Cílem knižní studie je postihnout pravidla platící v agonálním prostoru, do něhož literární znalci svými promluvami a texty jako subjekty vstupují a v jehož rámci jsou vzájemně poměřováni, posuzováni a hodnoceni. Autor přitom vychází z předpokladu, že myšlení o literatuře spoluformuje nadosobní pamět' určitého kolektiva a současně je také prostorem pro individuální tvořivost znalců. Literární historiky, teoretiky, kritiky či učitele interpretuje jako aktivní účastníky řečových her, kteří musí své názory a koncepty formulovat a prosazovat v kooperaci a konkurenci s ostatními, (...) což je také nutí volit jisté role a strategie. A protože si je vědom také toho, že pravidla hry jsou v čase proměnná, zachycuje rovněž posuny v myšlení o literatuře od pozitivistického důrazu na fakta přes víru, že klíčem k poznání je volba správné metody, tedy obecně aplikovatelného postupu, až po současnou konceptuální literární vědu, která hodnotově preferuje jednorázové demonstrace novosti, kreativity a neopakovatelné jedinečnosti. Vychází v edici Literární řada. (shrink)

1. The aim of the present article is not to compare Hume’s and Husserl’s philosophy or to trace Hume’s influence on Husserl’s phenomenology in detail. Such tasks would clearly exceed the limits of...

Chapter One: Constructions. Entities, constructions, and functions When one travels from Los Angeles to New York, going, say, by way of St. Louis, Chicago, ...

The article analyses the reception of Hume’s moral philosophy in the lectures and manuscripts of Edmund Husserl and in the published lectures of Franz Brentano, on which Husserl originally based his views. I first present the reasons that led Brentano to appreciate Hume’s sentimentalist background in moral philosophy and to criticize Hume’s relativism. I then show how Husserl, following the critique of psychologism in his Logical Investigations, builds on this starting point and attempts to show a possible contradictory nature of (...) Hume’s moral relativism. Finally, I consider whether Hume’s doctrine contains phenomenological insights that Husserl overlooks. (shrink)

Následující text vydal v roce 1930 Oskar Kraus pod názvem Zur Phänomenognosie des Zeitbewußtseins v časopisu Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, 75, n. 1-2, s. 1-22. Obsahuje výňatky z korespondence Franze Brentana a pražského profesora Karlo-Ferdinandovy univerzity Antona Martyho z roku 1895 a část Martyho přednášky o Brentanově teorii časového vědomí z téhož roku. Tématem textu je zdůvodnění přechodu od modelu časového vědomí, který pracuje s časovou modifikací předmětů představování, k modelu, který pracuje s časovou modifikací intencionálního vztahu k předmětu. (...) Ve verzi, která je zde zachycena, jde o přechod ke kontinuální modifikaci aktů souzení, které předmět „kladou“. Čtenáře, který by se zajímal o popis a hlubší zdůvodnění vývoje a povahy Brentanových teorií časového vědomí, bych odkázal na následující texty: Chisholm, R. (1981): „Brentano’s Analysis of the Consciousness of Time“. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1), 3-16, a Chrudzimski, A. (2005): Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein und Intersubjektivität, Studien zur Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden, Ontos, Frankfurt. V češtině pak na Janoušek, H. (2017): „Brentanova teorie času a časového vědomí“. Pro-Fil, 18, no. 1, (v tisku), dostupné online na stránkách časopisu Pro-Fil. (shrink)

The name the “Prague school of Brentano” refers to three generations of thinkers who temporarily or permanently lived in Prague, bound together by teacher/student relationships, and who accepted the main views of Franz Brentano’s philosophy. This chapter discusses central aspects of the philosophical work done in the School.

