The principle of belief persistence, or conservativity principle, states that ’\Nhen changing beliefs in response to new evidence, you should continue to believe as many of the old beliefs as possible' (Harman, 1986, p. 46). In particular, this means that if an individual gets new information, she has to accommodate it in her new belief set (the set of propositions she believes), and, if the new information is not inconsistent with the old belief set, then (1) the individual has to (...) maintain all the beliefs she previously had and (2) the change should be minimal in the sense that every proposition in the new belief set must be deducible from the union of the old belief set and the new information (see, e.g., Gardenfors, 1988; Stalnaker, 1984). We focus on this minimal notion of belief persistence and characterize it both semantically and syntactically. A ’possible world' semantic formalization of the principle easily comes to mind. The set of all the propositions that the individual believes corresponds to the set of states of the world that she considers possible and is a subset of the set of states that are not ruled out by the individual's information (or knowledge). It is required that, if the individual considers a state possible and her new information does not exclude this state, then she continue to consider it possible. Furthermore, if the individual regards a particular state as impossible, then she should continue to regard it as impossible unless her new information excludes all the states that she previously regarded as possible. This is closely related to the.. (shrink)

The literature suggests that the moral sense is based on innate abilities. In fact, it has been shown that children show the capacity for moral discernment, emotions and prosocial motivations from an early age. However, the moral sense is a complex construct of an evolutionary and social nature that evolves under the influence of interpersonal relationships. The emergence and development of moral sense is a challenge that has prompted many research studies with the aim of achieving a clear comprehension of (...) moral development. However, success has been scarce, and studies relevant to this subject are limited. Thus, a systematic review of studies relevant to this topic was conducted to clearly establish how moral sense emerges and develops. An Ovid search was conducted to retrieve relevant items for this systematic review. The databases that were electronically visited are Cross-reference, Google Scholar and PubMed. Strict inclusion and exclusion criteria were imposed on the retrieved items to retain only relevant resources. Twenty-six studies were found valid for inclusion in this systematic review. The results of these studies were presented differently: In order to effectively analyze the selected papers and bring out the results more clearly, a categorization of the approaches adopted in the studies was carried out. The approaches identified were: “Natural Moral Sense,” “Social Relationships and Moral Development,” and “Environmental Factors and Moral Development.” The evidence that emerged from the analysis of the papers was collected to produce a general basic model that explains moral development while also serving as a link between the various studies. First, moral sense is found to be innate in humans; individuals can naturally respond morally to various dilemmas. As seen among children and young infants, moral sense naturally exists. Second, it can be socially nurtured through social interactions and exposure to various environmental factors. Various research studies were reviewed in this systematic review to obtain a consensus on how moral sense emerges and develops. From the systematic review, the moral sense is found to be innate. However, moral development is fostered by social interactions and environmental factors. (shrink)

In this article I discuss some aspects of prima facie statements and compare them with some deductive properties of moral rules. The conclusion I draw is in the sense of a re-evaluation of some aspects of moral intuitionism, which seems essential to the concepts of moral imagination and moral education.

