The Nuremberg Trial is of paramount importance, first of all, in historic and legal terms, as it laid the foundations for an international justice system that had no precedent in history, but also in linguistic terms, as it marks the very beginning of simultaneous interpretation and the modern profession of interpreting. By analysing the testimonies of those exceptional interpreters who were ensuring the communication in four languages before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, we will highlight the linguistic and technical (...) challenges they were facing as well as the deeply personal struggles they had to overcome, in particular on a psychological and ethical level, while taking part in a worldwide historic event. The aim of this article is to deepen the current state of research on simultaneous interpretation, but above all to pay tribute to these remarkable interpreters and translators who made history with their pioneering work and their legendary accomplishments in Nuremberg.RésuméLe procès de Nuremberg revêt une importance capitale non seulement sur le plan historique et juridique, car il permet de jeter les bases d’une justice internationale sans précédent dans l’histoire, mais aussi sur le plan linguistique, car il marque l’avènement de l’interprétation simultanée et de la profession moderne d’interprète. L’analyse des témoignages de grands interprètes assurant la communication en quatre langues devant le Tribunal Militaire International à Nuremberg nous permet de mettre en exergue des problèmes linguistiques, les difficultés techniques et les obstacles liés à la nature humaine, tant psychologiques qu’éthiques auxquels étaient confrontés les interprètes et les traducteurs assistant à cet événement à l’échelle mondiale. Le présent article vise à approfondir l’état actuel des recherches sur l’interprétation simultanée, mais surtout à rendre hommage aux interprètes et traducteurs pionniers dont le travail remarquable à Nuremberg a marqué l’histoire du métier. (shrink)

This article deals with the notion of jurisdictional discourse, which, as a specific type of complex discourse, always poses a real challenge to translators. The authors present a contrastive analysis of the texts of legal decisions in French, German and Polish in order to demonstrate the difficulties in translation and the consequences which they entail, and to suggest a strategy for overcoming them. Firstly, the authors briefly compare the texts of judicial decisions indicating their characteristics both in terms of the (...) macrostructure of the text and in terms of syntactic and lexical units. Secondly, they explain the origin of the difficulties in translation resulting from the qualitative differences of the legal systems. Thirdly, the different types of difficulties are described and illustrated by practical examples, in order to make experienced translators and apprentice translators sensitive to them. The corpus used for the analysis consists of the integral and documented texts of the French, German and Polish judgments rendered in matters of civil law [37]. It should also be noted that the analyzed texts are comparable texts, which are a valuable tool for translators and allow them to acquire means of expression that are as natural as possible [40]. Regarding the methodology, the authors adopt for the analysis the contrastive method, borrowed from the theory of cultural transfer [15]. (shrink)

For many decades, access to human biological samples, such as cells, tissues, organs, blood, and sub-cellular materials such as DNA, for use in biomedical research, has been central in understanding the nature and transmission of diseases across the globe. However, the limitations of current ethical and regulatory frameworks in sub-Saharan Africa to govern the collection, export, storage and reuse of these samples have resulted in inconsistencies in practice and a number of ethical concerns for sample donors, researchers and research ethics (...) committees. This paper examines stakeholders’ perspectives of and responses to the ethical issues arising from these research practices. (shrink)

Plausibly, you should believe what your total evidence supports. But cases of misleading higher-order evidence—evidence about what your evidence supports—present a challenge to this thought. In such cases, taking both first-order and higher-order evidence at face value leads to a seemingly irrational incoherence between one’s first-order and higher-order attitudes: you will believe P, but also believe that your evidence doesn’t support P. To avoid sanctioning tension between epistemic levels, some authors have abandoned the thought that both first-order and higher-order evidence (...) have rational bearing. This sacrifice is both costly and unnecessary. We propose a principle, Evidential Calibration, which requires rational agents to accommodate first-order evidence correctly, while allowing rational uncertainty about what to believe. At the same time, it rules out irrational tensions between epistemic levels. We show that while there are serious problems for some views on which we can rationally believe, “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P”, Evidential Calibration avoids these problems. An important upshot of our discussion is a new way to think about the relationship between epistemic levels: why first-order and higher-order attitudes should generally be aligned, and why it is sometimes—though not always—problematic when they diverge. (shrink)

In defense of moral testimony Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-21 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9887-6 Authors Paulina Sliwa, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.

