A series of experiments on children and adults were conducted to define the features and workings of argumentative discourse. Oral and written arguments were analyzed for the complexity of the argument support structure and the presence of typological argumentation markers (certainty modals, value judgments, etc.). Subjects were asked to assess the argumentativity of texts that did or did not contain typical argumentation markers.At about age ten, children can produce and recognize a ‘minimal argumentative structure,’ in which the speaker takes a (...) stance and supports it with text that derives its argumentativity from the presence of this stance). However, full mastery of the negotiation process, that involves acknowledgment of the opponent's stance (generally through the use of counterarguments) is not present before the ages of 15 to 16. The minimal argumentative structure continues to develop with age and gain complexity. Certain situations are more conductive to the production of elaborate argumentative discourse, such as a genuinely controversial topic with an unfamiliar adult addressee whose stance is not known and whose reaction is thus unpredictable. Here speakers produce complex arguments while still leaving room for negotiation.Overall, certain argumentation markers can be identified in all argumentative text. these markers can be used to characterize stages of development of argumentative discourse. A number of issues remain unexplored, including: What other (implicit...) devices do speakers use to convince their audience? Why is the capacity to put argumentation in writing acquired at such a late stage of development? (shrink)

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.

Martin Heidegger's overt alliance with the Nazis and the specific relation between this alliance and his philosophical thought--the degree to which his concepts are linked to a thoroughly disreputable set of political beliefs--have been the topic of a storm of recent debate. Written ten years before this debate, this study by France's leading sociologist and cultural theorist is both a precursor of that debate and an analysis of the institutional mechanisms involved in the production of philosophical discourse. Though Heidegger is (...) aware of and acknowledges the legitimacy of purely philosophical issues, Bourdieu points out that the complexity and abstraction of Heidegger's philosophical discourse stems from its situation in the cultural field, where two social and intellectual dimensions--political thought and academic thought--intersect. Bourdieu concludes by suggesting that Heidegger should not be considered as a Nazi ideologist, that there is no place in Heidegger's philosophical ideas for a racist conception of the human being. Rather, he sees Heidegger's thought as a structural equivalent in the field of philosophy of the "conservative revolution," of which Nazism is but one manifestation. (shrink)

Presents an original and rigorous reading of the entire project of Kantian critique, demonstrating the essential role that cosmology plays in Kant and those he influenced.

Like other members of the Vienna Circle, Carnap criticized traditional philosophy for its lack of clarity and precision, as is well-know from such papers as "The elimination of metaphysics through the logical analysis of language" (1932) and many other writings. In 'The Logical Syntax of Language' (1934), while still entertaining the idea that, in some sense, metaphysics is nonsense, Carnap's critique of philosophy is based on different grounds and aimed at different authors. In this book, his critique of philosophy actually (...) takes the form of an attempt at a reconstruction of philosophy on a new basis. I shall try to examine this attempt and to show why it fails. I shall also try to show how Carnap's thought evolved on this point in later writings, in particular in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950). (shrink)

Some common notions about analytic philosophy - that it is uniformly anti-metaphysical or indifferent to the history of philosophy - are clearly misconceived. However the impression that analytic philosophers are essentially linguistic philosophers is not entirely false and hence less easy to refute.

Les grands paradigmes des sciences humaines ont été constitués, au fil de l’histoire, par l’éviction progressive de la dimension affective des objets et méthodes scientifiques. Après un long désintérêt, pour partie dû à la préoccupation de l’objectivation des phénomènes retenus par l’analyse sociologique, mais aussi à l’hypostase du social, qui a trouvé notamment chez Durkheim un accomplissement encore plus accentué que dans la plupart des conceptions holistes, la question des émotions est l’...

