ABSTRACTThis article describes our experience using art and theatre to engage rural communities in western Cambodia to understand malaria and support malaria control and elimination. The project was a pilot science–arts initiative to supplement existing engagement activities conducted by local authorities. In 2016, the project was conducted in 20 villages, involved 300 community members and was attended by more than 8000 people. Key health messages were to use insecticide-treated bed-nets and repellents, febrile people should attend village malaria workers, and to (...) raise awareness about the risk of forest-acquired malaria. Building on the experience and lessons learnt in the year prior, the 2017 project which was conducted in 15 villages involved 600 community members and attracted more than 12,000 people. In addition to the malaria theme, upon discussion with local health authorities, secondary theme was added to the 2017 project. We learnt the following lessons from our experience in... (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Ahead of Print. We connect learning algorithms and algorithms automating proof search in propositional proof systems: for every sufficiently strong, well-behaved propositional proof system [math], we prove that the following statements are equivalent, (1) Provable learning. [math] proves efficiently that p-size circuits are learnable by subexponential-size circuits over the uniform distribution with membership queries. (2) Provable automatability. [math] proves efficiently that [math] is automatable by non-uniform circuits on propositional formulas expressing p-size circuit lower bounds. Here, [math] (...) is sufficiently strong and well-behaved if I.–III. hold: I. [math] p-simulates Jeřábek’s system [math] (which strengthens the Extended Frege system [math] by a surjective weak pigeonhole principle); II. [math] satisfies some basic properties of standard proof systems which p-simulate [math]; III. [math] proves efficiently for some Boolean function [math] that [math] is hard on average for circuits of subexponential size. For example, if III. holds for [math], then Items 1 and 2 are equivalent for [math]. We use the following modified notion of automatability in Item 2, the automating circuits output a [math]-proof of a given formula (expressing a p-size circuit lower bound for a function [math]) in non-uniform p-time in the length of a shortest [math]-proof of a closely related but different formula (expressing an average-case subexponential-size circuit lower bound for the same function [math]). If there is a function [math] which is hard on average for circuits of size [math], for each sufficiently big [math], then there is an explicit propositional proof system [math] satisfying properties I.-III., i.e. the equivalence of Items 1 and 2 holds for [math]. (shrink)

The notion of “conception” plays a central role in Thomas Reid’s theory of perceptual knowledge, although “conception” might be studied for itself as a source of knowledge. In this study, we attempt to expose systematically the several contexts where Reid deals with the source of knowledge and the kind of mental operation called “conception”. The purpose is to understand a specific aspect of the deliverances of “conception” in Reid’s theory of perception, namely, a direct relationship, not mediated by ideas, between (...) knowing subject and external world. To understand the operation of conceiving, which is intrinsic to and constitutive of perception, is an efficient way to comprehend the nature and content of perceptual knowledge. At this step, reflections on the relationship between mind and external world, that is, mind and material world, have to be made. (shrink)

Cet article fournit la toute première édition critique de la deuxième des quatre Questiones ordinarie qui ont été débattues par le maître carme Gérard de Bologne : est-ce que l’ habitus de foi se trouve dans l’intellect spéculatif, l’intellect pratique ou la partie affective de l’âme? Notre édition est précédée d’une étude qui analyse la doctrine de Gérard en la situant dans son contexte historique grâce à l’identification de ses interlocuteurs. En affirmant que la théologie détient un double statut épistémologique, (...) spéculatif et pratique, Gérard soutient une position qui n’est pas sans rappeler celle que Godefroid de Fontaines avait défendue avant lui. (shrink)

Em distinções voltadas ao sacramento do batismo e à análise de casos de batismos válidos, João Duns Scotus ofereceu explanações filosóficas importantes sobre a vontade e a liberdade ou, mais especificamente, sobre a estrutura e a voluntariedade de ações mistas. Neste estudo, mostra-se a originalidade da descrição, por Scotus, de ações compostas de voluntariedade e de involuntariedade, em comparação com o relato aristotélico e de outros intérpretes medievais. Indica-se, ademais, aspectos controversos da recepção dos textos scotistas por missionários franciscanos, no (...) século 16. (shrink)