Moral understanding is a valuable epistemic and moral good. I argue that moral understanding is the ability to know right from wrong. I defend the account against challenges from nonreductionists, such as Alison Hills, who argue that moral understanding is distinct from moral knowledge. Moral understanding, she suggests, is constituted by a set of abilities: to give and follow moral explanations and to draw moral conclusions. I argue that Hills’s account rests on too narrow a conception of moral understanding. Among (...) other things, it cannot account for the importance of first-personal experience for achieving moral understanding. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an increase in the establishment of biobanks for genetic and genomic studies around the globe. One example of this is the Human Heredity and Health in Africa Initiative (H3Africa), which has established biobanks in the sub‐region to facilitate future indigenous genomic studies. The concept of ‘broad consent’ has been proposed as a mechanism to enable potential research participants in biobanks to give permission for their samples to be used in future research studies. However, questions (...) remain about the acceptability of this model of consent. Drawing on findings from empirical research about the role of trust in decision‐making, we argue that an account of entrustment may be an appropriate way of addressing current challenges of seeking consent for biobank research in Africa. We propose a set of key points to consider that can support the proposed entrustment framework. (shrink)

To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory ; it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a cognitive element—in particular, (...) it involves moral knowledge. I argue that the Rightness Condition is both necessary and sufficient for moral worth. I also argue that the Rightness Condition gives us an attractive account of actions performed under imperfect epistemic circumstances: by agents who rely on moral testimony or by those who, like Huckleberry Finn, have false moral convictions. (shrink)

My topic in this paper is the nature of faith. Much of the discussion concerning the nature of faith proceeds by focussing on the relationship between faith and belief. In this paper, I explore a different approach. I suggest that we approach the question of what faith involves by focussing on the relationship between faith and action. When we have faith, we generally manifest it in how we act; we perform acts of faith: we share our secrets, rely on other’s (...) judgment, refrain from going through our partner’s emails, let our children prepare for an important exam without our interference. Religious faith, too is manifested in acts of faith: attending worship, singing the liturgy, fasting, embarking on a pilgrimage. I argue that approaching faith by way of acts of faith, reveals that faith is a complex mental state whose elements go beyond doxastic states towards particular propositions. It also involves conative states and – perhaps more surprisingly – know how. This has consequences for the epistemology of faith: the role of testimony and experts, the importance of practices, and what we should make of Pascal’s advice for how to acquire faith. (shrink)

Two different kinds of multiple-conclusion consequence relations taken from Shoesmith and Smiley and Galatos and Tsinakis or Nowak, called here disjunctive and conjunctive, respectively, defined on a formal language, are considered. They are transferred into a bounded lattice and a complete lattice, respectively. The properties of such abstract consequence relations are presented.

Irrespective of length of stay or voluntariness, (im)migration is the movement of individuals across borders. From national identity to labor markets, (im)migration affects various dimensions and spheres of social life. Currently, 3.6% of the global population are international (im)migrants, underscoring its profound significance in contemporary debates on humanitarianism, ethical governance, socioeconomic realities and sustainability. The analysis of (im)migration as a business is relevant since it raises important questions about precarious conditions and situations including marginalization, exploitation, and vulnerability in which (im)migrants (...) often find themselves, and about the much-needed policy and management and organizational practice responses needed to address them. This Special Issue aims to bring (im)migration to the attention of business and management researchers interested in ethics. The intention behind it is to enhance the current understanding of (im)migration in order to develop comprehensive policies, foster inclusive societal and organizational frameworks, and focus on the ethical issues raised by (im)migration for organizations and management, as well as the complex realities faced by (im)migrants all over the world. Moreover, we aim to call for new research perspectives and streams that would address the novel challenges that (im)migrants encounter as a result of technological advancements, climate (in)justice, the ‘dark side’ of the business of international (im)migration, and new—or the lack thereof—migration policies. (shrink)

What is the relationship between understanding and knowing? This paper offers a defence of reductionism about understanding: the view that instances of understanding reduce to instances of knowing. I argue that knowing is both necessary and sufficient for understanding. I then outline some advantages of reductionism.