Článek analyzuje původní verzi Husserlovy kritiky Brentanova pojetí časového vědomí, která je obsažena v Husserlových Přednáškách k fenomenologii vnitřního časového vědomí, a Husserlovu snahu vyřešit Brentanův argument nekonečně nekonečného regresu v rukopisném textu O primární modifikaci paměti. Z Husserlovy kritiky si všímá jen dvou bodů. Za prvé kritiky Brentanova prezentismu, tj. názoru, že časové vědomí je založeno v bodu přítomnosti, v němž jsou psychické fenomény, které názor času konstituují, dány současně. Za druhé Husserlovy výtky, že Brentano nepoužívá pro výklad vědomí (...) času schéma počitkový obsah – pojetí počitkového obsahu. Za tímto účelem rekonstruuje text Brentanovu teorii v podobě, v které ji znal Husserl, a vykládá jak Brentanovy důvody pro odmítnutí časové povahy vnitřního vnímání, tak nedořešené problémy Brentanova hlediska. Následně se pokouší dokázat, že Husserl Brentanův prezentismus podcenil a že věcné problémy, které s jeho odmítnutím souvisely, musel řešit zavedením absolutně „kvazi-prezentního“ vědomí a odmítnutím schématu obsah – pojetí pro výklad konstituce imanentních časových jednot. Oba zvolené body Husserlovy kritiky Brentana se tak v pozdějších vrstvách přednášek ukazují jako částečně neoprávněné.The article discusses the original version of Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s concept of time consciousness, which forms a part of Husserl’s Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Next, it gives an overview of Husserl’s attempt to solve Brentano’s argument from the infinitely infinite regress against the consciousness of internal time. Two points of Husserl’s critique of Brentano are analyzed. The first point concerns Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s presentism. Brentano holds that consciousness of time is contained in the time point of the present now, in which psychical phenomena constituting our time consciousness are given simultaneously. The second point concerns the lack of content – apprehension scheme in Brentano’s explanation of the time consciousness. The article reconstructs Brentano’s position in the form known to Husserl and explains Brentano’s reasons for refusing the internal consciousness of time as well as problems connected with this refusal. An analysis of Husserl’s text proves that Husserl underestimated Brentano’s presentism and that he was forced to introduce a concept of the absolute time consciousness to solve the problems connected with his refusal of Brentano’s position. Since Husserl had to eventually give up the content – apprehension scheme in his explanation of immanent time unities, his original critique of Brentano is shown to be partly unjustified. (shrink)

The study aims to show that the Kantian distinction of synthetic and analytical resolution of the courts is originally epistemic and not purely logical. Proof of this proposition is done so that in the first step are distinguished two types of synthetic and analytical predicate relation to the subject - logical-semantic and epistemic. Furthermore, the examples demonstrated that Kant was familiar cases in courts, which are found only logico-semantic synthetic or analytic connection of concepts in trials. Consequently, Kant care for (...) them and are therefore not in terms classifiable Critique of Pure Reason, Kant even offers a way to understand its logic and Prolegomena. Based on various Kant notes offered by Article resolution three types of synthetic courts and courts of two kinds of analysis. The final part of the article is devoted to a brief outline of the relationship of epistemic and epistemic-synthetic-analytic courts, because the courts are due to which Kant its resolution synthetic and analytical courts instituted . Shown is both preferred synthesis of ideas before analysis, first, how Kant based his teachings on unum, verum, bonum featured specific tasks analysis concepts. article is supplemented by a short reflection on Kant's definition of the principle of the dispute and by showing a significant difference between Kant and Bolzano definition of analytic courts, whose oversight can lead to misunderstanding the context in which resolution synthetic and analytical courts in Kant belongs. (shrink)

The name the “Prague school of Brentano” refers to three generations of thinkers who temporarily or permanently lived in Prague, bound together by teacher/student relationships, and who accepted the main views of Franz Brentano’s philosophy. This chapter discusses central aspects of the philosophical work done in the School.

Despite relative neglect in the literature, Kant’s published and unpublished writings in theoretical philosophy reveal a sustained and at times ambivalent effort to come to terms with the problem of miracles. Because they entail a form of supernatural causation that undermines the law-governedness of the order of nature, miracles pose a significant problem for Kant’s metaphysics. I explore in detail Kant’s account of miracles in conjunction with the relevant aspects of his metaphysics of nature in order to establish in what (...) sense miracles are possible, and how they fit into Kant’s architectonic more generally. (shrink)

The goal of the present article is to describe the Brentanian background of several topics concerning judgments and assertions in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Why did Husserl abandon Brentano’s theory of two judgmental forces? Is the “is true/false” to be understood as an expression of judgmental force or as a logical predication? Is a “common expression” of the objective validity of judgment equivalent with our expression of our belief in that validity? Does the linguistic sign of the logical force manifest this (...) force or not? In order to provide a better understanding of Husserl’s approach, the paper also discusses his earlier views on these issues in recently published manuscripts from the early 1890s and in his Logic Lectures from the year 1896. (shrink)

