moral patients. Advocates of C claim that C is impartial, but only in a positional manner in which every moral agent would acquire (...) the same relational characteristics if that agent was in a certain relationship to the given moral patient. The opponents of C reply that a theory that allows for positional characteristics is self-defeating; it violates the requirement of prescriptivity due to its inability to provide moral recommendations what should happen all things considered. Advocates of C retort that a moral theory should be prescriptive by telling every agent what to do, not what should the joint outcome of those activities be. In this paper I analyze the last two moves of this debate: the objection that C is self-defeating and the reply that there is a plausible moral theory (C) that accommodates positional characteristics of special moral reasons. I argue that the last move wins. In the process I sketch out a theory able to accommodate agent-relative moral reason. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to present Marek Siemek’s interpretation of modernity, focusing on problems related to understanding of the modern subject that arose from the reading of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. Siemek seems to endorse a general drive of Habermas’ theory of intersubjective communication intended to overcome the dialectics of Enlightenment and to complete the project of modernity. However, his position is that its foundation can be traced back to the philosophies of Fichte (...) and Hegel and their mutually complementary intersubjectivity models. Siemek seeks to reconcile the idea of the philosophy of intersubjectivity underlying Fichte’s and Hegel’s philosophies with the tenets of the philosophy of consciousness. (shrink)

This article aims to analyse Wittgenstein’s 1929–1932 notes concerning Frege’s critique of what is referred to as old formalism in the philosophy of mathematics. Wittgenstein disagreed with Frege’s critique and, in his notes, outlined his own assessment of formalism. First of all, he approvingly foregrounded its mathematics-game comparison and insistence that rules precede the meanings of expressions. In this article, I recount Frege’s critique of formalism and address Wittgenstein’s assessment of it to show that his remarks are not so much (...) a critique of Frege as rather a defence of the formalist anti-metaphysical investment. (shrink)

Elzenberg’s philosophy is usually defined as perfectionism, culturalism, pessimism, conservatism, or asceticism. Despite the accuracy and validity of the above mentioned terms it seems, however, that none of them fully encompass the characteristics of the view, tending rather to focus on its given profile. One term that, in my opinion, can be regarded as a suitable candidate for the role is “aristocratism of the spirit”, which embraces perfectionism, culturalism and asceticism as well as pessimism, conservatism and outsiderism. In debating on (...) the elzenbergian variety of this idea I would like to put forward his relation to, or entanglement with the tendency to think in the categories of the aristocratism of the spirit, that has been present since the dawn of philosophy. I use the tentative term “entanglement” here, as Elzenberg in his writings never declared, either openly or indirectly, any adherence to a movement, including the movement of the aristocratism of the spirit. My ascribing Elzenberg to this movement is a convention of interpretation, imposed upon his philosophy for heuristic reasons. (shrink)

In this paper I address the problem of the pejorativisation of solitude in philosophical discourse. By the pejorativisation of solitude I mean giving it a negative meaning. I show that the tendency to the pejorativisation of solitude in philosophy was initiated by Aristotle. He saw solitude as contrary to human nature. This nature is supposed to determine people to form organised communities with others. Only through them the individual is able to survive and thrive. In solitude, one quickly learns how (...) inautarkic is and suffers because of it. Thomas Hobbes was one of the first philosophers to challenge Aristotle’s approach. He argued that man strives for community with others not as a result of a supposedly social nature, but because as a child one is dependent and helpless, and as an adult one expects benefits or honours from others. My thesis is that the pejorativisation of solitude is responsible for its negative stereotyping, the formation of prejudices against it and the learned helplessness syndrome, which makes us vulnerable to solitude. (shrink)

W artykule podejmuję problem operacjonalizacji pojęcia alienacji na gruncie ekofilozofii. Próbuję pokazać, że jest to jedno z kluczowych pojęć ekofilozoficznych. Rezerwuję dla niego określenie „alienacja ekologiczna”. Moją ambicją jest reartykulacja pojęcia alienacji w kontekście fundamentalnego dla filozofii ekologicznej problemu relacji natura – człowiek – kultura. Dokonuję tego w kilku krokach. Najpierw poszukuję źródłowego znaczenia pojęcia alienacji. W tym celu przedstawiam krótki rys etymologiczno-historyczny. W dalszej kolejności podaję przykłady najsławniejszych filozoficznych teorii alienacji. W następnym kroku czynię to samo w odniesieniu do (...) filozofii ekologicznej. Cała procedura służy ostatecznie ujednoznaczniającej precyzacji pojęcia alienacji ekologicznej. (shrink)

