El artículo analiza los aportes de la teoría sociológica de Norbert Elías y Pierre Bourdieu al campo de las ciencias sociales. Siguiendo a Corcuff, podemos ubicar las obras de estos dos autores dentro de las teorías constructivistas. Teorías que producen un desplazamiento mismo del objeto de la sociología: ni la sociedad ni los individuos, concebidos como entidades separadas, sino las relaciones entre individuos. Con ello, se abordan el rechazo a la teoría pura; el abordaje multidisciplinar y la vigilancia epistemológica (...) en la construcción del objeto de estudio; la superación de la oposición subjetivismo-objetivismo; la explicación social, histórica y relacional de los fenómenos sociales; la concepción agonista de lo social; y, por último, el eje temático que atraviesa las obras de dos autores con diferencias pero complementarios. (shrink)

En este artículo retomo el diálogo abierto entre los desarrollos schutzianos sobre fenomenología del poder propuestos por Jochen Dreher y el enfoque socio-antropológico sobre habitus y poder simbólico de Pierre Bourdieu. Dreher señala que es posible encontrar en la perspectiva de Bourdieu “puntos de partida claves” para una fenomenología del poder. Sin embargo, al criticar el carácter estático de la noción de habitus, opta por la teoría de las relevancias de Schutz, la cual, a diferencia de la propuesta bourdeana, (...) da lugar central a la perspectiva subjetiva del actor individual. En este trabajo mostraré las limitaciones de esta crítica al cotejarla con los desarrollos de Bourdieu sobre habitus desgarrados/escindidos, reflexividad/socioanálisis y contradiestramiento del cuerpo. Como contribución a una fenomenología del poder, propondré una lectura alternativa de la noción bourdeana de habitus, basada en Merleau-Ponty, puesta a prueba en una investigación empírica sobre colegios de clases altas. (shrink)

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.

The main objective of this article is to capitalise on many years of research, and of practice, relating to the use of introspection in a research context, and thus to provide an initial outline description of introspection, while developing an introspection of introspection. After a description of the context of this research, I define the institutional conditions which would enable the renewal of introspection as a research methodology. Then I describe three aspects of introspective practice: 1) introspection as a process (...) of becoming aware, theorized through Husserl's model of consciousness modes; 2) introspection as recollection, through the model of retention and awakening in Husserl's theory of memory; 3) the use of universal descriptive categories for the description of all lived experiences, as a guide for skilled practice of introspection in research. Finally I examine the question of the validation of introspective data, suggesting a strong distinction between the ethical criterion and the epistemic criterion of truth. (shrink)

Pierre Maquet1,2,6, Steven Laureys1,2, Philippe Peigneux1,2,3, Sonia Fuchs1, Christophe Petiau1, Christophe Phillips1,6, Joel Aerts1, Guy Del Fiore1, Christian Degueldre1, Thierry Meulemans3, André Luxen1, Georges Franck1,2, Martial Van Der Linden3, Carlyle Smith4 and Axel Cleeremans5.

"This volume assembles twelve texts published between 1892 and 1915.... The editors allow one to see the genesis of the ideas of Duhem, philosopher and historian, of the variety of his styles, and sometimes also the limits of his work.... A useful index, probably unique in the field of Duhemian studies, completes the book.... The English-language public may be assured an exemplary translation and a reliable critical apparatus." --Jean Gayon, _Revue d'Histoire des Sciences_.

Certain authors, in speaking of their works, say: My book, my commentary, my history, etc. They smack of these bourgeois homeowners, with “my house” always on their lips. They should rather speak of: our book, our commentary, our history, etc., since, generally speaking, there is far more in them of others than of their own.

Non-cognitive gadgets are fancy tools shaped to meet specific, local needs. Cecilia Heyes defines cognitive gadgets as dedicated psychological mechanisms created through social interactions and culturally, not genetically, inherited by humans. She has boldly proposed that many human cognitive mechanisms are gadgets. If true, these claims would have far-reaching implications for our scientific understanding of human social cognition. Here we assess Heyes’s cognitive gadget approach as it applies to mindreading. We do not think that the evidence supports Heyes’s thought-provoking thesis (...) that human children are taught to read minds the way they are taught to read words. We highlight a potential circularity lurking behind this analogy, and we explain why we are unpersuaded by Heyes’s anti-mentalistic proposal for handling data inconsistent with the gadget view, which others take to be evidence for mindreading in human infancy. We conclude that while human minds may well be filled with gadgets, mindreading is unlikely to be one of them. (shrink)

Avec une grande simplicité, Pierre Jacerme décrit dans cet ouvrage, ce qu'est le monde et comme l'habiter, quelle pourrait être la forme d'un déracinement positif et comment cela implique de retrouver un rapport au divin.

LaBerge examines the ethical positions of Rawls, Kant, John Walzer adapted from J. S. Mill, and Canadian philosopher Howard Adelman are, and writes that they constitute "an ethics of human rights, ethics of the right to a historical community, and an ethics of peace.".