We give an exponential lower bound on the number of proof-lines in intuitionistic propositional logic, IL, axiomatised in the usual Frege-style fashion; i.e., we give an example of IL-tautologies A1,A2,… s.t. every IL-proof of Ai must have a number of proof-lines exponential in terms of the size of Ai. We show that the results do not apply to the system of classical logic and we obtain an exponential speed-up between classical and intuitionistic logic.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Politické myšlení Davida Huma. Základní otázky, východiska a inspirace pro americké otce zakladatele by Adéla RádkováHynek JanoušekAdéla Rádková. Politické myšlení Davida Huma. Základní otázky, východiska a inspirace pro americké otce zakladatele [The Political Thought of David Hume. Basic Questions, Premises, and Inspiration for America’s Founding Fathers]. Prague: Togga, 2019. Pp. 201. Paperback. ISBN 978-80-7476-169-0, $10.00.The work of David Hume has never been a major focus of interest in (...) the Czech lands. Recently, however, a certain shift has been taking place. Hume’s Treatise has been translated into Czech for the first time, a new translation of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion has been published to replace the archaic nineteenth-century translation, and the archaic translation of the second Enquiry will soon be replaced by a new one as well. Texts are also being published that attempt to show the wider scope of Hume’s work. The book reviewed here is one of them. Adéla Rádková’s text is the first Czech book to introduce Hume as a political thinker to the Czech public. The book itself consists of two relatively separate parts, which seem to be different in content and intent. While the first part, along with the preface, summarizes Hume’s life and work and includes a brief introduction to the basic ideas of Hume’s moral and political philosophy, the second part contributes to the interpretation of the influence of Hume’s political philosophy on the American Founding Fathers, especially on James Madison.In the introduction, the book first presents a history of overall interpretations of Hume’s work, beginning with Thomas Edward Ritchie and Dugald Stewart, who, in agreement with their teacher Reid, saw Hume as a radical skeptic. A significant change comes with Norman Kemp Smith’s well-known interpretation, according to which the theory of moral sentiment forms the basis of Hume’s project, which Hume adapted to his conception of belief. Once we stress that the investigation of emotion- and passion-based human nature is to be based on the experiential method of observation, we arrive, according to Rádková, at the common element of the otherwise very different naturalistic interpretations of David Hume’s philosophy to which she herself subscribes.Two more recent interpretations of Hume’s philosophy are also mentioned, namely Paul Russell’s interpretation of Hume’s work in terms of his critique of religion, and James Harris’s view that the attempt to see Hume as a systematic philosopher who, in his works, pursues the project of the science of man announced in the Treatise, is a misunderstanding of the role of a man of letters in the eighteenth century.Rádková finds Russell’s interpretation interesting but hard to reconcile with some of Hume’s political essays and with his History of England, in which Hume advocates [End Page 181] a pragmatic politics that is so bound up with religious considerations that it is hard to defend the view that Hume was trying to push religion out of the public sphere.Harris’s point about Hume not being a systematic thinker and about Hume’s abandonment of the Treatise in his advertisement needs to be set in the context of Hume’s life. Hume published this advertisement only a year before his death, and he used it to discourage readers from reading the Treatise because he though the book was stylistically clumsy and unsatisfactory in certain respects. He does not mention abandoning his philosophical project. Harris’s assertion (viii) that Hume was a free intellectual who did not want to be intellectually constrained in the wide range of his research flies in the face of Hume’s willingness to be constrained at least twice—if only he had been given the professorship he sought first in Edinburgh (1745) and then in Glasgow (1751). Rádková also holds that Hume, in his later writings, does not abandon his intention to give an account of human nature with regard to the general principles of morals, politics, and criticism, which he announced in the Preface to... (shrink)

Aristotle's notion of experience plays an important role in his epistemology as the link between perception and memory on the one side, and higher cognitive capacities on the other side. However, Aristotle does not say much about it, and what he does say seems inconsistent. Notably, some passages suggest that it is a non-rational capacity, others that it is a rational capacity and that it provides the principles of science. This paper presents a unitary account of experience. It explains how (...) experience grows from perception and memory into a rational capacity, and in what way it provides the principles. (shrink)