This article aims to show that our acceptance or non-acceptance of certain facts is influenced by our adoption of a philosophical world-picture as a kind of background knowledge on the basis of which one decides what does or does not exist, and what is true or false. For this purpose, I discuss the positions of the existential Thomists, as well as those of Wittgenstein and Abel, while also occasionally invoking the work of Putnam and Fleck. To begin with, it is (...) demonstrated that philosophical facts are accepted on the basis of a world-picture that is itself a tangle of facts, values, and theories exhibiting varying degrees of generality. Whether we embrace them or not is thus not determined by any sort of direct experience. There are no neutral philosophical facts. Our world-picture suggests what sort of facts we are prepared to accept, and what methods we use to explain them. It is on precisely this that the heuristic role played by world-pictures in “creating” philosophical facts depends. (shrink)

This volume of the _Ignatianum Philosophical Yearbook _is dedicated to the issue of transhumanism. The texts in this issue focus predominantly on various bioethical issues discussed by transhumanists. Bioethical reflection around transhumanism is present primarily in the Englishlanguage literature, with the bulk of the debates taking place with the participation of prominent schoolars from the Anglo-American area. Increasingly, the issue is also visible in the German-speaking area. In Poland, on the other hand, it is only just entering the sphere of (...) interest of bioethicists from various scientific and research backgrounds. Recent years have abounded in publications addressing various issues related to transhumanism. (shrink)

Generalnie rzecz ujmując, prezentowana monografia pokazuje, że jej Autorka jest zdecydowaną przeciwniczką uprawiania filozofii tylko przy biurku z dala od problemów praktycznych. Swoich poszukiwań nie traktuje w kategorii realizacji akademickiego zawodu tylko zadania, związanego z podejmowaniem określonych działań, wpływających na zmianę postrzegania przez człowieka środowiska naturalnego. Postulaty upraktycznienia filozofii, a zwłaszcza etyki cnót, uprawiania jej w ścisłej współpracy z różnymi społecznymi interesariuszami są jak najbardziej słuszne i godne instytucjonalnego wsparcia. Książka ma niezaprzeczalnie walor perswazyjny. --------------- Zgłoszono: 19/11/2020. Zrecenzowano: 18/12/2020. Zaakceptowano (...) do publikacji: 09/02/2021. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest charakterystyka filozofii chrześcijańskiej w kategoriach tradycji badawczej. Za Larrym Laudanem uznano, że tradycja badawcza nadaje się do eksplikacji pojęcia filozofii chrześcijańskiej. W tym celu autor przybliża najpierw kluczowe pojęcie tradycji badawczej, następnie analizuje pojęcie obrazu świata, które zawsze jest związane z określoną tradycją badawczą. Kolejnym krokiem jest konstrukcja projektującej definicji filozofii chrześcijańskiej jako tradycji badawczej. W artykule wykazano, że filozofia chrześcijańska jako tradycja badawcza jest tradycją pluralistyczną i zdemokratyzowaną. Na zakończenie sformułowano kilka deklaracji metaprzedmiotowych, odnoszących się do (...) metody uprawiania filozofii chrześcijańskiej. Metodą tą powinna być dyskutowalność, czyli niedyktatorska gra zachodząca między przedstawicielami różnych tradycji badawczych wyznających odmienne obrazy świata. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Ludwig Wittgenstein „przydzielony do Krakowa” [Ludwig Witgenstein „Assigned to Krakow”], edited by Józef Bremer and Josef Rothhaupt.