La pedagogia utilizza sempre più spesso il termine formazione. Ciò richiede però un atteggiamento critico capace di riconoscere le diverse valenze del termine, i diversi contesti d'uso, il ricco e problematico spessore teoretico. Occorre che la riflessione pedagogica coniughi il pensare alla formazione con un pensare la formazione capace di accogliere le suggestioni e i contributi provenienti da diversi autori e discipline. In questa prospettiva si colloca l'approfondimento della realtà della coscienza svolto da Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984), filosofo e teologo canadese, (...) gesuita. Egli ha elaborato, nel corso degli anni, un pensiero molto articolato sulla vita coscienziale, in cui appare chiaro il legame con la dimensione della formazione. La coscienza è intrinsecamente segnata da un processo formativo, così come la formazione non si realizza pienamente se non attraverso una appropriazione operata dal soggetto del proprio dinamismo coscienziale. Inoltre l'approfondimento del pensiero coscienziale svela in Lonergan la presenza di elementi che concorrono a costituire una vera e propria 'filosofia' della formazione. La formazione risulta essere, nella sua peculiarità, nella sua essenza, una risignificazione costitutiva del soggetto. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je discute quatre contributions récentes sur Leo Strauss écrites par des chercheurs italiens : celles de M. Farnesi Camellone (1), de M. Menon (2), d’A. Ghibellini et la mienne (3). Il s’agit ici de clarifier les raisons pour lesquelles, dans plusieurs études italiennes des deux dernières décennies, Strauss a été étudié davantage comme philosophe que comme penseur politique au sens strict. La principale réside à mon avis dans la relation que Strauss lui-même a établie entre le « (...) problème de la possibilité de la philosophie », relatif à la séparation de l’épistémé d’avec la doxa, et la nécessité de « l’écriture réticente ». L’écriture réticente est un outil méthodologique permettant de contrôler le conflit généré par la question philosophique de la justice, un conflit aux conséquences potentiellement exorbitantes pour la philosophie en tant que mode de vie. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs what the famous sentence "what is rational is actual /and what is actual is rational" specifically means within the Hegel's Philosophy of Right. The two traditional and antithetical interpretations of these words share one main point: both transpose them on the level of the Philosophy of History. Haym does this from a conservative perspective. He regards the Hegelian saying as an immediate justification for existence. Gans and, more recently, Ilting do this from a liberal perspective. They find (...) the idea of the progressive realization of rationality in history in the Hegelian saying. The latter interpretation seems to be attested in some alternative formulations provided by Hegel in his lectures (where "real" and "actual" are linked by "wird" or "muß sein", not by "ist"). Hegel's words, however, do not directly refer to the Philosophy of History. They concern in the first place the structure of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). This is confirmed by the recurring reference to the category of “idea”. Ethical life is the process through which ethical substance – i.e. the ensemble of the substantial determinations that structure everyone’s life – is realized through the self-conscious action of individuals. This action is the objectifying of the spirit and is always a finite action. Through this very manifold contingency, the "brightly coloured covering" of men's being busy, the substance emerges as the "universal way of their acting". This process turns into a whole series of specific differences that structure several spheres of action and existence, whose compresence must be governed. As it is always open to error and not logically deducible, this process turns the identity of rational and actual, in the Philosophy of Right, into an ethical-political problem. (shrink)

The paper deals with the received view, shared by many social scientists, of expected utility theory as a descriptive and prescriptive vision both of right action and of right procedure of thought. It states that in the classical formulation of the theory there are scarce hints for such a monistic interpretation, which does not pay justice to the pluralistic reality of the reason for action.

The debate over the place of religion in secular, democratic societies dominates philosophical and intellectual discourse. These arguments often polarize around simplistic reductions, making efforts at reconciliation impossible. Yet more rational stances do exist, positions that broker a peace between relativism and religion in people's public, private, and ethical lives. _Christianity, Truth, and Weakening Faith_ advances just such a dialogue, featuring the collaboration of two major philosophers known for their progressive approach to this issue. Seeking unity over difference, Gianni Vattimo (...) and René Girard turn to Max Weber, Eric Auerbach, and Marcel Gauchet, among others, in their exploration of truth and liberty, relativism and faith, and the tensions of a world filled with new forms of religiously inspired violence. Vattimo and Girard ultimately conclude that secularism and the involvement of religion in governance are, in essence, produced by Christianity. In other words, Christianity is "the religion of the exit from religion," and democracy, civil rights, the free market, and individual freedoms are all facilitated by Christian culture. Through an exchange that is both intimate and enlightening, Vattimo and Girard share their unparalleled insight into the relationships among religion, modernity, and the role of Christianity, especially as it exists in our multicultural world. (shrink)

