Critiqués pour leur manque d’objectivité et de rationalité, les témoignages d’observations d’ovnis et d’« ufonautes » invitent-ils, dans le contexte de la crise écologique, à reposer la question de la pluralité des mondes extraterrestres ou à ouvrir plutôt celle de la pluralité des mondes terrestres? Invitent-ils à s’interroger sur les preuves de la présence d’E. T. dans notre environnement ou sur la nécessité de cesser de voir le monde dans lequel nous évoluons comme un stock de « ressources », afin (...) d’entrer en contact avec cette pluralité d’êtres et y trouver notre place dans un monde débarrassé du partage entre nature et culture? (shrink)

Without doubt, the principle of least action is a fundamental principle in classical mechanics. Contemporary physicists, however, consider the PLA as a purely mathematical principle – even an axiom which they cannot completely justify. Such an account stands in sharp contrast with the historical meaning of the PLA. When the principle was introduced in the 1740s, by Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, its meaning was much more versatile. For Maupertuis the principle of least action signified that nature is thrifty or (...) economical in all its actions, i.e., that nature avoids to do anything unnecessary. Maupertuis understood the principle in teleological terms and even considered the principle as an expression of God’s wisdom. It has been correctly pointed out by historians that Maupertuis in his later years moved towards a more speculative and metaphysical approach, whereas his contemporary Euler and later Lagrange, wanted to avoid such theological and metaphysical implications and frame the PLA in purely mathematical terms. Such readings, however, have had the unintended side-effect that they lose out of sight the question how the mathematical and metaphysical aspect of the principle of least action fit together within Maupertuis’ own work. Investigating if and how the mathematical and metaphysical aspects of the PLA are compatible within Maupertuis’ thought will be the main goal of this paper. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Love of God above SelfJordan OlverIS THERE ANY LOVE that is not ultimately a form of self-love? Anders Nygren famously maintained that for Thomas Aquinas there is not. Nygren was led to this conclusion in large part by Aquinas’s claims that love is an act of the will and that the ultimate end of the will is happiness: if every act of love is on account of happiness as (...) an ultimate end, it seems to follow that all love of others is motivated by, and reducible to, love of self.1 Others have drawn this conclusion for similar reasons. Scott MacDonald, for example, interprets Aquinas as proposing “egoistic rationalism”; he believes that this ethical position follows from Aquinas’s claim that human beings, like all creatures, seek their perfection.2Texts, however, can be produced to show that Aquinas himself believes that nonegoistic love is possible.3 If he is an [End Page 97] egoist, he is not so intentionally; he can only be so in the sense that his principles, despite his wishes, necessitate such a position. While Nygren interpreted Aquinas as an unwilling egoist of this sort,4 most modern scholars of Aquinas’s thought on love have held that his principles do not necessitate egoism, and they have endeavored to explain how nonegoistic love is possible on Thomistic grounds. Modern attempts to solve the “problem of love in Thomas Aquinas” normally look back to Pierre Rousselot’s 1908 work Pour l’histoire du problème de l’amour au moyen âge.5 Rousselot identified the “problem of love” as whether a love that is not egoistic is possible and, if it is, what the relation might be between this love and the love of self which appears to be the foundation of natural tendencies.6 Rousselot believed that in the Middle Ages this problem was primarily dealt with through the consideration of the more particular problem of whether it is possible to love God above self apart from grace. This approach, he thought, offered significant advantages: it was simultaneously concrete and profound, and the object of love was both the last end and the author of all natural appetites.7 If genuine love for another is possible, that possibility would be discoverable in this case and through analysis of love of God above self it would seem that one could [End Page 98] arrive at the principles needed to make sense of other nonegoistic loves.8 Accordingly, when Rousselot presented Aquinas’s solution to the problem of love, he did so exclusively through an explanation of Aquinas’s teaching on love of God above self.9 The most notable feature of this account was its appeal to the part-whole relation: Rousselot proposed that for Aquinas our love for God above self is due to the fact that we relate to God as a part to a whole.Rousselot’s work inspired a scholarly discussion that has persisted now for over a century. This discussion may be roughly divided into three stages: the early twentieth century, the mid-twentieth century, and the late-twentieth century to the present. General agreement with Rousselot characterizes early twentieth-century scholarship. Scholars of this period, such as Charles-Vincent Héris, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, and H.-D. Simonin, may claim that Rousselot neglects or overemphasizes something, but they do not assert that he is substantially wrong.10 By contrast, rejection or neglect of the “part-whole” approach to love of God above self characterizes the scholarship of the mid-twentieth century. Étienne Gilson, in his 1932 work L’esprit de la philosophie médiévale, vigorously objects to Rousselot’s account, arguing that the part-whole relationship, as it functions in Aquinas’s arguments for love of God above self, should not be understood in “a distressingly literal way,” but simply as “a metaphor, the first moment in a manuductio.”11 [End Page 99] Louis-Bertrand Geiger also emphatically rejects Rousselot’s account, arguing that the real explanation of disinterested love is to be found in the will’s special, “objective” inclination to the “good in itself” as opposed to the “good for me”; we love God... (shrink)