Standard semantic theories predict that non-deictic readings for complex demonstratives should be much more widely available than they in fact are. If such readings are the result of a lexical ambiguity, as Kaplan (in: Almog, Perry, Wettstein (eds) Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977) and others suggest, we should expect them to be available wherever a definite description can be used. The same prediction follows from ‘hidden argument’ theories like the ones described by King (Complex Demonstratives: a Quantificational (...) Account, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2001) and Elbourne (Situations and Individuals, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005). Wolter (That’s That; the Semantics and Pragmatics of Demonstrative Noun Phrases. Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Santa Cruz, 2006), however, has shown that complex demonstratives admit non-deictic interpretations only when a precise set of structural constrains are met. In this paper, I argue that Wolter’s results, properly understood, upend the philosophical status quo. They fatally undermine the ambiguity theory and demand a fundamental rethinking of the hidden argument approach. (shrink)

We are frequently confronted with moral situations that are unsettling, confusing, disorienting. We try to come to grips with them. When we do so, we engage in a distinctive type of moral inquiry: hermeneutical inquiry. Its aim is to make sense of our situation. What is it to make sense of one's situation? Hermeneutical inquiry is part of our everyday moral experience. Understanding its nature and its place in moral epistemology is important. Yet, I argue, that existing accounts of moral (...) inquiry do not give us the resources to do so. This paper develops a positive account of hermeneutical inquiry. I argue that when we engage in hermeneutical inquiry, we search for an apt perspective on our situation. (shrink)

W naszym obrazie świata przyzwyczailiśmy się do tego, że roślinność jest niema. Zestawienie pojęć dźwięku i rośliny przywołuje w pamięci szum drzew, odgłos suchych liści, wysokich traw czy łamiących się gałęzi. Wówczas świat flory pobudzony przez wiatr generuje dźwięki. Okazuje się jednak, że te wyobrażenia będą musiały ulec zmianie, ponieważ źródłem dźwięku może być także wnętrze otaczającej nas natury. Ostatnia dekada badań tej materii ujawniła nie tylko odbieranie i wytwarzanie sygnałów akustycznych, ale również reagowanie na muzykę jako właściwości roślin. Obserwacje (...) wskazują także na wzajemne komunikowanie się badanych obiektów. Audialne fenomeny o roślinnym pochodzeniu stanowią punkt wyjścia do rozważań na temat analizy dźwięków w oparciu o teorie semiotyki. Wobec poszerzającego się spektrum możliwości rejestracji i sposobów wykorzystania dźwięku dokonano próby umiejscowienia niestandardowych źródeł dźwięku w przestrzeni audialnej. Namysłowi towarzyszą pytania o funkcje i znaczenie dźwięku, relacje walorów estetycznych, komunikacyjnych i poznawczych oraz płaszczyzny interpretacji. (shrink)

The article gives a tentative interpretation of the history of the Churches in Germany starting 1945 to 1989. Crucial points are the relations oftheGerman Churches to questions of modern pluralism, to questions of peace and war and to questions of the transformation of Churchstructures. Common points are mentioned between the Churches of the older FRG and the former GDR-Churches just so differences between them.

A clear understanding of the concept of health plays a key role in defining what health care should comprise and in developing adequate strategies for overcoming the current "health care crisis". This volume is the result of an international and interdisciplinary cooperation between medicine and philosophy on the current debate on the concept of health.Besides offering a critical analysis of the WHO definition and a review of both ancient and contemporary conceptions of health, the cooperative effort of physicians and philosophers (...) presented in this book works through the challenges which any definition of health faces, if it is to be both truly personalist, and at the same time operational.The overall purpose of this book is to capture the essentials of human health and to propose the outlines for a personalist understanding of this concept, i.e., a conception that does justice to the personal nature of human beings by introducing dimensions that are essential to personal life and well-being, such as the realms of rationality, affectivity and freedom, the realms of meaning, values, morality, and spirituality, the realms of social and interpersonal relations. To grasp the uniqueness of the human person is not yet to grasp the specific nature of personal health. But it is certainly a first step, and it becomes evident that every theory of human health presupposes a theory of the person. Accordingly, the debate presented in this book is no less a debate about the nature of the human person than it is a debate about the nature of health.The investigations offered in this volume intend to provide an impetus for new conceptions of personhood and human health. The phenomenological approach has the advantage of advocating a systematic conception of the total person which combines surface experiences (subjective experiences of well-being) with deeper dimensions of the person (value and being). An adequate conception of the human person has enormous implications not only for our understanding of what constitutes the health and well-being of the person, but also for our conception of what health care should comprise. Hence, answering the philosophical questions, such as those raised in this volume about health, is crucial for the solution of political problems such as how to legislate health care policy. (shrink)