In On a Discovery, Kant depicts monads as simple beings that are thought in the idea as the ground of appearances. He argues that his account of monads is partially in line with both Leibniz's monadology and his own critical philosophy. However, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant appears to depart from the monadologies of his predecessors. In this article, I make sense of Kant's late subscription to a version of Leibniz's monadology by arguing that Kant considers monads to (...) be the objects represented through cosmological and psychological ideas posited by reason in its search for the unconditioned conditions of appearances. In particular, I point to what I take to be two instances of what Kant calls “objects in the idea” in the Critique of Pure Reason, namely (a) the substratum of matter qua ground of external appearances, and (b) the soul qua ground of internal appearances. Drawing on Kant's reply to Eberhard and the Transcendental Dialectic of the first Critique, I highlight the merely regulative—and yet fundamental—role that monads conceived as objects of reason play in Kant's critical philosophy. (shrink)

After recalling the Lockean doctrine of tacit consent and Hume’s criticisms to contractualistic theories, I propose a method for the selection of rulers.

In this paper, the author criticises some basic assumptions of Ferrara's book, which deal with: a) the concept of the so-called 'fact of pluralism'; b) the idea of linguistical turn; c) some of Ferrara's episodical but significant remarks on strategic rationality; d) the role of experts in sciences.

: In this paper I offer some criticisms of Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism. In Dancy’s version moral particularism states that there are neither general nor universal moral principles, that moral action is not the application of principles to particular cases, that moral reasoning has no motivational force because it deduces what must be done by moral principles, and that the agent who acts morally is not a person who has moral principles. However, Dancy’s proposal fails to explain the regularity of (...) moral behavior and the function of stability that moral agents and moral psychology play within social cooperation, nor is it able to explain the possibility of moral progress. Keywords: Jonathan Dancy; Moral Progress; Moral Psychology; Principles; Cooperation La mente morale particolarista Riassunto: In questo articolo espongo alcune critiche al particolarismo morale di Jonathan Dancy. Nella versione di Dancy il particolarismo morale afferma che non ci sono né principi morali generali né universali, che l’azione morale non è l’applicazione di principi a casi particolari, che il ragionamento morale non ha forza motivazionale perché deduce ciò che deve essere fatto dai principi morali, e che l’agente che agisce moralmente non è una persona che ha principi morali. Tuttavia, la proposta di Dancy non riesce a spiegare la regolarità del comportamento morale e la funzione di stabilità che gli agenti morali e la psicologia morale svolgono all’interno della cooperazione sociale, né è in grado di spiegare la possibilità del progresso morale. Parole chiave: Jonathan Dancy; Progresso morale; Psicologia morale; Principi; Cooperazione. (shrink)

The paper explores various conceptual formats that are designed to help us organize our thoughts concerning what we do, expecially personal identity, intertemporal preferences, and maximization. I discuss some suggestions from Parfit on personal identity and from Hare on interpersonal preference.

In this article I explore some consequences of the relations between technique, capitalism and radical liberation ideologies. My thesis is that the latter are going to rise to the extent that wage labor will become a scarce commodity. Through total automation, however, what may occur will not be the end of the reign of scarcity, but a new oppressive order.

The paper is devoted to a discussion of Rorty’s Truth and Progress. Some Rorty’s core ideas are discussed: ethnocentrism, pragmatism, liberalism, cultural differences, darwinism, feminism. The conclusion is that his idea of moral judgment as expression of our ethnocentrism does not allow a rational defence of liberal societies.

In this paper I offer some observations on the liberalism of Ackerman andI interpret it as a mixed method of solution of the problems of rivalness of goods by means of a set of dialogical norms.

The article is a critical note of A. Lambertino's work, Valore e piacere. It focuses particularly on the chapters dedicated to Kant, Nietzsche, Freud and on the last chapter, which clearly expresses the author's point of view. The conclusion is that the ethical position presented by Lambertino corresponds to a moderate ethical intellectualism.

Expressionism, holism, and deflationism are central concepts in Blackburn quasi-realistic metaethics. The paper deals with these in order to evaluate the general tenability of Blackburn’s version of non-cognitivism.