We show that if κ is an infinite successor cardinal, and λ > κ a cardinal of cofinality less than κ satisfying certain conditions, then no ideal on Pκ is weakly λ+-saturated. © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.

In 1751, LEONHARD EULER established “harmony” between two principles that had been stated by PIERRE-LOUIS-MOREAU DE MAUPERTUIS a few years earlier. These principles are intended to be the foundations of Mechanics; they are the principle of rest and the principle of least action.My claim is that the way in which “harmony” is achieved sets the foundations of so called Analytical Mechanics: it discloses the physical bases of the general ideas, concepts, and motivations of the formalism. My paper intends to (...) show what those physical bases are, and how a picture of the formalism issues from them. This picture is shown to be recast in JOSEPH-LOUIS LAGRANGES justification of the formalism, which strengthens my claim. (shrink)

From 1873 to 1878, the American physicist Josiah Willard Gibbs offered to the scientific community three great articles that proved to be a milestone for the science of thermodynamics. On the other hand, between 1886 and 1896, the French physicist Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem translated thermodynamics into the language of Lagrange’s analytical mechanics. At the same time, he expanded its scope to include thermal phenomena, electromagnetic phenomena, and all kinds of irreversible processes. Duhem formulated a version of thermodynamics (...) characterized by the conceptual unification of mechanics, physics, and chemistry. Overall, the work of both physicists on thermodynamics is tremendous, full of axioms, theorems, corollaries, proofs, and hundreds of equations. Therefore, it would be a utopian aim to provide a short analysis of their work. Instead, the present study will attempt to give a brief outline of the main tools and concepts used by the two physicists. I will argue that each scientist approaches thermodynamics in a new and unique way, which reveals their scientific styles as reflected in their personalities, the writing styles, their behavior toward publicity, and their inclination for publication. Finally, I will examine the influence of their theories on the development of chemical thermodynamics. (shrink)

Michael Brodrick’s book, The Ethics of Detachment in Santayana’s Philosophy, constitutes a much-needed contribution to the field of American philosophy. Although it is common for contemporary authors to claim that their preferred philosopher has been misunderstood, few can do so with as much conviction as Broderick has done for George Santayana, “a great and unjustly neglected philosopher”.The overarching goal of Brodrick’s investigation is the presentation of a conceptual framework for an “ethics of detachment” fundamentally mediated by human finitude. Setting his (...) work in opposition to the contemporary ethical conceit of an “attachment” to life, progress, and perfection, Brodrick seeks to demonstrate “how... (shrink)

Dans ce livre savant et moqueur, Pierre-André Taguieff passe au scalpel l'idéal moderne par excellence, celui d'émancipation, qui exalte, mobilise et aveugle depuis longtemps les Modernes. Le temps est venu de soumettre à un examen critique sans complaisance cette notion qui fait partie du prêt-à-penser dont se sont emparés les utopistes et les démagogues de toutes obédiences. Comment expliquer que cette notion banale ait pu devenir un thème philosophique et politique majeur depuis la fin du XVIIIe siècle, sous la (...) forme du projet universaliste de l'émancipation du genre humain comme sous celle de l'autonomie croissante de l'individu? Taguieff analyse la formation philosophique de l'idée d'émancipation, explore ses usages politiques et dissèque ce qu'il appelle "l'émancipationnisme ", produit de la corruption idéologique de cette idée-force. Car l'émancipation comme projet global appelle une critique fondamentale : ce qui est rejeté subrepticement, voire diabolisé, ce sont les attachements, les fidélités, les enracinements, les mémoires particulières, donc la transmission. Il s'agit d'un programme de refonte anthropologique, visant à créer l'" homme nouveau ", chimère d'une société mondiale d'individus également émancipés. La généalogie d'une idée floue, pour penser librement le monde de demain. (shrink)

The studies gathered in this book attempt to fill a gap in the history of logic by stressing the importance of the works devoted to the question of logic in the tradition of thought inherited from...