The text first briefly summarizes the contents of Annik Waldow's book and then attempts to highlight the diverse meanings of the concept of bodily experience in eighteenth-century philosophy, especially in the philosophy of David Hume. After a brief distinction between subjective and objective bodily experience in Descartes, I point to six different meanings of this concept in David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. One of these notions, the body as a center of reference, turns out to be important for interpreting (...) the meaning of Hume's notion of the general point of view and of moral judgment of character. In connection with this, I conclude by providing two somewhat different readings of Hume's example of judging Marc Brutus's character from T 3. 3. 1. 16, which works with finding the optimal point of view that implies the bodily form of our experience. (shrink)

Brentanova teorie času a časového vědomí patří mezi základní témata celé Brentanovy filosofie. Nabízí celou řadu spjatých témat, které určují dvě hlavní otázky. Jak bychom měli ontologicky popsat čas jako takový? A jak vlastně vnímáme čas? Na tyto otázky poskytl Brentano různé odpovědi v celé řadě různých pozic, které vypracovával od počátku své filosofické práce během své Würzburgské profesury až do posledních okamžiků před smrtí. Cílem této studie je představit souhru těchto problémů v Brentanově analýze času a ukázat, že je (...) bohatým zdrojem filosofických hádanek, jejichž řešení je stále otevřenou otázkou. (shrink)

Of two false theories, One can be, Intuitively, Closer to the truth than the other. The purpose of the article is to propose a rigorous explication of this intuitive notion.

Tato studie mapuje vývoj Brentanova pojetí pravdy a ontologie, která se s jednotlivými pokusy po definici pravdy pojí. Nejprve je představena Brentanova raná koncepce pravdy jako shody soudu a předmětu soudu. Jsou ukázány problémy, na které Brentano ve svém korespondenčním pojetí pravdy narazil. Tyto problémy se týkají zejména zvláštních typů entit, které mají ručit za pravdivost soudů, jež vypovídají o neexistujících předmětech, privacích etc. Tváří tvář těmto problémům Brentano svoji původní koncepci zavrhl a nahradil epistemickým pojetím pravdy jako evidence a (...) reduktivním pojetím nereálných předmětů, které jsou pouhým zdáním, jež v nás vzbuzuje nedostatečná analýza sémantické formy soudů. Studie předkládá v základních obrysech Brentanovo pojetí významu soudů o ireálných entitách podává a podrobuje ho kritice.The article describes the development of Brentano's conception of truth as well as the ontology which is closely connected to different attempts of Brentano's definition of truth. First of all comes Brentano's early view of truth as a correspondence between judgment and object into consideration. This conception brought Brentano face to face with peculiar kinds of entities which are to vouch for truth of judgments concerning non-existent objects, privations etc. Brentano was eventually forced to leave his original definition behind and substitute it with a new definition of truth as evidence. He also embraced a reductive stand towards supposedly unreal entities which are to be interpreted as fictions caused by insufficient analysis of semantic structures of judgments. The study ends with a presentation and critique of brentanian analysis of semantics of judgments concerning unreal objects. (shrink)

Smyslem článku je představit a kriticky k sobě vztáhnout Brentanovu a Husserlovu teorii abstrakce, jak je obsažena v jeho Logických zkoumáních, a z ní vycházející konceptualistické a realistické teorie obecnosti. Nejprve vycházím z rozboru Brentanova konceptualismu, a to zejména vzhledem k některým historickým inspiracím jeho teorie, jako dva možné zdroje jsem vybral Aristotelský konceptualismus a novověkou konceptualistickou pozici školy z Port-Royal. Následně se věnuji Husserlově kritice nominalismu a z ní plynoucí teorie názoru obecných entit. Zasazuji tuto nauku do všeobecnější nauky (...) o formách intencionality vědomí obecnosti v Logických zkoumáních a ukazuji, že tato nauka je nedořešená a ponechává mnoho k projasnění. Následně se vracím k Brentanovi a ukazuji, opět v souvislosti s port-royalskou teorií Antoina Arnaulda, že Brentanův konceptualismus taktéž končí ve slepé uličce. The goal of the article is to describe and critically asses Brentano's and Husserl's theories of abstraction and their ensuing theories of generality. At the beginning I describe Brentano's Conceptualism with regard to some of its historical sources, especially with regard to Aristotelism and the school of Port-Royal. I then approach Husserl's critique of Nominalism from his Logical Investigations and his theory if general intuition. I try to put the theory of general intuition into the wider context of Husserl's theory of generality in Logical Investigations in order to show a fundamental problem and a certain unclarity of this position. I then go back to Brentano to show, yet again in relation to Antoin Arnaulds theory, that Brentano's conceptualism is not tenable. (shrink)

Kritická stať se nejprve vztahuje k Beranovu pokusu srovnat Husserlovu fenomenologii a východisko Wittgensteina období Filosofických zkoumání, přičemž se snaží shrnout pozici tzv. statické fenomenologie a na jejím základě vznést otázky k tezi, že rozeznávání a identifikace předmětů je možno založit pouze z hlediska intersubjektivně sdíleného jazyka.