We connect learning algorithms and algorithms automating proof search in propositional proof systems: for every sufficiently strong, well-behaved propositional proof system [Formula: see text], we prove that the following statements are equivalent, (1) Provable learning. [Formula: see text] proves efficiently that p-size circuits are learnable by subexponential-size circuits over the uniform distribution with membership queries. (2) Provable automatability. [Formula: see text] proves efficiently that [Formula: see text] is automatable by non-uniform circuits on propositional formulas expressing p-size circuit lower bounds. Here, (...) [Formula: see text] is sufficiently strong and well-behaved if I.–III. hold: I. [Formula: see text] p-simulates Jeřábek’s system [Formula: see text] (which strengthens the Extended Frege system [Formula: see text] by a surjective weak pigeonhole principle); II. [Formula: see text] satisfies some basic properties of standard proof systems which p-simulate [Formula: see text]; III. [Formula: see text] proves efficiently for some Boolean function [Formula: see text] that [Formula: see text] is hard on average for circuits of subexponential size. For example, if III. holds for [Formula: see text], then Items 1 and 2 are equivalent for [Formula: see text]. We use the following modified notion of automatability in Item 2, the automating circuits output a [Formula: see text]-proof of a given formula (expressing a p-size circuit lower bound for a function [Formula: see text]) in non-uniform p-time in the length of a shortest [Formula: see text]-proof of a closely related but different formula (expressing an average-case subexponential-size circuit lower bound for the same function [Formula: see text]). If there is a function [Formula: see text] which is hard on average for circuits of size [Formula: see text], for each sufficiently big [Formula: see text], then there is an explicit propositional proof system [Formula: see text] satisfying properties I.-III., i.e. the equivalence of Items 1 and 2 holds for [Formula: see text]. (shrink)

Le présent ouvrage offre un aperçu des connaissances actuelles dans le domaine de la parentalité et des problèmes de santé mentale.

It is puzzling to notice that in his 1784 essay on Enlightenment, Kant addresses every human being with his watchword « Have the courage to use your own understanding! », while at the same time he seems to restrict the access to the public discussion of matters of common interest to the learned persons. This begs the question: Is the participation in the public debate part and parcel of Kant’s conception of Aufklärung? A positive answer to this question is given (...) by Katerina Deligiorgi in her Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment. A critical assessment of this book will lead us however to consider that Kant has a differentiated approach to enlightenment depending on whether someone is educated or uneducated. Following Rousseau, Kant has come to recognize as a matter of fact this inequality toward the products of culture. Now the two-level conception of enlightenment entailed by this inequality becomes explicit in the 1790s, especially in the very last work Kant has published: The Conflict of the Faculties. (shrink)

Fournissant une nouvelle edition ainsi que la premiere traduction francaise integrale du celebre decret parisien de 1277, cet ouvrage comprend egalement un commentaire qui entend montrer que, par-dela l'opposition entre orthodoxie et heterodoxie, la condamnation de l'eveque Tempier implique des enjeux epistemologique et ethique d'une grande importance pour l'histoire de la pensee en Occident. Providing a new edition and the first complete French translation of the famous 1277 Parisian decree, this book also includes a commentary which intends to show that, (...) beyond the opposition between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, the condamnation promulgated by the bishop Tempier involves epistemological and ethical issues of great importance for the history of Western thought. (shrink)