Gaz de schiste, OGM, énergie nucléaire, cellules souches, changement climatique, efficacité des médicaments... La science, plus que jamais, suscite la méfiance, voire la défiance, des citoyens. Pour une large part, cela vient d'une incompréhension de ce qu'est la démarche scientifique. «A l'occasion du colloque de rentrée du Collège de France organisé à l'automne 2013, des scientifiques, des historiens, des juristes et des politiques se sont attachés à analyser et à clarifier les enjeux technologiques et scientifiques, en s'appuyant sur des exemples (...) concrets au coeur des débats les plus actuels : comment aborder dans une société démocratique le problème du renouvellement des énergies et du remplacement des énergies fossiles par des formes d'énergie moins polluantes, ou celui qui lui est lié du réchauffement climatique, ou encore celui des thérapies géniques, en utilisant de la façon la plus rationnelle possible ce que la science nous apprend, pour optimiser la réponse de la société aux défis qui lui sont posés?» S. H. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AN OBSERVATION ON ROBERT LAUDER'S REVIEW OF G. A. McCOOL, S.J.1 RoMANus CEssARro, O.P. Dominican House of Studies Washington, District of Columbia BECAUSE OF HIS scholarly commentary on the development of Roman Catholic theology in the 19th and 20th centuries, students interested in the history of this period owe a debt of gratitude to Fr. Gerald McCool, S.J. In a recent issue of this journal, Robert Lauder presented a (...) clear and sympathetic account of two major works, in which McCool identifies and evaluates the figures and currents that he considers of central importance for a proper understanding of Roman Catholic intellectual life from before the First Vatican Council (1869-70) to after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).2 On Lauder's account, McCool records in these books " the movement within Thomism from its reliance on the commentators Cajetan and John of St. Thomas and the strong influence of hard-line Dominican Thomists such as Garrigou-Lagrange to the transcendental Thomism of Rahner and Lonergan" (p. 308). In his most recent study, From Uniity to Pluralism, McCool concentrates on the work of Joseph Marechal, Pierre Rousselot, Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson. Lauder believes that " McCool correctly cites these four thinkers as the key to Thomism's movement towards a greater openness to other thought patterns" (p. 308), but regrets that McCool failed to go further and provide " a detailed 1 See Robert E. Lauder, "On Being or not Being a Thomist," The Thomist 55 (1991): 301-319. 2 Gerald A. McCool, S.J., Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism: The Search for a Unitary Method and From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989). The first volume was originally published as Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Centur31 (New York: The Seabury Press, 1977). 701 702 ROMANUS CESSARIO, O.P. discussion of the presence of St. Thomas's insights in the thought of Rahner and Lonergan... the two most influential Catholic thinkers of the latter half of the twentieth century" (p. 318). Apart from this reservation, which even Lauder considers " a backhanded compliment " (p. 318), I observe no point either at which Lauder takes issue with how McCool narrates the history of Catholic theology from roughly the middle of the 19th-century to the present or where he suggests alternative approaches for interpreting the significance of the individuals and events that figure prominently in McCool's narrative. In his Foreword to T. M. Schoof's A Survey of Catholic Theology 1800-1970, Fr. Edward Schillebeeckx warned its readers against making the book " a kind of ' theological canonisation ' of the theologians mentioned to the exclusion of others." 3 I would like to sound a similar note of caution with respect to McCool's version of the history of Thomism. For while I share Lauder's appreciation of McCool's careful scholarship, I am not at all convinced that McCool has uncovered the whole story, nor that his interpretation of the events which he chronicles warrants the lavish praise that Lauder bestows on it. In particular, I suggest that Lauder uncritically adopts McCool's attitude towards certain Dominican theologians who, even though they remain little known in the English-speaking world, still contributed to the upbuilding of theological culture entre les deux guerres. For example, in From Unity to Pluralism, McCool describes the Dominican Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange as a "conservative " Thomist (p. 212), which, in the context of the narrative as McCool relates it, sounds more like ideological pigeonholing, than an honest attempt to describe adequately what a philosopher such as Kenneth Schmitz recently referred to as the "structured" Thomism of Garrigou-Lagrange.4 In the same s T. M. Schoof, A Survey of Catholic Theology 1800-1970, Foreword by Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Paulist Newman Press, 1970), p. 4. 4 In the first lecture, " In the Beginning : New Paths for Ancient Teachings " of the 1991 McGivney Lecture Series entitled "At the Center of the Human Drama: The Anthropology of Karol Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II." The four lectures will be published by The Catholic University of America Press. ROBERT LAUDER'S REVIEW OF G. A. MCCOOL, S.J. 703 manner, McCool talks about... (shrink)