V Ogólnopolska Konferencja Naukowa z cyklu „W kręgu pytań o człowieka: osoba, brak, byt?”.

What is it to take responsibility for a moral failure? This chapter investigates taking responsibility for wrongdoing. It starts by considering a prominent view in the literature: that to take responsibility for a wrong is to blame oneself for it. Contrary to the self-blame account, it is argued that taking responsibility and self-blame can come apart in various ways. Instead, the normative footprint account is defended. It is suggested that wrongdoing changes the normative landscape in systematic ways: it can create (...) duties to apologize, to acknowledge the wrong done, to make amends, to respond to the wronged party’s upset. To take responsibility for a wrong is to own the normative consequences of one’s wrong. (shrink)

Despite its status at the heart of a closely related field, philosophers have so far mostly overlooked a phenomenon sociolinguists call ‘social meaning’. My aim in this paper will be to show that by properly acknowledging the significance of social meanings, we can identify an important new set of forms that discursive injustice takes. I begin by surveying some data from variationist sociolinguistics that reveal how subtle differences in the way a particular content is expressed allow us to perform importantly (...) different illocutionary actions, actions we use to do things like constructing a public persona and building a rapport with an audience. The social importance of these activities and the pervasiveness of our engagement in them means that the ethical stakes involved are high—substantial injustices may result if speakers from different social groups are differently empowered with regard to the illocutionary possibilities made available to them by variation. (shrink)

According to the mainstream position in the bioethical definition of death debate, death is to be equated with the cessation of an organism. Given such a perspective, some bioethicists uphold the position that brain-dead patients are dead, while others claim that they are alive. Regardless of the specific opinion on the status of brain-dead patients, the mere bioethical concept of death, according to many bioethicists, has the merit of being unanimous and univocal, as well as grounded in biology. In the (...) present article, we challenge such a thesis. We provide evidence that theoretical biology operates with a plurality of equally valid organismic concepts, which imply different conclusions regarding the organismal status of a brain-dead patient. Moreover, the theoretical biology concepts of an organism are very distant from the view on an organism that appears by way of bioethicists theorizing on death. We conclude that if death is to be understood as the cessation of an organism, there is no single correct answer to the question of whether a brain-dead patient is alive or dead. (shrink)

The problem of idealization in empirical sciences is very rarely taken up in works concerned with the methodology of those sciences. It seems to be common knowledge that in advanced natural sciences references are made to concepts such as “perfectly rigid body,” “material point,” “perfect gas,” etc., but it remains a fact that the most important methodological concepts, concepts which have determined the present-day form of the philosophy of science, have been advanced without regard to the peculiarities of the procedure (...) mentioned above. And yet a moment's consideration suffices to raise doubts as to Carnap's physicalism and/or Popper's falsificationism if we just realize the trivial and commonly known truth that empirical sciences resort to idealizationism. For how are we to imagine a reduction of idealizational concepts to observation terms? And how are we to imagine that theorems which include idealizational concepts imply observation statements which refute, or at least are at variance with, those theorems? But it is a fact that such doubts have neither been raised by the authors of the conceptions mentioned above, nor have they been raised against them. (shrink)

