Sedlakova and Trachsel (2023) identify a major benefit of conversational artificial intelligence (CAI) in psychotherapy as its ability to expand access to mental healthcare for vulnerable populatio...

Skinner has assigned the persistence of cognitive explanations to the literature of freedom and dignity. This view is challenged especially as it applies to behavioral scientists. It is argued that cognitive explanations persist because current behaviorism does not challenge cognitive epistomology; because behavior analysts have failed to provide research evidence at the level of human behavior, and finally because a science of behavior based solely on operant principles is necessarily incomplete. The implications of these problems for behavior analysis are addressed.

In Transcendence and Sensoriness , scholars of theology, philosophy, art, music, and architecture, discuss questions of transcendence, the human senses, and the arts through case studies considered in a broad theological framework of religious aesthetics of the arts.

From the moment when we first open our homes—and our hearts—to a new pet, we know that one day we will have to watch this beloved animal age and die. The pain of that eventual separation is the cruel corollary to the love we share with them, and most of us deal with it by simply ignoring its inevitability. With _The Last Walk_, Jessica Pierce makes a forceful case that our pets, and the love we bear them, deserve better. (...) Drawing on the moving story of the last year of the life of her own treasured dog, Ody, she presents an in-depth exploration of the practical, medical, and moral issues that trouble pet owners confronted with the decline and death of their companion animals. Pierce combines heart-wrenching personal stories, interviews, and scientific research to consider a wide range of questions about animal aging, end-of-life care, and death. She tackles such vexing questions as whether animals are aware of death, whether they're feeling pain, and if and when euthanasia is appropriate. Given what we know and can learn, how should we best honor the lives of our pets, both while they live and after they have left us? The product of a lifetime of loving pets, studying philosophy, and collaborating with scientists at the forefront of the study of animal behavior and cognition, _The Last Walk_ asks—and answers—the toughest questions pet owners face. The result is informative, moving, and consoling in equal parts; no pet lover should miss it. (shrink)

Stressing the importance of understanding the grounds and the consequences of ethical or normative decision making, this collection of classic essays compiled by Pierce and VanDeVeer, examines disputes surrounding animals, ecosystems, the land, and their own proper place in the ongoing network of lives on this planet. A central question is "how can we live lives that are both personally satisfying but which are also ecologically sound and responsible?".

An attempt is made to give a coherent account of the logical essence of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. The central point is that quantum theory is fundamentally pragmatic, but nonetheless complete. The principal difficulty in understanding quantum theory lies in the fact that its completeness is incompatible with external existence of the space—time continuum of classical physics.

This book argues that human rights are not anathema to MacIntyre’s vision of practices, virtue, and tradition, but rather are necessary to stop that vision being appropriated in problematic ways and to help it take those outside one’s own community seriously. This work brings MacIntyre into extended conversation with historians such as Brian Tierney and Charles Reid as well as with postcolonial thinkers and theologians such as Edward Said and Willie James Jenning, demonstrating that each has something to say to (...) MacIntyre about the limits of virtue’s vision. MacIntyre’s readings of historical theologians, including Ockham and Vitoria, are brought into question, with each being shown to demonstrate how rights can act to complete, rather than undermine MacIntyre’s program. What emerges is a MacIntyrean understanding of rights in which they act as historically discerned constraints against the excesses of institutional power. (shrink)

There are three main metaphysical positions on race. Anti-realists do not believe there are any races. Natural kind approaches find sub-groups of homo sapiens that have scientific importance and label those groups races, generally taking them to be biological categories. This book argues that anti-realism is false, and the groups natural kind theorists point to, if real, are not the groups we care about in ordinary discussions of race. This book defends, instead, a social kind view, which considers races to (...) exist because of contingent social practices. I argue for a social kind view that recognizes that biological features we use to classify people racially do not make races natural kinds. Racial groups could theoretically exist independently of any social constructions, since they are just groups of people, but social constructions single out certain groups of people as races, give them social importance, and allow us to name them as races. This book also identifies several kinds of context-sensitivity in our racial classification and sees that context-sensitivity as central to how racial categorization works. In terms of our moral response to these metaphysical realities, we need racial categories to identify problems in how our racial constructions are formed, including addressing harmful effects, rather than seeking to eliminate the categories in any direct way, but we should also make efforts to change the conditions that generate those problematic elements, with a goal of retaining only the unproblematic aspects. (shrink)