Entre les deux guerres mondiales, l’empirisme logique se donna pour but de concilier le rôle de l’expérience dans la connaissance scientifique et l’existence des lois logiques. Ses représentants empruntèrent à Frege et Russell les techniques qu’ils venaient de créer et à Wittgenstein son interprétation des vérités logiques. Depuis cinquante ans, leurs héritiers ont modifié à la fois leur idée de l’expérience et leur conception de ses rapports avec la logique. Et si, ainsi que le suggère Quine, l’adhésion de l’esprit humain (...) à la logique classique était semblable à la croyance périmée dans le caractère euclidien de l’espace physique... Pourrions-nous encore penser dans une logique non classique? L’analyse aura fécondé le renouveau de l’empirisme. Elle en aura aussi dessiné les limites, au cours d’une histoire aussi mouvementée que l’histoire de l’Europe et des États-Unis au vingtième siècle. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

Faire valoir un réalisme minimal c'est faire tenir ensemble deux exigences : celle d'un réalisme qui cherche à montrer que les relations exprimées par le langage n'existent pas seulement dans le langage, ni seulement dans l'esprit, mais qu'elles nous font connaître quelque chose du monde ; celle d'un nominalisme qui applique le rasoir d'Occam avec vigilance et refuse, non seulement de poser l'existence d'universels qui seraient des essences ou des propriétés, mais même de concevoir les relations elles-mêmes comme des réalités (...) existant dans un autre monde que celui des individus liés par elles. (shrink)

Some may consider the title outdated. It's a conscious choice, even if blasphemy no longer has the same relevance in modern societies, where religion is confined mainly to the private sphere. The study of blasphemy in various religious traditions teaches us that it is not simply a matter of uttering insults in the absence of the concerned person, namely the divine. It is a sin of the tongue, with social and even political dimensions. Secularization and the often uneasy coexistence of (...) religions have led to an epistemic shift from blasphemy to hate speech against the adherents of a given tradition. Not insulting others because of their convictions becomes an instrument of social cohesion and bolstering political power. The correct use of speech is not just a matter of etiquette or decency but also of the moral obligation to respect the equal dignity of all human beings. As early as the Christian Middle Ages, several theologians articulated ethical principles revolving around the proper guard of the tongue. This ethics of speech immerses us in a universe that goes beyond the frontiers of blasphemy. Their insights and the classification of the sins of the tongue they present can be used to highlight the standards by which hate speech and the culture of banishment should be judged. -/- . (shrink)

La conception fodorienne de la psychologie scientifique soulève les trois problèmes suivants qui peuvent, je crois, être résolus. La condition de formalité est-elle compatible avec l'existence de lois psychologiques intentionnelles ? L'atomisme sémantique est-il compatible avec le fonctionnalisme? L'atomisme sémantique est-il compatible avec la systématicité des pensées humaines? Dans les trois premières sections du présent article, j'essaie de résorber ces tensions. Dans la quatrième et dernière section, j'examine la conception des attributions de croyance développée par Fodor dans « Substitution Arguments (...) and the Individuation of Beliefs » selon laquelle la relation de croyance est une relation à quatre places entre une personne, un symbole , un rôle fonctionnel et un contenu propositionnel. Je fais valoir que Fodor est confronté à un dilemme : soit le rôle fonctionnel est un déterminant du contenu propositionnel, et Fodor doit rejeter l'atomisme sémantique; soit le rôle fonctionnel est un déterminant de l'efficacité causale d'un symbole, et il doit amender la condition de formalité.Fodor's views about scientific psychology raise three puzzles : Is the Formality Condition compatible with there being intentional psychological laws ? Is Content Atomism consistent with Fonctionalism? Can Content Atomism be reconciled with the claim that human thoughts are systematic? In the first three sections of this paper, I try and show how to solve the three puzzles. Finally, in the fourth section, I examine Fodor's recent view of belief-ascriptions in "Substitution Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs" according to which the belief relation is a four place relation between a believer, a symbol token , a functional role and a propositional content. I argue that Fodor faces a dilemma : either the functional role is a determinant of content, in which case Fodor must reject Content Atomism; or it is a determinant of the causal efficacy of the vehicle, in which case he must amend his Formality Condition. (shrink)