Rozprawa Doktora Piotra Domerackiego zatytułowana Horyzonty i perspektywy monoseologii. Filozoficzne studium samotności stanowi ciekawą i oryginalną propozycję intelektualną. Jako oczywiste plusy przedstawionego opracowania wskazać należy oryginalność tematyki, rozległość studiów oraz dojrzały charakter refleksji autora. Samotność stanowi temat ciągle aktualny i powracający, a jednocześnie zaskakujący złożonością i wielowymiarowością. Jest to przy tym temat, który prowokuje do pytań o naszą własną tożsamość, stanowi punkt wyjścia dla autoanalizy i pytania o relacje z innymi. Odpowiedzi na pytanie o mechanizm rozprzęgania się tych więzi i (...) konsekwencje tych procesów dla człowieka ukazują paradoksy i sprzeczności myślenia o tym zagadnieniu. […] W przedstawionym opracowaniu dr Piotr Domeracki podejmuje ogromny wysiłek przedstawienia całej tej złożoności i wewnętrznych napięć organizujących badania i refleksję nad samotnością. Realizując podjęte zadanie, Autor odnosi wiele sukcesów. Z recenzji wydawniczej dr hab. Heleny Ciążeli, prof. APS, Warszawa Wszelki system wiedzy o samotności, jeśli aspiruje do zupełności oraz jeśli ma być wiarygodny, miarodajny i funkcjonalny, powinien być komplementarny, to znaczy powinien umiejętnie łączyć minimalistyczną oraz maksymalistyczną (w sensie Walzerowskim) perspektywę oglądu i deskrypcji. Zasadniczą trudnością w precyzyjnym i kompleksowym opisie samotności jest jej wysoce ograniczona komunikowalność na poziomie doznaniowości. Samotność jest bowiem niezwykle oporna wobec możliwości empatycznego jej współprzeżywania. Z tego powodu jawi się ona jako agregat takich negatywnie percypowanych własności i określeń, jak monadyczność, solipsystyczność, apatyczność, autystyczność czy outsiderstwo. Zasadniczym celem niniejszej monografii – oprócz intencji wyłożenia i popularyzacji standardów wiedzy monoseologicznej – jest dążenie do przedstawienia jak najszerszego spektrum problemowego oraz siatki pojęciowej filozofii samotności. (shrink)

The book introduces Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s philosophy of action into the mainstream of contemporary action-theoretical debates. Piotr Makowski shows that Kotarbiński–Alfred Tarski’s teacher and one of the most important philosophers of the renowned Lvov-Warsaw school—proposed a groundbreaking, original, and (in at least a few respects) still fresh perspective in action theorizing. The book examines and develops Kotarbiński’s ideas in the context of the most recent discussions in the philosophy of action. The main idea behind Kotarbiński’s action theory—and thus, behind this (...) book—is the significance of the philosophical investigations of the general conditions of effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of intentional actions. Makowski presents and reinterprets Kotarbiński’s views on these dimensions of our activities and sheds new light on the most important areas of action theory. (shrink)

L’article aborde la problématique des actes normatifs de droit pénal adoptés en Pologne dans les années 1944–1956. L’auteur essaie de répondre à la question : comment le régime politique et l’idéologie stalinienne ont-ils influencé la manière de rédiger les textes juridiques de cette branche du droit lors des plus grandes répressions par le pouvoir d’après-guerre en Pologne? À partir de 1944, le droit pénal a été adapté aux besoins des autorités communistes, contrôlées par l’Union soviétique. Dans la période analysée, on (...) a introduit en Pologne plus de cent actes normatifs englobant des dispositions pénales. L’idéologisation du droit pénal est visible dans toutes les parties des actes normatifs : titres, préambules et dispositions juridiques. On retrouve dans leur contenu les valeurs politiques, économiques et sociales fondamentales pour l’idéologie du stalinisme, dont les thèses ont été mises en œuvre en Pologne après la fin de l’occupation allemande. (shrink)

Spanning the period between Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge in 1929 and the first version of Philosophical Investigations in 1936, Piotr Dehnel explores the middle stage in Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical development and identifies the major issues which engrossed him, including phenomenology, philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of language. Contrary to the dominant perspective, Dehnel argues that this period was intrinsically different from the early and late stages and should not be viewed as a mere transitional phase. The distinctiveness of Wittgenstein's (...) middle work can be seen in his philosophical thinking as it unfolds in a non-linear trajectory: thoughts do not follow upon each other, ideas do not appear sequentially one by one, and insights do not form a straight chain. Dehnel portrays the diffused and multifarious quality of Wittgenstein's middle thinking, enabling readers to form a more comprehensive view of his entire philosophy and acquire a better grasp of his conceptual trajectory, complete with the intricacies and challenges that it poses. (shrink)