The Peruvian Franciscan thinker Jerónimo Valera published in 1610 his Commentarii ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac Subtilissimi Doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti logicam, which was the first philosophical work printed in South America. Both in his Summulae dialecticae and in the Books that comprise his Commentarii he deals with metaphysical questions. In this paper, we illustrate how he inserts important Scotist logical-metaphysical doctrines in his logical work, in this case the account of transcendental concepts given in his Summulae.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pour une histoire de la ‘double vérité’David PichéLuca Bianchi. Pour une histoire de la ‘double vérité’. Conférences Pierre Abélard. Paris: Vrin, 2008. Pp. 192. Paper, €18.00.Since the publication of the work of the Belgian medievalist Fernand Van Steenberghen, a solid consensus seems to have emerged in the community of historians of medieval philosophy: no scholar in the Middle Ages defended the so-called “doctrine of the double truth” that (...) the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, had denounced in the prologue of his 1277 Condemnation. Moreover, how could a professional philosopher or theologian seriously contend that two contradictory statements are simultaneously true, one due to natural reason, and the other through the authority of faith? Therefore, the matter seemed settled and the file definitely closed: the double truth is nothing more than a “legend.” Yet the Italian medievalist Luca Bianchi’s in-depth critical analysis of the pseudo-historical evidence has now changed this. Without wanting to propose an entirely new interpretation of the historical ins and outs of this famous doctrine, Bianchi carries out a re-examination of the subject through a meticulous study of certain key texts that he has read in the light of a three-fold question: What impact did passages from Tempier’s decree on the “double truth” have on the medieval scholars themselves? Does the expression itself, ‘duplex veritas’, appear in some medieval documents? What were medieval thinkers’ attitudes in the face of philosophical arguments leading to conclusions contradicting the teachings of the Catholic faith?Due to space constraints, I will limit my discussion to Bianchi’s most crucial results. The answer to the first question (ch. 1) leads us in a surprising fashion to the famous Disputatio of Luther (1539). In this text, the father of the Reformation opposes the principle according to which what is true in theology must also be true in philosophy—a thesis whose paternity he attributes to Parisian theologians. Wanting to ensure the pre-eminence of faith-based teachings over all forms of human rationalization, Luther came to subscribe to a certain form of the double truth, since he claimed that what is absolutely true according to faith can be false and impossible from the perspective of philosophy. This explains his radical opposition to the “Parisian” principle that Bianchi calls “the principle of the oneness of truth.” We learn that some theologians in fifteenth- century Paris, notably Jean Gerson and Guillaume Baudin, were actually inspired by Tempier’s decree to defend some form of this principle.To respond to the second question (ch. 2), Bianchi first researched the electronic database Library of Latin Texts (CLCLT-6), and came up with “disappointing results”: no author uses the expression ‘duplex veritas’ in the relevant sense. Nevertheless, as imposing as it is, this database is not exhaustive, and Bianchi, well aware of this, extended his research by consulting other documents on paper, allowing him ultimately to reach a positive conclusion: the expression ‘duplex veritas’ appears in the course of a debate that took place around [End Page 99] 1470 on the subject of the truth-value of statements about future contingents. This debate involved a master of arts from Louvain, Pierre de Rivo, who considered it essential to distinguish between the truth of philosophers and the “popular” truth upheld by the churchmen, and a Parisian theologian whom we have already encountered, Guillaume Baudin, who invoked the “principle of the oneness of truth” to denounce the “double truth” that his adversary was promoting.From Bianchi’s multifaceted response to the third question (chs. 3–4), I can only present the groundswell. From the statutes promulgated by the Parisian Arts Faculty in 1272 up to the condemnation of Galileo in 1633, including the constitution Apostolici regiminis issued by the Fifth Lateran Council (1513), a significant evolution may be observed in the requirements academic and religious authorities imposed on professors of philosophy (as well as on scientists) in the western Christian world. Indeed, we may observe that these requirements correspond, first, to the obligation to counter, as far as possible, arguments that contradict faith, and then transform into the duty to commit to a strong... (shrink)

Neste estudo, dá-se continuidade à exposição do scotismo do mestre franciscano chileno Alfonso Briceño, pondo a ênfase em um de seus cinco Apêndices Metafísicos, que constam em suas Controversiae. No terceiro Apêndice, após expor a relação entre “ente” e “unidade”, Briceño explicita o conceito metafísico de “distinção”, em si e nas suas diferenciações. Uma das mais importantes tipologias da “distinção” é a “distinção de razão”. Acima de tudo, Briceño esforça-se em esclarecer certos tipos de distinção de razão e distanciá-los da (...) distinção formal, que deve ser entendida como um tipo de distinção real. (shrink)

In order to systematically explore the normative treatment of black slavery by Second Scholastic thinkers, who usually place the problem within the broad discussion of moral conscience and, more narrowly, the nature and justice of trade and contracts, I propose two stations of research that may be helpful for future studies, especially concerning the study of Scholastic ideas in colonial Latin America. Beginning with the analysis of just titles for slavery and slavery trade proposed by Luis de Molina S.J., I (...) show how his accounts were critically reviewed by Diego de Avendaño S.J., revealing basic features of Second Scholasticism’s normative thinking in Europe and the Americas. The normative knowledge provided by these two Scholastic intellectuals would be profoundly tested during the last decades of the 17th century, especially by authors who sharpened the systemic analysis and a rigorist moral assessment of every title of slavery and slaveholding, as well as the requirements of an ethics of restitution. (shrink)

le jugement critique en appel Claude Piché. naturelle : ce concept se révèle être une notion intellectuelle au sens propre, conformément à la célèbre distinction établie par Kant entre « intelligible» et «intellectuel» '. Il s'agit à partir de là de ...