Scientists have long counseled against interpreting animal behavior in terms of human emotions, warning that such anthropomorphizing limits our ability to understand animals as they really are. Yet what are we to make of a female gorilla in a German zoo who spent days mourning the death of her baby? Or a wild female elephant who cared for a younger one after she was injured by a rambunctious teenage male? Or a rat who refused to push a lever for food (...) when he saw that doing so caused another rat to be shocked? Aren’t these clear signs that animals have recognizable emotions and moral intelligence? With _Wild Justice_ Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce unequivocally answer yes. Marrying years of behavioral and cognitive research with compelling and moving anecdotes, Bekoff and Pierce reveal that animals exhibit a broad repertoire of moral behaviors, including fairness, empathy, trust, and reciprocity. Underlying these behaviors is a complex and nuanced range of emotions, backed by a high degree of intelligence and surprising behavioral flexibility. Animals, in short, are incredibly adept social beings, relying on rules of conduct to navigate intricate social networks that are essential to their survival. Ultimately, Bekoff and Pierce draw the astonishing conclusion that there is no moral gap between humans and other species: morality is an evolved trait that we unquestionably share with other social mammals. Sure to be controversial, _Wild Justice_ offers not just cutting-edge science, but a provocative call to rethink our relationship with—and our responsibilities toward—our fellow animals. (shrink)

Neste Ano Internacional da Biodiversidade, reflito sobre as responsabilidades crescentes das entidades religiosas no contexto atual da Crise Ambiental. Faço uma retrospectiva sobre a origem evolutiva das religiões no contexto da evolução cultural do homem. Em seguida, menciono algumas dimensões ecológicas do pensamento religioso, significativas para os problemas ambientais. Paradigmas religiosos se originam de forma semelhante aos das ciências. As doutrinas sociais das igrejas, especialmente a igreja católica, estabelecem compromissos com os excluídos e promovem o desenvolvimento integral da pessoa humana, (...) buscando justiça social e econômica. Isto tem implicações para o equilíbrio ecológico e para o futuro da humanidade. Sugiro que as igrejas atuem mais intensamente, de forma integrada com a ciência, na intermediação política em prol da solução dos problemas ambientais. A moral religiosa ajudaria a reverter os ganhos econômicos advindos da utilização sustentável da biodiversidade genética para as culturas locais. Também antevejo um papel maior na conscientização das comunidades sobre os benefícios de uma vida equilibrada com a natureza e de uma exploração racional dos recursos naturais. A preservação da biodiversidade constitui uma questão moral de cuja conscientização e regulamentação legal urgentíssima dependemos para a sobrevivência dos ecossistemas naturais e da própria espécie humana. Palavras-chave: Evolução Cultural; Religião; Crise da Biodiversidade; Política Ambiental; Papel da Igreja.In this International Year for the Conservation of Biodiversity, I reflect on the increasing responsibilities of religious entities towards solving the present Environmental Crisis. I provide a retrospect on the debate over the origin of religions in the context of the cultural evolution of man. I then mention some ecological dimensions of religious thinking, which are particularly significant for approaching environmental problems. Religious paradigms originate in ways that are similar to those in science. The social doctrines of churches establish compromises for excluded groups and promote the unabridged development of the human individual, which includes social and economic justice. This has implications for the ecological balance of nature and for the future of humanity. I suggest that the Church should act more intensely, integrated with science, in the political intermediation that searches for solutions for our environmental problems. Religious morality could help to restore the economical benefits resulting from the sustainable use of genetic biodiversity to local cultures. I also foresee a larger role of the church in promoting human perceptions regarding the benefits involved in obtaining a more sustainable relationship with nature and in promoting a more rational exploitation of natural resources. The conservation of biodiversity represents a moral matter demanding urgent legislation for the survival of natural ecosystems and, ultimately, of the human species. Key words : Cultural Evolution; Religion; Biodiversity Crisis; Environmental Crisis; Role of Church. (shrink)

Although tranquility is a fundamental aspect of human life, the experiential nature of tranquility remains elusive. Traditionally, many philosophical, religious, spiritual, or mystical traditions in East and West have strived to reach tranquil experiences and produced texts serving as manuals to reach them. Yet, no attempt has been made to compare experiences of tranquility and explore what they may have in common. The purpose of this theoretical study is to explore the experiential nature of tranquility. First, we present examples of (...) what we consider some of the most central experiences of tranquility in Eastern and Western traditions. For the sake of simplicity, we sort these examples into four categories based on their experiential focus: the body, emotions, the mind, and mysticism. Second, we offer an exploratory account of tranquility, arguing that the different examples of tranquility seem to share certain experiential features. More specifically, we propose that the shared features pertain both to the content or quality of the tranquil experiences, which involves a sense of presence and inner peace, and to the structure of these experiences, which seems to involve some degree of detachment and absorption. (shrink)