The chapter deals both with the changing relations boys and men have had and have with ‘classic’ cars of the 1950s–1960s, and with the social relations classic cars aficionados have had and have between them apropos these machines that have survived and are still used, and therefore illustrate what has to be done so that artefacts do not become archaeological items. It raises an anthropological question having to do with what is at the core of the anthropology of objects, techniques, (...) and material actions, namely: What do interactions with the material world do that words alone could not do? The answer the chapter proposes is that by doing and making things in relation to these cars, men build, in a partially non-verbal way, a core of shared representations. In turn, this shared mixture of thoughts and actions is central to diverse social groupings and manifestations. (shrink)

Chez les Ankave-Anga, des agriculteurs forestiers de Papouasie Nouvelle-Guinée, les initiations masculines et les cérémonies de secondes funérailles restent des temps forts de la vie collective. L'étude ethnographique de tels rites contemporains d'une société «non-moderne» conduit à nuancer certaines propositions théoriques des abondants travaux récents - cognitivistes ou non - qui tentent de dégager la spécificité des actions rituelles, souvent en marginalisant la signification de ces actions. En particulier, l'opposition entre rite et technique mérite réexamen car elle est fondée sur (...) une vision obsolète des rapports entre techniques, culture et organisation sociale. Chez les Ankave, l'impossibilité de tracer une limite entre mythe, rite et technique souligne au contraire la part des objets et les gestes qui les fabriquent ou les mettent en oeuvre dans la convergence et la redondance de pratiques et de représentations qui donnent leur spécificité aux rituels.In Ankave-Anga, farmers forest of Papua New Guinea, male initiations and ceremonies, funerals remain second moments of collective life. The ethnographic study of such rites contemporary society "non-modern" qualified leads to some theoretical propositions of abundant recent work - cognitive or not - that try to identify the specific ritual actions, often marginalizing the significance of these actions. In particular, the opposition between ritual and technical merit review because it is based on an obsolete vision of the relationship between technology, culture and social organization. In Ankave, unable to draw a line between myth, ritual and draws attention to the technical part of the objects and actions that make or implement the convergence and redundancy practices and representations that give specificity rituals. (shrink)

Kant's philosophy must be understood nonnaturalistically and anti-psychologistically. Self-consciousness must be interpreted as preceding the distinction between different persons. Kant departs from the traditional idea that I thoughts are always mediated by a certain specific I sense or conceptualization of oneself. At the same time the so-called paradoxes of self-consciousness are resolved. The possibility of a pre-personal self-consciousness is what links the way all objects are given to finite beings to the way they are conceptualized by those beings. It serves (...) as the unifying basis for intuitions and concepts. Intuitions and concepts of objects are connected by their relation to a numerically identical self. ;The subject construed impersonally provides the frame for any possible experience and is one in the same in all possible experience. As such it can never be experienced as a distinct entity. It is the condition under which it is possible to have a point of view at all. One must be in a position to become conscious of the numerical identity of this logical subject of all representation if is to be possible to communicate indeed to compare and contrast representational contents at all. ;Self-consciousness is inherently empty and yet also necessarily in relation to contents of consciousness. This means that its numerical identity can only be sustained if all potential contents of consciousness present themselves to the self in such a way that they sustain the possibility of consciousness of the self as having a discrete empirical identity. Kant's argument in the First Analogy and the Refutation of Idealism fulfills this demand for a correlate to the numerical identity of pre-personal consciousness in the data presented to self-consciousness spatio-temporally. We must view self-construction and construction of objects existing outside of us as part of a single process which presupposes an impersonal self-consciousness. (shrink)

Based on the author's thesis, Universitae de Paris IV, 1976, submitted under title: Esquisse d'une philosophie du pratique.

We have no means of telling whether the ancient Greeks connected the onset of malaria with mosquito bites. Other peoples had done so, even before Manson's discoveries. But all we know of popular Greek ideas and beliefs comes down to us filtered through 'scientific' texts. In these texts (where imagination is tempered by rationality) fever is explained as a result of the body's mismanagement of the humours. The conceptual framework of Greek medical thought thus excludes a priori any relationship between (...) fever and the mosquito. (shrink)