In the commentary on the Isagoge ascribed to John Pagus, one of the major figures in the mid-thirteenth century Parisian Faculty of Arts, we encounter a statement according to which uniuersale per continentiam et ambitum is the sort of universal that is relevant in the context of the Porphyrian question about the ontological status of genera and species. The aim of this article is to decode this enigmatic phrase. We proceed in two steps, first examining some thirteenth-century texts in which (...) this phrase is found, and second providing a careful analysis and original interpretation of decisive passages in Pagus’ commentary. By means of this hermeneutical analysis, we develop a more precise understanding of the nature and significance of the realist teaching about universals, which was promoted by the vast majority of mid-thirteenth-century Latin thinkers. (shrink)

On est porté à sous-estimer le rôle authentiquement productif de la raison dans la Dialectique transcendantale de la Critique de la raison pure. Cet article propose une illustration de ce rôle à l'occasion des Paralogismes de la raison pure, qui ne sont rendus possibles que sur la base d'une fiction négative opérée à partir du sens interne. Cette illustration s'inscrit dans la perspective plus large d'une interprétation de la Dialectique transcendantale en vertu d'une théorie du schématisme, laissée au second plan (...) par Kant en raison de la prépondérance des motivations critiques.We tend to underestimate the authentically productive role of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason. This paper suggests an illustration of this role as it can be traced in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, which themselves became possible on the basis of a negative fiction exerted toward the inner sense. This illustration is part of a larger perspective aiming at an interpretation of the Transcendental Dialectic on the ground of a theory of schematism, which is somehow overshadowed by Kant's critical intentions. (shrink)

Claude Piché | : Il est symptomatique que Fichte ait destiné la première version écrite de sa Doctrine de la science « à ses auditeurs », c’est-à-dire aux étudiants de l’Université d’Iéna où il venait d’entrer en fonction. En effet, Fichte a toujours cru que la lettre de l’exposé proprement scientifique de sa philosophie devait être accompagnée d’une explicitation orale, privilégiant ainsi un contact direct avec l’auditoire en vue d’éviter les malentendus. Tout au long de sa carrière, il s’est en (...) vérité résolument méfié de l’« écrit » et c’est la radicalité de cette attitude qui explique en partie le différend qui s’est fait jour entre lui et Schiller à propos de l’article sur l’« esprit et la lettre en philosophie ». Ces deux termes prennent sous la plume de Fichte une signification inattendue qui témoigne de manière privilégiée de la façon dont il envisage la philosophie transcendantale et son mode de transmission. | : It is striking to notice that Fichte intended the first written version of his Doctrine of Science “for his listeners,” namely for the students of the University of Jena where he had just taken up his post. Fichte in fact always believed that the ‘letter’ of the scientific exposition of his philosophy should be accompanied by an oral explanation, so as to establish a direct contact with his audience in order to avoid misunderstandings. Throughout his career, he was suspicious of the “written” word ; this radical attitude explains at least in part the disagreement that took place between him and Schiller concerning the article “on the spirit and the letter in philosophy.” Under Fichte’s pen, these two terms take on an unexpected meaning that illustrates, in a priviledged way, how he envisages transcendental philosophy and its mode of transmission. (shrink)

The paper presents some basic tenets of the works by the Franciscan Friar Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668), as well as of his metaphysical thought. After offering the basic structure and purpose of his monumental Controversiae, we focus on a more specific way of seeing his philosophical and theological approach, namely Controversy 5 on the infinity of God. This will allow us to see the structure of his argumentation in philosophy and theology: after putting the formulation of controversial points between the Scotist (...) and the Thomist school, he analyzes arguments against the Thomist position both in the Medieval and Baroque traditions, trying then to defend Duns Scotus’s account by a careful and articulated interpretation of his texts. (shrink)

Schelling fait remarquer que la théorie kantienne du mal radical repose fondamentalement sur un acte de liberté, ce qui n’est pas le cas chez Fichte. Dans cet article, nous voulons examiner le bien-fondé de la thèse de Schelling selon laquelle les conceptions kantienne et fichtéenne du mal moral présentent d’importantes divergences. Pour I’essentiel, en effet, la position de Fichte s’éloigne de celle de Kanten ce qu’elle réhabilite une certaine forme d’humanisme en réduisant le mal à l’inertie de l’être raisonnable fini (...) et à l’ignorance dans laquelle il a tendance à se maintenir. Contrairement à Kant donc, jamais Fichte ne pourra admettre que la pleine conscience de la loi morale laisse encore. ouverte la possibilité de choisir délibérément le mal.Shelling contends that Kant’s theory of radical evil, unlike Fichte’s, is fundamentally based on liberty. In this article, we wish to examine the relevance of Schelling’s thesis according to which the Kantian and Fichtean conceptions of moral evil bear important differences. Essentially, in deed, Fichte’s position differs from that of Kant in that it restores a certain form of humanism by reducing evil to the inertia of a finite rational being and to the ignorance in which it tends to persist. Thus, unlike Kant, Fichte could never admit that full consciousness of the moral law allows the possibility to choose evil deliberately. (shrink)