Mental health courts, premised on the notion of therapeutic justice, have become an increasingly appealing way of dealing with what is widely, although not uniformly, seen as the inappropriate incarceration of people who engage in criminal behavior caused by mental illness. Nevertheless, mental health courts are not without their critics and a number of objections have been raised against the implementation of these courts. Among these criticisms is that mental health courts may inappropriately privilege criminal behavior by the provision of (...) expedited comprehensive services to persons with mental illness who commit criminal of enses and, in doing so, reduce or delay the provision of services to persons with mental illness who do not engage in criminal behavior. This article explores the mechanisms that may result in “queue-jumping” and analyzes whether a priority to of enders, when it does occur, is justii able. (shrink)

In 2011, when Judith Butler delivered the lecture series that would become Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, the speech act theorist joined other critical scholars attempting to work through the dark cloud of neoliberal fatigue settling over the humanities. “Identitarian ontologies” had become only more entrenched in the age of terror, any potential alternatives seeming destined for “discursive appropriation” by the insidious vocabulary of late biopolitical capitalism. Fatigued, but not yet resigned, Notes sets out “to rethink the speech (...) act”, not to discover something else to say or some other way to say it but instead to take seriously what Butler described more than a... (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Ecological feminism (or ecofeminism) and feminist bioethics seem to have much in common. They share certain methodological and epistemological concerns, offer similar challenges to traditional philosophy, and take up a number of the same practical issues. The two disciplines have thus far had little or no direct interaction; this is one attempt to begin some conversation and perhaps stimulate some cross-pollination of ideas. The email dialogue engaged an active ecofeminist scholar, Karen Warren, and an active feminist bioethicist, Hilde Nelson, in (...) an exchange of ideas. Jessica Pierce, whose research cuts between environmental philosophy and bioethics, served as moderator. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 27.1 (2003) 151-163 [Access article in PDF] Defining "Poetry" Robert B. Pierce SINCE TERMS ARE THE TOOLS of literary study, it is important to keep these tools in good condition, above all by having clear and functional meanings for them. Notoriously, many critical arguments about texts are in fact differences about terminology, and many confused arguments are built on vague or arbitrarily used terms. Few (...) have been the subject of more critical worrying and infighting than "poetry," 1 and few are more disparately defined. Definitions that are fuzzy or tendentious confuse many a discussion of poetry, and in particular they often narrow our response to the rich variety of the texts in front of us by silently imposing a view of what poetry ought to be. I would like to suggest that a Wittgensteinian approach to meaning can cut through a lot of the difficulty that surrounds the term. The refined understanding of the term "poetry" will result in a certain demystification, but it will dissipate only a false mystery based on confusion, not the real mystery of depth and richness that poetry can offer.What does it mean to approach this issue as a Wittgensteinian? The main principle is that the meaning of a term is its use, the way people deploy it in their speaking and writing, the work that it does. 2 A word does not have an essential core of meaning of which the various social uses are approximations; rather those social uses are the meaning. Thus meaning is a social phenomenon, and the way to determine it is to [End Page 151] look outward at how people use a term, not inward for some presumed mental essence that the term designates. Meaning is conventionally divided into reference and sense. What the term "poetry" refers to is a group of publicly visible things in the social world that we call poems, but there is no distillation in the mind that is the essence of poetry, the sense of the term. Of course we have a sense of the term that controls its range of reference. That sense is made up of our bases for calling one thing poetry and not another: the qualities that incline us to see a text as a poem. Wittgenstein would call these defining qualities criteria. The crucial fact is that they are determined by social processes and so are available to public inspection, not hidden away to be discovered only by introspection.Another observation about what it is to assign meaning to a term is important here. If someone asserts that "poetry" means X, he or she can appropriately be asserting that in fact the offered definition describes how people use the term, or else he or she can be suggesting how the term should or will be used in a specific discourse, that is, offering a definition proposal or stipulative definition. In the latter case the proposer needs to show the utility of the change from ordinary speech for his or her purposes. That is of course what literary critics do when they specify meanings for a term like "tragedy" or "irony" that are different from common usage. It is not that Wayne Booth's way of talking about irony uses the real meaning (both his and the ordinary senses are perfectly real since both are socially used), but that his is more useful for literary criticism than the general usage because it is more precise and nuanced. 3Thus it would make sense to begin defining "poetry" by looking at how people use the term and in particular how it is used in literary discourse. However, though I will pay some attention to what critics actually say and write, I would like primarily to offer certain proposals for refining our use of the term so as to avoid confusion and vagueness. It is not that this investigation will be approaching the real meaning of "poetry," which I have suggested is an imaginary goal, but that it will propose a use of the term constituting a vehicle for talking and writing about poetry that... (shrink)