When you don’t know what to do, you’d better find out. Sometimes the best way to find out is to ask for advice. And when you don’t know what the right thing to do is, it’s sometimes good to rely on moral advice. This straightforward thought spells serious trouble for a popular and widespread approach to moral worth: on this approach, agents deserve moral praise for a right action only if they are acting on right-making reasons. The first part of (...) this paper argues that cases of moral advice present right-making reasons accounts with a dilemma: depending on how we make the right-making relation precise, we either have to deny that agents who seek out and follow moral advice are morally praiseworthy or we have to credit morally wrong actions by unsavory characters with moral worth. This casts doubt on the claim that acting on right-making reasons can be both necessary or sufficient for moral worth. The second half of the paper explores an alternative proposal: what’s required for moral worth is moral knowledge. This idea has been unpopular in recent literature. My aim is to show that it deserves serious consideration. (shrink)

Biomedical sciences cannot answer the question who should be saved from death if not everyone can be. This is an ethical issue. However, we face exactly this question when deliberating on the criteria for organ allocation. The main aim of this article is to formulate a pluralistic theory of just distribution of organs, which incorporates the tenets of utilitarianism, egalitarianism and sufficientarianism. Each constituent theory adopts a different value as a criterion for organ allocation. For utilitarianism it is a health (...) benefit for the patient, for egalitarianism it is the ratio of deserts and health-related well being, for sufficientarianism what is important is that the candidate for a transplant be situated below the sufficientarian threshold. The article presents a proposal to reconcile these three competing theories. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Genomic research and biobanking present several ethical, social and cultural challenges, particularly when conducted in settings with limited scientific research capacity. One of these challenges is determining the model of consent that should support the sharing of human biological samples and data in the context of international collaborative research. In this paper, we report on the views of key research stakeholders in Ghana on what should count as good ethical practice when seeking consent for genomic research and biobanking in (...) Africa. This study was part of a multi-country qualitative case study conducted in three African countries: Ghana, Uganda and Zambia under the auspices of the Human Heredity and Health in Africa initiative (H3Africa). Our study suggests that while participants are willing to give consent for their samples and associated data to be used for future research purposes, they expect to receive feedback about the progress of the research and about the kinds of research being undertaken on their samples and data. These expectations need to be anticipated and discussed during the consent process which should be seen as part of an ongoing communication process throughout the research process. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have offered compelling reasons to think that demonstratives are best represented as variables, sensitive not to the context of utterance, but to a variable assignment. Variablists typically explain familiar intuitions about demonstratives—intuitions that suggest that what is said by way of a demonstrative sentence varies systematically over contexts—by claiming that contexts initialize a particular assignment of values to variables. I argue that we do not need to link context and the assignment parameter in this way, and that we (...) would do better not to. (shrink)

The peculiarity of Marx's investigation method is the use of idealization, i. e. idealizing assumptions are introduced, the laws, being in force under these assumptions, are being established, and then these assumptions are being removed with the simultaneous modification of the law. This method has not been recognized in the contemporary methodology because it assumes the essentialist vision of reality while contemporary methodology developed from the phenomenalism which negates the differentiation between essence and experience.

For contemporary critical philosophers of education, the thought of Paul Tillich, a protestant theologian, does not seem to be a very likely point of reference. Nevertheless, we decided to read some of his works within a philosophical-educational context. Reading those works of Tillich we realized that they required a pedagogical-philosophical acknowledgement. Scarce as the educational analyses of Paul Tillich’s writings are, they concern mostly either religious education or some specific issues connected with teaching. Our proposal was to read him differently: (...) as a critical tool for grasping contemporary educational issues, independent from a religious or didactic approach. In the article, referring to the thoughts of Tillich, we analyze the three most important tensions of the last and present centuries: kairos I and II, referring to the human condition after World Wars I and II, and kairos III, related mainly to the war on terrorism and to the growing climate crisis. The analysis of these special moments in the history of humankind is related to the postulates and pedagogical attitudes articulated by us. We conclude that as a result of the deepening climate crisis and the looming specter of a cataclysm, the transition to a better aion may enable the pedagogy of radical hope. The essence of this pedagogy is to shape the “courage to be” during grassroots, collective and political action - an existential attitude saturated with resistance, concern and hope that such grassroots, cultural-religious practices can contribute to social change and reduce the fear of inevitable death associated with the risk of annihilation of the Earth. (shrink)