Claude Piché | : Lorsqu’on dit de la morale kantienne qu’elle est « rigoriste », on entend habituellement par cette épithète une morale sévère et austère, voire puritaine. Dans ces conditions, on ne s’étonne nullement de trouver au fondement de celle-ci la thèse du mal radical, attribué au genre humain en entier. J’aimerais toutefois montrer que Kant a une conception bien spécifique du rigorisme, dont il accepte volontiers de se réclamer et qui, loin de toute connotation puritaine, ne concerne au (...) fond que la précision conceptuelle du discours philosophique. Or c’est grâce à cette rigueur intellectuelle que l’on peut comprendre ce que Kant entend par mal radical. Nous allons voir qu’il s’agit en vérité d’un mal qui n’a rien du caractère diabolique auquel l’adjectif « radical » nous porte spontanément à le rattacher. | : Kant’s conception of morality is often characterized as “rigorist,” a term which is usually associated with the adjectives “severe” and “austere,” even “puritan.” So it comes as no surprise to find, at the basis of this austere theory of morality, the thesis of radical evil, attributed to humankind as a whole. I would like to show, however, that Kant has a very specific conception of “rigorism.” In fact, the term has nothing to do with puritanism ; rather, it refers to the conceptual precision of philosophical discourse. Accordingly, Kant does not hesitate to accept it as a requirement for his own moral theory. Indeed, it is thanks to this intellectual rigour that Kant arrives at his conception of radical evil. It will be shown that this evil does not have the diabolical connotation that the adjective “radical” would suggest at first glance. (shrink)

Neste estudo, dá-se continuidade à exposição do scotismo do mestre franciscano chileno Alfonso Briceño (1587-1668), pondo a ênfase em um de seus cinco Apêndices Metafísicos, que constam em suas Controversiae (Madri, 1639-1642). No terceiro Apêndice Metafísico, após expor o conceito metafísico de “distinção”, após apresentar a sua doutrina da “distinção de razão” e após uma digressão sobre a “distinção precisiva”, Briceño dá início à sua apresentação da “distinção real”, da qual a “distinção formal” será um tipo especial e particularmente controverso. (...) Passo intermediário para a compreensão da distinção formal é uma breve exposição dos tipos de distinção real e uma discussão articulada sobre um tipo especial de “distinção modal” na escola scotista. O significado e a importância dessa distinção na metafísica scotista de Alfonso Briceño são o enfoque deste estudo. (shrink)

A noção de “concepção” ocupa um lugar central na teoria do conhecimento perceptual de Thomas Reid, embora “concepção” possa ser estudada por si como uma fonte de conhecimento. Neste estudo, procura-se expor sistematicamente os vários contextos em que Reid aborda a fonte de conhecimento e o tipo de operação mental chamada “concepção”. Oo objetivo é compreender um aspecto específico do desempenho da “concepção” na teoria reidiana da percepção, a saber, uma relação direta, não mediada por ideias, entre o sujeito cognoscente (...) e o mundo exterior. Eentender a operação de conceber, intrínseca à e constituinte da percepção, é um meio eficaz de compreender a natureza e o conteúdo do conhecimento perceptual. Nesse passo, considerações sobre a relação mente e mundo exterior, isto é, mente e mundo material precisam ser feitas. (shrink)