There are presently three broad approaches the project of naturalizing intentionality: a purely informational approach (Dretske and Fodor), a purely teleological approach (Millikan and Papineau), and a mixed informationally-based teleological approach (Dretske again). I will argue that the last teleosemantic theory offers the most promising approach. I also think, however, that the most explicit version of a pure teleosemantic theory of content, namely Millikan’s admirable theory, faces a pair of objections. My goal in this paper is to spell out Millikan’s (...) pure teleosemantic theory; then to present two objections; and finally to ask the question whether a teleosemantic framework can be saved from the objections. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Many papers have been devoted to the semantic turn Carnap took in the late 1930s after Tarski had explained to him his method for defining truth and his work on the establishment of scientific semantics. Commentators have often argued that the major turn in Carnap’s approach to languages had already been taken in the Logical Syntax of Language, but they have usually assumed that Carnap was happy to subsequently follow Tarski and adopt Tarskian semantics. In this paper, it is argued (...) that this assumption needs to be qualified and that Carnap was actually far from following Tarski when he decided to complement his syntactic method with a semantic one. Carnap and Tarski had different goals, divergent programs, and dissenting views on truth and semantics. After exploring several possible methods for the explication of logical concepts such as L-truth and L-implication, Carnap opted for definitions based on concepts he had found in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Waismann’s work on a logical interpretation of probability. Carnap’s reasons for taking a semantic turn are to be understood in the context of his principle of tolerance. He first hoped he could use Tarski’s technique to recover in the semantic setting the completeness result he had tried to establish in the Logical Syntax. His eventual adoption of non-Tarskian semantics can be accounted for by his program of a logical analysis of science—including empirical science—and his ambition to elaborate a unified logical framework for deductive, inductive, and modal logic, and for explicating analyticity. (shrink)

As a naturalistically inclined philosopher, I reject the thesis that meaning is intrinsically normative. I consider the deflationary proposal that meaning is not normative at all and I find it unacceptable. I argue from the difficulties met by the deflationary proposal in favor of the teleosemantic view that the normativity of meaning arises from biological functions.

Cet ouvrage propose un aperçu des recherches cartésiennes au Japon depuis l’époque d’Edo jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Il examine en outre la manière d’articuler la philosophie de Descartes, selon la modalité d’un in-sein philosophique, avec une pensée radicalement différente. / This work offers an overview of Cartesian research done in Japan from the Edo period to today. It also examines how to articulate Descartes’ philosophy - according to a philosophical In-Sein - with thought that is radically different. Table des matières: https://www.classiques-garnier.com/editions-tabmats/JeeMS01_tabmat.pdf.

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, (...) mais insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

Dans un langage accessible, 150 notions sont ici élucidées par l'épreuve de leur propre paradoxe. D'Absolu à Volonté, en passant par Conscience et Tabou, Plaisir et Droit, Cosmos et Substance, ce dictionnaire offre une introduction inédite à la philosophie et un remarquable approfondissement de son exercice."--Back cover.

Les articles reunis dans cet ouvrage ont fait l'objet de presentations lors du premier colloque Res per nomen, qui s'est tenu en 2007 a l'Universite de Reims, et qui fut entierement consacre a la reference en langue. Ils presentent tous un point de vue en rupture avec les doctrines les plus courantes sur le langage, a savoir le cognitivisme et le logicisme. Cela signifie-t-il que la perspective referentielle et denominative developpee ici puisse constituer une alternative? Il est trop tot pour (...) le dire. Il semble bien, toutefois, qu'aborder la langue sous l'angle referentiel la fasse voir plutot comme un objet anthropologique et semiotique complexe que comme le produit d'un encodage / decodage individuel, qui necessite des hypotheses ontologiques particulierement fortes sur la nature et la pensee. Il est remarquable aussi que nombre de ces articles se soient interesses a l'usage de la langue tel qu'il apparait dans les corpus, et notamment a propos des unites phraseologiques. Sans doute cela est-il du au fait que les solutions classiques au probleme du figement en langue ne soient pas vraiment satisfaisantes, et que nombre d'auteurs aient decide d'aller voir dans les corpus ce qui s'y passe reellement, ce qui les a rendu sensibles a la question de la denomination. (shrink)

Se recupera aquí para la discusión ética contemporánea la perspectiva universalista del logos presente en la Ética a Nicómaco de Aristóteles. En oposición a unas versiones comunitaristas de la ética aristotélica que dan lugar a posiciones particularistas o relativistas, el logos se liga a la naturaleza humana, y universal, del hombre.