Freedom of speech, religion, choice, will—humans have fought, and continue to fight, for all of these. But what is human freedom really? Taking a broad approach across metaphysics, politics, and ethics, Lars Svendsen explores this question in his engaging book, while also looking at the threats freedom faces today. Though our behaviors, thoughts, and actions are restricted by social and legal rules, deadlines, and burdens, Svendsen argues that the fundamental requirement for living a human life is the ability to be (...) free. _A Philosophy of Freedom_ questions how we can successfully create meaningful lives when we are estranged from the very concept of freedom. Svendsen tackles such issues as the nature of free agency and the possibility of freedom in a universe governed by natural laws. He concludes that the true definition of personal freedom is first and foremost the liberty to devote yourself to what really matters to you—to realize the true value of the life you are living. Drawing on the fascinating debates around the possibility of freedom and its limits within society, this comprehensive investigation provides an accessible and insightful overview that will appeal to academics and general readers alike. (shrink)

The recent proposal by Douglas and Savulescu for an ethics of knowledge provokes a renewed consideration of an enduring issue. Yet, the concept raises significant challenges for procedural and substantive justice. Indeed, the operationalisation of ‘an ethics of knowledge’ could be as alarming as what it seeks to prevent. While we can acknowledge that there is, and surely always will be, potential for misuse of beneficial science and technology, a contemplated conception of what we ought to not know, devise or (...) disseminate sets before us an enormously complex task. This essay challenges an ethics of knowledge to respond to concerns of procedural and substantive justice. While the concept has a certain appeal, it does not appear to adequately address certain fundamental issues as it is currently presented. Here, the author invites consideration of two primary points: (1) who should decide, based on whose interests? and (2) could such an exercise actually be effective in achieving its goal? (shrink)

The concept of rational agency commonly presupposes the freedom of the agent to act autonomously, for reasons of the agent’s own choosing. If we are rational agents, the normative nature of reason and the presupposition of autonomy appear to preclude a deterministic account of rational agency, in which actions would be reducible to events within a causally closed physical system. This paper will challenge the notion of rational agency as involving self-determination in the sense of freedom of action. My thesis (...) will be that a concept of rational agency that presupposes freedom of action is incoherent. For ‘rational agency’, I will substitute ‘rational reagency,’ i.e. behaviour that is a reasoned response to an existing state of affairs, and as such does not require freedom of action. Reasons will be reduced to actual or hypothetical causal factors and normativity will be retained in the form of conditional statements with implicit objectives. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Heterarchical Reflexive Conversational Teaching and Learning as a Vehicle for Ethical Engineering Curriculum Design” by Philip Baron. Upshot: The target article advocates the use of conversational heterarchical curriculum design as part of the process of decolonisation in South African universities. A stated objective is to reduce the amount of abstraction in the syllabus. I discuss whether the reduction of abstraction is an appropriate aim of decolonisation, considering some of the potential consequences and questioning whether (...) a less abstract teaching style would be advisable in practical terms and compatible with students’ values. (shrink)

In this thesis, I defend John Rawls’s assertion that political liberalism does not use the concept of truth. I respond to objections from Joshua Cohen and David Estlund. I argue that Cohen fails to show that public reason needs a minimalist conception of truth, since individuals with a range of conceptions of moral truth can meet the requirements of public reason. I dispute Estlund’s argument that the liberal principle of legitimacy is merely insular. Estlund assumes that the claim that the (...) liberal principle of legitimacy is reasonable is no different than the claim that the principle is acceptable to reasonable persons. I argue that this assumption is incorrect, and that therefore the liberal principle of legitimacy is justifiable on the grounds that it is reasonable. I argue that political liberals need not worry that doing without the concept of truth will undermine the semantic coherence or objectivity of political liberalism. (shrink)

This book shows how environmental decline relates to human health and to health care practices in the U.S. and other industrialized countries. It outlines the environmental trends that will strongly affect health, and challenges us to see the connections between ways of practicing medicine and the very environmental problems that damage ecosystems and make people sick. In addition to philosophical analysis of the converging values of bioethics and envrionmental ethics, the book offers case studies as well as a number of (...) practical suggestions for moving health care toward sustainability. (shrink)