In this essay, I introduce the reader to some major themes of the metaphysical thought of Juan de Fuica, a Chilean Franciscan Friar, who, in his activities as professor of philosophy, explained and developed, with many traces of originality, the philosophy of John Duns Scotus. In his cursus on metaphysics, Fuica presents the object of metaphysics, that is, the objective concept of the real being in common. Above all, he shows that being can receive a relative essential definition, in which (...) one can find the aspect of “non-repugnance” or “non-contradictoriness”, which is effectively common to the real being and the being of reason. Fuica, thus, makes an original contribution to the understanding of the scope of metaphysics and its connection to mental objects and the human mind broadly speaking. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to set out some features of Kant’s conception of transcendental philosophy. I would like to argue that this philosophy, although it is situated at a higher level of discourse than common knowledge, does not essentially transcend the limits that it sets to this knowledge. In order to achieve this, I stress the fact that Kant regards experience as a mere “possibility.” Now, the Critique of Pure Reason explains that the human understanding cannot conceive of (...) an absolute possibility, but only a relative one, namely a possibility that is tied to conditions. And possible experience as a whole is no exception here. Hence the expression “conditions of the possibility of experience” which designates the topic of the Transcendental Analytic. This also means that experience is “contingent”. It is not in itself necessary; rather, it is dependent upon certain conditions. But then we learn that the most important transcendental conditions for this experience, i.e., the dynamic principles, are themselves “contingent”. Consequently, these transcendental conditions are not unconditioned; they in turn depend on empirical conditions, over which they have no control. (shrink)

Gli A. esaminano le risposte che l'anonimo magister artium fornisce alle domande iniziali poste da Porfirio nell'Isagoge, relativamente, in special modo, alla questione degli universali. Ne risulta uno studio dottrinale che fa luce sui punti seguenti: l'anonimo pone un universale in rebus, sottoscrivendo la coeva posizione realista; l'universale reale non è affatto confinato in uno spazio-tempo determinato; all'interno del Compendium è posto in luce il concetto di virtus, a cui si lega una peculiarità nel pensare l'universale in re, cioè da (...) una parte viene pensato come ontologicamente immanente, dall'altra come separato per il rapporto con le molteplici realtà corporee; la dottrina dell'universale sembra portare un'impronta avicenniana , in quanto per il magister l'universale può essere considerato per naturam o per essentiam; altra distinzione cruciale è quella instaurata fra esse essentiae e esse actuale o esse existentiae. Sulla base del ms. Barcelona, ACA, Ripoll 109 gli A. presentano l'edizione dei punti relativi agli universali , accompagnati da note esplicative sui luoghi isagogici e sulle fonti del testo. Gli A. forniscono i dettagli relativi alla loro edizione alle pp. 293-6. (shrink)

ABSTRACT : The scientific character of theology was hotly debated among theologians of the 13th and 14th century. In what follows I expound the singular views of Hervaeus Natalis, a thinker who lived in the first quarter of the 14th century. According to him, the solution to this problem lies in the notion of abstraction. I offer a historical and philosophical analysis of his position based on the first French translation of a significative portion of one of his Quodlibets. I (...) made the translation from my own edition of its Latin text. (shrink)

La narration de l’histoire du problème des universaux souffre d’une importante lacune : on ne sait rien du traitement que ce problème a reçu de la part de ceux qui faisaient profession de philosopher à l’Université de Paris entre 1230 et 1260. C’est à ce deficit de savoir que le présent ouvrage s’attaque. Il se déploie en trois dimensions. En premier lieu, nous offrons une édition critique et une traduction française sectorielles d’un commentaire latin sur l’Isogoge de Porphyre ayant pour (...) auteur un dénommé Robertus Anglicus qui, comme nous le montrons, fut magister artium à Paris aux alentours de 1250. En deuxième lieu, nous sondons l’architectonique de ce texte et des écrits parallèles que rédigèrent des philosophes contemporains, nommément Jean le Page, Nicolas de Paris et Robert Kilwardby. Finalement, par l’entremise d’une étude comparative qui met à profit des œuvres inédites de ces artiens, nous explicitons, interprétons et évaluons les schèmes de lecture, les séquences argumentatives et les composantes doctrinales qui forment la “moelle” philosophique du commentaire isagogique de Robertus Anglicus. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that aesthetics had its place in Fichte’s early system of the WL, and that due to contingent circumstances he did not have the chance to expound it. But we can reconstruct the main lines of what his aesthetics would have looked like if we pay attention to the article sent to Schiller in 1795 on the “spirit” and the “letter” in philosophy, completing it with the courses he gave in the preceding months (...) on that topic and with other sources. We discover not only that aesthetics is an important part of the philosophical system but that art stands close the act of philosophising itself. In fact, both the philosopher and the artist draw from the same original source: “spirit” as defined in Kant’s third Critique. For the philosopher as well as for the artist the central faculty is then “imagination”, an imagination that relies on “feeling”. In the end Fichte sketches an aesthetics based on the creative genius of the artist, leaving little room for the faculty of judgment and for taste, that is: the receptive attitude toward beauty, that play a prominent role in Kant’s aesthetics. (shrink)