I have two aims for the present paper, one narrow and one broad. The narrow aim is to show that a class of data originally described by Lynsey Wolter empirically undermine the leading treatments of complex demonstratives that have been described in the literature. The broader aim of the paper is to show that Wolter demonstratives, as I will call the constructions I focus on, are a threat not just to existing treatments, but to any possible theory that retains the (...) uncontroversial assumptions that relative clauses always form a constituent with the nouns they modify, and that semantic composition proceeds sequentially and locally, with the inputs to interpretation having the structure syntax tells us they do. (shrink)

The perplexing relationship between two of the twentieth century’s most important philosophers, Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, has been the subject of much speculation within academic circles. For Arendt, Heidegger was at once, her mentor, her lover, and her friend. In this paper, we juxtapose Arendt’s theory of the banality of evil against her relationship with Heidegger in an effort to consider the question: How does corporeality inform theorizing? In answering this question, we repudiate the conventional reading of the banality (...) of evil, which attributes the theory to Arendt’s analysis of Adolf Eichmann during the latter’s criminal trial for the actions that he perpetrated in the operation of the Holocaust. Instead, we argue that the theory is, more compellingly, reflective of Arendt’s deeply personal attempts at making sense of Heidegger’s decision to affiliate himself with the German Nazi Party in the years preceding, and during, the Second World War. Through this revisionist account of the banality of evil, we animate the idea that theorizing is the discursive corollary, and belongs within the phenomenological parameters, of corporeality. Finally, we contend that any constructive understanding of how corporeality informs theorizing will only be realized, when there is a collapsing of the seemingly impervious philosophical boundaries that demarcate between ontology and epistemology. (shrink)

The Trans-Pacific Partnership was negotiated with participation of the U.S. representatives from 2008. It was discussed not only in terms of the economic consequences of it. The proponents of signing TPP claimed that it would strengthen the alliances in Asia-Pacific region, curtail the Chinese influences and let the U.S. establish the global trade rules for the future. The debate on this issue took place in the Congress, also the front runners of the presidential elections of 2016 expressed their standpoints. The (...) attitude of public opinion will be also presented as well as the position of Donald Trump which resulted in the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement once he became the President of the U.S. (shrink)

The author analyses “The Merchant of Venice” by William Shakespeare, to highlight the transformation of the Christian body and the Jewish soul during the early stages of capitalism. He reveals that the Venice described by Shakespeare is a world without measure, in which money is the only value. People are objects of financial speculation and all of humanity is treated as a commodity, an exchange value. When Bassanio praises the advantages of Portia, he first mentions her ducats, and only after (...) that does he allude to her beauty and virtues of mind. The capitalism that is being formed in the eyes of the viewers mocks significant cultural, ethnic and religious differences. It buries them in heaps of money and then blurs them, forcing a new concept of man, whose existence differs little from plants and animals growing freely. In such a world, a game is the only strategy that allows for survival. In Venice, everyone pretends, wears a mask and lives in hypocrisy. This behaviour is typical of the “carnival” atmosphere. Masks separate people from themselves, covering up their tracks and blurring identities. By wearing them, they can hide behind “someone else”. (shrink)

The present paper constitutes an introduction to a special issue of Diametros devoted to Setting Health-Care Priorities. What Ethical Theories Tell Us by Torbjörn Tännsjö. The book in question states that there are three moral theories which have valid implications in the field of the distribution of medical resources in a healthcare system: utilitarianism, the maximin/leximin view, and egalitarianism. A number of authors have contributed to this special issue with papers which challenge this thesis. Robert E. Goodin argues that, besides (...) general moral theories, some local principles of justice might be valid. Quinn Hiroshi Gibson states that Tännsjö should have considered the Rawlsian view on justice in its contractualist reading. Jay A. Zameska argues that his “revised lexical sufficientarianism” constitutes a more reliable moral view than prioritarianism. Finally, Lasse Nielsen points out that there is more to say about distributive justice than consequentialist theories can grasp. Moreover, he puts forward an argument in defense of prioritarianism. The final article in this issue constitutes Tännsjö’s replies to his critics. (shrink)