The paper deals with the semantics of mathematical notation. In arithmetic, for example, the syntactic shape of a formula represents a particular way of specifying, arriving at, or constructing an arithmetical object (that is, a number, a function, or a truth value). A general definition of this sense of "construction" is proposed and compared with related notions, in particular with Frege's concept of "function" and Carnap's concept of "intensional isomorphism." It is argued that constructions constitute the proper subject matter of (...) both logic and mathematics, and that a coherent semantic account of mathematical formulas cannot be given without assuming that they serve as names of constructions. (shrink)

It is well known that the manner in which a definitely descriptive term contributes to the meaning of a sentence depends on the place the term occupies in the sentence. A distinction is accordingly drawn between ordinary contexts and contexts variously termed non-referential, intensional, oblique, or opaque. The aim of the present article is to offer a general account of the phenomenon, based on transparent intensional logic. It turns out that on this approach there is no need to say (as (...) Frege does) that descriptive terms are referentially ambiguous or to deny (as Russell does) that descriptive terms represent self-contained units of meaning. There is also no need to tolerate (as Montague does) exceptions to the Principle of Functionality. The notion of an ordinary (i.e., non-intensional) context is explicated exclusively in terms of logical structure and it is argued that two aspects of ordinariness (termed hospitality and exposure) must be distinguished. (shrink)

This collection of essays engages with several topics in Aristotle's philosophy of mind, some well-known and hotly debated, some new and yet to be explored. The contributors analyze Aristotle's arguments and present their cases in ways that invite contemporary philosophers of mind to consider the potentials--and pitfalls--of an Aristotelian philosophy of mind. The volume brings together an international group of renowned Aristotelian scholars as well as rising stars to cover five main themes: method in the philosophy of mind, sense perception, (...) mental representation, intellect, and the metaphysics of mind. The papers collected in this volume, with their choice of topics and quality of exposition, show why Aristotle is a philosopher of mind to be studied and reckoned with in contemporary discussions. Encounters with Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind will be of interest to scholars and advanced students of ancient philosophy and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

Modal logic S5 is commonly viewed as an epistemic logic that captures the most basic properties of knowledge. Kripke proved a completeness theorem for the first-order modal logic S5 with respect to a possible worlds semantics. A multiagent version of the propositional S5 as well as a version of the propositional S5 that describes properties of distributed knowledge in multiagent systems has also been previously studied. This article proposes a version of S5-like epistemic logic of distributed knowledge with quantifiers ranging (...) over the set of agents, and proves its soundness and completeness with respect to a Kripke semantics. (shrink)

Traxler, Pickering, and Clifton found that ambiguous sentences are read faster than their unambiguous counterparts. This so-called ambiguity advantage has presented a major challenge to classical theories of human sentence comprehension because its most prominent explanation, in the form of the unrestricted race model, assumes that parsing is non-deterministic. Recently, Swets, Desmet, Clifton, and Ferreira have challenged the URM. They argue that readers strategically underspecify the representation of ambiguous sentences to save time, unless disambiguation is required by task demands. When (...) disambiguation is required, however, readers assign sentences full structure—and Swets et al. provide experimental evidence to this end. On the basis of their findings, they argue against the URM and in favor of a model of task-dependent sentence comprehension. We show through simulations that the Swets et al. data do not constitute evidence for task-dependent parsing because they can be explained by the URM. However, we provide decisive evidence from a German self-paced reading study consistent with Swets et al.'s general claim about task-dependent parsing. Specifically, we show that under certain conditions, ambiguous sentences can be read more slowly than their unambiguous counterparts, suggesting that the parser may create several parses, when required. Finally, we present the first quantitative model of task-driven disambiguation that subsumes the URM, and we show that it can explain both Swets et al.'s results and our findings. (shrink)