There are presently three broad approaches the project of naturalizing intentionality: a purely informational approach (Dretske and Fodor), a purely teleological approach (Millikan and Papineau), and a mixed informationally-based teleological approach (Dretske again). I will argue that the last teleosemantic theory offers the most promising approach. I also think, however, that the most explicit version of a pure teleosemantic theory of content, namely Millikan’s admirable theory, faces a pair of objections. My goal in this paper is to spell out Millikan’s (...) pure teleosemantic theory; then to present two objections; and finally to ask the question whether a teleosemantic framework can be saved from the objections. (shrink)

: Fodor was passionately unwilling to compromise. Of his several commitments, I focus here on informational atomism. Fodor staunchly rejected semantic holism for two conspiring reasons. He took it to threaten his commitment to the nomic character of psychological explanation. He also took it to pave the way towards relativism, which he found deeply offensive. In this paper, I reconstruct the strands of Fodor’s commitment to the computational version of the representational theory of mind that led him to informational atomism. (...) I take issue with three features of informational atomism. First, I argue that it deprives content from its expected causal role in psychological explanation. Secondly, I take issue with Fodor’s claim that only informational atomism can meet the requirements of the principle of compositionality. Finally, I argue that informational atomism yields a bloated or unwieldy category of nomic properties. Keywords: Informational Atomism; Representational Theory of Mind; Psychological Explanation; Principle of Compositionality; Jerry A. Fodor Fare i conti con l’atomismo informazionale: uno dei lasciti di Jerry Fodor Riassunto : Fodor è stato fortemente maldisposto al compromesso. Tra le molte cose di cui si è occupato, intendo qui concentrarmi sull’atomismo informazionale. Fodor ha coerentemente rifiutato l’olismo semantico per due ragioni convergenti. Lo vedeva come minaccia per il suo impegno verso il carattere nomico della spiegazione psicologica e come porta aperta verso il relativismo, cosa che considerava profondamente minacciosa. In questo lavoro, intendo riprendere le fila dell’impegno di Fodor verso la versione computazionale della teoria rappresentazionale della mente che lo ha portato all’atomismo informazionale, chiarendo tuttavia che non sono d’accordo con tre aspetti dell’atomismo informazionale. In primo luogo, mostrerò come questo sottragga al contenuto il suo ruolo causale nella spiegazione psicologica. In secondo luogo, non sono d’accordo con l’affermazione di Fodor per cui solo l’atomismo informazionale possa soddisfare i requisiti del principio di composizionalità. Illustrerò infine come l’atomismo informazionale ceda il passo a un insieme di proprietà nomiche ampio o difficile da gestire. Parole chiave: Atomismo informazionale; Teoria rappresentazionale della mente; Spiegazione psicologica; Principio di composizionalità; Jerry A. Fodor. (shrink)

L’opposition platonicienne de la Science et du Mythe, l’opposition cartésienne de la raison et de l’imagination se retrouvent dans l’effort de la physique contemporaine pour éliminer les images adventices, bien qu’aujour- d’hui comme naguère, images et mythes offrent, avec un secours pour l’invention, le seul moyen de présenter au profane une approximation concrète, d’ailleurs nécessairement inadéquate, des théories scientifiques.

Legal theories are interesting when they bite, when they organise, when they destroy, when they reveal patterns in the chaos, when they cast form or substance in stark relief, when they relate the...

Critiqués pour leur manque d’objectivité et de rationalité, les témoignages d’observations d’ovnis et d’« ufonautes » invitent-ils, dans le contexte de la crise écologique, à reposer la question de la pluralité des mondes extraterrestres ou à ouvrir plutôt celle de la pluralité des mondes terrestres? Invitent-ils à s’interroger sur les preuves de la présence d’E. T. dans notre environnement ou sur la nécessité de cesser de voir le monde dans lequel nous évoluons comme un stock de « ressources », afin (...) d’entrer en contact avec cette pluralité d’êtres et y trouver notre place dans un monde débarrassé du partage entre nature et culture? (shrink)

As a naturalistically inclined philosopher, I reject the thesis that meaning is intrinsically normative. I consider the deflationary proposal that meaning is not normative at all and I find it unacceptable. I argue from the difficulties met by the deflationary proposal in favor of the teleosemantic view that the normativity of meaning arises from biological functions.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage propose un aperçu des recherches cartésiennes au Japon depuis l’époque d’Edo jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Il examine en outre la manière d’articuler la philosophie de Descartes, selon la modalité d’un in-sein philosophique, avec une pensée radicalement différente. / This work offers an overview of Cartesian research done in Japan from the Edo period to today. It also examines how to articulate Descartes’ philosophy - according to a philosophical In-Sein - with thought that is radically different. Table des matières: https://www.classiques-garnier.com/editions-tabmats/JeeMS01_tabmat.pdf.